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Purpose, Author, and Acknowledgments
This book brings together the topic of genocide and a comprehensive sociology of 
knowledge (360 degrees, as one reader suggested). The empirical focus is on the 
Armenian genocide.
I ask how repertoires of knowledge emerge, among Armenians and Turks and 
in world society, and what dynamics they unfold. Importantly, by knowledge, I do 
not mean certified knowledge but simply humans’ taken-for-granted assumptions 
about the world.
Everyday exchanges, or micropolitics, lay the foundation. They involve conflict-
ing pressures to silence, deny, or acknowledge. Knowledge entrepreneurs, actors 
with privileged access to channels of communication, often set the para meters 
for such exchanges, exercising epistemic power. Some practice radical denial, 
even against overwhelming evidence—a pattern that reaches beyond the issue of 
genocide, especially in the current era of authoritarian populism (denial of global 
warming is but one example).
Knowledge entrepreneurs also initiate large collective rituals to confirm a sense 
of community among their followers and to solidify knowledge.
Finally, when radically distinct repertoires of knowledge face one another, 
conflicts and struggles erupt. They unfold in distinct social fields such as politics 
and law, embedded in national contexts and in world society with its 
pronounced human rights scripts since the end of World War II. 
Each of these points is the subject of one or more chapters of this book. The 
final chapter argues that denialism in the context of (partial) human rights 
hegemony likely produces effects that are counterproductive in the eyes of those 
who deny mass atrocities.
Now a few words about me, the author, and about institutions and individuals 
who contributed, speaking to the context and conditions of this book’s production 
of knowledge about genocide knowledge.
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THE AUTHOR
I was born in 1951, six years after the end of the Shoah, in a small conservative 
town in Germany, the country of the perpetrators. I grew up in a world in which 
World War II was an ever-present, albeit somber, theme, unavoidably in light 
of the physical traces it had left and the missing family members. It was also a 
world in which our elders, at home, in school, and in much of the public sphere, 
thoroughly silenced the Holocaust. Only in the late 1960s did my generation 
begin to learn, in piecemeal fashion, the horrifying facts of the Shoah. As chil-
dren of the perpetrator generation, we acquired cultural trauma; we were hor-
rified, shaken in our basic assumptions about the world we lived in and about 
our elders.
This exposure preceded, by a few years, my entry into the study of sociology, 
economics, and public policy at the University of Cologne (Köln), continued in 
the doctoral program of the University of Trier. A series of positions, includ-
ing postdoctoral fellowships at Johns Hopkins and Harvard universities and 
employment at the University of Bremen and at the Criminological Research 
Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN) in Hanover, led to my appointment as a pro-
fessor at the University of Minnesota. Along the way, I specialized in the sociol-
ogy of law and criminology and worked on various issues, such as white-collar 
crime legislation, sentencing guidelines, comparative punishment rates, and the 
sociology of criminology. Only the events of the 1990s, with their genocides and 
international criminal tribunals, enabled by the end of the Cold War, encour-
aged me to apply my professional expertise to issues that had preoccupied me 
for decades, as a private person and as a citizen. Biography met history, and a 
new line of work resulted.
I began to examine how legal proceedings color collective representations and 
memories of mass violence. That work is reflected in my books American Memo-
ries: Atrocities and the Law (with Ryan D. King, Russell Sage Foundation, 2011) and 
Representing Mass Violence: Conflicting Responses to Human Rights Violations in 
Darfur (University of California Press, 2015). I developed an undergraduate course 
on violations of human rights norms and wrote a small accompanying volume 
(Crime and Human Rights: Criminology of Genocide and Atrocities, Sage, 2010), 
supplemented by a graduate seminar in the sociology of knowledge and collective 
memory. I organized the latter along a line of theoretical approaches that provide 
the structure of this book. The seminar inspired several dissertation projects and 
motivated the writing of this sociology of genocide knowledge.
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The Arsham and Charlotte Ohanessian Chair at the University of Minnesota 
provided me with resources to advance a research agenda through several inter-
linked projects that helped me to examine many of my expectations in light of 
empirical evidence. Outside of Minnesota, I benefited from 2018–19 fellowships at 
the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS) in South Africa and at the 
Institut d’Études Avancées de Paris (IEA) in France, the latter with the financial 
support of the French State, programme “Investissements d’avenir,” managed by 
the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-11-LABX-0027–01 Labex RFIEA+).
The institutes, with their facilities and staff, provided ideal environments for 
writing and for exchanges with colleagues from many countries and disciplines, 
guarding against parochialism. STIAS enhanced my understanding of other soci-
eties’ engagement with dark pasts. Many fellows, especially from diverse parts of 
the African continent, enriched my experience. The IEA served as a basis from 
which to engage with the rich intellectual life of Paris and to reach out to civil 
society and political actors. I built on benefits received during the summer of 2016 
as a guest of the Fondation de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.
More individuals than I can mention merit special mention. I ask those left out 
for forgiveness. The names of numerous interviewees in Paris, Massachusetts, and 
Minnesota have to remain anonymous. To them I am especially grateful.
In Paris, Liora Israël and Jacques Commaille laid the foundation for a series 
of successful research visits, and John Hagan and Philip Smith helped pave the 
way to the French capital. Boris Adjemian, Olivier Baruch, Johann Michel, Claire 
Mouradian, Jacques Semelin, Michel Wieviorka, and Julien Zarifian enriched my 
understanding of French-Armenian history, genocide knowledge, and memory 
legislation.
At the IEA, Saadi Lahlou, as director, created an intellectually engaged atmo-
sphere. Gretty Mirdal, previous director and guarantor of continuity, enriched 
the experience with her intellect and personal warmth. Simon Luck’s advice was 
decisive in guiding us through (what may appear to outsiders as the jungle of) 
Parisian academic life. Many fellows, especially those concerned with issues of 
violence, enriched my thought. Hakan Seckinelgin merits special mention. We 
worked on related fronts, co-organized events, and co-adventured into Parisian 
intellectual life. Kei Hiruta, Michael Jonik, Andrew Kahn, Adam Mestyan, and 
Penny Roberts explored painful histories of violence, and I appreciated their soli-
darity. Many conversations with Gregory Bochner (on realism), Denis Walsh (on 
agency), Marylène Lieber (on gender), and Adam Frank (on intersections of art 
and intellectual life) provided further inspiration.
At STIAS, the former and incoming directors, Hendrik Geyer and Edward 
Kirumira, stimulated intellectual and social life. Christoff Pouw provided us 
with access to sectors of South African society that would have been difficult to 
gain without his help. Fellow Fellows Duncan Brown, Kelvin Campbell, Manuel 
Castells, Abdallah Daar, Charles Fombad, Peter Gärdenfors, Nkatha Kabira, 
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Marlize Lombard, Susanne Lundin, Henrietta Mondry, and Izuchukwu Ernest 
Nwankwo are among those who provided inspiration and community. Chielozona 
Eze, philosopher, literary scholar, survivor of the Biafra War, and author of 
Survival Kit, became a special companion.
At the University of Minnesota, Ohanessian Chair funds allowed me to bring 
to campus, as Annual Ohanessian lecturers, Bedross Der Matossian, Timothy 
Snyder, and Fatma Müge Göçek. Each enriched me far beyond the moment of 
their visit. I am grateful to Dean Jim Parente, who awarded me the Chair, and 
Dean John Coleman for twice extending the term.
The Ohanessian Chair, supplemented by a series of grants, including a Human 
Rights Initiative grant, Graduate Student-Faculty Collaborative grants, Under-
graduate Research Opportunity grants, and first-year student opportunity grants, 
allowed me to work with several gifted undergraduate and graduate students as 
research assistants. They are impressive young people and their contributions to 
this project are essential. I am most grateful for their engaged work.
Graduate student Brooke Chambers was a crucial collaborator, especially on 
the Griswold v. Driscoll court case. She collected the data and contributed to the 
writing up of results. Accordingly, Brooke became coauthor of chapter 8. Caitlin 
Barden, then an undergraduate student at Minnesota, now a successful lawyer, had 
collected basic information, on which Brooke and I were able to build. Jacqulyn 
Kantack (then Meyer), as an undergraduate research assistant, did impressive 
work analyzing French legislative records. Jackie has since earned her Master of 
Human Rights degree and works with Human Rights Watch.
Prashasti Bhatnagar, now a graduate student in a joint program at Georgetown 
and Johns Hopkins universities, worked in the Minnesota History Archives, tire-
lessly and reliably. Dr. Lou Ann Matossian, eminent Minnesota historian with an 
unparalleled knowledge of the history of Armenians in her state, provided the lead 
to the Thomas and Carmelite Christie files in the Minnesota History Archives.
Several undergraduate and graduate research assistants contributed admira-
bly to the coding of media reports and VAN (Vigilance Arménienne contre le 
Négationnisme) data and to the analysis of resulting data sets. They include, again, 
Brooke Chambers, Jessica Faulkner, Erez Garnai, Miray Phillips, Renée Rippberger, 
and Ellie Stencel. Abby Vogel and Kate Dwyer did outstanding work analyzing 
a set of documentary films on the Armenian genocide and Armenian survivor 
interviews from the Shoah Visual Archives, respectively.
Erez Garnai accompanied this project with his organizational abilities, his artis-
tic skill in the preparation of graphs and tables, and his editorial care for detail. His 
outstanding work on my book Representing Mass Violence, early in his graduate 
studies, suggested that I employ him again for this book (now, as he gets ready to 
defend his dissertation).
Intellectual inspiration is hard to trace. I do know that John Hagan motivated 
me to work on issues of mass violence a good dozen years ago. He must have done 
Preface    xv
a convincing job, as this is the fourth book I have since written on related themes. 
David Garland’s insights into the interaction between elite actors and conditions of 
people on the ground, articulated for the realm of criminal punishment, inspired 
my thoughts on similar interactions in the formation of genocide knowledge. 
Jeffrey Olick and Daniel Levy invited me into the world of memory studies. At 
Minnesota, Alejandro Baer, director of our Center for Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies (CHGS) and descendant of refugees from Nazi Germany, is my compan-
ion in the intellectual journey through this challenging and painful terrain. I also 
benefited from advice by Artyom Tonoyan, CHGS research fellow, who combines 
sociological insight with profound knowledge of Armenian affairs. Past coauthor-
ships on related issues with former advisees Ryan King and Hollie Nyseth Brehm 
(both now on the faculty of The Ohio State University), Wenjie Liao (Rochester 
Institute of Technology), James Nicholas Wahutu (New York University), and 
Susan McElrath (Montana State University) have undoubtedly affected this work 
as well, as did collaboration with current advisees Jillian LaBranche, Brooke 
Chambers, Nir Rotem, Michael Soto, and Nikoleta Sremac.
I am especially grateful to Alejandro Baer and Philip Smith, who read parts 
of an earlier draft of the manuscript, and to Pamela Feldman-Savelsberg, who 
closely read the final version, all providing most helpful feedback. Fatma Müge 
Göçek and Lois Presser reviewed the initial submission to UC Press. They waived 
their anonymity, enabling communication where I had questions. They went far 
beyond the call of duty. I thank them for their detailed and profound criticism and 
suggestions. I, of course, am solely responsible for any remaining imperfections 
or mistakes.
Maura Roessner, my editor at UC Press, combines professionalism and enthu-
siasm in ways that instill confidence in authors who have the good fortune of 
working with her and her colleagues, especially Jessica Moll and Madison Wetzell, 
reliable communicators. I am most grateful to Richard Earles for his thorough and 
masterful work as copy editor.
Finally, Pamela Feldman-Savelsberg accompanied me every step along the way, 
at home, sometimes in the office (at times hard to keep apart), in Minneapolis/
Saint Paul, Stellenbosch, Paris, and Berlin, through smooth and difficult stretches, 
always between cultures. I am more grateful than I can ever say. To her, I dedicate 
this book.
Joachim J. Savelsberg
Stellenbosch, South Africa / Paris, France / 




Epistemic Circle and History of the Armenian Genocide
This book sheds light on seemingly paradoxical times. Heads of state increasingly 
apologize for atrocities committed by their countries, and humankind builds insti-
tutions to prevent, or to respond to, mass violence. Some even speak of a justice 
cascade. Yet mass violence, silencing, and the denial of genocides continue. We also 
live in an era in which populist leaders deny what overwhelming evidence docu-
ments. They tell their followers, for example, that “global warming” is a hoax, even 
a Chinese conspiracy, advanced to damage the American economy. In countries as 
diverse as the United States, the Philippines, Brazil, China, and Russia, they pres-
ent themselves as saviors and spew falsehoods, “alternative facts,” that fly in the 
face of solid scholarly evidence.
Closer to the theme of this book is denial of repression, mass atrocity, and 
genocide. We encounter this denial, against overwhelming evidence, in places 
such as Burma (Myanmar) with regard to the Rohingya; in Sudan with regard to 
the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa; in China with regard to the Uighurs; and in 
Turkey, where, despite great historical distance, political leaders continue to deny 
the genocide against the Ottoman Armenians committed during World War I. 
Populist political leaders are not alone in their denial. The populace often follows 
suit and at times encourages politicians’ denialist practices. At times, silencing 
takes the place of denial. The long American history of silencing the near extinc-
tion of the American Indian population is but one example. The silencing of the 
Holocaust in this author’s native Germany during the 1950s and 1960s is another. 
Even victim groups often silence the violence they experienced, albeit for different 
reasons, and this book speaks to that too.
In this contradictory and puzzling context, I ask how we know about geno-
cide. Why do various collectivities and their leaders deny, silence, or recognize the 
same event of mass violence differently? Why do some insist on defining events 
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as genocide, while others forcefully reject the label? This book is specifically about 
the emergence of radically distinct repertoires of knowledge about the Armenian 
genocide, which moved from broad acknowledgment to denial among Turks and 
from silencing to determined recognition among Armenians. The time span of 
more than a century during which this drama played out allows for insights into 
historical shifts and their drivers that the study of a more recent event would 
not grant.
This introduction summarizes themes, central theoretical ideas, and the 
chapters organized along those ideas. It speaks to empirical evidence, the data 
I use to illustrate and examine the validity of theoretical ideas. It specifies for 
whom I wrote this book, and it finally offers a brief historical overview of the 
Armenian genocide.
KNOWLED GE AB OUT GENO CIDE—THE SUBJECT  
OF THIS B O OK 
As I engage with the sociology of knowledge, I draw on and contribute to classi-
cal and contemporary strands of this sociological perspective. I show that each 
of them also applies to knowledge about genocide. Throughout this book, knowl-
edge does not mean certified knowledge. Instead, as noted in the preface, the term 
simply refers to that which humans take for granted, to the perceived “certainty 
that phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics” (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966: 1). Repertoires of knowledge are clusters of such certainties that 
pertain to a particular set of phenomena, for example historical events.
Interactionist traditions in sociology show how humans produce an under-
standing of social reality (knowledge) in their daily interactions, communications, 
and thought processes. The literature, biographies, diaries, interviews, and obser-
vations of those who were touched by mass violence—as victims, as perpetrators, 
or as their descendants—serve as data. They document the unfolding of silenc-
ing, denying, or acknowledging when members of families, neighbors, friends, or 
humanitarians address (or avoid) the topic of genocide, as chapter 1 shows. Inner 
conversations supplement social interactions. They unfold, in George Herbert 
Mead’s terms, between the I and the Me, the part of the self that assumes patterns 
of attitudes among others. Going beyond Mead, I see these patterns as embedded 
in social fields.1 Such inner conversations become visible in correspondence and 
diaries kept by humanitarians and other observers, which I examine in chapter 2.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in The Social Construction of Reality, 
show how knowledge constructed through self-reflection and millions of interac-
tive situations becomes sedimented. It solidifies into knowledge repertoires of col-
lectivities, “carrier groups” in the words of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim. Yet, 
where Berger and Luckmann suggest harmony, we may in fact find disagreement 
and—importantly—diametrically opposed sets of knowledge across social groups. 
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Such an outcome becomes visible in debates about mass atrocities, including—
with particular intensity—the Armenian genocide.
We also see that not all actors have equal chances to contribute to the construc-
tion of knowledge, a point overlooked by Berger and Luckmann. Asymmetries in 
power and communicative capacities affect outcomes. Knowledge entrepreneurs, 
acting from privileged institutional positions, shape and spread their group’s defi-
nition of social reality to wider audiences. They also seek to manipulate, inten-
sify, mobilize, or alter knowledge repertoires of carrier groups with which they 
are associated. Constructionist social problems theory, and scholars of reputations 
such as Barry Schwartz and Gary Fine, highlight the role of entrepreneurs in the 
construction of knowledge, in instilling in larger publics a specific definition of 
reality. These insights also apply, as Jeffrey Alexander has shown, to the role of 
entrepreneurs in the processing of horrendous experiences that threaten the exis-
tence or self-understanding of a collectivity, in the generation of cultural trauma 
after genocide. Finally, knowledge is not as stable as Berger and Luckmann sug-
gest. It is at times dormant. Entrepreneurs may mobilize and alter it. In chapter 3, 
I deposit these theoretical concepts and ideas in a toolbox from which I draw in 
subsequent chapters.
The process of sedimentation of knowledge about the Armenian genocide 
among Armenians, in their own country and in the diaspora, is the subject of 
chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines the evolution and sedimentation of Turkish knowl-
edge. Throughout these chapters, I draw from literature that provides analyses of 
memoirs, banners displayed at demonstrations, memorial sites, news media, and 
textbooks.
Where different collectivities generate radically distinct repertoires of knowl-
edge, their encounter with “the other” becomes a challenge they need to address. 
One option is the enactment of public rituals through which each group seeks 
to protect and reinforce its identity and knowledge. Armenian genocide com-
memorations, across the diaspora and centrally in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital city, 
held on each April 24, provide an excellent example. The Turkish state instead has 
developed rituals to cleanse the memory of the Ottoman Empire and to celebrate 
unambiguously its history, disregarding its dark sides. Émile Durkheim and a new 
school of neo-Durkheimian thought explores the role of rituals in public life: their 
capacity to evoke a sense of group integration and collective effervescence and 
to solidify shared beliefs. This literature provides us with valuable tools for the 
analysis of Armenian and Turkish rituals, the focus of chapter 6. Ethnographic 
observation is the key method here.
Yet collectivities and their leaders do not just seek to solidify knowledge rep-
ertoires within their own groups. They also openly attack those of “the other” in 
conflictual processes. The Turkish state has attempted, with growing intensity, to 
challenge knowledge about the Armenian genocide. Armenians have fought, in 
return, for the recognition of their history. The form such conflicts take, and their 
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outcomes, vary by social fields in which actors carry them out (politics and law, 
for example). Each field follows, in the terms of Pierre Bourdieu, its own rules of 
the game. Yet players in these fields also enjoy discretion. They improvise, with 
at times unpredictable outcomes. They finally act within institutions that differ 
across countries, while also being connected to world society.
Politics is a central social field in which conflicts over knowledge unfold. In 
chapter 7, I explore political struggles over knowledge pertaining to the Armenian 
genocide in France, using interviews and document analysis as key methods. The 
French case is most relevant, because the country is home to the largest Arme-
nian diaspora per capita and because conflicts over historical knowledge feature 
prominently in French politics. At stake are “memory laws” promulgated by legis-
lative bodies. They reach from simple statements of acknowledgment to laws that 
criminalize denialist utterances. Many countries have recognized the Armenian 
genocide over the past two decades, often through legislative votes. Examining the 
French case under a microscope sheds light on the specific struggles and mecha-
nisms of power at work. 
The legal field is another battleground. Past research has focused on the contri-
butions to knowledge and memory of trials against perpetrators of mass violence. 
Chapter 8, cowritten with Brooke B. Chambers, deals with a different type of legal 
engagement, formally a fight over free speech rights. We examine an American 
court case, Griswold v. Driscoll, in which Turkish interest groups mobilized young 
civil liberties enthusiasts toward such ends, using a free speech lawyer as a go-
between. The plaintiffs insisted that each repertoire of knowledge has to be repre-
sented evenly—for example, in curricula or textbooks—for freedom of speech to 
be secured. We detail the unfolding of this exemplary case in the federal courts of 
Boston, Massachusetts, and its consequences for knowledge about the Armenian 
genocide. The United States is a most appropriate setting in which to examine such 
a conflict in the realm of law, because it is home to one of the largest Armenian 
diasporas, second only to Russia, and because in the United States, compared to 
other Western democracies, the legal arena is most prominent in the settling of 
conflicts. Again, interviews and the analysis of documents provide core evidence.
Finally, chapter 9 examines the counterproductive outcome of denialism in the 
context of a (partial) human rights hegemony. Here I return to the American and 
French cases to show the blowback that denial caused those who engaged in it. 
Their attempts resulted in substantial ethnic mobilization and support by human 
rights organizations and state actors, who used various means at their disposal 
toward a solidification of genocide knowledge among the victim group. I supple-
ment these case studies by an analysis of the public sphere, specifically news media 
and documentary films.
The overall model sketched here is depicted in figure 1. It leads from social 
interaction and interventions by knowledge entrepreneurs to a group-specific 
sedimentation of knowledge, attempts to solidify such knowledge against 
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competing views through rituals, and conflictual engagement with challengers in 
the fields of law and politics. All of this unfolds in specific nation-states with their 
particular institutions, as well as in a global realm in which human rights prin-
ciples have gained a hegemonic status. Once sedimented and secured, knowledge 
repertoires then feed back to the micro-level through socialization processes. The 
epistemic circle, or circle of knowledge, closes.
In line with a broad constructionist approach, I am not concerned with knowl-
edge produced by specialists, but with knowledge generated in the context of prac-
tical action, in everyday life and in fields of law and politics (in line with Swidler 
and Arditi 1994). The study of knowledge about the past, in the form of collective 
memory (Olick 1999; Schwartz and Schuman 2005) or cultural trauma (Alexander 
et al. 2004), aligns well with such constructionism. Note, however, that knowledge 
produced by specialists (Camic and Gross 2001; Collins 2000) may, at times, and 
possibly with substantial lags, feed into an understanding of reality in everyday 
life. The common view of our world as a globe circling around the sun is one 
example from the natural sciences.
To avoid any misunderstandings, I must state that this book is not an attempt 
to answer the question of truth—even though I have my own understanding of 
the history of mass violence against the Ottoman Armenians. My understand-
ing is consistent with overwhelming historical scholarship and expressed in the 
language I use. Throughout, I refer to this catastrophic chapter of mass violence 
as the Armenian genocide. Yet, working in a sociology of knowledge frame, I take 
Everyday practices/  
interactions/ inner 
conversations (Berger & 
Luckmann, Mead, Goffman)
Conflictual encounters 
between carriers in context of 
social fields 
(Bourdieu)
Ritual affirmation of 
knowledge in public rituals 
(Durkheim)
Historical time, changing contexts 









Figure 1. Epistemic circle: Formation of genocide knowledge in a multicausal process.
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seriously the knowledge repertoires on all sides. Those who endure denialist prov-
ocations, especially, should have an interest in understanding the knowledge that 
so radically clashes with their own and the conditions that generate, solidify, and 
diffuse that knowledge.
This book is also not a sociology of genocide; I do not seek to explain causes 
of genocide. Yet I am interested in the contending parties’ knowledge about the 
conditions of genocide, because they are part of genocide knowledge. Importantly, 
the outcome of struggles over genocide knowledge may affect the likelihood of 
future genocides.
Finally, this book is not an exhaustive evaluation of literature, neither in the 
sociology of knowledge nor on the history or sociology of (the Armenian) geno-
cide. It is instead an effort at bringing core elements of these two distinct bodies of 
literature into a conversation.
FOR WHOM I  WROTE THIS B O OK—CHANCES  
AND RISKS
I wrote this book simultaneously for those interested in the sociology of 
knowledge and collective memory; for those concerned with the denial 
and recognition of genocide and other forms of mass violence, specifically of 
the Armenian genocide; and finally for those interested broadly in the buildup 
of contradictory repertoires of knowledge and the dynamics that unfold 
between them.
For readers with an interest in the sociology of knowledge, my project confirms 
the applicability of this sociological specialty to the social and cultural processing 
of mass violence. By drawing on a wealth of classical and contemporary traditions, 
I simultaneously show the value added by each approach and potential gains from 
its application to the difficult theme of genocide. For those concerned with col-
lective memory, I suggest that opening up the broader toolbox of the sociology of 
knowledge provides new perspectives.
While the promises are substantial, by addressing genocide through a sociol-
ogy of knowledge perspective, I also enter into dangerous terrain. Seeking to avoid 
misinterpretations, I did not adapt Berger and Luckmann’s famous title, The Social 
Construction of Reality, into The Social Construction of Genocidal Reality. As a 
sociological constructionist, I recognize that our understanding of social reality 
and history is always culturally processed. Yet, as a philosophical realist (Ferraris 
2014), I know that the pain, suffering, humiliation, and death of those who fell 
victim to genocides and other forms of mass violence are all too real. While the 
term genocide is a judicial construction, and while our knowledge about genocides 
is the result of cultural processing, there is most certainly a real referent to the 
phenomena the term genocide covers.
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I am simultaneously writing for readers who are concerned with recognition 
and denial of genocides and other forms of mass violence generally, and of the 
Armenian genocide in particular. I hope that helping these readers look at famil-
iar themes through a sociology of knowledge lens will supply them with fresh, 
and maybe surprising, insights. I also hope to answer some questions that almost 
certainly plague these readers: How can “the other side” insist on denial even in 
the face of massive evidence? What kinds of strategies do its protagonists use to 
spread denial? What are their chances at succeeding? How do members of victim 
groups respond? Which of their responses are helpful in enhancing recognition, 
and which are counterproductive?
Finally, and more broadly, I wrote this book for those who are desperate to 
understand the coexistence of, and interaction between, radically opposed 
repertoires of knowledge; their emergence, their solidification, and their confron-
tations; and, closely related, the denial of well-established facts, especially by pop-
ulist leaders and their followers. Such confrontation is increasingly common, and 
it is destabilizing. This book thus speaks to all concerned with the dynamics that 
today contribute to a destabilization of our social and political world.
GENO CIDE AGAINST THE OT TOMAN  
ARMENIANS IN C ONTEXT
Again, this book is not about the history of the Armenian genocide. It is instead 
a sociology of genocide knowledge, examining how different collectivities know 
and tell this history. Yet some basic historical information is in order. I thus con-
clude this introduction with a nutshell summary of the prehistory, history, and 
post-history of the violence, to which subsequent chapters add detail. I here focus 
on basic information on which historians have reached an overwhelming consen-
sus, even if disagreements on details and specific aspects remain. These histori-
ans, supplemented by historical-comparative sociologists, include Fikret Adanir, 
Boris Adjemian, Taner Akçam, Donald Bloxham, Hamit Borzaslan, Bedross 
Der Matossian, Vincent Duclert, Fatma Müge Göçek, Richard Hovannisian, 
Raymond Kévorkian, Hans-Lukas Kieser, Bernard Lewis (despite his rejection of 
the genocide label), Claire Mouradian, Ronald Grigor Suny, Yves Ternon, and Uğur 
Ümit Üngör.2
This is not the place, of course, to tell the more than three-thousand-year 
history of the Armenian people. Historians trace this people’s migration from 
the Caucasus region into Asia Minor, its early Christianization in the first 
century CE, its establishment of a territorial state with shifting boundaries, most 
expansive in the first century, and the invention of its own alphabet in the fifth 
century. Nor is this the place to tell the history of the Ottoman Empire, which 
arose in the fourteenth century. At the time of its greatest expansion, from the 
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sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, the empire controlled much of 
the Middle East and the Arab world, the North African coastal regions, and 
Southeastern Europe. By the sixteenth century, the empire had also incorpo-
rated the Armenian people.
The decline of the Ottoman Empire, conflicts among its neighbors, and the rise 
of ethno-nationalism became crucial preconditions for the Armenian genocide. 
In 1804–13 and 1826–28, two Russo-Persian wars resulted in the incorporation of 
Eastern Armenia (Yerevan and Karabakh) into the Russian Empire. Most territories 
with predominantly Armenian populations, however, remained under Ottoman 
rule. Armenians, and other minorities, now enjoyed limited equality within the 
millet system of relatively autonomous self-administration. Yet they suffered sub-
stantially higher tax burdens and were prohibited from bearing arms. In addition, 
military defeats suffered by the Ottoman Empire resulted in the scapegoating of 
minorities and increasing repression, culminating in the mass killings of more 
than two hundred thousand Armenians in 1894–96 under Sultan Abdülhamid II 
(the Hamidian massacres). Simultaneously, Armenian movements formed and 
radicalized, including the Dashnaks, a nationalist and socialist political party 
founded in 1890 in Tiflis (Georgia).
The Young Turk revolution of 1908 and the overthrow of the sultan brought 
hope to the country’s minorities, but that hope was short lived. For Armenians it 
ended in 1909 with a massacre of thousands in the city of Adana. For the postrevo-
lutionary Ottoman Empire, hope was crushed by military defeats during the Bal-
kan Wars of 1912 and 1913. These wars resulted in the loss of the most economically 
developed parts of the empire, the forced resettlement of hundreds of thousands 
of ethnic Turks from the Balkans into Anatolia, and—in reaction—a massive cam-
paign of Turkification of space, people, and the economy.
The catastrophe suffered by the Ottoman Armenians unfolded soon thereafter 
in the context of World War I (1914–18), during which the Ottoman Empire was 
allied with Austria-Hungary and the German Empire. The Young Turk govern-
ment now defined the Armenian minority, small and radicalized segments of 
which had risen up in opposition, as an internal tumor. It set up the Special Orga-
nization, a militia force dedicated to the repression of internal opposition and 
minority groups. The first deportations of Armenians began in March 1915. On 
April 24, 1915, the regime rounded up, deported, and killed hundreds of Armenian 
intellectuals, silencing their voices in anticipation of an outcry that would have 
accompanied the following events. These events included the killing of tens of 
thousands of Armenian men and the deportation, by train and by foot, of hun-
dreds of thousands, mostly women and children, to concentration camps in the 
deserts of Syria and Mesopotamia. Thousands perished from exhaustion and star-
vation along the way. By March 1916, half a million subsisted in camps, where 
many died from starvation. Most fell victim to mass liquidations. Map 1 represents 
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While historiography largely agrees on the basic facts, differences pertain to the 
specific conditions and the pattern of the unfolding genocide. Some scholars place 
greater emphasis on religion and continuity of violence or nationalism, while oth-
ers highlight demographic engineering; further, while some focus on one moment 
of decision making, others see a cumulative policy radicalization, stressing the 
contingency of the unfolding events (see overview by Der Matossian 2015).
Events shortly before and after the end of World War I further determined the 
fate of the Armenians in the postwar order. Initially, the Russian Revolution of 
1917 provided opportunities for nationalist Armenians to create an independent 
Armenia (May 1918). Hopes were further elevated by the Treaty of Sèvres, signed 
on August 10, 1920, the outcome of negotiations between the victorious powers 
of World War I and the Ottoman Empire. This treaty promised vast territories to 
the new Armenian state, reaching far into today’s Turkey.
Almost simultaneously, however, the Turkish National Movement under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) established the Turkish Republic, overthrew 
the sultan, moved the capital from Constantinople to Ankara, and engaged in a 
war of independence against the occupying powers. The new Turkish government 
did not recognize the Treaty of Sèvres. Working to neutralize some of the losses 
resulting from defeat in World War I, its leaders coordinated with the new Soviet 
Union an attack on Armenia, with Soviet troops invading from the north and 
Turkish troops from the south. The northern part of Armenia was incorporated 
into the Soviet Union, and major territories of the short-lived Armenian state were 
returned to Turkey, including those eastern sections where Armenians had been 
the dominant population group before 1915. The year 1920 thus marked the end of 
the short-lived first Armenian republic. The Soviet authorities eventually merged 
what remained of Armenia with Georgia and Azerbaijan into the Transcaucasian 
Socialist Republic (1922–36), until they eventually allowed for the establishment of 
a separate Armenian Soviet Republic (1936). These moves contributed to a replace-
ment of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which, for the time 
being, ended all Armenian hopes for an independent country.
Meanwhile, the new Turkish Republic, under the leadership of Atatürk, stabi-
lized during the 1920s and 1930s. It remained neutral during World War II, and in 
the war’s aftermath joined the United Nations (1945) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (1952). Civilian governments took turns with military rule after 
several successful coups. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey negotiated, albeit 
unsuccessfully, for membership in the European Union. Secular since Atatürk, 
the republic displayed a more religious orientation beginning in the early 2000s, 
under the populist and increasingly authoritarian rule of prime minister, and then 
president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). 
Throughout, Turkey sought to eradicate remnants of Armenian culture and the 
memory of Armenian contributions to the history of the Ottoman Empire.
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The former Soviet Republic of Armenia, for its part, declared independence 
from the Russian Federation in 1994. The relatively poor country, with a popu-
lation of some three million people and its capital city of Yerevan, is in close 
exchange with a much larger diaspora of an estimated eight million ethnic 
Armenians, mostly in France, the United States, and Russia.
What, then, do Armenians, Turks, and world society know about the mass 
violence against the Armenians during World War I? How did their knowledge 
change over time and under what conditions? These questions are the subject of 
the following sociology of knowledge explorations.

PART I





Social Interaction, Self-Reflection, and 
Struggles over Genocide Knowledge
Carmelite Christie—missionary, school administrator, and educator in the town 
of Tarsus in Turkey—writes observations about the Armenian genocide, which 
unfolded around her and throughout the Ottoman Empire, in her diary entries 
of 1915–19 (Minnesota Historical Society [MHS], n.d.). Christie’s first preserved 
entry confirms scholarship according to which killings and deportations were in 
full force by the fall of 1915. On October 1, 1915, she notes that 
Prof. Zenop Bezjian spent one night in Tarsus en route for Constantinople, whither 
he goes as the ecclesiastical representative for the Protestants of all Turkey. He told 
us of 60,000 exiles encamped between the end of the RR [railroad] journey, Osmania 
and Aleppo,—sent from home and business all the way along the line from Constan-
tinople,—and not wanted in the regions to which they go. Multitudes are starving. 
They are without money, no work to be had, food scarce, even for those able to pay, 
sickness of all kinds prevalent, numbers dying every day. (MHS Box 28:2–3)
Christie writes about massacres in villages near Yozgat, the dead left unburied: 
They told of a village of 300 where 200 had been butchered. There were many mur-
ders on the road, and women outraged in the usual manner, and young women stolen 
and taken away. Robbery was a daily occurrence. . . . I heard today of a poor woman 
at Gulek [Gülek] Station, who was without any money or food.  .  . . [The woman] 
threww [sic] her two little ones into the shallow stream . . . the inhumanity of man 
to man, of which we take daily knowledge is almost past belief. (MHS Box 28:2–3)1
This testimony, together with that of hundreds of other observers and the experi-
ences of thousands of survivors, accumulated, over the past century, to form a 
body of knowledge about the Armenian genocide. Testifying is often challenging. 
Even for a worker in the field of humanitarian aid like Christie, it takes courage to 
note the cruelties. After all, she has to operate under the regime that is responsible 
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for the suffering she seeks to alleviate. While entrusting a private diary with testi-
mony for posterity is less risky than testifying publicly at the time of the atrocities, 
a diary writer still has to overcome a sense of caution and accommodation to the 
surrounding powers. The temptation to hold back information is encouraged by 
prevailing silences on the part of victims and perpetrators, and by denial, espe-
cially by the perpetrators.
Unlike Christie, most do not document their observations in writing. Yet they 
communicate, or seek to avoid communication, in millions of day-to-day interac-
tions in which they silence, deny, or acknowledge. Through these exchanges they 
generate knowledge, an understanding of present and historical reality. Which 
aspect of reality prevails depends on which of these strategies dominates in a given 
collectivity. Most who grew up in post-atrocity eras know the mechanisms well. 
Born in 1951 in Germany and growing up in the decades following the Holocaust, 
this author’s knowledge about the world missed essential aspects of the immediate 
past. Parents, teachers, clerics, neighbors—all to whom children and adolescents 
look up and from whom they seek to learn—silenced the Shoah. Only in the mid- 
to late 1960s was this silence broken. Acknowledgment set in, slow initially and 
then accelerating. When silencing was no longer an option, many responded with 
various forms of denial.
This generational experience motivates and informs this first chapter. Here I 
address patterns of communication in personal interaction and written texts as the 
first stage in the buildup of repertoires of knowledge about genocide. Eventually, 
millions of micro-level communicative exchanges aggregate into macrosociologi-
cal outcomes. They become part of group-specific knowledge repertoires in a pro-
cess of sedimentation that is the subject of subsequent chapters.
KNOWLED GE:  WHAT WE TAKE FOR GR ANTED
We all have answers to questions about the world. They reach from the banal—
say, what the safest place is to cross the street—to more challenging matters such 
as what type of education leads to occupational opportunities, or what family 
arrangements provide a healthy upbringing for children. They include difficult 
issues, for example questions about the origins of human life, human contribu-
tions to global warming, or the safety of nuclear energy or genetically engineered 
food. Closer to the subject of this book, many of our contemporaries have answers 
when asked about the Armenian genocide that began in 1915 or about the number 
of Jewish lives extinguished during the Holocaust. We consider our answers to 
these questions part of what we know about the world. Yet almost none of that 
knowledge results from our own scholarly or otherwise systematic exploration. 
Again, knowledge—in the sociology of knowledge tradition—is not certified 
knowledge, but simply the perceived “certainty that phenomena are real and that 
they possess specific characteristics” (Berger and Luckmann 1966:1). Knowledge 
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consists of “matter of course assumptions” (Schütz [1932] 1967), which, in aggre-
gate, constitute a “relative-natural world view” (Scheler 1992)—relative, in that it is 
specific to a collectivity’s place in the world.2
Some of our knowledge concerns the here and now—phenomena that sur-
round us at the current time and in the places in which we live, work, play, or 
endure. Yet the meaning of the here and now is not always clear to us. We encoun-
ter new situations that appear to be chaotic and confusing. Consider exposure to 
mass violence and the disorientation it evokes. Noted Armenians such as Aurora 
(Arshaluys) Mardiganian, Kaspar Hovannisian, and the parents of Arsham and 
Sita Ohanessian, and hundreds of thousands of others less well known suffered the 
cruelty of eviction from their homes in the Ottoman Empire and the exhaustion 
of death marches from their villages and towns into the Syrian Desert. They saw 
their brothers killed and their mothers raped. Just a quarter of a century later, Jean 
Améry, Paul Neurath, Primo Levi, Maurice Halbwachs, and Jorge Semprún lived 
through pain and humiliation in Nazi Germany’s torture chambers and concen-
tration camps. Deprived even of basic markers of their identity, they neverthe-
less communicated with others, even at the time of suffering, and through such 
exchanges, some made sense of their experience (e.g., Semprún 1981; Neurath 
[1943] 2005).
Most of our knowledge, however, concerns events and phenomena far 
removed from our own experience. We learn about them through mediators: 
some close, such as grandparents or parents who experienced the past directly, 
or friends who have traveled to distant places; others more removed and formal, 
such as history books, the internet, or news media. When knowledge about the 
past is shared, acknowledged, and reaffirmed by members of a collectivity, we 
refer to it as collective memory (Coser 1992). Unlike the firsthand knowledge of 
Aurora Mardiganian or Jorge Semprún, the collective memory of mass atrocities 
is, for most of us, part of the body of mediated knowledge. We did not gain it 
through personal experience.
Addressing communication that supplies us with knowledge about genocide, 
I build on a branch of sociology that was inspired by pragmatist philosophy and 
phenomenology. It includes lines of work that purists separate strictly, but that 
have basic features in common. Its contributors share the notion that knowledge 
about the world is constructed through social interaction. Charles Cooley (1926), 
Alfred Schütz ([1932] 1967), Herbert Blumer (1969), Erving Goffman (1967), and 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) are among the prominent represen-
tatives of this approach to the understanding of society. Closely related is the 
notion that knowledge is constructed through thought processes, inner conversa-
tions between the I and the Me (Mead 1934). When documented through writing, 
thought processes become externalized and objectified, subject to transmission 
to others, including new generations. Throughout chapters 1 and 2, we encounter 
such knowledge construction in the form of letters, diaries, and memoirs.
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While scholars in the interactionist tradition thus focus on the micro-level of 
social life, they know that social interactions in the here and now do not occur in 
empty social space. Instead, they unfold in a world of social facts of which actors 
have to be mindful. They also know that social interaction has consequences. It 
leaves traces, solidifying and altering, albeit in microscopic steps, the social reality 
in which it takes place.
The history of the term genocide offers an example. At the beginning stood a 
dispute over the notion of state sovereignty, carried out between Raphael Lemkin, 
then a law student, and one of his professors at the University of Lviv. Lemkin, well 
informed about the mass violence against the Armenian people, was disturbed by 
the trial conducted in Berlin against Soghomon Tehlirian, the young Armenian 
assassin of Talaat Pasha, one of the main responsible actors in the genocide. In 
debating his professor, Lemkin came to challenge the notion of state sovereignty, 
ingrained in international law since the end of the Thirty Years’ War and the West-
phalian Peace Treaty of 1648, a principle that allows a government to act toward its 
subjects as it sees fit, with no legal recourse or threat of outside intervention. Lem-
kin developed the concept of genocide over subsequent decades, in publications, 
conference contributions, and manifold discussions with legal scholars, activists, 
and politicians. He fought desperately and succeeded in convincing the newly 
founded United Nations to draft and vote on the Genocide Convention—formally, 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—
adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1948. Genocide, according 
to the Genocide Convention, “means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group condi-
tions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.”3 What began with communi-
cative interaction, a dispute between student and professor, solidified and became 
a central concept in modern international human rights law.
A MICROSO CIOLO GICAL PERSPECTIVE  
ON SILENCING,  DENYING,  
AND ACKNOWLED GING GENO CIDE
Victims and perpetrators of genocide, and their descendants, face special chal-
lenges when they communicate about the history of genocide. They need to repair 
their spoiled identities and to manage stigma (Goffman [1963] 1986; Giesen 2004a; 
Savelsberg 2021). In interactions, they often silence the past, or they deny, challeng-
ing truth claims of the “other.” In the alternative, they recognize and acknowledge 
the deadly past. Acknowledgment among perpetrators, or those to whom perpe-
trators have passed on the stigma of perpetration, may take the form of confession.
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Silencing is a common strategy in the immediate aftermath of genocide. So is 
denial, especially among perpetrator peoples once silence is broken and informa-
tion about the genocide begins to seep to the surface of social life. Today, in fact, 
many have listened to testimonies that survivors of the Holocaust gave to school 
classes or have watched archived video recordings of survivor interviews.4 They 
may have viewed documentary films such as Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah, with its 
ten hours of interviews with surviving victims and perpetrators, or one of the many 
documentaries on the Armenian genocide. Many today have read biographical 
texts, memoirs, or diaries, or have spoken with survivors and their descendants.
In the following, I draw on such sources in examining how various actors 
engage in silencing or denying the Armenian genocide, or in acknowledgment 
and recognition. I make use of autobiographical accounts, family histories, and 
memoirs as quarries from which pieces of information about interactive situa-
tions can be broken off and analyzed. Secondly, at a different level of analysis, I use 
autobiographical accounts, memoirs, and diaries themselves as data, as examples 
of inner conversations by the authors, or their conversations with imagined audi-
ences. While elsewhere I examine strategies used by authors and in everyday inter-
action as forms of stigma management for post-Holocaust Germany (Savelsberg, 
2020b), here I am primarily interested in the contribution of these strategies to 
repertoires of knowledge among Armenians and Turks.
Silence and Silencing
Silence is a state, silencing an activity. In social interactions, we may silence our-
selves. “Biting one’s tongue” is a familiar expression, and we can all think of times 
when we were about to utter a statement but stopped ourselves at the last second 
(or did not, but should have). We may instead silence others, by imposing rules of 
speech, cutting others off, or interrupting their utterances with discouraging com-
ments or gestures (Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989). Silencing a dark past is common 
practice among victim as well as perpetrator groups.
Consider Peter Balakian, who grew up in an Armenian American family and 
became a writer, a Pulitzer Prize recipient, and a scholar. He wrote prominently 
about the Armenian genocide in The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide 
and America’s Response (Balakian 2003). In an autobiography written a few years 
earlier—Black Dog of Fate: An American Son Uncovers His Armenian Past (Balakian 
1997)—he tells his readers about family interactions that involved the fate of his 
ancestors, including stories about silencing. Consider young Peter secretly observ-
ing his grandmother, a survivor of the genocide, as she took a long ivory pipe out 
of her purse, prepared it, and smoked “in long puffs.” Occasionally, she made the 
sign of the cross and repeatedly uttered “Der Voghormya” (Lord have mercy) and 
“Sourp Asdvadz” (Holy God)—while watching television news about the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962. Daring to ask his mother, albeit after some delay, about his 
grandmother’s strange rituals, Peter was told: “Oh, in the old country, at a certain 
age, women smoke pipes once in a while. It’s a sign of wisdom” (Balakian 1997:16). 
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Not surprisingly, his mother’s answer, by silencing much, raised new and more 
urgent questions in the boy’s mind. He knew that “the old country” meant Armenia, 
but his notion of Armenia was a blurry one, and he did not know why its men-
tion made him feel uneasy. When he sought to inquire, adults would change the 
subject. If it is not “really around anymore,” as his mother told him on another 
occasion, where had it gone? An absence of physical markers accompanied the 
silence. Where others to whom a place is dear might display a map or a photo, 
there was emptiness in the Balakian home, adding to young Peter’s unease.
Peter Balakian’s story is neither universal nor unique. It is one of millions of 
moments of silencing among survivors and their descendants, inhibiting the 
transmission of knowledge across generations. Simultaneously, Balakian’s story 
shows that silence is rarely total silence. While his mother avoided the difficult 
topic of genocide, she did refer to “the old country.” Silences, especially partial 
silences, may speak. Balakian’s mother thus communicated not just a void to her 
son, but unease. This transmission of unease may not be generalizable, but the way 
silence speaks is again not unique to the Balakian family.
Recent interviews with French citizens of Armenian descent reveal similar 
stories about silencing.5 For example, a prominent Armenian-French man—
editor-in-chief of a renowned ethnic magazine and a leader in organized French 
Armenian life—tells me about his grandparents, who had survived the genocide 
and migrated to France from Greece in 1920: “They did not speak to their grand-
children about the genocide, to protect them; but they talked among each other 
and expressed their hatred of Turks” (paraphrased). His parents, however, did 
speak to their son about the Armenian experience during World War I. Another 
prominent French person of Armenian descent, editor-in-chief of a prestigious 
academic journal dedicated to Armenian issues, similarly reports that he talked 
with his parents, but not with his grandparents, about Armenian issues. And a 
young Armenian-French scholar shared the experience of learning little from his 
grandfather, who had escaped the genocide, about his suffering.
Across the Atlantic Ocean, in the thin Armenian diaspora of Minnesota, an 
Armenian American revealed his experiences at an event entitled “How it was to 
grow up Armenian in…,” organized by the Armenian Cultural Organization of 
Minnesota. He spoke to his audience about the absence of April 24 commemora-
tions in his childhood, and recalled that his parents did not talk much about the 
Armenian past. He attributes their silence to their fight against outsider status in 
their new country, to which their own parents had migrated from the Ottoman 
Empire, but in which they were born.
Silencing comes in different shapes. A leading activist for the cultural asso-
ciation Vigilance Arménienne contre le Négationnisme, for example, grew up 
in a dense Armenian-French community, and she remembers attending somber 
annual ceremonies on April 24, the Armenian day of genocide commemoration. 
Yet elders did not explain the meaning of those ceremonies, leaving her with a 
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diffuse awareness of something dark. The shock came—and the silence was 
broken—at age eight, when she discovered a book with images of the genocide.
Again, silencing histories of mass atrocity is not universal, and below we will 
encounter different stories, ones of active denying and of acknowledging. Yet 
silencing is widespread, and Armenians share it with other groups whose history 
involved genocidal victimization. Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Chana Teeger write 
about “social silences,” with a focus on the Jewish experience. They distinguish 
between overt silence, a literal absence of speech, and covert silence, “covered and 
veiled by much mnemonic talk and representation” (2010:1104). Both types may 
serve the aim of either memorializing or forgetting. A “moment of silence,” for 
example during Israel’s Memorial Day for the Holocaust, serves the preservation 
of memory. It contrasts with overt silence practiced by groups that “actively do not 
wish to remember” (2010:1110). On the side of covert silence, Vinitzky-Seroussi 
and Teeger identify “bland commemoration,” a selective way of memorializing, 
in which some aspects of history are silenced (e.g., the genocide) while others 
are cultivated (e.g., music and culinary traditions). From this, they distinguish 
“cacophonous commemoration,” exemplified by days of commemoration of trou-
bling events that are coupled with the commemoration of one or several other 
occurrences. Consequently, the undesirable event is crowded out.
In the interactive situations reported above for Armenians, social actors typi-
cally engage in two of these four types of silence: overt silence with the goal of 
forgetting and covert silence by way of “bland commemoration.” Yet their stories 
show that even overt silence with the goal of forgetting is never complete silence. 
Occasional referents to the repressed past tell recipients that something unpleasant 
is being avoided, that there is a proverbial elephant in the room (Zerubavel 2006).
At times, silence is only verbal silence. Cultural anthropologist Carol Kidron 
(2009) interviewed fifty-five descendants of Holocaust survivors in her native 
Israel. While her respondents confirm the preponderance of verbal silence, they 
simultaneously report nonverbal forms of communication. Examples include 
embodied practices such as the habit of keeping one’s shoes close to the bed, 
passed on to children and grandchildren. Getting into shoes quickly might con-
fer enhanced chances of survival in the camps. Respondents also report about 
person-object interactions, such as the spoon a respondent’s mother used in the 
Auschwitz camp to eat her soup. The spoon had become a matter-of-course object 
in the household with which she fed the interviewee as a little child. The daugh-
ter adds: “Look, she won, she survived with that spoon” (Kidron 2009:11). While 
such statements reveal triumph rather than trauma, other quotations appear to 
reflect at least ambivalence. Kidron quotes one of her interviewees who reports 
how her mother’s nightly screams woke her frequently when she was a child: “I 
didn’t know why she was crying, I knew she was having a bad dream, that it must 
have been something very frightening or painful and that it was about the Holo-
caust. I think my father may have told me it was because of the Holocaust. I didn’t 
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know what she was dreaming about the Holocaust or really what the Holocaust 
was, but . . . I knew it was about what I didn’t know” (Kidron 2009:5–6). Obviously, 
the cries of this respondent’s mother provided some knowledge, further advanced 
by her father’s words (Holocaust as a “painful” experience that, decades later, 
causes nightmares—“bad dreams”); but other knowledge was missing (“what the 
Holocaust was”). The situation Kidron’s respondent reports thus reveals awareness 
(knowledge) of ignorance (not knowing), resulting from a mix of verbal and non-
verbal communication. I heard similar accounts from non-Jewish Polish friends 
whose parents had survived the camps.
Kidron’s second major point challenges much of the literature on silence. She 
argues that the effect of verbal silence is not necessarily disturbing or traumatic. 
Instead, silent traces transmit tacit knowledge of the past within everyday fam-
ily life. These arguments pertain to the quality of knowledge, in that it matters 
if knowledge is verbally articulated or embodied. They speak secondly to the 
affective consequences of verbal silence in combination with nonverbal commu-
nication. Kidron’s conclusion certainly contrasts with the unease that quotations 
from the interviews and biographies above overwhelmingly reflect. Might it be 
that Kidron’s findings and conclusions are reflective of the specific Israeli con-
text, characterized by a sense of relative cultural safety in a new, post-genocide 
state (as opposed to diaspora) and surrounded by a world in which many share 
in the respondents’ experiences? Contrast this with stories about Jewish life in 
the diaspora.
Philippe Sands, an international lawyer and professor of law at University Col-
lege London, conveys such stories in East-West Street (Sands 2016). The author 
tells us that he learned little about his grandfather Leon’s life before 1945, in 
Lemberg (today, Lviv) and Vienna. “The past hung about Leon and Rita [his wife], 
a time before Paris, not to be talked about in my presence or not in a language I 
understood” (16). He remembers his grandfather’s words “C’est compliqué, c’est le 
passé, pas important” (17) (It’s complicated, it’s the past, not important). He also 
remembers—similar to Peter Balakian—the “absence of photographs” (15), and he 
quotes psychoanalyst Nikolas Abraham: “What haunts us are not the dead, but the 
gaps left within us by the secrets of others” (7). If Kidron is right that the silenced 
past of her respondents is not necessarily haunting, then Philippe Sands’s experi-
ence might have been different had he grown up with his grandfather in Israel.
In short, the experience of silence is crucial in social interactions between sur-
vivors of genocide and their descendants, be they survivors of the Shoah or of the 
Armenian genocide. Silence may take different forms, but it is never total silence. 
At times, it is but verbal silence, paired with nonverbal forms of communication. 
At other times, it is partial silence, whereby participants in interactive situations 
communicate something verbally, but in a way that leaves obvious gaps. On yet 
other occasions, silencing consists of aborted or disrupted utterances. No mat-
ter the form of silencing, silence may or may not be traumatizing, depending on 
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context. Most importantly here, social silence is one form of social interaction and 
communication that contributes to the generation of knowledge—often ambigu-
ous, at times troubling—about a horrific past.
Silence is an experience shared by descendants of the victim group and of the 
perpetrator group, but the motivations and consequences differ. We find simi-
larities to this author’s memories of silence in post–World War II Germany in 
many biographical accounts of the children and grandchildren of (at times just 
suspected) German perpetrators (e.g., Leo 2014; Schenck 2016; Mitgutsch 2016). 
Such literature shows how silence among the perpetrator people is profoundly 
disturbing to at least some, especially when paired with information from other 
sources. Different from what Kidron observed, social silences do not easily enter 
into the calm flow of everyday life where the silence of perpetrators is concerned. 
Silence instead interweaves with a sense of secondary guilt—guilt for loving (or 
having loved) those who perpetrated (or possibly perpetrated), and guilt for not 
inquiring decisively about their past. The inheritance is associated with stigma. It 
is dyed into the fabric of those who succeed their elders. Those who are born into 
the collectivity out of which evil had grown inherit shame and stigma, be they 
Germans or Turks.
If some survivors of the Armenian genocide and of the Shoah practiced silence, 
and if silencing the history of the Holocaust was common in Germany, then we 
may assume that silencing was also a common practice in the perpetrator people 
of the genocide against the Armenians. Yet perpetrators and their descendants 
may also be tempted to engage in another strategy of managing stigma or a spoiled 
identity. They may deny, and that denial mixes with silencing to produce particu-
lar repertoires of knowledge.
Denial and Denying
Among the three concepts at the center of this chapter—silence, acknowledg-
ment, and denial—the latter is the dominant subject of scholarship, and prob-
ably of everyday talk. A Google book search shows at least a hundred titles that 
include the word denial. A well-known example is historian Deborah Lipstadt’s 
(1993) Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. In 1999, 
historian Richard Hovannisian edited Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the 
Armenian Genocide. Two years later, Stanley Cohen (2001) published States of 
Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering, a criminologist’s take on denial 
of government repression and mass violence. Finally, 2015 saw the appearance 
of historical sociologist Fatma Müge Göçek’s magnum opus, entitled Denial of 
Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the 
Armenians, 1789–2009 (2015). The latter book is the most impressive effort thus 
far to document and explain denial of the Armenian genocide. Göçek’s volume, 
based on a detailed analysis of more than three hundred memoirs of prominent 
Turks, addresses denial in four stages of Turkish history.
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All these books treat denial as something morally abominable. Given that denial 
can also refer to a rejection of falsehoods and outrageous claims, the authors cited 
above obviously mean something more specific. They generally refer to the denial 
of historic events documented by overwhelming evidence, including scholarship.6
Types of denial.  Denial is a difficult and even confounding concept, in that it 
embraces distinct phenomena. Thankfully, Stanley Cohen helps by distinguish-
ing between three forms of denial. The first is literal denial, “the assertion that 
something did not happen” (2001:7). This can also be called factual denial, and 
cognition is at stake. The second type, interpretive denial, poses greater challenges. 
Here “the raw facts (something happened) are not being denied [but instead] . . . 
given a different meaning from what seems apparent to others” (2001:7). This type 
of denial concerns morality. Yes, someone argues, many human lives were lost, but 
those losses were not the result of murderous violence but rather the unavoidable 
side effect of war. A more specific instance of interpretive denial can occur when 
meaning is captured in legal terms. When social actors categorize mass killings 
as genocide, for example, this form of denial challenges their attempt to subsume 
evidence under the legal category; most prominent in this regard are challenges to 
the subsumption of intent.
Criminologists know interpretive denial well, recognizing such strategies 
of neutralization as enablers of deviance (Sykes and Matza 1957). Deviant actors 
neutralize by denying responsibility, victimization, or injury; by condemning 
their condemners (e.g., accusing them of having provoked the violence or having 
engaged in even worse atrocities); or by appealing to higher loyalties (e.g., the 
nation’s honor over norms of international law). In all these cases, they do not 
deny that others have been harmed, but they seek to defend their identity as moral 
actors and upright citizens, shielding it from potential moral and legal damage.
Factual and interpretive denial often overlap, and their deployment begins dur-
ing genocidal regimes. Raul Hilberg ([1961] 2003) reveals such strategies in the first 
major historical study of the Holocaust. He shows how the regime built an arse-
nal of defenses, including social mechanisms of repression, to help its murderous 
agents overcome moral scruples that result from a long civilizing process (Elias 
[1939] 2000). Such mechanisms include hiding the ultimate aim of the actions 
(controlling information); forcing those who know what is occurring to partici-
pate, in order to secure their silence and denial (“blood kit”); prohibiting criticism; 
eliminating destruction as a subject of conversation; and cultivating camouflaged 
vocabulary (e.g., avoiding the term killing). Once introduced, these strategies 
likely spill over into the post-genocidal era, no longer motivated by the desire to 
enable mass killings, but by the need to face a new world that abhors the evils of 
the immediate past.
Cohen distinguishes a third type of denial: implicatory denial. Such denial 
accepts the facts and their conventional interpretation, but “what are denied or 
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minimized are the psychological, political or moral implications that convention-
ally follow” (Cohen 2001:8). This type of denial again concerns morality, in terms 
of not accepting responsibility.7 Historians of genocide also engage with impli-
catory denial. Again, Hilberg ([1961] 2003) provides an example, writing about 
mechanisms of collective and individual rationalization. The former may include 
justification of the destruction process as a whole, for example by defining the 
target as evil. While such collective rationalization still falls under the category 
of interpretive denial, individual rationalization involves methods through which 
actors seek to claim helplessness in the face of larger forces, even if they were 
directly involved in the killings. They include reference to the doctrine of supe-
rior orders, also found in the famous Milgram experiment (Milgram 1963) and 
in Arendt’s (1963) notion of the banality of evil; insistence that no personal vin-
dictiveness was involved, for example by telling stories about one’s “good deeds” 
toward Jewish neighbors; blaming others; or diminishing one’s own importance 
(“I was just one among many”). In other words, those engaging in implicatory 
denial accept that terrible deeds were committed, and also accept their definition 
as genocide, but they insist that they could not really do anything about them; they 
were tools in the hands of others, deprived of agency. Implicatory denial comes 
even more easily to bystanders than to perpetrators.
Like the practice of silencing, denial occurs at different levels of social life. We 
find it in official pronouncements, where it is easily institutionalized (a subject of 
subsequent chapters). Yet it is also common at the micro-level. There it leaves its 
traces in social interactions and inner conversations reflected in diaries, memoirs, 
or other autobiographical texts.
Denial by Turkish memoir writers.  Perpetrators most commonly practice denial. 
Accordingly, Göҫek’s analysis of more than three hundred memoirs of promi-
nent Turks focuses on related strategies. Let us consider two of her examples. 
The first is Dr. Mehmet Şahingiray, a member of the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP; the Young Turk party) and of the Special Organization, the chief 
executor of the mass killings. Şahingiray, reflecting on the mass violence against 
Armenians in 1915, claims there was intense hostility and armament among 
the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire, aiming to “drive the Turks 
from [the latter’s] beloved ancestral homeland of eight or ten centuries” (quoted 
in Göҫek 2015:249–250). He continues by asking his imagined audience: “[Why 
should] the Armenians not be punished? Which ‘civilized government’ would have 
remained just an onlooker? Which government would expose its political survival 
to such danger? Just as the government is obliged to undertake precautionary 
measures, it is also natural for there to be a danger for the Muslim populace to 
get carried away by their emotions, reacting in kind to the rapacious and terrible 
murders of the [Armenian] element with which they had lived for so many centu-
ries, considering them [fellow] citizens and brethren” (quoted in Göҫek 2015:250).
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Göҫek challenges Şahingiray’s arguments by reminding the reader of crucial 
distinctions in the size and nature of suffering between Turks and Armenians: yes, 
two million Turks lost their lives in the violence of World War I, but those deaths 
occurred mostly on the battlefield, in the fight against Allied soldiers, absent any 
contacts with Armenians. “Armenian suffering [instead] was empire-wide, with 
the Ottoman state, government and military forcibly and systematically removing 
and subsequently destroying civilian Armenian communities of mostly women, 
children and the elderly” (Göҫek 2015:250). In Cohen’s terms, Göҫek considers 
Şahingiray’s reflections a form of interpretive denial. Her second refutation con-
cerns (at least partial) literal denial: the equation of the scale of Armenian mili-
tancy, which destroyed an estimated sixty thousand Muslim lives, and the death 
toll of at least eight hundred thousand among the Armenians.
Göҫek provides another example that links factual and interpretive denial. She 
quotes from the memoir of an Ottoman officer who writes of how he encoun-
tered “on the two sides of the road [between Meskene and Deyr Zor] unburied 
corpses of those among the [Armenian] refugee convoys who had fallen sick and 
died” (Göҫek 2015:205). While expressing sorrow, he continues thus: “The CUP 
government was forced to remove these Armenians from the regions near mili-
tary conflict due to the inevitability of [the conditions] of war. But during this 
migration executed without any organization or transportation, some among the 
Armenian refugees died due to exhaustion and disease. Yet, according to our cal-
culation at the time, THE LOSS OF THE TURKISH POPULACE WAS MUCH 
MORE THAN THAT OF THE ARMENIANS” (caps in original; quoted in Göҫek 
2015:251). Again, equalizing the numbers of deaths constitutes at least partial literal 
denial, while attributing the deaths to unavoidable exhaustion is an example of 
interpretive denial.
Denial is not limited to the perpetrators themselves. It extends, in many cases, to 
their children (e.g., Sands 2016:240) and even to their children’s children, who grew 
up with the love grandchildren develop for their grandparents, though they may 
learn later about the dark chapter in their grandfathers’ past (Welzer et al. 2002). 
Welzer and his collaborators have found, in the case of Germany, that grandchil-
dren tend to redefine, minimalize, and rationalize their grandfathers’ involvement 
in Nazism. They also find that this tendency intensifies in the context of growing 
public recognition of the horrors of the Holocaust. In other words, acceptance in 
public life motivates implicatory denial at the family level. Denial and acknowledg-
ment at the macro- and micro-levels of society move in opposite directions.
Importantly, in all cases of implicatory denial, by the perpetrator generation 
or its descendants, literal and often interpretive acknowledgment are implied. At 
times, implicatory denial is a reaction to acknowledgment of fact. Boundaries 
between acknowledgment and denial are thus blurry.
In short, when a collectivity acknowledges involvement in mass atrocity, impli-
catory denial is a common practice in everyday communication and individual 
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reflection. Alternatively, by practicing factual or interpretive denial, collectivi-
ties offer individuals an escape from challenging situations. Many former Young 
Turk politicians and military laid the ground for such denial, as Göçek convinc-
ingly shows in her study of memoirs. The new Turkish Republic, eager to engage 
them in its service after its foundation in 1922, embraced their interpretation. 
Later chapters show how their seed bore rich fruit within Turkey—how denial 
in individual reflections, in memoirs and in everyday communication, became 
sedimented. Yet today’s broad public recognition of the Armenian genocide in 
the contemporary West suggests that, despite denial and silencing, acknowledg-
ment was at work as well.
Acknowledging and Bearing Witness
Traces of acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide occasionally appear in writ-
ings by agents of the perpetrator state, even those written while the atrocities were 
still unfolding. In addition, and following a long period of silencing and denial, 
acknowledgment today advances cautiously among some courageous Turkish 
intellectuals. Within the victim group, pulled for many decades between silencing 
and acknowledgment, recent decades have witnessed organized efforts to docu-
ment survivor testimonies, archive them, and make them available in places such 
as the Visual History Archive of the USC Shoah Foundation. Such testimonies 
merge personal and collective knowledge that has accumulated over decades, and 
they reinforce collective memory.
Perpetrator people: Turkish acknowledgments.  One of the Turkish memoirs ana-
lyzed by Fatma Müge Göçek was penned by Ahmed Refik, director of dispatches 
of the Ottoman government in the early phase of World War I. With the impe-
rial capital under threat of occupation during the 1915 battle of the Dardanelles, 
Ahmed Refik was sent to the town of Eskişehir to coordinate the possible reloca-
tion of the seat of the Ottoman government. Having arrived in Eskişehir, Ahmed 
Refik witnessed the violence committed against the Armenian population. He 
was horrified by his observations, and his memoir provides one of the strongest 
examples of acknowledgment, embedded in the sea of denialist statements by his 
compatriots that Göçek collected in her volume. Refik writes:
[When gathered at the train station for deportation,] no one wanted to move for 
all [the Armenians] believed that a fearsome force awaited them there [death]. 
Forests around the mountains were filled with the armed bands the CUP govern-
ment had sent from İstanbul. In order to stay alive, the people were willing to stay 
in Eskişehir.  .  . . [Additional observations justified such fear:] Rivers are filled 
with human torsos and heads of children. This view tears one’s heart to pieces. 
But won’t people be one day called to account for this? . . . No government at any 
historical period has committed murders with such cruelty. (quoted in Göçek 
2015:153)
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Göçek, a Turk of the grandchildren’s generation, writing a century after Refik, her-
self engages in acknowledgment. She does so through scholarship that lays open 
what Turkish witnesses of the Armenian genocide observed, and how they simul-
taneously engaged in denial. In the autobiographical preface to Denial of Violence, 
Göçek introduces the book as “the end result of a long journey, one that was not 
only scholarly but also intensely personal” (Göçek 2015:vii).
Having grown up as the daughter of an upper-class family in cosmopolitan 
İstanbul, availed of the best educational opportunities her country had to offer, she 
also became aware of “prejudicial and discriminatory behavior” (Göçek 2015:viii) 
against non-Turkish and non-Muslim groups. Yet only as a graduate student at 
Princeton University did she learn from one of her mentors, the renowned Middle 
East historian Bernard Lewis, “the role non-Muslim minorities had played in the 
empire. . . . [N]ot only was the role of non-Muslim minorities unrecognized, but 
their presence and participation had gradually dissipated during the ensuing repub-
lican years” (Göçek 2015:ix). Göçek writes about the silencing of various other epi-
sodes of violence and repression in Turkey’s past. She summarizes her previous 
scholarship and her efforts to bring violent occurrences into some temporal order-
ing. Her account culminates in an epiphany, a recognition of how this intellectual 
journey led her “to arrive at the foundational violence that had not only triggered 
but also normalized the subsequent practices: it was through this line of inductive 
reasoning that I arrived at what had happened to the Armenians in the past, in 1915 
to be exact, because it was the earliest instance of collective violence that had still 
not been accounted for by the Turkish state and society” (Göçek 2015:ix).
Göçek’s work thus challenges silence and denial of the foundational violence 
of the Turkish Republic. She seeks to help break Turkey’s path-dependent history 
of violence and to advance its democratic potential. Importantly, she is not the 
only Turkish scholar to work toward acknowledgment. Other examples include 
Taner Akçam (2006), Seyhan Bayraktar (2010), Hamit Bozarslan (2013), Hakan 
Seckinelgin (2019), Buket Türkmen (2019), and Uğur Ümit Üngör (2015).
In addition to these scholars’ public and political mission, a confessional func-
tion may be a motivating force for perpetrators or their descendants who acknowl-
edge. German sociologist Alois Hahn (1982) traces historically how new methods, 
including the writing of diaries and biographies as well as testimonials in psycho-
therapeutic settings, supplement traditional, religious forms of confessions (see 
also Berger and Luckmann 1966). Engagement in scholarship about the dark past 
of one’s own nation and of one’s forebears may be but one mode of responding to 
(collective) responsibility (or even to a sense of guilt). The goal today is the over-
coming of traumata, and, possibly—in line with David Riesman’s notion of the 
“other-directed self ”—a new form of adaptation to externally generated pressures 
or expectations (Riesman et al. [1950] 2001).8
Scholarship is only part of this new engagement with the past. Göçek, in the 
final substantive section of her book, elaborates on “three spheres of knowledge 
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production and reproduction where the Turkish official narrative has begun to be 
contested and countered .  .  .  : newly transliterated and penned texts [as the 1928 
script reform had made many documents inaccessible to young Turks], activities at 
newly established private universities, and public interpretations of a new generation 
of Turkish journalists and intellectuals” (Göçek 2015:466). Her expression of hope 
preceded the new authoritarianism during the late reign of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a 
brutal rigidity especially evident after the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016.
The victim people: Armenian voices in the visual history archives.  Acknowledg-
ment plays a more prominent role among the victim people, despite early tempta-
tions to silence the painful past.9 In some cases, the transmission of knowledge 
sets in early, in historical eyewitness accounts and lines of communication from 
survivors to their children and grandchildren. Claire Mouradian, one of my inter-
viewees, was raised by her grandmother, who had endured terrifying experiences 
and survived a massacre under a pile of corpses. She told her granddaughter about 
the great catastrophe of the Armenian people, including her personal experience, 
inspiring Mouradian to enter a life of scholarship dedicated to the fate of her eth-
nic group, a case to which I return in detail below.
We find similar intergenerational transmission of knowledge among Armenians 
in the United States. Kaspar Hovannisian, having escaped from the Otto-
man Empire, arrived in the United States on August 30, 1920. His son Richard 
Hovannisian (1971) wrote the first history of the Republic of Armenia, and Richard’s 
son Raffi Hovannisian became foreign minister of the newly independent country 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union. In Family of Shadows: A Century of Murder, 
Memory, and the American Dream (2010), Garin Hovannisian, Raffi’s son, writes 
about the fate of his family, and the cultivation and transmission of knowledge 
about the Armenian genocide. The process began in the first generation, with his 
great-grandfather Kaspar in Tulare, California, where he had settled after immi-
grating. Kaspar was intensely involved in Armenian life and immersed in the 
Armenian newspaper Hairenik, delivered daily from Boston. Yet the transmission 
of knowledge was gender-specific, excluding his newlywed wife, Siroon. In Garin’s 
words, Siroon “did not know the man she served. She did not understand .  .  .” 
(Hovannisian 2010:44).
Growing temporal distance allows for new forms of acknowledgment. Con-
sider testimony by Armenian genocide survivors and witnesses, made available 
by the Visual History Archive of the USC Shoah Foundation, in the form of 
interviews conducted between the 1970s and the early 2000s by J. Michael 
Hagopian, himself a survivor of the genocide and creator of the Armenian Film 
Foundation, producer of the recordings. Encounters between Hagopian and other 
survivors are interactive situations, but they differ from those examined above. 
They do not unfold in everyday life. Instead, their very purpose is the establish-
ment of a record of testimony about the genocide.
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In analyzing a random sample of sixty videotaped interviews among those 
conducted in English, we coded statements about forms of victimization, refer-
ences to perpetrators, public responses to atrocities, attitudes toward Turkey and 
Turkish people, and explanations of the genocide. Merging accumulated knowl-
edge absorbed by respondents during their lifetime with personal memories, 
these statements reinforce sedimented genocide knowledge. Many themes well 
known from the historiographic literature appear in these sixty depictions: depor-
tations (thirty-nine); forced marches (twenty-nine); starvation and dehydration 
(fifteen); robberies (twenty-five); and massacres and killings (forty-three), spe-
cifically shootings (twelve), mutilation by stabbing or cutting (ten), decapitations 
(seven), beatings (eight), and rapes (seven). Perpetrators are most often referred 
to neutrally as “they” (forty-two), frequently also as “Turks” (thirty-four), with 
some specifications such as “Turkish soldiers” (twelve), “gendarmes” (twenty), 
“police(men)” (twelve), “Turkish government” (twelve), and references to mem-
bers of the Young Turk ruling triumvirate generally or by specific names (eleven). 
We find only one reference to “Muslims.” In the following paragraphs, I focus on 
accounts of victimization.
Interviewees report generally known facts, probably not based on their per-
sonal observations—for example, that the first victims of the genocide were male 
intellectuals, and that other men and boys between the ages of fourteen and 
sixty-five were targeted next. Some refer to personal observations, though, when 
they report how perpetrators used guns, bayonets, and daggers to massacre 
people. Women, too, experienced violence, often in a gendered form. Emma 
Modrisoff recalls Turkish civilians and soldiers invading Armenian homes, 
butchering their inhabitants, raping young girls, and mutilating pregnant 
women. She reports how bodies were thrown out of windows and piled several 
feet high in streets and alleyways. One survivor, Haroutune Aivazian, describes 
soldiers forcing women, with children in their arms, from their homes and whip-
ping them through the street.
Other survivors report that the genocide began with deportation notices. They 
recount that sometimes lists of three hundred to five hundred families were posted 
on churches; other times, notices were hung directly on homes; and occasion-
ally, town criers announced upcoming deportations. Some victim-witnesses tell 
how families were given days’ or weeks’ notice, while others were taken the same 
day. Only few families were fortunate enough, they report, to prepare food and 
purchase caravans and donkeys to carry some of their possessions, which they 
typically lost during the marches. Once evicted from their homes, victim- 
witnesses observed Turkish civilians and soldiers plundering them, setting looted 
homes aflame, burning churches and destroying religious texts and artifacts.
Many testimonies speak to the fate of children. Survivors of forced marches 
regularly describe their mothers carrying their infant siblings in their arms, many 
of whom died from starvation. Some women decided to end their young children’s 
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lives instead of letting them endlessly suffer; others abandoned their children on 
the sides of streets, hoping that someone with more resources would take care 
of them.
Some victim-witnesses report decapitations before and during the marches. 
Agnes Dombalian, a child at the time of the genocide, recalls Turkish soldiers sep-
arating men and women and forcing women to identify their husband or father. 
Soldiers then forced the man’s head on a log and cut it off with an axe. Dombalian 
was among the children who lost their fathers that day. Often, mutilated bodies 
were thrown into rivers. Two survivors report that decapitations and stabbings 
were so common that the Euphrates River ran red. Abductions and rapes by civil-
ians and soldiers were also routine, according to the surviving witnesses.
Interviewees further report that soldiers and civilians stole from dying or 
dead victims, including clothes and shoes. Occasionally, people suspected 
of swallowing pieces of gold were cut open. Krikor Baldikian recalls a Turkish 
man nearly cutting off his finger for a ring before his mother freed him from 
the man’s grasp.
On the deportation marches, deprived of food and water, victims were forced 
to walk for hours until their feet were too swollen to continue. One survivor, Sarah 
Koltookian, describes soldiers forcing her and others to climb repeatedly up and 
down a mountain, beating to death with clubs and rocks anyone who stopped. 
Survivors recall drinking from mud piles created by animal footprints and from 
rivers in which corpses floated. They ate any plants they could find on the ground 
and cooked the stems with contaminated water. The desperation of victims was 
so extreme that they began feeding on the flesh of corpses. George Messerlian 
remembers a young boy in the Syrian Desert telling his mother, “Mother don’t 
cry. When I die, don’t give my meat to nobody. You eat [it] yourself.” Gendarmes 
shot and killed those dragging behind. Corpses surrounded the deported on all 
sides, in rivers, on the sides of streets, under bridges, and next to campsites. Once 
arrived at their desert destinations, many victims were abandoned and left to star-
vation. Survivors returning to these sites found piles of bones, many belonging to 
young children.
These victim-witnesses were mostly young children during the genocide. They 
survived, but most lost family and home, and some lost their identity. Paranzan 
Narcisian, orphaned, is among the typical cases; she bemoans the loss of her 
family. Only a few survived with their parents or as a complete family. J. Michael 
Hagopian, in his interview, explains the pain of losing one’s home: “I’ve come to 
realize that leaving your native land is probably the worst punishment you can 
get; to be exiled, that you can never go back to your home is a horrible thing.” 
Finally, some survivor-witnesses report assuming Turkish identities under pres-
sure. Harry Kurkjian, for example, describes his forced conversion to Islam 
and denigration of his heritage when he was coerced to urinate on Armenian 
graves. While many survivors regained their Armenian identity, some, like Jirair 
32    Chapter 1
Suchiasian, report that the violence left them with no knowledge of who their par-
ents were or where and when they were born. Suchiasian says, “I am somebody, 
but I am nobody”—spoiled identity indeed. The interview does not reveal how 
long it took this survivor to break the silence.
C ONCLUSIONS:  INTER ACTIVE STRUGGLES  
OVER GENO CIDE KNOWLED GE
Silencing, denying, and acknowledging in the aftermath of genocide and mass 
atrocity unfold at different levels of social life. This chapter has focused on the 
micro-level—on communication and thought processes, and their external-
izations in written texts or video recordings—during times of violence and in 
later periods. When a troubling past has left actors with the spoiled identity of 
victims or perpetrators, silencing and denial are tempting responses (Goffman 
[1963] 1986). Yet confessing, providing eyewitness testimony, and acknowledging 
are realistic alternatives, and their chances increase over time. They became a rich 
source of knowledge on many episodes of mass atrocity, including the Shoah and 
the Armenian genocide.
Importantly, social interaction, communication, and negotiation over an appro-
priate understanding of troubling experiences are rarely harmonious. Often, sur-
vivors and their descendants confront members of the perpetrator group. Within 
the perpetrator group, intergenerational conflict intensifies when children of the 
perpetrator generation challenge their elders. They may condemn their parent 
generation’s involvement in or toleration of past atrocities and demand acknowl-
edgment. Alternatively, descendants of perpetrators may hope to free family 
members (or their group or nation) from stigma through continued silencing and 
denial. Even on the side of victim groups, silencing is common, despite substantial 
variation across contexts and time.
Finally, and again, this exploration of silencing, denial, and acknowledgment 
is part of a sociology of knowledge project. It addresses the social construction of 
reality. It does not challenge the notion of reality: the history of violence is very real. 
Millions were killed; were starved; lost their limbs, health, and dignity; were raped 
and driven from their homes and ancestral lands. Yet we know about such atrocities 
only through cultural processing. As this chapter has shown, social interaction and 
reflection play a crucial part in the generation of this type of knowledge. Another 
form is the systematic documentation by eyewitnesses—for example, in the form 
of diaries that humanitarians on the ground in Turkey wrote during the genocide. 
These diaries are the subject of the next chapter.
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Diaries and Bearing Witness  
in the Humanitarian Field
Structural contexts, including the nature of social fields, affect whether and 
how actors engage in acknowledgment, silencing, or denying.1 In the case of the 
Armenian genocide, embeddedness in fields that transcend the boundaries of 
the Ottoman state encouraged acknowledgment. A dense trail of testimony left 
behind by international eyewitnesses has fed into today’s body of knowledge about 
the Armenian genocide. Reports by consuls and ambassadors, and especially diaries 
by missionaries involved in humanitarian aid work in Turkey during World War I, 
feature prominently. In this chapter, I focus on one example from the field of 
humanitarianism from which I quoted at the outset of the preceding chapter: a 
diary written between 1915 and 1919 by Carmelite Christie, an American school 
administrator and humanitarian in the Turkish town of Tarsus.
In the symbolic interactionist tradition, I think of diaries as objectivations—
thoughts written down and reflecting, in the words of George Herbert Mead 
(1934), inner conversations between the “I,” that responds to a social situation, 
and the “Me,” that part of our minds that anticipates and takes into account pat-
terned reactions of others to our utterances. Importantly, those others are not 
free floating, but are themselves embedded in social fields in which they act 
and form a habitus (Bourdieu 1984). Introducing the terms field and habitus, I 
take the unusual step of linking George Herbert Mead’s theory of thought with 
Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory. Field, for Bourdieu, refers to a set of actors who pur-
sue specific goals such as accumulating power (political field), finding truth (field 
of scholarship), practicing justice (judicial field), or providing aid (humanitarian 
field). Fields also impose particular rules of the game on participants, and they 
form the participants’ habitus, or relatively stable dispositions (Bourdieu 1984). 
The stress is on “relative”: habitus leaves room for improvisation, and this is where 
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symbolic interactionism (with its focus on fluidity) and field theory (with its stress 
on structure) converge.
Workers in the humanitarian aid field are oriented toward alleviating suffer-
ing and saving lives. This mission may motivate them to depict the suffering and 
plead to the outside world for help. Their writings should thus constitute one of the 
clearest examples of acknowledgment. Yet humanitarians also act in the context 
of states and their enforcement apparatus, and those states may well be—as in the 
Ottoman context—perpetrators themselves. Such context likely inserts caution 
into the testimony of humanitarians, possibly as accommodation to state authori-
ties. The history of humanitarianism is rich with examples of this tension. The fail-
ure of the International Committee of the Red Cross to ring the alarm bells after 
inspecting the Nazis’ Terezin Concentration Camp, all for the sake of neutrality, is 
one of the low points of humanitarianism. Organizations such as Médecins Sans 
Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), formed in reaction to such constraints dur-
ing the Biafran War in Nigeria, are determined to bear witness. Yet, in concrete 
situations, they too have to accommodate repressive political regimes, unless they 
are ready to pay the price of expulsion from the field (Weissman 2011). The work of 
Médecins Sans Frontières in—and its eviction from—the Darfur region of Sudan 
is but one recent example (Savelsberg 2015). In short, humanitarians desire to bear 
witness, but they are constrained by the perpetrating state on whose collaboration, 
or at least toleration, they often depend.
Diaries are a partial way out of this dilemma. Their authors write in private, not 
for (immediate) publication. In addition to the desire to bear witness, the writ-
ing of diaries also serves as a tool toward surviving challenging contexts. It helps 
their authors manage difficult, at times seemingly unbearable, situations. Anne 
Frank’s diaries, written in her hiding place in Amsterdam, are but one famous 
example. A more recent case in point is Antjie Krog, who reported for the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation about the excruciating testimony of suffering 
and perpetration before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Experiencing each session and interviewing many victims and perpetrators, Krog 
was able to continue her work only by writing down what she heard. Her reflec-
tions resulted in a disturbing text, later published under the title Country of My 
Skull (Krog 1998). 
The fact that authors of diaries preserve their writings—even if they do not (at 
least initially) seek publication—indicates that their purpose is not just therapeu-
tic. Might some want their writings preserved as a record of the world in which 
they lived and suffered, as testimony of their experiences? In fact, some authors, 
such as Krog, or their surviving relatives, such as Anne Frank’s father, do eventu-
ally publish diaries written privately under trying circumstances. While neither 
Carmelite Christie nor her descendants published her writings, the texts did sur-
vive and later generations decided to make them accessible as archival documents.
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CARMELITE CHRISTIE AND HER DIARIES :  TARSUS, 
TURKEY,  1915–1919
Sarah Carmelite Christie, née Brewer, was born in 1852 in small-town Illinois as 
the daughter of a minister and farmer and his housekeeper wife. She attended 
Rockford Seminary, from which she graduated in 1871. She briefly worked as a 
schoolteacher until she married Thomas D. Christie, a Civil War veteran and Con-
gregational missionary, in 1872. As a child, Thomas had emigrated with his parents 
from Ireland to settle in Wisconsin.
In 1877, the couple, with their first living child, moved to Turkey, where, for 
sixteen years, they were engaged in missionary work in the mountainous town of 
Marash (Maraş), about a hundred miles north of Aleppo. In 1893, two years before 
the Hamidian massacres of hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Armenians under 
Sultan Abdülhamid II, the family, now with five living children, moved to Tarsus, 
a town west of Adana, close to the Mediterranean coast. There, Thomas Christie 
assumed the presidency of the Saint Paul Institute, a privately funded college. He 
traveled much, to missionary outposts and to raise funds, the college’s benefactor 
having died shortly after he took over the presidency, leaving the institution with-
out adequate funding. Consequently, Carmelite was often alone in Tarsus, raising 
the children and working on behalf of the college, especially toward the educa-
tion of women. In 1915, shortly after the beginning of the mass violence against 
the Armenians, Thomas traveled to Constantinople, seeking to intervene with the 
government on behalf of several teachers whom the authorities threatened with 
deportation. Not only did the government not grant his request, it did not allow 
him to return to Tarsus. Carmelite now had to fend for herself and for the Saint 
Paul Institute throughout the remainder of World War I and beyond, from 1915 
until 1919. She managed to keep the institute open initially, and she worked to 
provide humanitarian aid to the displaced and to victims of war after its closure on 
November 26, 1915. In 1920, more than a year after the war ended, the couple, now 
reunited, returned to the United States.
Data: Archives and Selection
The following pages are based on the Thomas and Carmelite Christie and Family 
Papers, archived by the Minnesota Historical Society (MHS, n.d.), which contain 
“Correspondence, diaries, and other papers documenting the lives of a family of 
Protestant missionaries from Minnesota serving in the Turkish cities of Marash 
and Tarsus.”2 According to the file description, “Family letters, essays, and dia-
ries by Carmelite and Mary [a daughter] detail the sufferings of the Armenian 
people during the 1895, 1909, and 1915 massacres, and the missionaries’ efforts to 
give them refuge and relief ” (see note 2). Given my interest in knowledge about 
the genocide, I selected, from this wealth of materials, the diaries Carmelite 
Christie wrote between 1915 and 1919.3 In addition, I analyzed The Treatment of 
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Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–16, a compilation of consular and mission-
ary reports published in a British government series.
Reading all her diaries of this five-year period, my research assistants and I 
documented all instances in which Carmelite Christie describes the suffering of 
Armenians and others affected by violence and disease, the constraints imposed 
by the Turkish government against intervention, and finally the compromises 
Christie accepted so that she would be able to continue her humanitarian work 
while simultaneously bearing witness to suffering and persecution. Her testimony 
is acknowledgment, but a conservative one in light of the threatening context in 
which she operated.
In Her Own Words: Torn between Desire to Bear Witness  
and Constraint
Carmelite Christie intensely experienced the conflict between her desire to bear 
witness, to document, and to acknowledge, on the one hand, and the necessity to 
navigate threats and demands by the Turkish state while seeking to provide aid 
to the suffering population on the other. Impediments in communicating to the 
outside world, due to censorship and control by the Turkish government, are 
among the constraints about which Christie reports repeatedly. For example, on 
October 18, 1915, she writes about a ship heading to America and her attempt to 
send even modest communication to the outside world: “A little gift of mine in an 
envelope to Agnes [a daughter] for Christmas was kept because I had written a 
few words on a slip of paper about it, and enclosed. Four ‘officers of the Law’ were 
present at the examination” (MHS Box 28:15). Again, on December 7, 1915, Christie 
mentions difficulties in communication to and from America. She describes an 
exceptional opportunity to do so, but expresses her general resignation: “Under 
ordinary circumstances it is impossible to get messages from America by cable 
or wireless” (MHS Box 28:37). Given such impediments against communication 
with the outside world, the writing of diaries was not just a therapeutic exercise for 
Carmelite Christie. It was also the only way to document her observations, pos-
sibly in the hope that they might one day reach the public.
The Turkish government did not merely restrict communication to the outside 
world. It also imposed constraints on delivery of aid to refugees from persecution 
and severely punished those who did not obey. On April 29, 1916, Christie writes 
in her diary, 
We hear that the Priest is in Adana to be tried for the crime (!) of trying to hide exiles. 
He had none in his house: but probably knew where certain others were, and helped 
them. Awful threats are made against those who do anything for exiles, and the feel-
ing against all Christians is increasing. . . . It seems best to lie a little low [underlined 
in original] just at present. . . . It would be disastrous for us to try to shelter fugitives. 
With so many soldiers on the premises and all about us, we could not hope to escape 
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detection. . . . We are practically buying [underlined in original] the goodwill of those 
[who] might make life uncomfortable for us. (MHS Box 28:66, 67)
Carmelite Christie must have been a woman of extraordinary determination and 
courage. While she is reluctant to shelter refugees, her efforts to engage in relief 
work continue unabated, albeit with a cautious eye toward the authorities. An 
entry of April 9, 1917, states: “It would be hard on the poor should my hands be tied 
so that I could not continue relief work. I have an idea that if worse came to worst, 
that I might offer to superintend a Red Crescent Hospital on our premises on 
condition of retaining our present servants, cooks, table-boys, etc. I know nothing 
of such work, but might piece out guess work by self assurance and sympathy and 
smiles! These are times when one must use her wits for all they are worth,—and a 
little more” (MHS Box 28:117).
Another strategy that allows Christie to continue her humanitarian work is 
going under the radar of the authorities. In the same context, she thus writes in 
April 1917: “The govt is not in sympathy with relief work, so I do nearly everything 
so quietly that very few have any idea of how much I am doing. I am supposed to 
be simply a kind neighbor, by the Turks” (MHS Box 28:145).
Government intervention not only makes the hiding of refugees dangerous 
and aid provision difficult; it also infringes on the regular functions of the insti-
tute for which Christie is now responsible. On October 4, 1915, she describes the 
possession of school buildings by the government: “From Adana comes word 
that the Govt want the premises and buildings of the Girls’ School (American) 
for a hospital. Already they have all their own school buildings, the Protestant 
school and church (from which they have moved the bell), the Gregorian schools 
and churches, and all the fine large buildings used for boarding schools by the 
Catholics” (MHS Box 28:7). A few weeks later, on October 25, 1915, she reports: 
“We . . . also lose [sic] our gymnasium, eight furnished recitation rooms, and a lot 
of dormitory space” (MHS Box 28:19).
The decisive moment for Christie’s own institution comes on November 26, 
1915, when her school closes and police take over. “He [government agent] told 
us briefly that within 2 hours he was to have a full list of our students, place of 
residence, parents’ names etc, and that day pupils should be separated and dealt 
with by themselves. Mr. Nute [Carmelite’s son-in-law] asked for his authoriza-
tion papers. He said they were not necessary. . . . Our good Kaimakam [Provin-
cial Administrator] has been sent elsewhere, and his ‘Vekil’ [representative] is the 
judge who is the arch enemy of foreign institutions. It seems the order is direct 
from the Vali [Provincial Governor]” (MHS Box 28:30–31). Much remains in the 
dark in this diary entry. Why would the police want all the student information? 
Clearly, the intent was not friendly.
The pressure to accommodate the Turkish authorities continues throughout 
the following years. For example, on August 28, 1917, Christie writes about needing 
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to prioritize favors to the Turks to live safely and for the sake of “the distribution 
on the sly of relief funds, fearing each day that you will be called to account for 
it. . . . In my place they would understand that to some extent, to keep the peace 
one must in Turkey ‘do as the Turks do’ ” (MHS Box 28:158). A few months later, 
on November 4, 1917, she reports that their yard is still full of Mersin prisoners— 
Syrian Arabs, mostly—and troops coming and going, and sick soldiers brought 
here for convalescence. “We couldn’t refuse without losing the goodwill of one 
whose favor may be useful to us. I have to think of the Armenians in our service” 
(MHS Box 28:192). Even at this late stage, it seems as though Armenians in the 
service of international institutions could still survive. Christie’s sense of responsi-
bility for these survivors simultaneously intensified the pressure she felt to accom-
modate the authorities.
In sum, Carmelite Christie, missionary and school administrator in Tarsus, 
Turkey, describes in her diaries of 1915 to 1919 how she initially sought to continue 
the functioning of her college and worked throughout to help refugees and others 
who sought aid. She experienced dilemmas faced generally in the field of humani-
tarian aid. To provide aid, humanitarians need to accommodate the authorities in 
order to retain access to those in need, even if the same authorities are responsible 
for much of the suffering the aid worker seeks to alleviate. It is under such condi-
tions that Christie, during times of violence, observed and sought to find a balance 
between aid delivery and bearing witness in the form of diaries. The quotations 
above show that constraints posed by the Turkish state entered into Christie’s “Me” 
(in the sense discussed above). What, then, does Christie tell us in her diaries 
about the violence and the suffering of the population? How does she bear witness 
and acknowledge these, in line with her position in the humanitarian field, but 
cautioned by the powerful role of state actors whose goodwill she had to secure? 
The following section provides exemplary observations.
A Humanitarian’s Local Knowledge: “We Hear of Terrible Things,  
and of Massacres”
While Carmelite Christie’s writings are constrained by the context in which she 
operates, they nevertheless provide rich testimony regarding the mass violence 
against the Ottoman Armenians. Christie writes about those who suffer, but also 
about those who perpetrate. Her pages make clear that she is not driven by resent-
ment against Turks. In fact, she extends help to Turks, at times under pressure, 
to keep the authorities on her side, at other times voluntarily, especially toward 
the end of the war and in face of the suffering of the local Turkish population. 
Throughout, some themes repeat: massacres, deportations, authorizations of vio-
lence, misery of the evicted on their trek toward the deserts in the Southeast, forced 
conversions and the abuse of girls and young women. To convey the unfolding of 
events over time, I present a selection of Christie’s diary entries about victimiza-
tion and atrocities in chronological order.
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Available diary entries begin on October 1, 1915, five months and one week after 
the deportation and killing of hundreds of Armenian dignitaries and intellectuals 
on April 24, and continue in the following weeks of the same year.4 Christie’s first 
entry confirms scholarship according to which killings and deportations were 
in full force by the fall of 1915. I quoted earlier from her entry of October 1, 1915, in 
which she writes about massive displacements, misery, and deaths of the suffering 
as well as massacres (MHS Box 28:2–3). Four Red Cross nurses (“Catholics from 
Germany”) confirm the conditions of refugees described there: “[On their way 
from Constantinople to Beirut] they told of the suffering multitudes that filled the 
way all along the route. There were oh so many old people, lame and bent, and 
so many little children and so many who were ill, and they saw people dying by 
the roadside. The majority were on foot” (MHS Box 28:8). On November 2, 1915, 
Christie mentions theft of property, exiling, and massacres: “Many who worked 
near Tarsus during the summer, now have no homes. Their families have been 
exiled. Nearly all Armenians have at least lost their property. In some cases parents 
have been massacred” (MHS Box 28:21). Six days later, on November 8, Christie 
says more about massacres: “Our streets still swarm with soldiers. . . . We under-
stand that the Arab soldiers now here came via Oorfa [Urfa]; and are the ones who 
massacred there. I fear there was an attempt at self defense which made matters 
much worse, the Armenians being always the weaker in means and numbers. It 
is only occasionally one hears of their giving trouble to their persecutors” (MHS 
Box 28:22).
At times, visitors come through Tarsus and describe what they observed on 
their travels. For example, on November 13, 1915, Christie writes: “Miss Ditson of 
Hadjin came yesterday and went on today. She told us of the burning of Hadjin, 
that of about 3000 houses, only 300 remained, and those are the very poorest, and 
a few Moslem houses.  .  .  . It is an open secret that the city was destroyed by an 
order of the Govt. under special superintendance” (MHS Box 28:23).
Christie’s observation regarding the “open secret” is significant. What the sultan 
did publicly, the Young Turks executed primarily through their Special Organiza-
tion, with an attempt to leave no traces, no proof, as little documentation as pos-
sible. Yet officials were told of these actions informally, and people knew because 
they witnessed the violence.
Displacement accompanied the destruction of Armenian settlements, and so 
the observations on the following page are not surprising: “Awful accounts come 
to us from those in camp at Külek [Gülek] Station5. . . . One of our church men 
assists in the soldiers’ hospital at Külek Station, and so sees the people camping 
about. He tells of a family of 12 who were gathering grass and roots and boiling 
them for food. . . . We hear of terrible things, and of massacres” (MHS Box 28:24).
Book 2 of the diaries starts the way Book 1 ended. On November 17, 1915, 
Christie reports: “People are not allowed to remain long at Külek Station where they 
are actually dying from hunger. Our agents are giving secretly food and money to 
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as many as possible, since money has come by telegram ‘on John’s account.’ I keep 
women at work making coarse underclothes and warm petticoats for some of the 
poorest who were robbed en route, and are penniless and without change og [sic] 
garments” (MHS Box 28:25).
The remaining diary entries of 1915 similarly report mass violence. On 
December 18, an acquaintance “tells of auful [sic] conditions in Osmania, and says 
the treatment given Armenian children can’t be told, and that numbers of such 
children were carried off by the Turks to be made Moslems” (MHS Box 28:41). 
Later: “Several old and feeble—near dead people, were buried with five corpses 
in a common pit! One woman, still alive, pushed her hand through the earth and 
waved it to call attention. Later the dogs came and ate the hand! This horrible inci-
dent called forth a remonstrance even from the cowed Armenians, and the Pasha 
receiving it, forbade a repetition of this inhuman treatment of human beings” 
(MHS Box 28:41–42). A subsequent entry includes reports of massacres in Urfa, 
Armenian attempts at resistance that were crushed, “and then followed a most 
horrible butchery with knives and bayonets and guns etc., the Moslem women 
following and sometimes smashing in skulls with stones!” (MHS Box 28:45). 
Again, massacres are accompanied by the taking of property. On December 20, 
1915, Christie writes about the government’s “open robbery in seizing Armenians’ 
property—houses and lands and even the bales of rugs and bedding and bureaus 
etc.” (MHS Box 28:42).
In short, Christie’s diary entries of late 1915 speak to atrocities committed by 
the Turkish military, the Special Organization, and at times civilians against the 
Armenian population. Mass killings, arson, deportation, and robbery are part of 
the unfolding events.
Descriptions of victimization and suffering are less frequent in the diary 
entries of 1916. Yet what we read speaks to the continuation of mass evictions and 
killings begun in the preceding year. For example, on April 6, travelers report of 
recent massacres: “They saw awful sights, and tell awful tales” (MHS Box 28:62). 
On April 17, Christie writes about impediments to aid: “Our sewing has been 
taken from us. The Govt do [sic] not wish the Armenians to receive favors from 
foreigners. They promised to give our women work from their depot, and we have 
sent their names, each carrying our card. Thus far excuses have been made and 
no work given to those we sent. Others (Turkish and Arab women) got enough” 
(MHS Box 28:64).
On the evening of the following day, the news is of deaths of those close to 
Christie: “This time it is one of our old pupils, Gülabi Kouyoumjian, also Eyilme-
zian and son, and Suren Azirian. Scarcely a day passes in which we do not hear of 
the death of some Tarsus exile” (MHS Box 28:69).
Entries of 1917 suggest that the government is working to eliminate remnants 
of Armenian life. On January 30, Christie’s bewilderment about massacres of civil-
ians continues, as she writes that “one cannot,—simply cannot [underlined in 
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original] understand the cruelty of Turks in treatment of the families of Christians. 
How can they instigate massacres! Have they no fellow feelings? It’s a mystery to 
me” (MHS Box 28:107).
A March 6, 1917, entry describes again the fate of children:
Last evening an eye witness who was at the RR [railroad] station when the train came 
in, saw over two hundred little Armenian orphans taken from five cars and driven 
by an officer into the garden across the road, and later on up in to the city: They were 
from four or five years old up to perhaps fourteen, and the majority were boys. . . . 
They appeared like children who had been under supervision, and were in a uniform 
dress that suggested the Germans. We have a fear that they may have been taken 
from the German orphanage in Aleppo which was in charge of Miss Rhoner. We 
have had vague reports of designs against her work. (MHS Box 28:112)
On August 23, 1917, attention shifts to the Greek population while Armenian sur-
vivors are crowded into Aleppo: “The Greek subjects [emphasis in original] are 
doomed to exile, and the Mersine Greeks are now in Tarsus awaiting orders. . . . 
Aleppo is full to overflowing with Armenian exiles” (MHS Box 28:155). Christie 
describes local conditions as worsening further.6
By early 1918, the defeat of Turkey and the other Axis powers becomes increas-
ingly predictable. The character of Christie’s diary entries changes accordingly. 
Signs of hope and new beginning mix with reports of new atrocities and continuing 
suffering. On January 19, Christie writes about plans to reopen the school, making 
it self-supporting. She writes about Muslims asking for such a school. “There will 
be Greeks and Armenians also—all boys” (MHS Box 28:206).
Some of the exiles manage to return to their places of origin, as an entry of 
March 27, 1918, indicates: “It’s wonderful how people in Exile manage to get back 
one by one into the region of their former home. Yesterday a Hadjin woman came 
from Mosul! .  .  . Her family .  .  . were massacred some time ago. She was nearly 
naked and the boy had only a few tatters of one garment clinging about him. They 
were hungry and penniless. We gave them money and underclothing, and must 
see about giving them a lodging place” (MHS Box 28:220).
A diary entry of April 10 again reflects hope, but also struggles with the Turkish 
authorities over the continuation of the extermination campaign:
People are hearing from Marash, and one person has come from there. There was a 
time of anxiety and a few were exiled, I believe, but no massacre [underlined in origi-
nal]. The same was true of Adana. Here there was much uneasiness for a few days, 
as recorded before. It seems that a certain party wanted the Armenians to be sent 
away, but as no region or city wanted more exiles, there was an intention to dispose 
of them en route. Orders came, however, from those high in authority in Constanti-
nople that the Armenians were not to be disturbed, save perhaps a few troublers of 
the peace who were to be exiled. Friday April 5th was the day when something was 
to have occurred that would have reduced the population, but God turned the hearts 
of those in influence so that we went to our beds at the close of the day, and slept and 
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awoke in safety. So it is that God keeps us amidst alarms. Of many dangers we are 
unconscious. (MHS Box 28:224)
Despite signs of hope, danger and fear continue. On April 4, Christie writes that 
“still, deportations and massacres come suddenly, so I am not surprised at the fre-
quent apprehensions of the people” (MHS Box 28:223). She sees signs that also the 
last remnants of minority populations will be destroyed.
On August 12, just three months before the end of the war, notes indicate a 
mixture of hope and resignation: “There is a report that the new Sultan [Mehmed 
VI, as of July 4, 1918] has forgiven the exiled Armenians, and that they are free to 
return to their homes. This is good policy on his part, but what of all the property 
he confiscated, houses torn down, goods sold, gold appropriated, and all the death 
and suffering that have come upon a helpless people?” (MHS Box 28:244).7
With the end of the war in November 1918, the horrendous state of survivors 
becomes a central topic of Christie’s remaining diary entries. On a trip to Adana, 
she reports, she
went over to the American Girls’ Seminary where about 900 returned exiles are 
staying. There are many more in other centers in Adana. Such a crowd! All of them 
dirty, unkempt and spiritless men and women and children. The men were in  
minority. There were many young women who had been captives among the Koords 
[Kurds]. Some had already given birth to children. Others were soon to be con-
fined. The photographer of the expedition took several photos. One was of a group  
of young women who had hands and faces disfigured.  .  .  . Helpers are to come  
to us after a while to open orphanages and help in other ways with relief work. 
(MHS Box 28:289)8
Carmelite Christie, a missionary, school administrator, and teacher in Tarsus, 
writing between 1915 and 1919, thus describes the suffering she observes and about 
which she learns from travelers and close acquaintances. The expulsions and mas-
sacres to which the Armenian population was exposed stand out in her reports.
Several observations are in order from a sociology of knowledge perspective. 
First, Christie’s diary entries are reflections of an inner conversation, including her 
spontaneous reactions to the violence she observes or about which she learns from 
eyewitnesses. Second, her “Me”—again, defined as that part of the self that takes 
into account the imagined other, especially, in her case, the potential reactions of 
the Turkish state—reflects the habitus of a humanitarian aid worker whose ability to 
function depends on cooperation by the regime that bears responsibility for the 
suffering. Because bearing witness under such circumstances is challenging, we 
have to take Christie’s descriptions even more seriously. Third, Christie writes 
her observations from a local perspective. They are direct, fresh, documented in 
real time. Yet they only partially reflect the bigger picture. Even information she 
obtained from others mostly speaks to the part of Turkey in which she resided. 
Fourth, and finally, Christie’s observations became part of the historical record, 
one puzzle piece among many, contributing to a body of knowledge about mass 
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violence against the Armenians. Her observations alone would certainly not have 
shaped knowledge in subsequent decades. Yet many other witness testimonies, 
even if varying by geographic region, overwhelmingly confirm the overall pattern 
of genocidal violence.
FROM A SINGLE VANTAGE POINT TO A PAT TERN  
OF OBSERVATIONS:  THE BRITISH BLUE B O OK
Christie’s observations report about a region of the Ottoman Empire where 
Armenians were relatively wealthy and concentrated in cities. In such places, in 
conditions that did not apply everywhere, Armenians provided a convenient (and 
profitable) target. Historical research consequently shows geographic variation in 
patterns of violence (Kezer 2019), patterns to which the cover picture of this book 
speaks. French photographer Josephe Marando took that picture in the town of 
Sölöz, near the city of Bursa, south of Istanbul. The Armenian population was 
evicted from Sölöz in 1915. Some were saved from deportation into the Syrian 
Desert by Djelal Bey, governor of Konya, and returned home at the end of the 
war in 1918.9 These Armenians were displaced again in 1922, after the War of 
Independence. Sölöz was taken over by Muslims, originally from Bosnia and 
Bulgaria, resettled in 1923 to Asia Minor from the region of Thessaloniki 
and Drama (today Greece). This latter resettlement was part of a massive popula-
tion exchange approved by the victors of World War I.10
Despite such variation, hundreds of pieces of documentation, penned by con-
suls and other missionaries from all over Turkey during the years of World War I, 
parallel Carmelite Christie’s diary entries. While the intensity of violence varied, 
the many observations accumulate to a Gestalt that reveals the genocidal nature of 
the aggression committed against the Ottoman Armenians.
Numerous reports are assembled in The Treatment of Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire 1915–16, a book written by British historian and diplomat James 
Bryce in collaboration with historian Arnold J. Toynbee (Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 
2005]). The volume allows us to place the small tile provided by Carmelite Christie 
into the larger mosaic that emerges from accounts by many observers across the 
Ottoman Empire. Composed primarily of documentation, supplemented by dis-
cussion and analysis, the book appeared in 1916 in the British Parliamentary Blue 
Book series in the form of a legal report (in the following, I will refer to it simply 
as the Blue Book). Nearly all of the evidence came from primary sources. Authors 
of these sources agree that “starting in the spring of 1915, the Ottoman government 
had embarked on a systematic program to annihilate Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire” (Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 2005:vii).
Analyzing the Blue Book, my research assistants and I coded a total of 150 gen-
eral descriptions or accounts provided by eyewitnesses. Similar to our analysis of 
the Christie diaries, we focused on reports about bearing witness, providing relief 
support, conflict between these two goals, and compromises.
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Information Constraints and Background of British Information Politics
In a background section included in its “Introduction,” the Blue Book speaks to 
information control practiced by the Ottoman Empire and its German allies. Both 
“Constantinople and Berlin exercised a strict regime of censorship and misinfor-
mation regarding the fate of Armenians” (Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 2005:viii). 
This depiction is in line with Christie’s local observations from Tarsus. The British 
government initially hesitated to publicize information about the fate of the 
Armenians. It feared detrimental effects that revelations about the mistreatment 
of Christians in Turkey could have on its relationship with allied Muslim leaders. 
Yet “the turning point in the British position came after October 4th 1915, when 
the United States government began releasing information on the destruction of 
Ottoman Armenians. This was through a front organisation called the Committee 
on Armenian Atrocities (CAA), which had direct access to State Department files 
from Ottoman Turkey” (Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 2005:viii).
Indeed, it appears as though most of the information about the fate of the 
Armenians was communicated to British authorities from the Ottoman Empire 
via the United States. A central actor in this transmission was Reverend James 
Barton, head of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the 
Committee on Armenian Atrocities, and the American Committee for Armenian 
and Syrian Relief. Barton, the Blue Book informs us, “was highly respected in 
President Wilson’s administration, [and] had direct access to American consular 
reports from the interior of the Ottoman Empire” (Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 
2005:xiii). Such reporting, collaboration with humanitarian aid organizations, and 
the channeling of relief funds were possible because the United States was still a 
neutral power in 1915. In addition, prior to the war, American missionaries had 
enjoyed excellent relations with the American Department of State (see Sarafian 
1994, 2004; Morgenthau 2003).
Yet caution was the order of the day. “In one communication to Bryce, Barton 
explained, ‘Our State Department allows me to make public use of the material if I 
can conceal the source of information. The Consuls in Turkey have been warned [by 
the Turkish authorities] against reporting the local conditions. There is a danger that 
if publicity matter can be traced to the Consuls they may be sent out of the country’ ” 
(Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 2005:xiii). Such concerns about disruptions of diplomatic 
ties have consequences similar to those feared by humanitarian aid workers. Here, 
as in other cases, they suggest caution in reporting about atrocities (Savelsberg 2015: 
chapters 6 and 7). Much in line with Christie’s specific situation, what aid workers and 
diplomats report, despite the risks of bearing witness, should be taken all the more 
seriously. It likely constitutes a conservative assessment of repression and atrocities.
Atrocities Reported in the Blue Book 
Segments of the Blue Book speak to the treatment of the Armenian population in 
the Ottoman Empire in the years 1915 and 1916. The content of these reports from 
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various locales is similar to what we learn from the diaries of Carmelite Christie. 
While Christie describes massacres, evictions, neglect, and abuse of women pri-
marily from her local perspective, this volume suggests patterns across the empire. 
A few examples have to suffice in this context.11 The first is an excerpt from a letter 
“from an authoritative source,” dated August 15, 1915, addressed to an Armenian 
outside of the empire:
It is now established that there is not an Armenian left in the provinces of Erzer-
oum [Erzerum], Trebizond, Sivas, Harpout [Harput], Bitlis and Diyarbekir. About a  
million of the Armenian inhabitants of these provinces have been deported from 
their homes and sent southwards into exile. These deportations have been carried out 
very systematically by the local authorities since the beginning of April last [1915]. 
First of all, in every village and every town, the population was disarmed by the 
gendarmerie, and by criminals released for this purpose from prison. On the pretext 
of disarming the Armenians, these criminals committed assassinations and inflicted 
hideous tortures. Next, they imprisoned the Armenians en masse, on the pretext 
that they had found in their possession arms, books, a political organisation, and 
so on—at a pinch, wealth or any kind of social standing was pretext enough. After 
that, they began the deportation. And first, on the pretext of sending them into exile, 
they evicted such men as had not been imprisoned, or such as had been set at liberty 
through lack of any charge against them; then they massacred them—not one of these 
escaped slaughter. Before they started, they were examined officially by the authori-
ties, and any money or valuables in their possession were confiscated. They were usu-
ally shackled—either separately, or in gangs of five to ten. The remainder—old men, 
women and children—were treated as waifs in the province of Harpout [Harput], 
and placed at the disposal of the Moslem population. The highest official, as well 
as the most simple peasant, chose out the woman or girl who caught his fancy, and 
took her to wife, converting her by force to Islam. As for the children, the Moslems  
took as many of them as they wanted, and then the remnant of the Armenians were 
marched away, famished and destitute of provisions, to fall victims to hunger, un-
less that were anticipated by the savagery of the brigand-bands. In the province of 
Diyarbekir there was an outright massacre, especially at Mardin, and the population 
was subjected to all the afore-mentioned atrocities. In the provinces of Erzeroum 
[Erzerum], Bitlis, Sivas, and Diyarbekir, the local authorities gave certain facilities  
to the Armenians condemned to deportation: five to ten days’ grace, authorisation to 
effect a partial sale of their goods, and permission to hire a cart, in case of some fami-
lies. But after the first few days of their journey, the carters abandoned them on the 
road and returned home. These convoys were waylaid the day after the start or some-
times several days after, by bands of brigands or by Moslem peasants who spoiled 
them of all they had. The brigands fraternised with the gendarmes and slaughtered the  
few grown men or youths who were included in the convoys. They carried off  
the women, girls and children, leaving only the old women, who were driven along 
by the gendarmes under blows of the lash and died of hunger by the roadside. An 
eye-witness reports to us that the women deported from the province of Erzeroum 
[Erzerum] were abandoned, some days ago, on the plain of Harpout [Harput], where 
they have all died of hunger (50 or 60 a day). (Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 2005:52)
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This report indeed is a strong form of acknowledgment. There is no silencing or 
denial, and the core message resembles that from Carmelite Christie’s diaries. 
The fact that it was written from a distance, in a Christian nation at war with the 
predominantly Muslim Ottoman Empire and no alien to Orientalism, certainly 
favored such depiction, but it does not take away from the ontology of the violent 
excesses. Importantly in our context, it contributes to today’s body of knowledge 
about the Armenian genocide.
Some reports detail conditions in specific places, for example, the following pas-
sages we identified in the Blue Book from a “CABLEGRAM, DATED 4th MAY, 1916, 
TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT WASHINGTON 
TO THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR ARMENIAN AND SYRIAN RELIEF, 
FROM THE COMMITTEE’S REPRESENTATIVES IN TURKEY” [caps and italics 
in original]. This account highlights the need for relief support in different areas 
based on the conditions and violent acts committed by the Ottoman government.
Aleppo.
Relief work here supports 1,350 orphans who are only a portion of the destitute chil-
dren now in the city. It has also furnished food to families in nine destitute centres, in-
cluding Hama, Rakka, Killis and Damascus. £1,500 (Turkish) monthly are being used 
at Aleppo for orphans; £600 (Turkish) are being used for the poor of Aleppo; £2,245 
(Turkish) are being used in the destitute centres. This is considered to be a minimum 
allocation, and ten times the amount would not meet the full needs. The work is be-
ing overseen by the German and American Consuls. So insufficient are the funds that 
many exiles in the destitute places have only grass to eat, and they are dying of star-
vation by hundreds. £1,000 (Turkish) are required each week for the Aleppo centre. 
[. . .]
Aintab.
Forty-five hundred Armenians remain here, two thirds of whom are on relief lists. 




This being a station on the route taken by the exiles from the region north of Tarsus, 
the roads are always full of people in miserable condition. According to Govern-
ment estimates, 92,000 exiles have passed through Tarsus, while according to other 
reports, the number is much larger. Typhus is very prevalent. The needs here require 
£500 (Turkish) a month. (Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 2005:70)
With this last entry, the circle closes. The Blue Book takes us to Tarsus, that 
town close to the Mediterranean coast, where Christie wrote her diaries. We link 
back from the big picture to the descriptions of perpetration and human suffer-
ing Christie provided from a local perspective, but in great detail and enriched 
by depictions of the fate of specific individuals. Importantly, the Blue Book was 
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compiled by prominent scholars for publication in a British government series. 
More than the testimony of a lone humanitarian-missionary such as Christie, it is 
thus backed by influential knowledge entrepreneurs. It is a powerful contributor to 
collective memory, backed up by a most influential institution, about the genocide 
against the Armenians.
Excursus: A Question of Validity
The sociology of knowledge is not concerned with the validity of knowledge, the 
construction and shape of which it seeks to explore. The reader might nonethe-
less be interested, and so here I briefly switch gears to summarize debates over the 
validity of the information provided by the Blue Book. While not an exercise in 
sociology of knowledge themselves, these debates are part of the massive epistemic 
struggle with which this book is concerned. They are thus subject to the sociology 
of knowledge.
Britain was party to the unfolding of World War I, and, generally, caution is 
advisable when reading war-related information issued by one party against an 
enemy. Consequently, critiques abound—and, in a newer introduction to the Blue 
Book, the editors see reason to respond:
[I]n recent years a number of partisan authors have argued that the Bryce-Toynbee 
volume was part of a British wartime misinformation campaign against the Ottoman 
Empire and its allies. Such authors have insisted that the work was based on forged 
documents with no scholarly merit. Enver Ziya Karal, a former dean of history at 
Ankara University, dismissed the report as merely “one-sided British propaganda,” 
which was “not worth dwelling upon.” Ismet Binark, former general director of the 
State Archives in Turkey, claimed that “the events described in the reports presented 
as the records of the so-called Armenian massacre . . . [were] all falsified informa-
tion taken from the English’s files relating to the East.” The Treatment of Armenians 
in the Ottoman Empire was “ornamented with massacre stories, unrelated with the 
truth, biased, written with Armenian fanaticism, and misleading the world’s public 
opinion.” (Bryce and Toynbee [1916] 2005:x)
Yet the core messages of the Blue Book are consistent with independent local reports 
such as those by Carmelite Christie. Many others, like hers, are buried in archives 
in Armenia, the United States, France, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany’s foreign 
ministry, home of the archives of Imperial Germany. Contained in all of these 
archives are multiple eyewitness accounts. They include, from the world of Ameri-
can diplomacy, reports by Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Consul Leslie A. Davis 
(in Harput), and Consul Oscar Heizer. Note that, when most of these reports were 
written (1915–16), the United States was not yet involved in the war. Still more sig-
nificant, in light of Turkish critique of the propagandistic intent of the British Blue 
Book, is testimony from German sources. They include statements by Paul Graf 
Wolff Metternich, German ambassador in Constantinople; Walter Rössler, German 
consul in Aleppo; and Wilhelm Litten, head of the German Consulate in Täbris.
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Similar reports come from the German allied military. They include testimony 
by General Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein of the First German-Turkish Expedi-
tion Corps; and by Armin T. Wegner, a German medical orderly, to whom we owe 
much of the iconic photographic evidence of Armenian suffering. Diplomatic and 
military testimony is supported by journalistic reports, including those by Samuel 
S. McClure, an American correspondent, and Harry Stürmer, German correspon-
dent for the Kölnische Zeitung. 
Christie’s diary entries about the treatment of the Armenians and the documen-
tation in the Blue Book also find manifold confirmation among humanitarians of 
the time. Examples are reports by Alma Johannsson and Beatrice Rohner, mis-
sionaries from Sweden and Switzerland, respectively; Tacy Atkinson, an American 
missionary stationed in Harput; Johannes Lepsius, head of the Armenisches 
Hilfswerk (German Armenian aid organization); Jakob Künzler, a German 
missionary and physician’s aid stationed in Urfa; Martin Niepage, a teacher at a 
German school; Ernst Christoffel, director of a home for the blind in Sivas; and 
Karen Jeppe, Danish head of orphanages in Urfa and Aleppo.12
Such eyewitness testimonies, supplemented with occasional moments of 
acknowledgment by Turkish memoir writers (identified by Fatma Müge Göçek; see 
chapters 1 and 5), with photographic evidence (see figure 2), and with conclusions 
Figure 2. Iconic photograph by Armin T. Wegner, a German medic, depicting displaced  
Armenians on their trek into the Syrian Desert. Image courtesy of the Armenian National 
Institute, Inc. / Sybil Stevens (daughter of Armin T. Wegner). Wegner Collection, Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv, Marbach & United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
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drawn by an overwhelming number of historians, suggest the validity of informa-
tion that has today become sedimented in a widely accepted genocide discourse.13 
Such evidence, in combination with the state of scholarship, suggests to me that I 
should use the term genocide against the Armenians throughout this book. Leaving 
this excursus on the validity of the Blue Book and the Christie diaries behind, I 
now return to the role of a sociologist of knowledge.
C ONCLUSIONS
Social interactions result in knowledge, including knowledge about mass violence. 
In addition, actors engage in inner conversations and, at times, externalize and 
objectify such conversations, for example through the writing of reports and dia-
ries. In disorienting contexts, including those of mass violence, they may do so 
because sense-making becomes a precondition of sanity, the ability to act, and 
possibly survival. Carmelite Christie’s diaries are a powerful example. They pro-
vide testimony, even in the context of a humanitarian field, in which Christie has 
to be mindful of the power of government and military. In the terms we have 
established, the “I” (spontaneous thoughts and reactions in the face of suffering) 
is constrained by the “Me” (that part of the self that takes imagined reactions by 
others into account and that, in the social field of humanitarian aid, codetermines 
the habitus of the writer). The Blue Book and a multitude of archival sources show 
that Christie’s local observations about the treatment of the Armenians were part 
of a broad pattern, despite some variation across the Ottoman Empire. The fact 
that institutions such as the British Parliament backed these observations provides 
them with particular epistemic power.
Finally, social interactions as well as inner reflections, externalized in the 
form of diaries, have cultural consequences. Knowledge generated at the micro-
sociological level may become institutionalized, objectified, and sedimented, 
especially when aggregated by macro-level actors such as the authors of the Blue 
Book. The outcome of millions of everyday practices, thus supported, is a col-
lective repertoire of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966). It becomes the 
property of carrier groups (Weber 1978)—that is, collectivities defined by criteria 
such as religion or nationality that secure the transgenerational transmission of 
beliefs and worldviews.14
Importantly, not all participants in these processes are equal. Powerful entre-
preneurs of memory and knowledge, with access to vast resources and channels 
of communication, have an outsized impact on processes of sedimentation and 
aggregation. State actors feature prominently among them. The next chapters 
explore these themes. Chapter 3 provides theoretical and conceptual tools, which 
help analyze, in chapters 4 and 5, how distinct, in fact radically opposed, knowl-
edge repertoires about the mass violence against the Ottoman Armenians became 








Carriers, Entrepreneurs, and Epistemic 
Power—a Conceptual Toolbox toward 
an Understanding of Genocide 
Knowledge
Part I of this book examined how social interactions and inner reflections, some 
expressed in writing, generate knowledge about ongoing and past mass vio-
lence. Silencing, acknowledging, and denying are common strategies, distributed 
unevenly across groups and over time. Part II explores repertoires of knowledge as 
properties of social collectivities. Following this theoretical excursus, I specifically 
seek to display what the Turkish and Armenian peoples know about the events of 
1915 and subsequent years. Throughout, I use the word people with caution, mind-
ful of variation within each of the two ethno-national groups.
Introducing the term carrier group, this chapter recognizes that some knowl-
edge, including knowledge about the past, is the property of groups, transmitted 
across generations. Different groups may develop, through millions of interactions 
and reflections, distinct and at times clashing knowledge repertoires—that is, clus-
ters of taken-for-granted notions of specific phenomena (as described in chapters 1 
and 2). Knowledge thus negotiated becomes sedimented (Berger and Luckmann 
1966:67–72) and relatively resistant to change. Nonetheless, and in line with Mau-
rice Halbwachs’s (1992) thesis on the presentism of collective memory, knowledge 
is subject to later modifications, especially when it is marred by ambiguities, gaps, 
and contradictions, as knowledge about mass violence typically is. Modifications 
of established knowledge are also likely when strategic actors in advantaged insti-
tutional positions seize opportunities to promote knowledge change. Those actors 
are knowledge entrepreneurs or, where knowledge about the past is at stake, mem-
ory entrepreneurs (Schwartz 1991, 2003; Fine 2001). These entrepreneurs may hold 
substantial epistemic power. In the following sections, I detail these concepts and 
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arguments. I apply them to the cases of Turkish and Armenian knowledge about 
the Armenian genocide in chapters 4 and 5.
CARRIER GROUPS AND KNOWLED GE
Maurice Halbwachs—noted French sociologist, a student of Émile Durkheim, and 
later a victim of Nazi Germany’s concentration camps—examined how know-
ledge develops in social groups. He famously coined the term collective memory, by 
which he meant knowledge about the past that is shared, mutually acknowledged, 
and reinforced by a collectivity (Coser 1992). Halbwachs (1992) thereby recognized 
that memory is the property of social groups. To be sure, individuals remember, 
but Halbwachs showed how group processes shape what they think about the 
past.1 Group boundaries are also boundaries of shared memories.
A different line of sociological thought aligns well with Halbwachs’s notion 
of collective memory, and it provides an additional building block to our under-
standing of group-specific knowledge, including knowledge about mass violence 
and genocide. Max Weber (1978) wrote about carrier groups to refer to collectivi-
ties such as social classes, ethnic groups, and formal organizations that are associ-
ated with specific ideas or religious beliefs and carry them across time, even across 
generations (see Kalberg 1994, 2014; Gorski 2003). Members take these ideas and 
beliefs for granted, and they reaffirm them. Knowledge and ideas become doxa—
that is, taken-for-granted, unquestioned assumptions about the world.
Building on Weber, Karl Mannheim (1986, [1936] 1985) applied the notion of 
carrier groups to the sociology of knowledge. Like Weber, he highlighted social 
classes as carriers.2 He further acknowledged—in fact, he stressed—the overlap 
of different types of groups or units of social organization. His term genera-
tion units, for example, refers to groups of persons who are not just part of the 
same birth cohort, having thus experienced the same historical events in their 
formative years, but who additionally have been exposed to similar structures 
of experience (Mannheim 1952).3 Such structures are likely to vary along lines 
of social class, religion, ethnic group membership, or skin color. In other words, 
Mannheim was mindful of the intersectionality of knowledge.
The association between groups and knowledge often results from interest-
based affinities. For a prominent historical example, consider bourgeois classes of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Drawing their strength from ownership 
of capital and their position in expanding markets for goods and services, they 
experienced the impediment of traditional status-group distinctions embedded 
in aristocratic society. They were receptive to enlightenment ideas, to principles of 
formal liberty and the equality of individuals. Intellectuals, philosophers, writers, 
and poets may have been the producers of these notions. Yet their ideas would 
have dissipated had they not attached themselves to receptive social classes that 
provided them with stability and endurance.
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As in the case of generations, class membership interacted with other traits, 
including nationality. In France, for example, enlightenment ideas originated 
with members of the nobility such as Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La 
Brède et de Montesquieu. In his 1748 book on The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu had 
famously proposed the division of government powers, and this notion became 
one of the foundations of modern democratic constitutions. Class coalitions took 
different shape in Germany, where Karl Mannheim (1986) closely examined the 
emergence of a specific type of nineteenth-century conservatism. He identified 
the royal bureaucracy, nobility, and underdeveloped middle classes as carriers of 
conservative thought. These groups privileged thinking that was concrete (favor-
ing folk tradition as opposed to abstract ideas of individual rights) and holistic 
(focusing on the nation as a whole), and they advanced nation-based romanticism 
(see also Elias [1939] 2000; Kalberg 1987; Gorski 2003). Such a worldview reflected 
mistrust in the enlightenment, partly in response to the French Revolution with 
its call for equality, liberty, and solidarity and its abstract notion of rights. Again, 
the link between group membership and ideological identification may be country 
specific. It is never straightforward.
Knowledge may also directly grow out of the lived experience of social groups, 
including the experience of violence. Collectivities exposed to violence are often 
defined by national, ethnic, or religious characteristics. Their background and 
experience combine to shape them into carrier groups with distinct memories of 
atrocity. Knowledge repertoires of perpetrator and victim groups frequently offer 
the starkest contrast, and they may clash in mnemonic struggles. Chapters 4 and 5 
explore Armenians and Turks as carriers of starkly conflicting knowledge reper-
toires about the Armenian genocide. Chapters 7 and 8 examine struggles.
FLEXIBILIT Y OR INERTIA OF KNOWLED GE?
The notion of carrier groups might suggest stability of knowledge over time. Yet the 
following chapters show flexibility as well. What social forces might then induce 
shifts in knowledge within carrier groups? What are the limits of such mutabil-
ity? Thankfully, several lines of sociological scholarship provide us with tools that 
guide us through the analyses of the following chapters. They inspire a thesis, an 
antithesis, and a synthesis.
Thesis: Flexibility and Presentism
On one side of the divide, we find Maurice Halbwachs’s argument about the pre-
sentism of collective memory. By presentism, Halbwachs meant that current-day 
interests and needs of social groups tend to affect their knowledge about the past. 
Images of historical events, in this line of thought, are always subject to change. 
Applied to our topic, knowledge about past mass violence likely takes new 
shape over time and from generation to generation. Halbwachs exemplified his 
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argument by tracing shifting ideas about the topography of the Holy Land over 
several centuries, as Lewis Coser summarizes in his introduction to Halbwachs’s 
work: “The Jerusalem, say, of the Persians, the Romans, the Jews and the Christian 
crusaders described a landscape that shifted rapidly in character depending on 
the various nation-states that dominated the Holy Land over a long span of time” 
(Coser 1992:28).
More recent empirical evidence supports presentism arguments about the flexi-
bility of knowledge. Weil (1987), for example, shows that an astonishingly high per-
centage of Germans held on to the notion of Hitler as a great political leader in the 
immediate years after the end of World War II. Yet these attitudes changed substan-
tially during the 1960s, largely driven by new birth cohorts who were not social-
ized under the Nazi regime (cohort effect). Older cohorts, indoctrinated under 
Nazi rule, eventually followed suit (period effect). For the United States, Schwartz 
and Schuman (2005) identify changes in the popular memory of Abraham 
Lincoln, especially after the civil rights movement. Of various traditional images 
of Lincoln, including those of the savior of the Union and the man of the people, the 
notion of the abolitionist, the great emancipator, eventually prevailed. Even where 
memories are carved in stone, including memories of violence, later modifications 
and uses by visitors may change the meaning of the memorial site—for example, 
from the somber to something patriotic, even heroic. Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 
(1991) offer an impressive example of this in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.
In short, presentism of memory is a force with which to contend. Knowl-
edge, even if held by carrier groups, is subject to modifications. It is always 
living knowledge.
Antithesis: Signification, Sedimentation, and Inertia of Knowledge
Despite such support for the notion of flexible knowledge repertoires and the pre-
sentism of collective memory, scholarship has also produced arguments that sug-
gest at least relative inertia of knowledge. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann 
(1966), for example, in The Social Construction of Reality, write about the objecti-
vation, signification, and sedimentation of knowledge (see also Zerubavel 2016). 
Objectivation is the process through which subjective meanings become part 
of the intersubjective world, available beyond face-to-face situations. Consider 
examples surrounding the theme of hate and violence. Hate is a subjective state, 
often expressed through facial expressions and gestures in the here and now. Once 
haters throw rocks to smash the window of a church, synagogue, or mosque, the 
communication of meaning no longer depends on such temporary expressions. 
The broken window and the rocks represent the meaning that motivated the act.
One important type of objectivation is signification, the production of signs 
that can deliver intended meaning, including hate messages, most powerfully. 
Instead of breaking a window, anti-Semites may have painted a swastika on the 
wall of the synagogue. Such signs typically cluster in systems, and language is 
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the most significant sign system in the social world. It is more detachable from 
face-to-face situations than other sign systems. It transcends the here and now 
most effectively. Language organizes signs. It builds up classification schemes 
for things such as gender, zones of intimacy, and types of violence. It allows us, for 
example, to identify and categorize acts of violence as war, terrorism, self-defense, 
crimes against humanity, or genocide. Within such semantic fields (fields of signs 
and meanings), biography and history are (selectively) retained, accumulated, and 
passed on through time.
Via accumulation, groups build a stock of knowledge and transmit it from 
generation to generation. In the end, the commonsense world of social collectivi-
ties is equipped with specific bodies of sedimented knowledge. We know that we 
share such knowledge with others—and they know that we know. The confidence 
is mutual, advancing group cohesion and a special sense of trust in other members 
of our in-groups. Berger and Luckmann also write about language as an aggregate 
of sedimentations, reaffirmed through symbolic objects, actions, and rituals, pro-
viding a sense of reality (on sedimentation as a metaphor, see this book’s “Conclu-
sions”). Humans communicate such reality to new generations through processes 
of socialization. Like the work of Mannheim, a revival of Berger and Luckmann’s 
book has great potential for contemporary sociology, including the sociology of 
knowledge, as several interventions on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary 
of The Social Construction of Reality show (e.g., a special issue of Cultural Socio-
logy, vol. 10, no. 1, 2016; Knoblauch and Wilke 2016; Presser 2018:9).
This, then, is the antithesis: A world (and history) constructed through objec-
tivation, signification, and sedimentation should be solid, not easily manipulated 
to align with current circumstances—against Halbwachs’s notion of presentism. 
Who is right, then, when we address genocide knowledge?
The Test Case of “Genocide”: From Debate to Legal Doxa.  The emergence of legal 
language about mass violence provides a partial answer to the question just raised. 
Such language, too, is generated and diffused in personal interaction, and is fluid 
initially. Eventually, however, legal terms become part of sign systems, doxa, sedi-
mented in the repertoires of law. Remember the conversations in which Lemkin 
engaged with his professor, and later with international lawyers, conversations that 
sparked his initial thoughts about the killings of entire social groups (chapter 1). 
The term genocide grew out of those exchanges, and today we take it for granted. 
It is part of our categorical system when we seek to interpret situations of mass 
violence. It is codified in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, passed by the United Nations in 1948, and in the Rome 
Statute of 1998, the foundation on which is built the International Criminal Court, 
the first permanent international criminal court. We depend on this concept 
and on related categories such as crimes against humanity (Lauterpacht 1943) 
or atrocity crimes (Scheffer 2012) when we think and communicate about mass 
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violence. Clearly, international criminal law is an example of a sign system. Sym-
bolic objects, actions, and rituals such as international trials reaffirm the validity 
of these concepts and the notion that they reflect real phenomena. The category of 
genocide becomes independent of the interactive contexts from which it emerged.
The Test Case of Genocide: Toward Cultural Trauma.  What applies to the con-
cept of genocide also holds true for knowledge about specific instances of mass 
killings. Again, social interaction and communication contribute to repertoires of 
knowledge about events such as the Armenian, Cambodian, or Rwandan geno-
cides or the Holocaust. In communication, these historical events, disturbing and 
confusing initially, take cultural shape. The process of meaning-making begins in 
the situation of terror, as we learn from survivor narratives (Neurath [1943] 2005; 
Levi [1986] 2017; Semprún 1981). Eventually, even those who never experienced 
violence know what occurred, and they may learn to empathize. The dark past 
becomes part of their world. They may even experience the cultural trauma of 
victims or of perpetrators, including their descendants and those who learn to 
identify with them (Alexander et al. 2004).
The late Berkeley sociologist and psychoanalyst Neil Smelser defined cultural 
trauma as “a memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant member-
ship group and evoking an event or situation that is a) laden with negative affect, 
b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as threatening a society’s existence or 
violating one or more of its cultural presuppositions” (2004:44). Again, the group 
is central as a carrier of knowledge, in this case of collective memory or—yet more 
specifically—cultural trauma. Jeffrey Alexander (2004) adds that cultural trauma 
is anchored in Émile Durkheim’s classical idea of “religious imagination.” Such 
imagination, argues Alexander, forms “inchoate experiences, through association, 
condensation, and aesthetic creation, into some specific shape” (2004:9). In other 
words, what once was diffuse and chaotic in the minds of those who experienced 
horrific events begins to take shape and comes into focus; it becomes organized. 
Only after such transformation are groups able to communicate effectively about 
terrifying experiences and potentially share them, as solidified knowledge, with 
others who were not directly involved.
Like legal concepts, knowledge about specific experiences of mass violence 
becomes resistant to change, in line with Berger and Luckmann’s arguments. This 
applies to the recognition of genocide, where cultural trauma emerged, for example 
in the cases of the Shoah or Rwanda. It likewise applies to denial of mass violence, 
colonialism, and oppression. Consider the memory of Christopher Columbus. 
Even if today’s history textbooks depict Columbus critically, even if social move-
ments portray him as co-responsible for the genocide of indigenous American 
populations, even if mass media and politicians display sympathy with the victims 
of the European conquest, the traditional image of Columbus as the “discoverer 
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of America” remains dominant in nationally representative opinion polls (84.7%) 
(Schuman, Schwartz, and D’Arcy 2005). Few see him as a villain (3.6%). Schuman 
and coauthors attribute such inertia to the institutionalization of the “traditional 
Columbus” memory through Columbus Day commemoration in schools, paint-
ings, statues, and literature.
Postcommunist Russia partially, but only partially, confirms the notion of mne-
monic inertia. In the late twentieth century, a majority of Russians continued to 
remember the Stalinist purges of 1936–38, especially those who had lived through 
the period.4 They did so despite widespread silencing of this violent chapter of 
history by the Soviet, and later Russian, state—a case of inertia. Yet the memory 
dropped off substantially among younger cohorts (Schuman and Corning 2000)—
proof of the limits of inertia due to an imperfect intergenerational transmission of 
knowledge in adverse political contexts.
In short, different strands of scholarship are divided, each supported by empiri-
cal evidence. Some suggest flexibility and others inertia of knowledge, including 
knowledge of past mass violence—thesis and antithesis.
Toward Synthesis: Dialogism and Carrier Group Dynamics 
Contemporary scholarship has addressed the tension between inertia and pre-
sentism, creatively working toward a synthesis. It holds on to Halbwachs’s insights 
regarding the mutability of knowledge. Yet it simultaneously allows for degrees of 
inertia, recognizing the weight of sedimentation and endurance of carrier groups. 
Olick (1999), for example, studied May 8 anniversaries in Germany and asked 
whether this day in 1945 was commemorated as defeat (of a nation guilty of the 
crimes of the Nazi regime) or as liberation (of a nation victimized by the Nazi 
regime). Building on Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism, in which each utter-
ance is a link in the chain of speech communication, Olick analyzes commemora-
tion of this difficult date for each of the subsequent decades. He finds substantial 
path dependency, meaning that today’s speakers at commemorative events have 
to take past commemorations (and the reactions they received) into consider-
ation (i.e., inertia). Yet he simultaneously identifies politics of commemoration as 
speakers take seriously current-day conditions, from the hardship of the imme-
diate postwar era, via exposure to the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial and intergener-
ational frictions of the 1960s and 1970s, to rightist violence in post-unification 
Germany of the 1990s (i.e., presentism).5
While Olick displays the simultaneity of the past in the present and the present’s 
manipulation of the past, analyses of Armenian versus Turkish knowledge about the 
Armenian genocide show that specific conditions allow for flexibility, while others 
promote inertia. The nature of the knowledge at stake matters, as do the different 
types of actors who seek to change knowledge. Their interests and institutional posi-
tions, their narrative facility, and their epistemic power are crucial factors.
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AMBIGUOUS KNOWLED GE,  KNOWLED GE 
ENTREPRENEURS,  AND EPISTEMIC POWER  
IN C ONTEXT
Knowledge about difficult experiences is full of ambiguities, as we have seen: per-
forated by gaps and silences; marred by contradictions; resulting from struggles 
between recognition, silencing, and denial. Such features of knowledge may create 
vulnerabilities, opening up opportunities for revision when strategic actors seek to 
revise images of history. True for participants in everyday interactions, this holds 
especially for strategic players, often macro-level actors such as representatives of 
movements or parties, or heads of organizations or governments. Their institu-
tional positions allow them to reach large audiences, and they are chief promotors 
of presentist adaptations of knowledge to contemporary interests. Scholarship 
often refers to them as entrepreneurs, including problem entrepreneurs in the tra-
dition of social problems theory (Schneider 1985), reputational entrepreneurs, or 
mnemonic or knowledge entrepreneurs. Barry Schwartz (1991; 2003) and Gary 
Fine (2001) have documented, in multiple case studies, how entrepreneurs shape 
reputations of past presidents or of entire communities. Their success depends 
on their motivation, driven by material or ideal interests, and on their institu-
tional placements, their ability to reach large audiences. Clearly, what applies to 
reputations also affects other types of knowledge, including genocide knowledge. 
Accordingly, the role of knowledge entrepreneurs will show prominently through-
out all of the following chapters.
Narrative Facility and Receptive Audiences
Narrative facility advances knowledge entrepreneurship. It manifests itself in 
the skilled use of analogies and narrativization (Rydgren 2007). Consider analo-
gism, the drawing of conclusions from a partial similarity to a similarity in all 
other respects. This strategy is attractive because it reduces uncertainty—even if 
it offends against the rules of logic. During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, for 
example, the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, evoked memories of the 
1389 Battle of Kosovo between Serbs and troops of the Ottoman Empire to advance 
his campaign against Bosnian Muslims. He analogized from the aggressive cruelty 
of the fourteenth-century Ottoman military to the twentieth-century Muslims of 
the former Yugoslavia, to whom he falsely attributed aggressive tendencies.
Some literature relatedly uses the term analogical bridging—that is, the appli-
cation of an event that has taken clear cultural shape to a new event that is still 
confusing. A well-known example is the image of Bosnian Muslims, emaciated, 
behind the barbed wires of the Omarska concentration camp during the Bosnian 
civil war. Albeit partially staged, this image, published on title pages of news 
magazines all over the world, resembled iconic pictures of liberated inmates from 
Nazi concentration camps and thus evoked memories of the Holocaust. It also 
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contributed to the willingness of Western powers to intervene militarily. Effects of 
skilled analogical bridging can obviously be substantial.
The second way to display narrative facility is skilled narrativization, success-
ful reduction of complexity by bringing events into an order of interconnected 
sequences. Narrativization often goes along with other forms of simplification, as in 
Marxist or Christian master narratives that distinguish dichotomously between the 
righteous and the condemned. Such dichotomization is a common trait of narration 
in the aftermath of mass violence. Some legal concepts, prominently “genocide,” 
actually require the identification of entire groups as victims—and, by implica-
tion, that of other groups as perpetrators. Importantly, narratives about violence 
not only shape knowledge repertoires, but may also lay the groundwork for future 
violence or for the slowing of circles of violence, a core theme in narrative crimi-
nology (Presser 2018) and in neo-Durkheimian writings about war (Smith 2005). 
Such narratives may be advanced by rituals, which are the subject of chapter 6.
One additional condition is required to achieve epistemic change: receptivity of 
audiences. Receptivity to simplifying narratives is high in times of uncertainty. In 
such eras, schematized knowledge is in high demand, and leaders who are trusted 
on the basis of common ethnicity or positions of authority find the greatest reso-
nance. David Garland (2001), seeking to explain excessively punitive attitudes in 
late modern societies, cites Anthony Giddens’s notion of “ontological uncertainty.” 
He argues that elites would not have succeeded in instilling a culture of control 
on the populace without a general sense of uncertainty, social isolation, and loss 
of trust in traditional institutions. Like late modernity, post-genocide periods are 
rife with ontological uncertainty. Old ties have been torn apart, institutions under-
mined. Limited contact across groups further enhances receptivity to narratives 
with clear messages and stark images of the other (Rydgren 2007). Context thus 
codetermines which narratives reach audiences and “what kind of a hearing par-
ticular stories secure” (Polletta 2006:167).
Epistemic Power
Knowledge entrepreneurs succeed best in certifying or modifying knowledge if 
their narrative facility is supplemented by epistemic power. I approach this dif-
ficult term by first clarifying what I mean by power. For the level of social action, 
especially suited for concrete decision-making processes, Max Weber provides us 
with his classical definition. He refers to power as “the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resis-
tance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (1978:53). Building 
on Weber, I have elsewhere coined the term representational power. Specifying 
the notion for the realm of international criminal justice, I referred to representa-
tional power as the chance for international criminal justice institutions to affect 
collective representations and memories, even against resistance, and thereby to 
impress on a global public an understanding of mass violence as a form of criminal 
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violence (Savelsberg 2020a). More broadly, we may conceive of epistemic power as 
the chance for actors to affect knowledge repertoires, even (but not necessarily) 
against resistance, in line with their desired understanding of reality, regardless of 
the basis on which this probability rests.
The means of epistemic power, the basis on which the probability to affect 
knowledge rests, are diverse. In the context of genocide knowledge, actors may 
practice power through the initiation and structuration of rituals (a mechanism 
explored in chapter 6); through the threat of economic or diplomatic sanctions or 
military force in international relations, or the risk that ethnic blocks will with-
draw voter support in electoral politics (mechanisms explored in chapter 7); or 
by the use of legal resources (as analyzed in chapter 8). All of these strategies may 
enhance the ability of some actors (and reduce that of others) to certify, diffuse, or 
regulate knowledge.
In the context of state action, special kinds of power to which social actors 
attribute legitimacy play an important role. Weber calls them authority or domi-
nation. Submission to the will of others here involves a voluntary element, a belief 
in the justification of command. Such justification may be based on a “belief in 
the appropriate enactment of impersonal statutes and regulations” (Kalberg 
2005:xxii). A case in point is obedience to legislatively imposed language reg-
ulations that criminalize either genocide denial or the articulation of genocide 
history. Court judgments are another example of legal-rational authority, and 
struggles over court decisions that pertain to speech rights versus restrictions on 
hate speech show the importance that current societies attribute to this mecha-
nism (see chapter 8). Perceived justification of authority or domination may rest, 
alternatively, on charisma, whereby “obedience results from a belief in and devo-
tion to the extraordinary sanctity and heroism of an individual person” (Kalberg 
2005:xxii). It may finally be rooted in tradition, when “obedience results from an 
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of 
those exercising rulership under them (for example, clan patriarchs)” (Kalberg 
2005:xxix–xxx). Indeed, obedience based on old age or religion is relevant in our 
context, because many Armenians and many Turks are closely wedded to reli-
gious communities—the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Hanafi school of 
Sunni Islam, respectively.
The notion of legitimacy also fares prominently in Pierre Bourdieu’s concept 
of symbolic power, a tacit mode of cultural domination unfolding within every-
day social habits and belief systems (Bourdieu 1984). For Bourdieu, symbolic 
power is “the form that the various species of capital [economic, social, cul-
tural] assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate” (Bourdieu 
1989:17). Symbolic capital thus enables its holders to use their economic, social, 
or cultural capital in order to impose ideas and knowledge on others. They are 
unlikely to face resistance. The term hegemony, to which I return in chapter 9, is 
closely related.
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STRUCTUR AL C ONTEXT S OF GENO CIDE 
KNOWLED GE:  INSTITUTIONS,  NATIONS,  
AND HISTORICAL TIME
Narrativization and the practice of power happen not in a vacuum, but in the 
context of social fields—for example, legal and political fields (and the institutions 
embedded in them). Each social field follows its own rules of the game, and insti-
tutions are endowed with specific institutional logics.
Institutions and Their Rules of the Game (Institutional Logics)
Consider criminal trials and the stories, silencing, denial, and acknowledg-
ment they generate. Their narratives tend to focus on individuals, relatively 
short time frames, and the need to arrive at binary guilty/not guilty decisions. 
They are also contingent on specific evidentiary criteria that differ from those 
accepted, for example, in the world of scholarship. Under such conditions, 
participants act in predictable ways. Defendants, when confronted with over-
whelming evidence, tend to respond with implicatory denial. In genocide trials, 
they tell a story in which they were ignorant of the atrocities, or at least lacked 
agency, and are thus not guilty. By engaging in implicatory denial, however, they 
implicitly acknowledge the violence and its interpretation as crime, possibly as 
genocide.6 Yet theirs is not the only story told in trials. In the adversarial setting of 
a criminal court, the other side will challenge the defendant’s story and the denial 
it entails. Victim groups and their representatives contest incomplete confessions.
A series of effective trials advance at least partial acknowledgment. Their force 
may help explain differences between post–World War II Germany and post–
World War I Turkey. International trials in the case of Germany are famous, and 
domestic trials there extended over decades. In Turkey, by contrast, there were no 
international trials and the domestic trials took place only in 1919–20. The latter 
trials reached guilty verdicts against some perpetrators, but opponents success-
fully challenged the legitimacy of the proceedings (Göçek 2015).
Nation-States as Contexts
In addition to social fields and institutional settings, societal contexts also affect 
the chances of truth claims to settle in collective knowledge repertoires. Consider 
country contexts in which institutions and social fields are embedded. Recently, 
Mark Wolfgram (2019) demonstrated the weight of national contexts on knowl-
edge about the past in his comparative study of legacies of war and genocide in 
Germany, Japan, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. His comparison highlights the 
explanatory weight of generational distance, generated by nation-specific cultural 
assumptions about strong families, patriarchy, collectivism, and tradition versus 
individualism. These forces impede critical distance toward the past, includ-
ing in generations that follow the perpetrators, and Turkey provides a strong 
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illustration (Wolfgram 2019:185ff). In other contexts, where acknowledgment and 
confessions prevail, they may lead to a contentious coexistence at the societal level 
that is wholesome for democratic development, as Payne (2008) observes in her 
study on confessions in transitional justice contexts and as Göçek (2015) hopes for 
Turkey. Yet at the level of families and communities, a price may have to be paid in 
the currency of discord and conflict.
Like perpetrator knowledge, knowledge repertoires of victim groups are also 
contingent on national context, especially a victim group’s proportional represen-
tation. Wholesome effects of verbal silencing described by Carol Kidron (2009) 
for the families of Holocaust victims in Israel seem to be weaker or absent in the 
diaspora, as stories told by Philippe Sands (2016) illustrate (see chapter 1).
Importantly, though, nation-states are embedded in global contexts, in world 
society. Effects of nation-level action are always contingent on forces emanating 
from world society (a theme I engage with in chapter 9).
Historical Context and Cohorts
Historical context, especially temporal and generational distance from the geno-
cide, may also affect knowledge repertoires. In Germany in the first decades after 
the Holocaust, silencing prevailed, as did implicatory denial in specific contexts 
such as trials. Later, silencing by the perpetrator generation gave way to acknowl-
edgment. At times, members of younger generations struggled for comprehen-
sive, including implicatory, acknowledgment. In other societal contexts, in which 
silence and denial have been successfully institutionalized, such generational pat-
terns are missing. Turkey is a prime example. Turkish intellectuals such as Fatma 
Müge Göçek are not alone with their insistence on acknowledgment, but they 
are exceptions.
Where societies have reached broad consensus about past violence as an 
instance of mass atrocity and genocide, the pressure on individuals and families 
to acknowledge those facts intensifies. Yet such acknowledgment sets in motion 
opposite tendencies at the level of small, intimate groups, especially fami-
lies, that often seek to redefine actions by elders in ways that exculpate those 
involved in the history of perpetration (Welzer et al. 2002). Grandchildren who 
have strong ties with their grandparents experience intense dissonance when 
affection clashes with information about mass atrocities that is taught in school, 
described in literature, or uttered in public discourses—atrocities in which their 
grandparents’ generation had been involved. Even if grandpa was a member of 
the SS in Nazi Germany or of the Special Organization in Turkey, grandchil-
dren will likely find ways to exculpate him. They may reason that he did not 
join voluntarily, or that he was not in the places where atrocities were commit-
ted. Implicatory denial on behalf of a grandparent then becomes a common 
form of stigma management—but, again, it is associated with factual and inter-
pretive acknowledgment.
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C ONCLUSIONS:  HARVESTING THEORETICAL TO OLS
In sum, repertoires of knowledge, including knowledge about mass violence, past 
and present, are associated with group membership. Some types of knowledge 
stick to specific groups with particular ease, especially if they grow out of those 
groups’ experience. We refer to these as carrier groups. Knowledge repertoires 
build up through thousands and millions of day-to-day interactions. They are cap-
tured in enduring signs and symbols, which are sediments of social communication. 
Consequently, inertia is one attribute of such bodies of knowledge.
Yet knowledge is not immutable. Knowledge repertoires, especially those 
entailing ambiguous knowledge, are receptive to mutations, especially when 
knowledge entrepreneurs are involved. Knowledge entrepreneurs are actors who 
are motivated to shape knowledge, who occupy privileged institutional positions 
with access to channels of communication, and who master narrative facility. An 
additional condition for their success is public receptivity, often the result of uncer-
tainty and social isolation. In such contexts, knowledge entrepreneurs may hold 
substantial epistemic power. Yet they have to contend with context: social fields, 
institutions, nation-states, historical time, and generational patterns within which 
they seek to establish, or revise, repertoires of genocide knowledge.
In short, sociological literature offers us a set of conceptual and theoretical tools 
with which to trace and possibly explain conflicting knowledge repertoires held by 
Armenians and Turks about the events of 1915 and subsequent years, their inertia, 
and their transformations—a task to which I turn next.
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Sedimentation and Mutations  
of Armenian Knowledge about  
the Genocide
Armenians are, in Max Weber’s terms, an ethno-religious carrier group. Many 
ancestors of today’s Armenians are survivors of the mass violence of 1915 and sub-
sequent years. These ancestors suffered through great cruelties and experienced 
grave losses, and later generations of Armenians are receptive to the accumulated 
genocide knowledge documented in the first two chapters. While those chapters 
showed great fluidity of knowledge in its early production and intergenerational 
transmission, I now focus on Armenian repertoires of genocide knowledge in its 
sedimented form—relatively stable, but subject to modifications.
Armenians, of course, are not a monolithic group. Some three million live 
in Armenia, long a Soviet Republic but since 1991 an independent country. 
Millions of others live in the diaspora, many in France and the United States, 
where they wage mnemonic struggles against adversaries (see chapters 7 and 8). 
Armenians are divided further by political convictions, by degrees of involve-
ment in religious life, by levels of participation in Armenian organizations, and 
by age cohorts and generations. While keeping these distinctions in mind, I first 
focus on knowledge in Armenia about the mass violence of 1915, and then turn 
to the diaspora.
GENO CIDE KNOWLED GE IN ARMENIA
On a hill named Tsitsernakaberd, overlooking the one-million-inhabitant city of 
Yerevan, capital of the Republic of Armenia, is a memorial complex “dedicated to 
the memory of 1.5 million Armenians” who perished in the genocide. The complex 
“consists of three main buildings: the Memorial Wall, the Sanctuary of Eternity 
(Memorial Hall & Eternal Flame) and the Memorial Column ‘The Reborn Armenia.’ ” 
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It signifies the memory of the violence the Armenian people endured. The mes-
sage is explicated on the website of the memorial complex, from which I took the 
above quotations.1 It is worth quoting from this text in detail:
Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex in Yerevan is dedicated to the memory of the 
1.5 million Armenians who perished in the first genocide of the 20th century, at  
the hands of the Turkish government. Completed in 1967, the Genocide Monument 
has since become a pilgrimage site and an integral part of Yerevan’s architecture. Set 
high on a hill, dominating the landscape, it is in perfect harmony with its surround-
ings. The austere outlines convey the spirit of the nation that survived a ruthless 
campaign of extermination. . . .
Before reaching the central part of the monument, visitors first observe a 100-meter  
long basalt Memorial Wall with the names of cities engraved in stone. The names 
also include the Armenian populations that were massacred by Turks during the 
Genocide campaign. Since 1996, the last portion of the Memorial Wall houses glass 
casings that contain soil taken from the tombs of political and intellectual figures 
who raised their protest against the Genocide committed against the Armenians by 
the Turks. Among them are Armin Wegner, Hedvig Bull, Henry Morgenthau, Franz  
Werfel, Yohannes Lepsius, James Bryce, Anatole France, Jakomo Gorini, Benedict XV,  
Fritioff Nansen, Fayez El Husseyn.
As part of the Monument, an arrow-shaped stele of granite, 44 meters high, 
reaches to the sky, symbolizing the survival and spiritual rebirth of the Armenian 
people. Partly split vertically by a deep crevice, this tower symbolizes the tragic and 
violent dispersion of the Armenian people, and at the same time, expresses the unity 
of the Armenian people.
At the center of the Monument stands the circular Memorial Sanctuary. Its un-
roofed walls consist of twelve, tall, inward-leaning basalt slabs forming a circle. The 
shape of these walls simulates traditional Armenian khatchkars, which are stone slabs 
with large carved crosses at the center. These slabs also suggest figures in mourning. 
The level of the floor of the Genocide Monument is set at one and a half meters lower 
than the walkway. At its center, there is an eternal flame, which memorializes all the 
victims of the Genocide. The steps leading down to the eternal flame are steep, thus 
requiring visitors to bow their heads reverently as they descend.
The symbol-rich buildings of the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex represent 
what collective memory scholars call structural memory, something carved in 
stone, a monument that endures. Yet the meaning attributed to monuments is 
subject to variation across social groups and time. The above interpretation is pro-
vided by the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, part of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia. I conceive of the Museum-Institute 
as a macro-level actor seeking to offer a binding and universal interpretation of 
the mass violence committed against the Armenians. In doing so, it does what 
memory entrepreneurs commonly do: it answers “questions to which a success-
ful process of collective representation must provide compelling answers: A. The 
nature of the pain . .  . B. The nature of the victim . .  . C. Relation of the trauma 
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victim to the wider audience . . . [and] D. Attribution of Responsibility” (Alexander 
2004:12–14). Below, I address each of these in turn.
The nature of the pain is captured, in the long passage quoted above, in the 
words perished, extermination, tragic and violent dispersion, and the repeated use 
of the term genocide, as in “first genocide of the 20th century,” “genocide cam-
paign,” and two more times just “genocide.” The word first gives the events of 1915 
historical primacy over the sequence of subsequent genocides, the second of which 
is the Holocaust. Such primacy must be important to the authors, all the more so 
as it omits the genocide committed by the German military against the Herero 
and Namaqua in 1904 to 1908 in Namibia, then German South West Africa. It is 
unlikely that the authors are not mindful of this event, especially given the histori-
cal proximity and the similarity of the main method of extermination: driving the 
population into the desert so they would painfully perish.
The text also determines the nature of the victims: “1.5 million Armenians,” 
“Armenian populations,” and “the Armenian people.” The categorization is already 
implicit in the term genocide, defined by the Genocide Convention as acts directed 
against a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group” with the intent to destroy 
that group, “in whole or in part.” The authors writing for the Museum-Institute 
also attribute responsibility, defining the perpetrator as “the Turkish government,” 
“Turks,” and “the Turks.” The text does not speak to its authors’ relationship to a 
wider audience. Yet the annual memorial events of April 24, discussed in detail 
in chapter 6, do provide an answer. On these occasions, the president of Armenia 
and the head, or Catholicos, of the Armenian Apostolic Church lead members of 
the cabinet, a procession of celebrities, diplomats, and scholars from around the 
globe; and tens of thousands of Armenians into the memorial. Through this repre-
sentation, and the invitations that precede it, the rituals reach a large international 
audience.
The text describing the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex provides a distilled 
narrative of the violence against the Ottoman Armenians during World War I. 
Mnemonic entrepreneurs—motivated and in a privileged institutional position, 
suited to reach a wide audience—classify the suffering, the victims, and the per-
petrators, and establish a relationship between victims and a world audience. The 
memorial and rituals provide the tools. Local audiences are likely to subscribe to 
the narrative, given three conditions the current context fulfills. The first is uncer-
tainty, generated by continuing Turkish challenges to the narrative, an unstable 
state history, and a neighborhood of potential aggressors. The history of Armenian 
acts of perpetration—incomparably more limited, to be sure, than those the Arme-
nian people endured—may also play into this uncertainty. The second condition 
is the sedimentation of knowledge through decades of interpersonal communica-
tion. The third is the relative lack of communication between the antagonists.
In short, the memorial site of Tsitsernakaberd hill, supplemented by the text 
on the website of the Museum-Institute, provides us with a condensed narrative 
of the Armenian genocide. Shared by Armenian communities around the globe, it 
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is relatively stable, supported by the confluence of knowledge diffused in informal 
social networks over many decades. Yet this narrative is not the natural outcome 
of the events unfolding in the Ottoman Empire. Human agency intervened, and 
knowledge entrepreneurs played a prominent role, leading up to the contempo-
rary understanding.
A series of articles by Armenian scholar Harutyun Marutyan (2007, 2010, 
2014a, 2014b) sheds light on the process that cumulatively formed the dominant 
narrative. Marutyan distinguishes between three major stages: the silence of the 
1920s, the definition of victim status resulting in the establishment of the memo-
rial in 1967, and the emergence of a new Armenian identity beginning in 1988. His 
account provides us with insights into the stability and the flexibility of Armenian 
genocide knowledge, and into the social forces that contribute to both.
Repression and Quiet Reminders: Postwar Memories
The introduction to this book provides a brief overview of the conquest of the 
Armenian people by the Ottoman Turks and the 1923 division of the short-lived 
post–World War I Armenian state between the Soviet Union and Turkey. The 
Soviet-occupied part was initially incorporated into a Transcaucasian Socialist 
Republic. Conditions for the cultivation of an Armenian public national memory 
in the new Soviet Union were poor, and the new multinational country fought, 
with an iron fist, any nationalist movements. Marutyan (2010) attributes the with-
ering of collective memories of the Armenian genocide in the early years of Soviet 
domination to this antinational context. Massive displacements of ethnic popula-
tions and the internment of Soviet-Armenian intellectuals in the Gulags, espe-
cially during Stalin’s Great Purge of 1938, further contributed to discontinuities of 
collective memories (Mouradian 2003; Werth 1998; Polian 2004). Note that this 
was the second destruction of Armenian intellectuals within less than a quarter 
century, occurring just twenty-three years after the April 1915 arrests, deporta-
tions, and killings of leading Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The associated 
memory loss must have been devastating.
At the level of informal social life, Armenian genocide survivors nevertheless 
cautiously cultivated knowledge about the horrors they and their ancestors had 
experienced, even if that cultivation was perforated by the kinds of silencing we 
encountered in chapter 1. Cultivation of knowledge even found written expression: 
“The national tragedy first appeared in Soviet Armenian literature in the form of 
literary descriptions of childhood reminiscences. Writers who survived the atroci-
ties of genocide, and lost their motherland, recalled their childhood years and 
places dear to them, [yet] without actually speaking about the fact of genocide” 
(Marutyan 2010:24–25). There had thus emerged a knowledge repertoire, a form of 
cultural capital—tenuous as it may have been—that enabled Armenians to seize the 
opportunity for public articulation at the moment of de-Stalinization, initiated by 
the new party secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, and articulated famously in his speech 
to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. Remember 
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also that the international community had established the Genocide Convention 
eight years earlier. The moment had come to move beyond the vocabulary of “Metz 
Yeghern” (the Great Crime) that Armenians had used for the mass destruction of 
their people. The time was right to claim the term genocide.
Approaching the Fiftieth Anniversary: Epistemic Shifts of the 1960s
The decade following the thaw of the immediate post-Stalinist moment witnessed 
a rapid expansion of Soviet-Armenian literature. A series of political events helped 
as it brought the memory of the genocide into public view, albeit still cautiously. 
In December 1964, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Armenian 
Communist Party, Yakov Zarobyan, wrote to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with regard to the memory of 
the Armenian past (Marutyan 2014b). Zarobyan pointed at the prominent role 
of nationalist forces in the diaspora for the commemoration of Armenian history 
and noted that “Soviet Armenia does nothing to commemorate the anniversa-
ries of mass killings of Armenians” (quoted in Marutyan 2014b:65). He depicted 
this omission as dangerous in light of the fact that “our country neglects the mem-
ory of hundreds of thousands of our compatriots, thus actually exonerating the 
policy of genocide” (2014b:65). He concluded: “We think it appropriate to com-
memorate the 50th anniversary of the date in the light of the absolute victory of 
the CPSU Leninist national policy, to signify the great achievements of the reborn 
Armenian people in the spheres of economy, culture and science” (2014b:65).
The party secretary was mindful of Soviet interests in maintaining constructive 
relations with Turkey. He stressed that the Armenian tragedy could be commemo-
rated in universalistic terms, without mentioning Turkey’s role, in order to move 
the events from a “level of a solely Armenian tragedy to the level of world his-
tory” (Marutyan 2014b:65). The first secretary’s letter thus showed great sensitivity 
to ideological concerns of the Soviet leadership, while simultaneously raising the 
idea of a memorial. Its author proved himself a skilled and influential knowledge 
entrepreneur in a sensitive context.
Importantly, mass demonstrations in Yerevan in April 1965, on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the genocide, followed the initiative by the Armenian communist 
leadership. Slogans on posters and banners reflected a sense of national renais-
sance, proclaiming, for example, “Compensate [for] Our Lands” or, with an image 
of Mount Ararat, Armenia’s sacred mountain (on Turkish territory), in the back-
ground, “Give a Just Solution to the Armenian Cause” (Marutyan 2010:26).
The skilled moves by the Armenian leadership in combination with these pop-
ular demonstrations convinced the government in faraway Moscow that it would 
be wise to allow for the establishment of a memorial. A competition was held, and 
construction of the winning design was completed in 1967. It differed substantially 
from that of monuments in the style of Soviet Socialist Realism, further support-
ing a sense of Armenian cultural autonomy within the Soviet Union (see figure 3).
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The Armenian public started flocking to the memorial from the beginning, and 
in 1975, eight years after its construction, the Soviet Armenian leadership began 
official visits, laying wreaths on April 24, Commemoration Day. The authorities 
added a Moment of Silence, further sanctifying the memory of those who had 
fallen victim to the Armenian genocide.
Strategic actors in the Armenian political leadership were initially willing to 
pay the price of the omission of any attribution of responsibility for the mass 
atrocities and the celebration of the Soviet Union as a savior of the Armenian 
people. Further, only pain and victimhood were on display—heroism and nation-
alist themes were avoided. Yet, while the memory shaped by strategic macro-level 
actors obviously reflects power asymmetries in Soviet Armenia, the memorial, 
like all elements of structural memory, is polysemic, open to reinterpretations and 
modifications that power holders may not be able to control (see Wagner-Pacifici 
and Schwartz 1991). The continuation of the story is a case in point.
New Opportunities and Analogies: On Polysemy and Reinterpretations 
of the 1980s
World historical changes, unfolding in the late 1980s, fundamentally affected 
Armenia and Armenians. They simultaneously left profound traces in Armenian 
collective identity and affected how Armenians remembered the events of 1915 and 
subsequent years. The Soviet Union became destabilized. The projects of Glasnost 
Figure 3. Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex, Yerevan. Photo courtesy of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of Armenia.
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(openness) and Perestroika (restructuring), designed under Mikhail Gorbachev 
to save the Union, freed up sentiments in peripheral republics that had previously 
lain dormant. In Armenia, a flurry of interconnected events unfolded between 
1988 and 1994:
• In February 1988, in mass demonstrations in the Opera Square of Yerevan, 
hundreds of thousands of people expressed solidarity with demands by 
Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. These Armenians increasingly 
demanded independence from Azerbaijan, to which a Soviet decision had 
assigned Karabakh when the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) sepa-
rated from the Transcaucasian Republic.
• On February 20, 1988, the Soviet of People’s Deputies in Nagorno-Karabakh 
voted to request the transfer of their region from Azerbaijan to Armenia.
• During the last days of the same month (February 27–March 1), anti- 
Armenian pogroms took twenty-six Armenian lives (and six Azeri lives) 
in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait, further fueling nationalist sentiments in 
Armenia. Conspiracy theories claimed that Armenians had instigated the 
violence to discredit Azerbaijan. Almost simultaneously, a series of mass dem-
onstrations took place in Armenia, referred to as the Karabakh Movement. 
Participants in the movement demanded the incorporation of the ethnically 
predominantly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh region into Armenia.
• On November 22, 1988, the legislature of the Armenian SSR passed a “Law on 
the Condemnation of the 1915 Genocide of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey.” 
This law formally designated April 24 as the “Genocide Martyrs’ Commemo-
ration Day.” The political leadership of the Armenian SSR had abandoned 
previous caution about naming the responsible country.
• Just two weeks after the passing of the law, on December 7, 1988, a horrific 
earthquake struck Armenia, taking between twenty-five thousand and fifty 
thousand lives, injuring many more, and destroying towns and villages. In 
response, Armenia experienced an outpouring of international aid, especially 
from the Armenian diaspora.
• In December 1989, the Supreme Soviets of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-
Karabakh passed a resolution on the formal unification of Nagorno-Karabakh 
with Armenia.
• New violence in Azerbaijan followed. Beginning on January 12, 1990, a seven-
day pogrom unfolded against the Armenian civilian population in Baku. 
Ninety Armenians were killed, hundreds injured, and the majority of  
Armenians were expelled from the city.
• On August 23, 1990, Armenia declared its sovereignty, and the issue of the 
genocide was included in the Armenian Declaration of Independence:  
“The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving inter-
national recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western 
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Armenia.” The new country formally declared independence from the Soviet 
Union on September 21, 1991. Independence was completed on December  
26, 1991.
Many of the above events motivated (or were motivated by) the Nagorno-
Karabakh War, an ethnic and territorial conflict that started on a small scale 
in 1988.2 It erupted into open warfare in early 1992, unfolding in the enclave 
of Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan, with ethnic Armenians, 
backed by Armenia, on one side and the Republic of Azerbaijan on the other. By 
the end of the war, in 1994, Armenians controlled almost the entire enclave and 
a mountain pass—originally part of Azerbaijan—that connects Armenia with 
Karabakh. Russia mediated, but a formal peace treaty is missing to this date. 
The conflict, which displaced 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 
Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh, continues to linger, with occasional 
outbreaks of violence. Violence has again intensified into open warfare in the 
fall of 2020.
Early Armenian popular mobilization, especially after the pogroms of Sumgait 
of February 1988, reflect an Armenian understanding of this new conflict in close 
affinity with the memory of 1915. Analogical bridging was at work—that is, an 
interpretation of current events in light of memories of the genocide. Marutyan 
(2007) tells us about these sentiments as he analyzes banners and posters dis-
played at Armenian demonstrations. He interprets them as “changing icons . . . as 
an index of the collective understanding of the Movement by its participants . . . 
[and of the] stages of transformation of ethno-psychological orientations, and the 
changing identity of the nation as a whole” (Marutyan 2007:85). 
What, then, do banners and posters tell us about shifts in collective identity and 
genocide knowledge at this dramatic historical juncture? Marutyan (2007) identi-
fies several major themes, each expressed by demonstrators and captured best in 
titles the author chose for section headings. The first set includes “Recognize the 
Great Genocide of 1915”—presented in the shape of (then familiar) Soviet-style 
wreaths—and “We Demand of our Soviet Government that the 1915 Genocide Be 
Officially Recognized.” This theme should not be surprising in light of the events 
of 1965 to 1967, leading up to the establishment of the memorial, and the yearly 
anniversary commemorations ever since. Yet, at this historic moment, toleration 
of commemoration no longer sufficed; recognition became the demand of the day. 
When the government in Moscow did not respond, producers of posters directed 
their call to global authorities. A banner of April 1989 reads, “We appeal to United 
Nations to accept the Armenian Genocide.”
This first episode in the unfolding drama teaches two lessons. First, the weak-
ening of the Soviet Union provided movement leaders and Armenians generally 
with opportunities for the expression of nationalist agendas and associated memo-
ries, especially memories of the genocide. Second, activists seemingly hoped for a 
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“boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). By appealing to global actors, they 
bargained that their country’s government, not responsive to local voices, would 
be swayed by changing positions of a world audience.
A second set of posters established a series of causal links and analogies 
between different events of mass violence: “Sumgait is a sequel to the Genocide” 
or “Sumgait is a continuation of the Great Genocide.” Other banners and post-
ers displayed the dates “1915” (genocide) and “1988” (Sumgait pogroms) against 
the silhouette of Mount Ararat. They linked the current events in Sumgait, no 
matter the difference in scale, to the genocide of 1915 and to Armenian identity. 
Intensifying such analogical bridging, and thereby underlining the message, on 
the genocide anniversary of April 24, 1988, a khatchkar (traditional Armenian 
cross-stone) commemorating the victims of Sumgait was erected on the area of 
the genocide memorial. Other khatchkars followed in later years, commemorat-
ing subsequent pogroms.
Another poster of April 24, 1988, engages in further analogism: “Der-Zor, 
Buchenwald, Sumgait.” This message links the Sumgait pogrom to Deir ez-Zor, a 
city in eastern Syria that had been a core destination of the genocidal deportations 
during World War I. Tens of thousands of Armenians who had survived the tor-
turous journey perished in nearby concentration camps. Marutyan estimates the 
number at two hundred thousand. Buchenwald is one of the early concentration 
camps erected by the Nazi German government. The producers of banners thereby 
linked both the Armenian genocide and the Sumgait pogroms to Nazi Germany’s 
concentration camps.
Mnemonic entrepreneurs elsewhere in the world drove the analogy between 
the Nazi crimes and the destruction of the Armenians further. For example, Peter 
Balakian wrote in The New York Times of December 5, 2008: “For Armenians, Der 
Zor has come to have a meaning approximate to Auschwitz. Each, in different 
ways, [is] an epicenter of death and a systematic process of mass killing; each a 
symbolic place, an epigrammatic name on a dark map. Der Zor is a term that sticks 
with you, or sticks on you, like a burr or thorn: ‘r’ ‘z’ ‘or’—hard, sawing, knifelike.” 
Yet more pronounced is the statement of Armenia’s president during a 2010 state 
visit to Syria, at the Church of Holy Martyrs at Deir ez-Zor: “Quite often historians 
and journalists soundly compare Deir ez Zor with Auschwitz saying that ‘Deir ez 
Zor is the Auschwitz of the Armenians’. I think that the chronology forces us to 
formulate the facts in a reverse way: ‘Auschwitz is the Deir ez Zor of the Jews’. Only 
a generation later, the humanity witnessed the Deir ez Zor of the Jews” (quoted 
in Marutyan 2014b:70–71). The skilled use of analogisms testifies to the narrative 
facility of mnemonic entrepreneurs. This strategy is especially powerful when ana-
logical bridging links the Armenian genocide with the Shoah.
Other posters at the April 1988 demonstrations in Armenia quoted poetry 
of mourning from the aftermath of the 1915 genocide. Yet others, with banners 
reading, for example, “We demand the truth about Sumgait,” called for political 
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assessments of the recent pogroms and for the attribution of guilt. Some suggested 
appropriate answers, proclaiming that the governments of Azerbaijan and the 
USSR were responsible: “Moscow + Baku = Sumgait.”
Increasingly, with the drive for independence intensifying, and the Soviet Union 
weakening further, opportunity structures became yet more favorable. Dem-
onstrators now identified Moscow as complicit with the perpetrators. Merging 
the themes of Soviet guilt and Holocaust analogism, and supplementing this the-
matic pair with a reference to Stalinist crimes, one banner of November 18, 1988, 
stated: “These are our children. Buchenwald—Oswiecim—Khatin—Experience 
exchange—Sumgait—Masis—Zvartnots—Shushi—Stepanakert .  .  .” (Marutyan 
2007:100). Depicted on this poster was a soldier of Nazi Germany’s Wehrmacht 
and a Soviet internal forces soldier, shaking hands from which blood drips to 
the ground. Armenian movement leaders, encouraged by the lack of repressive 
responses by the reforming and weakening Soviet state, now began to link their 
memory of the genocide with the history of Soviet repression, including a repres-
sion of nationalist sentiments.
A fifth major theme, emerging in this ever-changing field of opportuni-
ties, appeared on a poster reading, “We Should Fight, Not Weep . . . .” Here, the 
narrative moved from one of victimization to one of active, in fact forceful, agita-
tion. Marutyan suggests:
Perhaps it was due to this, that all of about 60 posters of April 24th, 1990 completely 
lacked any pleading intonations. Among the posters recorded on that day calling 
for fight and for getting armed, a text taken from a fedayeen song was depicted in 
six different posters . . . , ‘We should fight, not weep, but fight / to gain back losses of  
nation by weapons.’ The fact that the text of an 80-year-old patriotic song was so 
often recalled is proof enough of a parallel between the events of the 1900’s and the 
1980’s, as well as of a certain resemblance in the mentality of the Armenian people 
then and now. (Marutyan 2007:103)
The new Armenian identity as fighters did not replace the memory of victimiza-
tion; it supplemented it, as many other posters and banners documented on the 
same occasion.
In short, knowledge about the Armenian genocide in Armenia proper showed 
both stability, due to the slow accumulation of knowledge through everyday inter-
action (Berger and Luckman 1966), and change. Mnemonic entrepreneurs made 
sure that private knowledge became public, but they also drove knowledge change. 
Their representational power became visible especially in the last phase of Soviet 
rule, when they incorporated the notion of heroism and nationalism into Armenian 
collective memory, built analogical bridges between genocide knowledge and 
repression during the Soviet (and especially the Stalinist) era, and made a further 
bridge to the Holocaust. Knowledge entrepreneurs initially included leaders of 
the national branch of the Soviet Communist Party. Later, in the 1980s, social 
movement leaders and their followers played crucial roles. Today, in independent 
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Armenia, political leaders are prominent in this regard, in harmony with insti-
tutions such as the Museum-Institute of Tsitsernakaberd and the thousands 
of Armenians who make the annual pilgrimage to the genocide memorial on 
April 24, the anniversary of the genocide.
In the Armenian drama, as in similar situations elsewhere, some drivers of 
mnemonic change occupy influential institutional positions. They are highly moti-
vated by ethno-political agendas, and they possess substantial narrative facility, 
skillfully using narrativization and analogisms (Rydgren 2007). All of the above 
factors are among the conditions Fine (2001) highlights as preconditions for suc-
cessful memory entrepreneurship (see chapter 3). Mnemonic entrepreneurs finally 
recognize and seize opportunities, here the weakening and eventual breakup of the 
Soviet Union. While this story from Armenia entails central sociological lessons 
about the generation and mutation of knowledge about genocide, we gain addi-
tional analytic leverage when we examine genocide knowledge in the very differ-
ent context of the Armenian diaspora.
ARMENIAN GENO CIDE KNOWLED GE  
IN THE DIASPOR A
Almost a century has passed since survivors of the Armenian genocide, in search 
of safety and new opportunities, migrated to new countries. The leading recipients 
were France and the United States. Here, as ethnic minorities, Armenians built up, 
maintained, reinforced, and defended, in mnemonic struggles, knowledge about 
the Armenian genocide.
Consider the United States. Today, according to U.S. Census data, 447,580 
Americans self-identify as Armenian Americans, about 0.14 percent of the U.S. 
population. Estimates suggest, however, that the actual ethnic Armenian popu-
lation is more than twice that size. Some Armenians had already arrived in the 
United States in the late nineteenth century, but many more followed in the con-
text of World War I and the genocide. These populations are concentrated in 
California, especially in Fresno and Los Angeles, in New York, and in Massachusetts, 
particularly in Boston and its suburb of Watertown. Ten percent of Watertown’s 
population are of Armenian descent.
Estimates of the size of ethnic minorities are yet more difficult in France, 
where the law prohibits census takers from inquiring about origin and 
ethnic status. Experts on French Armenian issues nevertheless suggest an ethnic 
Armenian population of about five hundred thousand, approximately one percent 
of the French people. Most French Armenians are concentrated in the metropoli-
tan areas of Lyon, Marseille, and Paris.
In diasporic communities of both countries, communication about the mass 
killings was spotty in the decades immediately following the genocide, a pattern 
similar to that of the former Armenian SSR and its Transcaucasian predeces-
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sor. Quotations from autobiographies, interviews, and “How it was to grow up 
Armenian in…” reports (cited in chapter 1) provide illustrations. In regard to the 
United States, recall the autobiographical reflections of Peter Balakian, who would 
later become a Pulitzer Prize–winning writer about the Armenian genocide. 
Balakian had little knowledge about the genocide far into his adolescence.
In France, Serge Avédikian, a French Armenian actor and a director of powerful 
films with Armenian themes, and an immigrant from Soviet Armenia, observed 
that “in the 1970s, the Armenian community of France did not yet have all the 
structures it has today. One spoke rather little about the Armenians” (Avédikian 
and Yégavian 2017:37, translated by author). Avédikian continues: “There were not 
yet those claims of recognition of the genocide as organized, explicated, and writ-
ten. There were not yet all those associations, and the traditional parties were very 
closed” (Avédikian and Yégavian 2017:37). Avédikian also writes about Armenian 
ghettos (ghettos arméniennes).
The rather slow development of an ethnic identity and of genocide knowledge 
in France may be due to several adverse conditions. Early French hostility toward 
the new immigrants was one factor. In 1923, for example, the mayor of Marseille 
referred to Armenians as “Cholera and Plague” entering the country (interview 
with Claire Mouradian). Armenians found themselves lower in the ethnic hier-
archies than other “European” immigrant groups (on hierarchy of peoples, see 
Mauco 1932). Low social status challenged Armenians in everyday life all the more, 
as their names revealed their ethnic background (on early Armenian immigration 
to France, see Deschamps 1923; on “hybrid societies” and integration, see Bastide 
1948). After all, Armenians had gained citizenship only after World War II. The 
position of Armenians in France was thus precarious far into the 1960s.
Self-identified as “guests,” Armenians in France acted accordingly. They sought 
to contribute (e.g., serving in the military and the Résistance during World War II). 
After gaining citizenship, they worked to be exemplary French citizens, not 
to seek the benefits of the proverbial “squeaky wheel.” Additional impedi-
ments for the organization of Armenian communities resulted from divisions 
along political lines, as well as from “snobbism” among those self-identifying as 
more European than newer immigrants (interview with Claire Mouradian; for 
details, see Mouradian and Kunth 2010). Yet the 1970s finally brought notice-
able change, even against resistance. In 1975, the first major French book on the 
genocide appeared, and in 1973, the Armenian community of Marseille planned 
a genocide memorial in one of its churches. The French government, however, 
intervened and prevented its realization.
Commonalities in the temporal unfolding of Armenian knowledge about 
the genocide among immigrants to France and the United States and among 
Armenians in the homeland indicate that the early silence in the Soviet Union 
was not only a result of Soviet repression. Instead, it reflects a general tendency 
toward silencing found among many genocide survivors and some descendants. 
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Carol Kidron’s work, cited earlier, attests to this pattern in the case of Holocaust 
survivors. In all of these cases, however, such silence was not to last, and France 
and the United States are no exceptions.
Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century and certainly by the 2015 centennial 
of the genocide, knowledge about the Armenian genocide was firmly entrenched 
in both France and the United States, in Armenian diasporic communities and in 
parts of the host societies. In today’s America, the genocide is a regular subject 
of public presentations and discussions in Armenian congregations and cultural 
associations, whose members flock to annual April 24 commemorations. Arme-
nian youth groups travel to the Republic of Armenia, and a visit to the genocide 
memorial is on their agenda as a matter of course.
On special occasions, such as the one hundredth anniversary of the genocide, 
Armenian organizations set up billboards along major highway arteries. In Min-
nesota they displayed the inscription “1915–2015—100 Years of Remembrance—
The Armenian Genocide,” adding “saintsahag.org,” the web address of the Saint 
Sahag congregation that had initiated this billboard (see figure 4). Also on the 
one hundredth anniversary, congregations of the Armenian Church held memo-
rial services. In the small diasporic community of Minnesota, for example, U.S. 
senators, representatives, and state and local officials attended and addressed those 
assembled in Saint Sahag Church, attesting to the representational power arising 
from the overlap of ethnic and religious affiliation.3
In short, emergence from marginality, strengthening of ethnic self-confidence, 
opportunities arising as external constraints diminish, and temporal distance 
from the genocide allowed mnemonic entrepreneurs to articulate forcefully the 
history of the Armenian genocide, and Armenians to communicate openly. 
The silence of early decades was broken.
Figure 4. Billboard on a highway in the Twin Cities region of Minnesota, March 2015. Photo 
courtesy of Lou Ann Matossian.
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In such situations, chances of finding allies grow, and they materialized in 
the struggle over recognition of the Armenian genocide as well. For example, 
university chairs, some endowed by Armenian donors, organize symposia and 
lectures, as do centers for genocide studies. Academic institutions offer teacher 
workshops to provide high school teachers and college instructors with mate-
rials and strategies designed to evoke their students’ interest in the history of 
Armenians, especially the genocide, a challenge in light of great geographic 
and historical distance.4 Initiatives intended to reach broader audiences further 
include teaching guidelines, issued by state departments of education (the central 
topic of chapter 8).
Knowledge about the Armenian genocide is as prominent in France today as 
it is in the United States. Armenian-French communities established a strong 
sense of identity in the last third of the twentieth century. They began to com-
municate their memory to the world around them. We will see later (in chapter 7) 
how these communicative efforts, paired with political strategies, were a 
precondition for the French legislature to pass a law in 2001 that formally recog-
nized the Armenian genocide and a second law in 2012 that criminalized denial 
of the genocide—even if the latter was overruled by the Constitutional Council.
What, then, contributed to the transformation of knowledge that had remained 
hidden in small communities for half a century? How did it accumulate and 
become a publicly professed memory? Above, we have encountered mechanisms 
such as status gains of ethnic communities, political opportunities, ethnic and 
national organization, and the formation of coalitions with fields such as academia 
and politics. In the following sections, I elaborate on two of these mechanisms 
in greater depth. The first is an organization effect: the promotion of memory 
by ethnic organizations and their leadership. The second is a charging effect: the 
acquisition, by carriers of local knowledge, of universalistic academic capital and, 
through the latter, the extension of that knowledge into civil society.
Ethnic Organizations as Carriers: An American Illustration
Armenian ethnic organizations are potent contributors to genocide knowledge. 
Remember that Max Weber identified both ethnic communities and formal orga-
nizations as carrier groups. Ethnic organizations thus hold a double promise as 
carriers of collective memory. It becomes a triple promise, despite impediments 
resulting from assimilative pressure and internal tensions (Panossian 2006), when 
ethnicity overlaps with a specific religious identity, as is the case for substantial 
parts of the Armenian community.5
Recent studies by Julien Zarifian (2014) and Ben Alexander (2007) indeed 
highlight the central role of ethnic organizations for Armenian diasporic life and 
knowledge held by Armenians in the United States beginning in the early twentieth 
century. Local party headquarters served as social clubs for members, and each 
major organization published its own newspaper. Ethnic leaders play a particular 
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role, as Alexander, working in the tradition of John Higham (1979), shows. They 
strive to build up collective identities and memory among followers, with consid-
erable success.
The division of Armenian American organizations into two adversarial politi-
cal camps, each with its own organizations, provides a natural experiment in that 
each set of organizations cultivated a distinct memory of Armenian history, even 
though both converged on the history of the genocide. On one side is the Armenian 
National Committee of America, earlier named the American Committee for the 
Independence of Armenia. Its roots are in the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(or Dashnak [also Tashnak] Party), founded in the early 1890s in Tiblisi, the 
capital city of Georgia. The Dashnaks pursued a nationalist and socialist agenda. 
They dominated the first Armenian Republic (May 1918–November 1920) 
and strongly opposed incorporation into the Soviet Union. Accordingly, they 
rejected the leader of the Armenian Church in Soviet Armenia, the Catholicos at 
Echmiadzin, who sought to accommodate the Soviet authorities. Instead, they 
have recognized, since 1933, the Holy See at Antelas, Lebanon. The Dashnak side 
of organized Armenian life has published, since 1899 and out of Boston, a weekly 
newspaper, Hairenik (homeland).6
On the other side of the divide is the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA), 
founded in 1972. The AAA grew out of the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party, 
which dates back to 1921 and is rooted in the Armenakan Party of 1885. Originally 
embedded in a bourgeois and clerical milieu, this party eventually broadened 
its base when aligning itself with the Armenian General Benevolent Union 
and its leader, Boghos Nubar Pasha. Motivated by political pragmatism, this strand 
of Armenian organizational life favored accommodation with Soviet Armenia and 
recognized the Catholicos at Echmiadzin. It, too, published a major newspaper to 
disseminate news and commentary, though the name changed repeatedly, from 
Azk (nation) to Baikar (struggle) after 1922, to Armenian Mirror after 1933, to 
AM-Spectator after 1939.
Aligned with this division between two major camps within organized Armenian 
American life, each side cultivated its own version of Armenian history. While the 
Dashnak side celebrated the 1918–20 era as one of a free and independent Armenia, 
often using the terms Armenian people and Dashnaks interchangeably, the AAA 
side depicted the era of the first Armenian Republic, under Dashnak rule, as anti-
democratic, highlighting the preponderance of social problems, economic depri-
vation, and hunger. The division was so deep that, on December 24, 1933, a group 
of young Dashnaks assassinated the Armenian Archbishop of New York, Levon 
Tourian, during a religious service. The bishop had refused, on July 1 of the same 
year, to be seated under a flag of the Armenian Republic during an ethnic cer-
emony. Doing so would have demonstrated a rejection of Soviet Armenia and, 
simultaneously, of the Catholicos at Echmiadzin. The divisions between the two 
factions of organized Armenian life further deepened after the murder, leading to 
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a formal split of the Armenian Church in America. Not surprisingly, subsequent 
generations of Armenian Americans would learn different accounts not only of 
the history of the first Armenian Republic, but also of the assassination of Arch-
bishop Tourian. By 1933, the division and separate sets of knowledge about the first 
Armenian Republic were institutionalized among followers of both movements 
(Alexander 2007).
If ethnic leaders, through competing organizations and associated news outlets, 
succeeded in instilling distinct versions of Armenian state history in their follow-
ers, how much more successful must they have been in impressing on them the 
one issue on which both sides were in full agreement: recognition of the Armenian 
genocide? They succeeded indeed, and they worked to spread knowledge of the 
genocide to broader audiences.
The Armenian Museum of America in Watertown, Massachusetts, exempli-
fies both reaffirmation and outreach. Established in 1985, and affiliated with the 
Dashnak branch of Armenian American organizations, the museum supplements 
a display of Armenian material culture with an exhibit on the Armenian genocide. 
It features artifacts such as the clothing of a boy who was killed, bone fragments, 
and a Bible that belonged to a victim. Panels tell about the progression of the vio-
lence and the American response. The museum’s website describes the display as 
a “stunning visual narrative of the events of the 1915–1923 Genocide, and the con-
tinuing aftermath and denial by the Turkish government over generations.”
The establishment of the AAA and of the museum coincided, not accidentally, 
with an era of “ethnic revival” (Glazer and Moynihan 1970). Even if this revival is 
but an “ethnic myth” (Steinberg 2001), myths contribute to new cohesion among 
those who believe. In addition, this revival occurred during a time of intensify-
ing Holocaust consciousness (Alexander 2002), when other victim groups were 
encouraged to articulate their own suffering (Novick 1999; Stein 2014). Armenian 
group consciousness thus solidified in this era, and Armenian organizations 
reached out to communicate knowledge about the genocide against their people 
to a broader public.
Going further, both branches of Armenian life targeted political actors. Despite 
different histories of political engagement,7 they have headquarters in Washington, 
D.C., hold regular meetings with the Armenian embassy, maintain internet sites, 
and network with members of Congress, especially the eighty-eight-member-
strong Armenian Congressional Caucus.8 In their fight for recognition of the 
genocide, they have been most successful at the state level. All U.S. states have for-
mally recognized the Armenian genocide. At the federal level, successes include 
budgetary allocations to Armenia, the blocking of the nomination of a potentially 
hostile ambassador, and recognition of the genocide by the U.S. Congress in 2020, 
during a time of heightened tensions between Turkey and the United States. As 
of this writing, however, no presidential administration has ever recognized the 
genocide; this is attributable to American political and military ties to Turkey—a 
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NATO ally in the volatile Middle East—in combination with Turkey’s continued 
staunch denial of the genocide (Zarifian 2018).
This historical account delivers a sociological lesson. Ethnic organizations 
function as carriers. Their leaders, as knowledge entrepreneurs, are motivated 
and capable of shaping the identity and consciousness of diasporic communities. 
Opportunities broaden in times of “ethnic revival,” even of “ethnic myth.” In the 
Armenian case, the articulation and diffusion of knowledge about the genocide is 
a core theme, aided by the simultaneous recognition of the Holocaust. Eventually, 
leaders and their followers reach beyond the in-group toward broader audiences. 
Their efforts are likely to succeed in a new era of human rights hegemony, a topic 
to which I return in chapter 9.
Charging Effect: From Biography via Scholarship  
to French Genocide Exhibitions
Another path toward objectivation of subjective experiences of genocide leads 
from biography and exposure to genocide knowledge in family or community 
interactions, to the world of scholarship, and on to major public statements such 
as the curation of a national genocide exhibit. Early motivation is charged by new 
currents from academic life and propelled into public view. The example of Claire 
Mouradian, a French scholar, illustrates this progression well.9
Born in 1951, Mouradian is a French historian, specializing in the history and 
geopolitics of the Caucasus, specifically Armenia and the Armenian diaspora. 
She is director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research 
(Centre national de la recherche scientifique, or CNRS), and she teaches at the 
School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (École des hautes études en 
sciences sociales, or EHESS) in Paris.
In an interview conducted in her office at the EHESS in the summer of 2016, 
Mouradian told me about her grandparents, survivors of the Armenian genocide. 
Her grandfather was a militant (Dashnak), fighting first against the Turks and 
then against the Soviets. He escaped both struggles with journeys leading from 
his home in Diyarbekir via Istanbul, Greece, Armenia, Istanbul again, and finally 
to France. Mouradian also tells about her grandmother Hripsimé, originally from 
Sasun (Sassoun, Sason), a descendant of a “family of fighters.” She reports how 
her grandmother found herself under a pile of corpses at age fifteen, with massive 
injuries, how she was taken in (or held captive) by a local Kurdish family, escaped, 
and eventually arrived in France. Her grandparents raised the young Claire from 
the age of six, after her mother died in a car accident. They lived in Paris, near 
Porte Saint-Martin, in the second arrondissement, rue d’Aboukir, at that time a 
predominantly Jewish and Armenian neighborhood. As mentioned in chapter 1, 
her grandmother talked with Claire about the genocide, and this transmission of 
knowledge and the surroundings in which Claire grew up contributed to her deci-
sion to become a historian and to specialize in Armenian history.
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An impressive career of scholarship and publishing followed. Motivation rooted 
in biographical experience was charged by intellectual currents, and Mouradian 
became an ethnic leader and mnemonic entrepreneur. In 1992, she helped 
reestablish the Société des Études Arméniennes, where she contributed to the pub-
lication of the (albeit short-lived, 1994–2001) scholarly journal Revue du Monde 
Arménienne Moderne et Contemporaine. Later she accompanied the French presi-
dent when he visited Yerevan on the centennial anniversary of the genocide.
In Paris, the path from scholarship to public life is shorter than elsewhere 
(see chapter 7). Claire Mouradian traveled this path successfully, and in 2015, 
on the centennial of the genocide, she co-curated, with historians Raymond 
Kévorkian and Yves Ternon, a major exhibit, hosted by the Shoah Memorial 
(Mémorial de la Shoah) in Paris. The memorial exhibit was paralleled by a second 
display in the Hôtel de Ville, the city hall of Paris. Both exhibits reflect and con-
tribute to the objectivation of knowledge about the genocide as it had developed in 
France by the early twenty-first century. They provide yet another opportunity to 
lay out the structure of sedimented knowledge of the Armenian genocide.
The full title of the exhibit at the Shoah Memorial was Le Génocide des Arméniens 
de l’Empire Ottoman: Stigmatiser, Détruire, Exclure (Mouradian et al. 2015). As 
the title suggests, it was organized in three parts. The first part, entitled “Stig-
matiser” (stigmatize), provides historical background information, from early 
Armenian migration into Asia Minor during the times of the Trojan War; to the 
establishment, the waning and the waxing, and the geographic shifts of Armenia; 
all the way to its absorption into the Ottoman Empire. Under Ottoman rule, the 
viewer learns, Armenians and other minorities enjoyed limited equality and self- 
rule within the millet system, the partial self-administration of ethno-religious 
communities, but at the price of higher tax burdens and the prohibition of 
owning arms.
This section of the exhibit also highlights nineteenth-century military defeats 
of the Ottoman Empire, with substantial territorial losses in the Balkans and Cau-
casus. It informs the visitor that these defeats initiated a new era of stigmatization 
of Ottoman Armenians. Increasing repression resulted in the formation and radi-
calization of Armenian nationalist movements, including that of the Dashnaks. 
The repression turned into mass killings in 1895–96 under Sultan Abdülhamid II. 
Under headings such as “The Politics of the Sultan” or “The Times of Massacres,” 
the exhibit informs the visitor that “the outcome is terrible: more than 200,000 
dead, tens of thousands of orphans, mass conversions, exile of many survivors 
to the Russian Caucasus, Persia and the United States” (Mouradian et al. 2015:21, 
translated). Contemporary posters from France accompany the text tables, show-
ing a blood-stained “Le Grand Saigneur [word play, combining Seigneur, or Master, 
with sang, or blood], le Sultan Abdülhamid II” (published in L’Assiette au Beurre, 
a French satirical magazine). Other countries stood by. An American poster, for 
example, shows John Bull, personification of England, looking at an Ottoman Turk 
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raising his dagger and pistol against a kneeling woman, with the words “C’est dif-
ficile de les déranger—C’est un si bon client” (It is difficult to disturb them—it is 
such a good customer; Mouradian et al. 2015:18). Yet signs of solidarity challenge 
indifference. At the time of the massacres, France experienced an Armenophile 
mobilization, overlapping with the movement against the anti-Semitism-inspired 
trial of Alfred Dreyfus, and including prominent French politicians and writers 
such as Georges Clémenceau, Jean Jaurès, and Anatole France.
The exhibit next leads the visitor into a brief era of hope following the Young 
Turk revolution of 1908 (see also Der Matossian 2014). A 1908 poster, with Asia 
Minor in its center, shows a rainbow reaching from the western shore of the 
Bosporus to Armenian land in the east, with the word Constitution inserted (in 
the Armenian language). In addition, flags held by representatives of different 
ethnic groups state, each in their own language, “Autonomy,” while the flags 
held by the Turk sport the words “Union, Equality.” Yet hope was short lived. 
The exhibit leaves unanswered the question of whether the massacres against 
Armenians in the city of Adana in April 1909 should be attributed to remaining 
followers of the sultan or to the new Young Turk–led government. It leaves no 
doubt, however, that the latter responded to new territorial losses during the 
Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and the resulting flow of refugees from the Bal-
kans to Anatolia, with a massive campaign of Turkification of space, people, and 
the economy.
The second part of the exhibit is entitled “Détruire” (destroy) and subtitled “La 
mise en oeuvre du génocide” (enacting the genocide). A large photo of the Syrian 
Desert, the fatal destination of hundreds of thousands of displaced Armenians, 
accompanies these words. This section introduces the visitor to the events of World 
War I as a necessary condition for the execution of the genocide. It shows how 
the war, and its preparation, included the advancement of nation-state ideology, 
support from Imperial Germany, military mobilization (also of Armenians), and 
military requisitions, especially directed at Ottoman Greek and Armenian busi-
nesses. Most consequential was the formation of the so-called Special Organiza-
tion, a paramilitary group for combat against “tumeurs internes” (internal tumors) 
under the control of the party. The exhibit also points at responsible actors, detail-
ing names and positions of the Young Turk leadership.
Moving forward in the exhibit, the visitor learns how “The Ottoman offensive 
on the Caucasian front is accompanied, under the cover of military operations, by 
localized massacres. . . . Already in late March 1915, the first signs of the genocidal 
project can be seen: the Armenian populations of Zeytun and Dörtyol are being 
deported” (Mouradian et al. 2015:35, translated).10 Fifteen thousand villagers seek 
refuge in the city of Van from massacres committed by units of the Special Orga-
nization: “one counted 58000 victims” (Mouradian et al. 2015:35, translated). 
Armenian forces, concentrated in two neighborhoods, defend the city against the 
Turkish military for more than a month until Russian units approach. The exhibit 
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reports how “these events, presented in Istanbul as an Armenian revolt, served 
to justify the initiation of the plan to exterminate the Armenians” (Mouradian 
et al. 2015:35, translated). Other elements of the exhibit show the deportation of 
Armenian intellectuals on April 24, 1915, a mass grave discovered by Russian troops 
in spring of 1916, and the deportation by train and by foot of mostly Armenian 
women and children to the “concentration camps” (Mouradian et al. 2015:39, 
translated) of Syria and Mesopotamia in the following months of 1915:
• April: 8 convoys, 35,500 deportees
• May: 21 convoys, 131,408 deportees
• June: 65 convoys, 225,408 deportees
• July: 96 convoys, 321,150 deportees
• August: 86 convoys, 276,800 deportees
• September: 5 convoys, 10,825 deportees
• October: 11 convoys, 27,500 deportees
• November: 6 convoys, 4,600 deportees
• December: 8 convoys, 7,500 deportees
Part 2 of the exhibit concludes with panels on the “Second Phase of Destruction in 
the Camps of Syria and Mesopotamia” (Mouradian et al. 2015:40–41). Beginning 
in October 1915, a department in the Ministry of the Interior set up twenty-five 
“concentration camps” with a capacity of eight hundred thousand. By March 1916, 
some “500,000 interned subsist in these camps and some other places of relega-
tion. The Central Committee of the Young Turks now made a final decision, to 
move ahead with their liquidation. From April to December 1916, two locations . . . 
were the sites of systematic massacres that caused the deaths of several hundred 
thousand, primarily women and children” (Mouradian et al. 2015:41, translated; 
see also map 1 in the introduction of this book).
Part 3 of the exhibit is entitled “Exclure” (exclude). The subtitle specifies: 
“Exclure du territoire, effacer de l’histoire” (Exclude from territory, erase from 
history; Mouradian et al. 2015:43). It addresses the small size of the remaining 
Armenian population in the new Republic of Turkey and the state’s efforts to 
reduce the memory of Armenians to one of “rebels and traitors of the father-
land” (Mouradian et al. 2015:45, translated). It displays images of ruins of formerly 
Armenian historical sites, especially churches, and, in sharp contrast, a Turkish 
memorial constructed in 1997 through which Armenians are defined as genocidal 
killers of Turks (Mouradian et al. 2015:47). The last images of this section show 
“monuments against forgetting” (Mouradian et al. 2015:48–49), including a 1919 
memorial erected in Constantinople (today Istanbul), but destroyed by Kemalist 
nationalists in 1922; the Tsitsernakaberd memorial discussed above; a memorial 
church and museum in Deir ez-Zor (destroyed by ISIL in 2014); and monuments 
in Sydney, Australia, and in Paris. The exhibit depicts these as mere examples of a 
wave of recognition and commemoration around the globe:
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Almost two-thirds of the seven to eight million Armenians live today in the  
diaspora, far from the Republic of Armenia, spread over all five continents, mostly 
descendants of those who escaped 1915. The chronology and geography of the  
memorials they erected . . . allow us to trace the expansion of the diasporic space, 
the itineraries of exile, the processes of integration, and the status of liberty in the 
countries after the settlement, in private and public spaces. Virtual exhibitions 
in cyberspace have recently enlarged the field of expression. Each new monu-
ment constitutes simultaneously a place of gathering and a symbol in the battle 
against the persistent denialism in the Turkish state, which has chosen to cele-
brate the executioners, set to affirm the “genocide of the Turks by the Armenians.”  
(Mouradian et al. 2015:49, translated)
In short, the exhibit examined here, hosted by the Shoah Memorial in Paris and 
representing the events of the Armenian genocide, displays several messages. It 
provides legitimization—and, in fact, celebration—of Armenian life in territories 
later incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. It represents Armenians as victims 
of mass violence. The segment on the resistance at Van, displaying Armenians 
as heroes, is an exception. It specifies the form of victimization (killings, death 
marches, starvation). It claims applicability of the genocide label, a concept that 
became part of international law in 1948. It also identifies responsible actors. Dif-
ferent from the Tsitsernakaberd site, it does not refer to “Turks” or the “Turkish 
State,” but instead attributes responsibility more specifically to the “Young Turks,” 
the “Committee of Union and Progress,” to specific (named) actors within the gov-
ernment and military, and finally to military units and the Special Organization. 
The label “Turkish State” appears only late, primarily in the section on denial-
ism. The specification of terms avoids a broad and generalizing attribution of guilt 
or responsibility. The exhibit finally points to the spread of Armenian genocide 
knowledge across the globe, as manifested in memorials in many countries. It 
does not engage in analogism, but it has been relieved of that task by its host, 
the Shoah Memorial in Paris. Inviting this display at the central site of French 
Holocaust commemoration in itself establishes a link between the Shoah and the 
Armenian genocide.
Importantly, the story presented here shows the process of proliferating indi-
vidual, community-level knowledge. Private memory, communicated in family 
circles, is charged by currents from scholarship and backed by academic capital. 
Especially in France, such capital can be converted into political and civil-society 
capital to reach a broad public. Finally, the outcome of memory formation, crys-
tallized in an exhibition, constitutes a form of structural memory, a reflection of 
memory in material objects. While different visitors may interpret the displays 
in various ways, the visual and textual representation of the Armenian genocide 
reflects the knowledge of Armenians as a carrier group, and it communicates it to 
a broad public.11
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C ONCLUSIONS
This chapter has examined Armenians, in the homeland and in the diaspora, as 
an ethno-religious carrier group of genocide knowledge. Such knowledge, how-
ever, was not the natural result of the experience of genocide.12 Over decades, 
widespread—even if often only partial—silencing turned to acknowledgment. 
History reveals the externalization and objectivation of thoughts and subjective 
experiences, their sedimentation as an Armenian knowledge repertoire about 
perpetrators, victims, and forms of victimization. It further shows both inertia 
and change of articulated knowledge with shifting historical contexts and ethnic 
organization, in the diaspora as well as in Armenia. This history finally demon-
strates how entrepreneurs are at work to advance genocide knowledge within 
their ethnic community and to spread it toward a broad audience in their coun-
tries and globally. All of these elements, jointly, constitute the ingredients of 
cultural trauma.
Armenian genocide knowledge includes knowledge about Turkish reactions to 
and denial of the events of 1915 and subsequent years. The next chapter sets out 




Sedimentation of Turkish Knowledge 
about the Genocide—and Comparisons
Research on Turkish knowledge about the Armenian genocide identifies deeply 
ingrained and systematic denial by the Turkish state and most of its citizens. As 
in the case of Armenians’ genocide knowledge, however, scholars find that group-
specific memories are not a constant. They solidify over time, as Stanley Cohen 
observes of the years after World War I: “This is not the usual story of initial 
unconfirmed rumours giving way to certain truths. . . . Rather, the opposite: truths 
that were certain at the time and the object of international attention were trans-
formed into speculation, rumours and uncertainties. The initial denials entered 
collective culture in Turkey and slowly became more prevalent outside: the events 
did not take place; Turkey bears no responsibility for any loss of life; Armenian 
deaths were an unintentional by-product of bad conditions; the term ‘genocide’ is 
not applicable” (2001:134).
The shift from genocide knowledge as “truth” to its categorization as “uncer-
tainty” and “speculation” poses a challenge to the sociology of knowledge. Who 
turned “truth” into “uncertainty”? Why and by what means? Was Halbwachs’s 
notion of presentism at work? Who adjusted knowledge to new circumstances, 
and how? Further, in light of early changes, how can we explain the later solidifica-
tion of knowledge, the relative inertia of memory?
The explanatory puzzle posed by Cohen is especially pronounced because 
denial costs Turkey dearly. Bayraktar (2010) rightfully stresses that Turkish denial 
contrasts with widespread and growing acknowledgment of various historical 
atrocities around the globe, encouraging official apologies by heads of state for 
crimes against humanitarian law and human rights norms committed in the name 
of their countries (see also Bilder 2006). Bayraktar finds Turkish denial of events 
that unfolded over one hundred years ago even more peculiar in light of modern 
Turkey’s efforts to distance itself from the Ottoman Empire, at least until recently. 
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Göçek adds to the puzzle, highlighting that, in addition to symbolic costs, Turkey 
also pays a substantial material and political price: “millions of dollars to prevent 
other countries from employing the term ‘genocide’ ” (2015:2), a closed border to 
Armenia with its military risks and barriers to economic development, and the 
impediment genocide denial poses to membership in the European Union. Why, 
then, is Turkey willing to pay such a high price in the currency of challenged legiti-
macy, loss of international prestige, and economic cost?
Thankfully, recent literature provides rich material with which to reconstruct, 
in condensed form, the evolution and state of Turkish knowledge about the mass 
violence against the Armenians. It suggests several answers to questions raised 
above about the conditions of knowledge, its mutations, and later inertia. I seek 
to show how these answers correspond with, benefit from, and contribute to the 
sociology of knowledge approaches discussed thus far.
Knowledge entrepreneurs play a central role, for which Fatma Müge Göçek’s 
(2015) book Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Vio-
lence against the Armenians, 1789–2009 provides crucial evidence. Göçek’s analysis 
of the evolution of Turkish knowledge about the country’s violence covers more 
than a century, divided into four eras. The ensemble of more than three hundred 
memoirs of prominent Turks she analyzed allows for the construction of a gestalt 
of collective knowledge as property of those segments of Turkish society that were 
motivated and able to write such texts. Exceptions notwithstanding, factual denial 
and, especially, interpretive and implicatory denial were prevalent. They played 
out especially in the immediate post–World War I era (see also Kaiser 2003).
Further, news media and textbooks diffused knowledge produced by elites 
to a broad public, and for this, too, recent scholarship provides a wealth of evi-
dence. Seyhan Bayraktar (2010) analyzes Turkish newspapers and their statements 
pertaining to the Armenian genocide (1973–2009), and several authors examine 
Turkish textbooks (Adak 2016; Akçam 2014; Wolfgram 2019). Together, memoirs, 
news media, and textbooks reveal the state of Turkish knowledge about the treat-
ment of Armenians during World War I. Each of the authors cited also provides 
causal arguments that correspond with and enrich a sociology of knowledge per-
spective. Consider the sedimentation of knowledge regarding the genocide against 
the Armenians over four periods Göçek (2015) distinguishes.
THE YOUNG TURK ER A (1908–1918)
Accounts of Turkish knowledge about the Armenian genocide during the Young 
Turk era, an era that includes the war and the execution of mass violence, are fraught 
with ambiguities. Recognition is accompanied by denial, repression of informa-
tion, silencing, media control, and various forms of neutralization, from blaming 
the victim to attributing responsibility to the Great Powers. Memoir writers, 
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especially Young Turks and members of their administration, are motivated to 
shape, in an exculpatory manner, public understanding of the events to which they 
contributed. Like all political leaders, they hope to go down in history as heroes, 
and they certainly want to dispel any thought of criminal responsibility. They are 
also in institutional positions to reach a broad audience, and some master substan-
tial narrative facility, capturing ideas in a narrative form that is convincing to many.
Narrating Violence in Memoirs
Early memoirs acknowledge mass violence. I quoted, in chapter 1, from Ahmed 
Refik’s account of the fate of Armenians during the deportations, written shortly after 
the end of the Young Turk period (1919). Refik described the mournful state of ten 
thousand to twenty thousand deportees, waiting at the train station of Eskişehir, 
a “flood of disaster and death” (in Göçek 2015:152), victims of “theft and plunder” 
whose “houses were burned down to cover their [the perpetrators’] illegal acts” (in 
Göçek 2015:153). I repeat an earlier quote from this text: “No government at any 
historical period has committed murders with such cruelty” (in Göçek 2015:153). 
Yet even Ahmed Refik relativizes by equating violence against the Armenians 
with violence committed by Armenians against Turks. The title of his book, 
Two Committees, Two Massacres, indicates as much. By “second” committee and 
massacre he means “the massacres the Armenian revolutionary committee Dashnak 
committed against the Muslims in 1918 from Erzurum all the way to Trabzon” 
(in Göçek 2015:154). Refik disregards the massive difference in the scale of vio-
lence committed by the two sides, which Göçek depicts as “deaths of up to 60,000 
Muslims . . . [versus] at least 800,000 Armenians” (Göçek 2015:250).
Ahmed Refik is not the only Turkish official to have acknowledged the mass vio-
lence. A government inspector, also stationed in Eskişehir, writes how houses “had 
been blockaded, hundreds of Armenian families had been loaded onto carriages, 
and [many] dumped in streams. Many women witnessing these atrocities had lost 
their mind” (quoted in Göçek 2015:220). The mayor of Kayseri, a Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) member, describes in detail the organization and staffing 
of units that were to drive the Armenian population from their villages into collec-
tion centers in larger towns (Göçek 2015:221; for a literary account, see Werfel [1936] 
1983:152ff). An Ottoman officer describes deportations he observed when traveling 
to Damascus. He saw “on the two sides of the road unburied corpses of those among 
the refugee convoys who had fallen sick and died” (in Göçek 2015:223). Four Ottoman 
Turkish officials describe the Armenian deportations from Diyarbekir (Göçek 
2015:224), and ten contemporaneous accounts portray the “deportations and mas-
sacres in Aleppo, Damaskus, and Syria . . . in great detail” (Göçek 2015:225). Yet such 
recognition of mass violence and suffering, and occasional expressions of empathy, 
pity, and regret, are rare compared to instances of denial with its various strategies.
Denialist strategies are, of course, not unique to perpetrators of the Armenian 
genocide. I showed (in chapter 1) how Raul Hilberg ([1961] 2003) details, for 
the Holocaust, ways in which actors at different levels of hierarchy managed to 
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overcome moral scruples against the execution of atrocity that had been incul-
cated by a long civilizing process. Within an arsenal of defenses, he distinguishes 
mechanisms of repression and rationalization. The former include hiding the 
ultimate aim by controlling information, prohibition of criticism, elimination of 
the destruction as a subject of conversation, and camouflaged vocabulary. Mecha-
nisms of rationalization, comparable to Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralization 
strategies, include a collective form: the justification of the destruction process as 
a whole, typically achieved by defining the targets as evil. They further include, at 
the individual level, references to the doctrine of superior orders, insistence that 
no personal vindictiveness was involved (e.g., the telling of stories about “good 
deeds” toward Jewish neighbors), blaming others, and attempts to diminish one’s 
own importance in the destruction process.
We find many of these strategies in the Young Turk accounts of the years of 
mass violence. Consider repression: Göçek reminds us that “the violent and sys-
tematic elimination of Ottoman Armenians by the CUP, the government, and 
state forces was carried out under the legal cover of ‘temporary deportations’ [i.e., 
camouflaging vocabulary]” (Göçek 2015:246). Repression by silencing takes two 
forms. Memoir writers intentionally silence events that did take place, or they omit 
mention of “the actors involved in secret and informal execution of the collective 
violence” (Göçek 2015:247). One writer describes the role of Bahaeddin Shakir, 
the CUP official who implemented Interior Minister Talat’s orders on the ground: 
“This issue was not dissected or illuminated even at the most intimate [CUP] 
meetings. I do not have a clear, absolute opinion, but from a word used when 
other issues were being discussed, a thought that leaked out, jests that could not 
be contained, in summary, from all such fine and slight clues . . . he was the great-
est motivator and creator of the deportation business” (quoted in Göçek 2015:217).
In addition to repression, neutralization strategies (Sykes and Matza 1957) 
come to full display, including collective neutralizations that seek to justify the 
destruction process as a whole (Hilberg [1961] 2003). The government inspec-
tor from Eskişehir, cited above, reports the words of a CUP official who, in a 
speech, compared the Christians in the empire to “snakes and scorpions” (Göçek 
2015:220). This language builds on a long tradition in which Ottoman authorities 
and intellectuals considered Armenians traitors and internal enemies, especially 
after select groups of militant Armenians cooperated with the Russian enemy 
during World War I and in previous armed conflicts (Göçek 2015:251). It is also 
in line with language used in the buildup and execution of other genocides (e.g., 
Rwanda, Holocaust).
Individual neutralization, partly building on such collective form, appears in 
memoirs primarily in the form of “blaming the victim.” Remember the words 
of Dr. Mehmed Şahingiray, a CUP and Special Organization member, quoted in 
chapter 1, who deems it “natural for there to be a danger for the Muslim populace 
to be carried away by their emotions, reacting in kind to the rapacious and ter-
rible murders of the [Armenian] element with which they had lived for so many 
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centuries, considering them [fellow] citizens and brethren” (quoted in Göçek 
2015:250).
Göçek observes correctly that the author omits specification of “precautionary 
measures” (what in fact did the government do?) and that he joins those who 
falsely equate Turkish and Armenian victimization. In addition, this Young Turk 
memoir writer blamed the Great Powers (Göçek 2015:246), and he points at a 
few “black sheep” as responsible for atrocities that even he cannot deny (Göçek 
2015:252, 255).
Institutional Position, Motivation, and Popular Receptivity
Importantly, the Young Turk leaders were not only motivated to deny, they also 
had the means to spread their denialist narrative. They were knowledge entrepre-
neurs. A paragraph from Göçek’s book makes this point quite clear:
Given the CUP’s extensive control of the state, government, and the media, [Interior 
Minister] Talat had no problem altering the public discourse, claiming that the ru-
mors about the massacres of Armenians in 1915 were “lies and slander the Armenians  
had started to contrive and fabricate about [some] Turkish and Kurdish massacres.” 
And Talat did so when he had full knowledge that such massacres were occurring, 
executed mainly by the [Special Organization] armed bands he had personally 
helped organize and fortify. In 1915 the CUP also published propaganda material 
to allegedly demonstrate the destructive intent of all Armenians, material originally 
confiscated by the Ottoman state during the 1893–96 rebellions. (Göçek 2015:248)
The early strategies employed during the peak of the deportations continued as the 
end of World War I was in sight and CUP leadership had to expect military defeat. 
Göçek continues thus: “In the aftermath of the Armenian deportations and mas-
sacres, the CUP once again published propaganda as early as 1917 and 1918, per-
haps due to the limited Armenian massacres of the Turks and Kurds in the east 
after the withdrawal of the Russian empire from the Great War, leading ‘those 
who had been ashamed by the Armenian deportations to change their views as a 
consequence of this propaganda, to instead feel animosity toward the Armenians’ ” 
(Göçek 2015:248–249).
Göçek also informs her readers about historical conditions that contributed to 
both the genocide and its denial. She highlights the sultan’s modernization efforts, 
continued by the Young Turks, which lacked a sufficient structural and cultural 
basis in Ottoman society (Göçek 2015:155–157); the widespread perception of 
minorities dominating the business world (Göçek 2015:171–172); and the nature 
of the Young Turks as a movement rather than a formal party. As a movement, 
they developed a pattern of secrecy, which they imported into government prac-
tice after their coup of 1913 under Enver Pasha (Göçek 2015:188). A culture of vio-
lence within the CUP supplemented these conditions (Göçek 2015:191, 202), as did 
the radicalization of the CUP (Bloxham 2005).
One additional factor speaks not just to the motivation of Young Turk leaders 
but also to the receptivity of the public. Preceding the Armenian genocide, just 
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before the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire had suffered a devastat-
ing defeat in the Balkan War of 1912 to 1913. Göçek writes that “the war was disas-
trous for the empire; it lost 146,100 square kilometers of land, and approximately 
a million Balkan Turks were massacred or escaped to the empire with nothing but 
their clothes on their backs. In the end, the population of the empire decreased 
by 5 million, corresponding to a loss of about a quarter of all land mass” (Göçek 
2015:228). The territorial loss was not just vast; it also included the industrially 
most developed regions of the empire. The Ottoman leaders believed that the 
Great Powers had promised a return to the status quo of the prewar era, a promise 
that was not fulfilled; hence, deprived of land, economic capacity, and population, 
their sense of betrayal was profound.1
The defeat in the Balkan War thus damaged the resource base of the empire, the 
Ottoman leaders’ national pride and political ambitions, and the sensitivities of 
many leading Young Turks who were native to the lost territories. The wounds also 
dug deep into the lives of ordinary Turks, as “hundreds of thousands of refugees 
flooded the empire ahead of the Bulgarian army. . . . The Directorate of Refugees 
kept sending the refugees ‘to Anatolia in droves,’ while at least 40,000 to 50,000 
ill and neglected ones remained behind in the capital. With this flood, the popu-
lace of the imperial capital also witnessed the trauma of the Balkan Wars” (Göçek 
2015:235). Meanwhile, the arrival of masses of refugees in Anatolia intensified 
competition over scarce resources.
We can only imagine the stories about loss and betrayal circulating among the 
refugees and their struggle to secure an existence in their new settlement areas. 
Many Turks were pained even more because these displacements followed, by 
little more than one generation, those resulting from the Ottoman-Russian wars 
of 1853–56 and 1877–78. The second of these wars especially had already caused 
substantial loss of territory in the Caucasus and in the Balkans, and it, too, had 
unleashed a wave of refugees into the empire (Göçek 2015:37). Many Turks’ pro-
found suffering and sense of victimhood, we must assume, had lowered their sen-
sitivities toward the victimization and suffering of others, including Armenians 
during World War I, and increased their receptivity toward denial.
MEMORY FORMATION IN THE EARLY  
REPUBLICAN ER A (1919–1973)
The Young Turk era ended with the defeat of the Axis Powers at the end of 
World War I. In Germany, the emperor was forced into emigration, and the 
foundation for the short-lived Weimar Republic was laid. The formerly mighty 
Austro-Hungarian Empire split into small nation-states, and the imperial capi-
tal of Vienna suddenly seemed out of proportion to the now modest Alpine 
republic of Austria. Finally, the long history of the Ottoman Empire had reached 
a shameful and degrading end. Large parts of its territories were occupied by the 
victorious powers.
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What were the conditions for the development of knowledge about the 
Armenian genocide in this new context, specifically in the early republican era 
of the new Turkey? Here too, Göçek’s analysis of memoirs contributes answers. 
Marking the beginning of this era with the 1919 onset of the Turkish independence 
struggle, she considers the war crimes trials of the early postwar era (1919–1922) 
and the establishment of the Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923, extending this 
period to include the end of the first half century of the republic’s existence. Exam-
ining her account through the analytic categories laid out above yields further 
insights for the sociology of genocide knowledge.
Criminal Trials: Failures of an Otherwise Powerful Cultural Tool
In response to pressure from the victorious Allies, the postwar Turkish authorities 
initiated and held criminal trials of some actors whom they suspected of having 
perpetrated violence against the Armenians and of other mass atrocities. Socio-
legal theory and empirical evidence from a variety of postwar and post-dictatorship 
trials suggest that such trials should have generated Turkish recognition of the 
atrocities. Arguments by Émile Durkheim, further developed in recent sociologi-
cal literature, consider trials powerful rituals that awaken society’s conscience, 
highlighting and generating a collective understanding and condemnation of evil. 
This literature interprets criminal punishment as a didactic exercise, a “speech act 
in which society talks to itself about its moral identity” (Smith 2008:16). The repre-
sentational power of trials became most visible a quarter century later, through the 
proceedings of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which initiated 
the extension of knowledge of the Holocaust and broad psychological identifica-
tion with the victims (Alexander 2004). Supplemented by the Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem and the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, these court proceedings produced 
cultural trauma as members of a world audience developed empathy with suffer-
ing they had not experienced themselves.
Not only sociologists, but legal and political practitioners as well have invested 
much hope in post-violence trials. Prominently, both President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and the American chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg trials, Justice Robert Jackson, 
hoped that the trial—by laying out all the evidence, both written documents and 
the testimony of witnesses under oath—would certify knowledge, beyond reasonable 
doubt, of the unbelievable acts Nazi Germany had committed (Douglas 2001).
Trials can indeed serve such a function, even if constrained by a particular 
institutional logic. Examples abound, as documented in scholarly works on the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz trial (Pendas 2006), the Nuremberg “Doctors’ trial” (Marrus 
2008), the My Lai trial (Savelsberg and King 2011), and trials held by the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Hagan 2003; Savelsberg and 
King 2011). A recent example is the impact on Western public opinion generated 
by criminal charges filed against perpetrators of the Darfur conflict in Sudan, all 
the way up to the country’s (then) president, Omar al-Bashir (Savelsberg 2015; 
Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015).
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Yet the trials held in Constantinople between 1919 and 1922 had no such effect. 
Instead, they stood at the beginning of a period in which denial of the Armenian 
genocide solidified, and in which former perpetrators were celebrated as heroes of 
the independence struggle. These trials thus constitute a challenge for the sociol-
ogy of law and knowledge. What features of the Constantinople trials, and what 
contextual conditions, contributed to this unexpected outcome?
Some of the context and the constraints under which these trials were con-
ducted become evident through Göçek’s description of the judicial proceedings, 
for which she again provides evidence contained in contemporaneous Turkish 
memoirs. Challenges associated with setting up the trials included the issue of 
national sovereignty, which the Allies resolved by allowing the Ottoman authori-
ties to conduct the trials, and legal ambiguities resulting from the informal ties 
between the Ottoman government and the CUP on the one hand and the illegal, 
and nonpublic, actions of the Special Organization on the other. These conditions 
posed substantial impediments in identifying suitable defendants.
Once the court began its work on December 16, 1918, the challenges intensi-
fied. First, the court faced fierce resistance. Memoirs document how former CUP 
members, now in positions of authority, obstructed the trials by warning friends, 
slowing the flow of correspondence, and destroying documents: “In our sleepless 
eyes, half drowned by the smoke and dripping with tears, the flames of the things 
we burned started to take on the color of blood. And we constantly burned the 
strange thing we call the past” (in Göçek 2015:357). CUP and Special Organiza-
tion members further sought to obstruct proceedings by infiltrating offices of the 
Allied forces. They finally sought to delegitimize the courts through media com-
mentaries that linked the trials to the occupation by foreign powers.
Second, politicization of the trials posed a challenge. Unionists, following in the 
CUP’s footsteps and seeking to create an ethnically pure Turkish nation, charged 
that the Ententists, who pursued the continuation of a multiethnic empire and 
who constituted the government in the postwar years, cooperated with the occupi-
ers, therefore engaging in a witch hunt against former CUP officials.
Thirdly, and most importantly, multiple efforts to delegitimize the military 
tribunal and to rehabilitate the perpetrators posed challenges. One memoir writer 
described the judge as “an enemy of the Turks” (quoted in Göçek 2015:360). 
Challengers of the court celebrated their greatest successes when the court also 
sentenced nationalists in absentia.
In the course of the court proceedings, the populace, in its nationalist fervor, 
and encouraged by Unionist leaders, began to redefine perpetrators as heroes who 
fought for the country’s liberation from the occupying forces. Several memoir 
writers, in fact, tied the independence struggle to the trials, condemning those 
who sought to punish the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide. One writer 
explicitly linked the trials with prominent Armenian actors and their political, 
and territorial, pursuits: “The one gathering, readying, and transporting the wit-
nesses [to the tribunal] is the (Armenian) Patriarchate. The Armenians are after 
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Greater Armenia, some . . . after a Kurdistan next to this Armenia, the Greeks after 
Smyrna, Thrace, and a Pontus Kingdom on the Black Sea shores” (quoted in Göçek 
2015:360).
The most convincing evidence of the attempt to cleanse the record of perpe-
trators results from Göçek’s detailed effort to trace the fate of different catego-
ries of suspects. Those arrested, charged, and acquitted contributed memoirs that 
“selectively narrated their past violence, providing irrelevant information while 
silencing their actual acts of destruction” (Göçek 2015:361). A second category 
were those the British had exiled to Malta and Egypt, in reaction to mass pro-
tests against the first conviction and the hanging of the convicted. Eventually, they 
were allowed to return to Turkey, in exchange for British citizens who had been 
sequestered in the empire. Many of these former exiles later became prominent 
republican politicians. Those among them who wrote memoirs never mentioned 
the violence against the Armenians or the role they had played in the genocide. Yet 
another group consisted of those who had escaped arrest, fled to Ankara (outside 
the reach of the occupying forces), and joined the independence struggle. “They 
were all very well received in Ankara because the leaders of the independence 
struggle needed educated CUP officials, officers, and civilians and therefore did 
not hold the perpetrators’ crimes against them” (Göçek 2015:371).
A final category consists of those who were tried and hanged or otherwise killed. 
Many memoir writers celebrated them as “national martyrs” (Göçek 2015:365). 
Given the impediments the court faced, their number was quite small (fewer than 
ten). The redefinition of their reputation began right after the death sentence and 
execution of Kemal Bey, which shocked those who were imprisoned and awaiting 
trial but expecting lenient treatment. They and their loyalists’ desperate desire to 
redefine perpetrators as martyrs was helped by the trial against Nusret Bey, in 
which the court offended against rules of procedure, and—mindful of potential 
challenges—sped up the convict’s execution.
Summarizing this event in the context of judicial (non-)responses, Göçek 
writes that 
the rationalizing event comprising the few injustices committed at the 1919–22 mili-
tary tribunals coincided with the independence struggle, enabling the nationalists 
to gradually transform the former perpetrators into patriots, thereby leaving only 
a few to be held accountable for the crimes they committed against the Armenians. 
The majority not only avoided prosecution but escaped to Anatolia to join the inde-
pendence struggle, and with the victory of the struggle, they reemerged as repub-
lican patriots and served the newly established nation-state in high positions. This 
transformation effectively produced the republican denial of the perpetrators of the 
collective violence against the Armenians. (Göçek 2015:373)
In short, against Durkheimian expectations and despite positive historical evi-
dence for other post-atrocity trials, the court proceedings in Istanbul did not 
affirm the history of the Armenian genocide. Instead, the trials strengthened the 
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notion of Armenians as aggressors and the redefinition of former perpetrators 
as national heroes. Collective amnesia about the victimization and suffering of 
the Armenians during World War I was the ultimate consequence. The ritual 
power of trials is contingent, as this experience certifies, on the legitimacy of 
courts, and circumstances described in this section thoroughly undermined 
such legitimacy.
Strategies of Denial: Historical and Personnel Decoupling
Following the immediate postwar period and the trials, denial unfolded in two 
stages. Memoir writers first engaged in what we might call historical decoupling. 
They denied any connection between the independence struggle and the CUP. 
Nationalist leaders used various strategies. The CUP itself held back the publica-
tion of individual memoirs by its leaders in the years immediately following the 
war (Göçek 2015:375). Leaders blocked the return of CUP top leaders from exile 
(Göçek 2015:378), and they obscured the continued presence of CUP members—
first in the liberation struggle and later in the new republic—and obscured their 
identities (Göçek 2015:379). A famous 1927 speech by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) 
was crucial. In that speech, he skillfully hid the role of the former CUP in the inde-
pendence struggle, portraying himself as the undisputed leader of the movement 
and the new republic (Adak 2003). Many memoirs show that this definition of the 
new Turkish reality conflicted with the actual historical situation.
A second stage of denial silenced the involvement of perpetrators in the repub-
lican cadres, which I refer to as personnel decoupling. Nineteen memoirs analyzed 
by Göçek confirm the continued presence of former CUP members as civil ser-
vants in the new republic. Many among them swore an oath not to inform on each 
other. One memoir writer determines that November 1920 was a turning point. At 
that time all former perpetrators, CUP and Special Organization members, joined 
the independence struggle under the condition that they be granted amnesty. “The 
allied forces and the destroyed non-Muslims had indeed noted and protested the 
Unionists amid the national forces, but this did not change the future course of 
events because in the end, they were forced to leave, and the national movement 
ultimately succeeded. The subsequent national history of Turkey was penned by 
the winners who whitewashed the past violence against the Armenians as well 
as the violence they committed in achieving their victory” (Göçek 2015:381).
Additional strategies supplemented and solidified new knowledge repertoires: 
exclusion of contributions that Armenians and other minorities had made to the 
Ottoman Empire, and the cleansing from history of the mass violence committed 
against these populations. Toward that end, state authorities renamed parks and 
squares and confiscated Armenian property, turning some buildings into schools 
and theaters.
Perhaps most consequentially, the new republican government introduced 
changes to the educational system. Republican leaders decided early on to 
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centralize all educational institutions under the Department of Education in 
Ankara. The department controlled textbook production, teacher training, course 
content, and examination questions. Textbooks harmonized closely with official 
nationalist rhetoric. The curriculum highlighted Turkish contributions to the 
country’s development and the righteousness of Muslim Turks, at the expense of 
other religions and ethnicities. These patterns transcended that era and survived 
into the late republican period, as an analysis of recent Turkish textbooks shows 
(Akçam 2014; also Adak 2016; Wolfgram 2019). Political controls reached beyond 
primary and secondary education to encompass institutions of higher learning. 
Constraining critical engagement with Turkish history, they tightened in specific 
moments such as the 1960 military coup. Göçek concludes that “the ensuing sys-
tem produced public knowledge that instituted, diffused and reproduced Turkish 
ethnic nationalism, distorting the past and erasing the presence in and contribu-
tions of non-Muslims and non-Turks to Turkish history.  .  .  . In summary, early 
republican modernity, undertaken with the intent to democratize the country and 
successfully transform former Ottoman subjects into Turkish citizens, instead 
produced a society hegemonized by the Turkish state and government in particu-
lar and the dominant Turkish majority in general” (Göçek 2015:294–295).
Consequently, memoirs written by leading politicians and administrators of the 
CUP shortly after World War I, but published only decades later, self-celebratory 
and self-exculpatory, fell on fertile ground. Authors included Talat Bey (Minister of 
the Interior) and Djemal Bey (Minister of the Navy), both members of the trium-
virate of Young Turk rule, and lower-ranked but powerful actors such as Ali Münif, 
whose career reached from serving as Talat’s undersecretary to becoming governor 
of Lebanon and Beirut (1915, 1916). All were highly motivated to present to their 
readers a clean and heroic Turkish past, and all mobilized substantial narrative facil-
ity to eliminate knowledge of the atrocities they had committed during their reign, 
or—where elimination was not an option—to justify their actions (Kaiser 2003).
L ATE REPUBLICAN KNOWLED GE  
FORMATION (1974–2009)
The year 1974 marked the beginning of a new era of Turkish denial, in response 
to a global and intensifying Armenian insistence on acknowledgment of the 
genocide. Destabilizing domestic events sharpened Turkey’s reaction. Impor-
tantly, in 1973 the conservative wing of the military had intervened in the political 
process, resulting in a substantial tightening of civil liberties. In the following year, 
the Turkish military launched an offensive in Cyprus. Turkish troops occupied 40 
percent of its landmass, setting off waves of refugees and an exchange of Greek 
and Turkish populations to split the island into two parts (Bayraktar 2010:99–103).
Simultaneously, a new cultural climate provided fertile ground for the 
emergence of terrorist organizations across the Western world. In Germany, 
the Baader-Meinhof group engaged in abductions and killings of prominent 
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politicians and business leaders; in Italy, the Brigadi Rossi pursued similar strate-
gies; and in the United States, groups such as the Symbionese Liberation Army 
spread terror. In Palestine, Israel, and beyond, the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) engaged in terrorism to pursue its goals. It was in this context that 
members of radicalized Armenian diaspora groups resorted to terrorist strategies. 
Leading among them was the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, 
organized in Beirut and operating in collaboration with the PLO, presumably with 
support from the Kurdish Workers’ Party and the Irish Republican Army (Bayraktar 
2010:98). Around the same time, a group named Justice Commandos of the 
Armenian Genocide, founded in the United States, also took up arms.
Establishment of these organizations resulted in a decade of terrorist violence. 
The series of murders was initiated, however, by the violent act of an individual. 
In 1973, Gurgen Yanikian, a seventy-seven-year-old immigrant from Turkey to the 
United States, who had lost many members of his family during the violence of 
1915, assassinated the Turkish consul general to Los Angeles (Mehmed Baydar) 
and his deputy (Bahadır Demir) (Bayraktar 2010). In a letter to various American 
newspapers, Yanikian wrote that he wanted to avenge the genocide, and he called 
on other Armenians to follow his example. Göçek (2015) spells out the deadly har-
vest: “a total of 110 acts of terror against the Turkish republic in thirty-eight cities 
of twenty-one countries. Of these, 39 are armed attacks, 70 are bomb attacks, and 
1 is an occupation. During these attacks, 42 Turkish diplomats and 4 foreign 
nationals are murdered, and 15 Turks and 66 foreign nationals are wounded” 
(Göçek 2015:46–47). This wave of violence against Turkish targets reached its peak 
in 1979 and finally ebbed in 1986.
Armenian terrorist activities succeeded in breaking Turkish silence about 
Armenian history (Bayraktar 2010:97). Yet, against the intent and expectation 
of the terrorists, they did not yield acknowledgment. On the contrary, the vio-
lence provided Turkish authorities with new bricks to build their wall of denial 
and to appeal to the Turkish public at home and the Turkish diaspora abroad. 
Turkish state actors used Armenian terrorist violence to engage in reverse ana-
logical bridging: to color the interpretation of all past violence in Armenian-
Turkish relations in light of the present. Current terrorism aided their interpre-
tation of past Armenian violence as aggression and Turkish violence as defense. 
Göçek concludes:
In a defensive move that commenced in 1981, Turkish state officials in general and 
the diplomats in the Foreign Ministry in particular developed an official counternar-
rative that actually delegitimated and negated the Armenian claims. These officials 
selectively focused on the past, homing in exclusively on the incidents of Armenian 
violence to thereby portray the Turks not as perpetrators but as victims. As a con-
sequence, it became easier to argue that what had occurred in the past had been 
‘mutual massacres.’ By doing so, however, the Turkish official stand actualized the 
last stage of denial, namely, the denial of responsibility for the collective violence 
committed against the Armenians. (Göçek 2015:456–457)
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Narratives of historical processes cannot easily establish causality. Would Turkish 
denial not have succeeded and further solidified without the wave of Armenian 
terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s? We do not know. Yet we do know that Turkish 
discourses on Armenian history were revived at this juncture. They built on past 
practices of denial and further advanced the sedimentation of Turkish knowledge. 
Göçek’s analysis of memoirs shows that much.
Critical readers may challenge Göçek’s account of Turkish denialist repre-
sentation, noting that it relies primarily on one type of document. They may ask 
whether memoirs merely reflect knowledge within a small group of actors in posi-
tions of authority and in the intelligentsia. Such critics, however, should not over-
look analyses, by Göçek herself and other scholars, of news media and textbooks, 
which are crucial mechanisms through which knowledge entrepreneurs reach a 
broad audience and pass knowledge on to new generations.
Diffusing Knowledge: News Media
Turkish news media indeed reinforce dominant themes from the memoirs Göçek 
analyzed, as findings by Seyhan Bayraktar (2010) convincingly demonstrate. 
Bayraktar analyzed 1,339 Turkish media reports, published between 1973 and 2009, 
from five distinct newspapers. Included in her sample are the nationalist, populist, 
and military-friendly Hürriyet; the left-leaning, radically secular, and somewhat 
elitist Cumhuriyet; the Islamist-fundamentalist Milli Gazete; the liberal Radi-
cal; and the Islamist-conservative Zaman. Bayraktar selects articles specifically 
addressing “critical discourse moments,” historic events that evoke broad public 
debates about Turkish history.
Working to identify frames through which Turkish media interpret Armenia-
related events, Bayraktar first finds a terrorism frame. Reporting on Armenian ter-
rorist activities, media juxtapose “innocent diplomats,” good people who dutifully 
served their nation, to “cold-blooded Armenians” (Bayraktar 2010:106). Yanikian, 
the initial individual assassin, is portrayed as “vengeful,” “uncivilized,” and “crazy.” 
Media reports omit, or mention only in passing, his traumatic experiences of 1915. 
Armenians are “notorious terrorists.” One commentary proceeds to link the kill-
ing of the Turkish consul-general to the 1921 assassination of Talaat Pasha by a 
young Armenian, Soghomon Tehlirian, in Berlin (Bayraktar 2010:109). Media also 
represent Yanikian as a member of the “Huntschak” organization, thereby linking 
his action to the violent Armenian resistance movement of the 1890s (Bayraktar 
2010:111).
Following highly organized terrorist attacks against the Turkish embassies 
in Vienna and Paris in the fall of 1975, the interpretive frame in Turkish news 
media shifts from “Armenian” to “international” terrorism. On October 25, 1975, 
Cumhuriyet quotes Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s words in its headline 
“Turkish State Target of Murders” (Bayraktar 2010:112). Media reports are care-
ful, however, to interpret the Armenian terrorists as members of the diaspora, 
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contrasting them with “our Armenians” (Bayraktar 2010:115). Such distinction 
seeks to present domestic Turkish-Armenian relations as harmonious. It also aims 
to prevent a recurrence of Turkish pogroms akin to those against Greeks in 1955 
that had caused major destruction and bloodshed. Yet not all papers apply such 
caution. Milli Gazete more aggressively writes about “minorities in our country 
that have, throughout our history, pushed the knife into the back of the nation. The 
minorities include Greeks and Armenians” (Bayraktar 2010:116).2
Other media reports reflect more explicitly on Ottoman-Armenian relations 
throughout history, including the violence of 1915. Milli Gazete writes about “The 
Massacres by Armenians in our History,” and a five-part series in Hürriyet is enti-
tled “The Truth behind the Armenian Question” (Bayraktar 2010:121). This series 
reads like a “treatise on Armenian revolts, collaboration and instrumentalization 
by foreign powers” (Bayraktar 2010:212). Its authors attribute responsibility for vio-
lence primarily to “radicalized” Armenian organizations and political parties such 
as the Huntshaks and Dashnaks. In addition, they seek to identify foreign powers 
as responsible for the decline in Ottoman-Armenian relations: Armenians “dared 
to engage in the revolts only because they had the back of the European powers” 
(in Bayraktar 2010:125). Thus, the series concludes, Turks and Muslims are the real 
victims of history: “Millions of innocent Turks . . . were killed during the Armenian 
massacres. . . . Yet, Armenians received the appropriate response. . . . They had to 
receive that response as there are two things Turks cannot tolerate: injustice and 
cowardly actions” (in Bayraktar 2010:125).
In short, terrorist violence, motivated by rage about Turkish denial of the 
Armenian genocide, provided the Turkish government and media with ammuni-
tion to advance denial further. It helped knowledge entrepreneurs strengthen, at 
least domestically, Turkish interpretations of the violence of 1915.
A decade and a half later, another historical moment evoked Turkish media 
engagement with Armenian history. In 1991, Armenia once again became an 
independent country. After separating from the dissolving Soviet Union, the new 
republic joined diasporic Armenian communities to push for recognition of the 
genocide at national and international organizational levels. A new knowledge 
entrepreneur had thus entered the scene, and a growing number of countries 
now recognized the Armenian genocide (see chapter 7). Such recognition evoked 
massive governmental and societal responses in Turkey, where sensitivities were 
heightened in the context of the country’s new status, in 1999, as an official candi-
date for membership in the European Union.
Challenged and sensitized, Turkey intensified denial. In response to a 2001 
French genocide recognition law, Hürriyet’s chief editorial writer, Oktay Ekşi, 
calls for a general boycott of France by Turkish organizations and businesses. 
Generally, papers express alarm regarding the spread of the “recognition virus” 
(Bayraktar 2010:202). Using its geostrategic position vis-à-vis the Middle East 
and Incirlik Air Base (shared with NATO allies) as a bargaining chip, Turkey 
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manages to prevent U.S. recognition of the genocide. Media now open a new 
line of attack, charging European powers with their own complicity or guilt. Milli 
Gazete reminds its readers that France continues to pay pensions to Armenian 
veterans (Bayraktar 2010:206), and Cumhuriyet, responding to a pending debate 
of the Armenian genocide in the German legislature (Bundestag), quotes a 
leading Turkish foreign policy maker who charges Germany with the attempt to 
relativize the Holocaust.3
Eventually, however, Turkey recognized that its version of the events of 1915 was 
no longer internationally accepted. Armenians had spread, in the words of a com-
mentator in Milli Gazete, a “lie for a truth” (Bayraktar 2010:211). Journalists now 
redirected their writings, as in a commentary in Cumhuriyet, against a three-phase 
plan: recognition, reparation, territorial demands (Bayraktar 2010:212, 216). They 
also reminded the world of histories of atrocities committed by European powers, 
including French violence in Algeria, and challenged European “claims of cultural 
superiority” (Bayraktar 2010:220).
In short, media discourses analyzed by Bayraktar raise similar themes as the 
memoirs Göçek dissects. Both types of documents generate Turkish knowledge 
about Armenians and the Armenian genocide. Both involve factual and interpre-
tive denial. Well-known neutralization strategies of blaming the victim and chal-
lenging the accuser support such denial (Sykes and Matza 1957). Journalists join 
government officials and intellectuals in articulating and reinforcing denial of the 
Armenian genocide.
Intergenerational Transmission of Knowledge: Textbooks
Textbooks do not just reflect knowledge; they communicate it to new generations. 
The Department of Education in Ankara produces or approves all textbooks, and 
these textbooks, not surprisingly, reflect official Turkish positions on topics such 
as the Armenian genocide. Clashing with historical scholarship and radically 
opposed to Armenian knowledge, they simplify to the extreme. Easily identifiable 
errors abound (Akçam 2014; Adak 2016; Wolfgram 2019:175–180).
Textbook narratives, like other contributors to cultural trauma, identify the 
nature of the pain, the nature of the victim, the relation of the trauma victim to 
the wider audience—and they attribute responsibility. Yet here the account is 
reversed, advancing cultural trauma about Turkish suffering and victimization. A 
middle school textbook, approved by the Ministry of National Education’s Board 
of Instruction and Education on December 8, 2011, addresses the “The Armenian 
Events.” It teaches students about Armenian rebellions, initiated by revolutionary 
organizations. In this narrative, rebels issued instructions to fellow ethnics accord-
ing to which “if you want to survive you have to kill your neighbor first” (quoted 
in Akçam 2014).4 Consequently, “Armenians murdered ‘many people living in vil-
lages, even children, by attacking Turkish villages, which had become defenseless 
because all the Turkish men were fighting on the war fronts’.  .  .  . They stabbed 
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the Ottoman forces in the back. They created obstacles for the operation of the 
Ottoman units by cutting off supply routes and destroying bridges and roads. . . . 
They spied for Russia and by rebelling in the cities where they were located, they 
eased the way for the Russian invasion” (in Akçam 2014).
Another textbook, written for the tenth grade and approved on May 4, 2009, 
addresses the events of 1915 under the heading “The Armenian Problem during 
the World War I Years.” It explains to students that “the entry of the Ottoman 
state into World War I was viewed as a great opportunity by Armenians.  .  .  . 
[B]y invading Erzurum, Erzincan, Mus, and Bitlis in Eastern Anatolia, Russia 
further incited the Armenians in these regions” (in Akçam 2014). This account 
misses the fact that Russian military invaded the cities listed here only beginning 
in April 1916, after the deportation of the Armenian population.
Elsewhere, textbooks teach Turkish students that deportations actually sought 
to protect Armenians from radical-militant Armenian groups, that agricultural 
opportunities were prepared for resettled Armenians, and that police stations 
were set up at the places of destination to protect them from violence. The relative 
size of victimization, as well, deviates gravely from that identified by mainstream 
scholarship: “[B]ased on figures from unbiased researchers, 300,000 Armenians 
lost their lives due to war and sickness.  .  .  . [Yet,] according to official Russian 
records .  .  . Armenians killed around 600,000 Turks in just Erzurum, Erzincan, 
Trabzon, Bitlis, and Van and forced 500,000 . . . to migrate” (textbook quoted in 
Akçam 2014).5
In short, Turkish textbooks describe much suffering, manifold deaths, and 
displacement of populations. Yet the victims are primarily Turks and those 
Armenians who did not heed the call of their radical brethren to kill Turks. 
Responsible for the violence are either Armenians generally, radical Armenian 
organizations, or foreign powers. At times, textbooks present Armenians as 
internal enemies who betrayed their own country (the Ottoman Empire) to for-
eign powers. The basic structure of Turkish textbook narratives is thus consistent 
with that identified for memoirs and media. As is common in textbooks, the 
narrative is simplified. The contours are yet more starkly recognizable than in 
the other types of documents. Turks as a carrier group, with the Turkish state 
as a powerful knowledge entrepreneur, thus recharge sedimented knowledge to 
transmit it to new generations.
C OMPAR ATIVE PERSPECTIVES:  ARMENIANS,  TURKS, 
AND THE USHMM
Karl Mannheim, one of the founders of the sociology of knowledge, believed that 
the examination of knowledge carried by collectivities with different positions 
in social life, and thus with different viewpoints, could help scholars approxi-
mate that which constitutes truth. Contemporary scholarship no longer shares his 
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hope. Today, the sociology of knowledge limits itself to analyzing and explaining 
varying and potentially clashing sets of knowledge, and possibly to examining 
their consequences. The truth about the Armenian genocide thus does not lie 
somewhere between Armenian and Turkish knowledge. Nor do we arrive at a 
more objective truth if we add yet other perspectives that are not carried by the 
adversarial groups.
Nevertheless, comparing Armenian and Turkish depictions of history, and 
juxtaposing them with knowledge generated by other actors and in the realm of 
scholarship, holds some analytic benefit. At the least, it alerts us to ways in which 
each—Armenian knowledge and Turkish knowledge—varies not just from the 
other, but also from outsider knowledge, generated under conditions that differ 
from those characteristic of the worlds of Armenians and Turks.
Armenians dominate among those who curate exhibits and establish memorials 
to the Armenian genocide. The Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex in Yerevan and 
the 2015 exhibit at the Shoah Memorial in Paris are but two examples (chapter 4). 
While the latter did not take place in an Armenian institution, the curators were 
prominent Armenian scholars. How does knowledge communicated at these two 
sites compare with that provided by institutions not associated with Armenians? I 
select a detailed entry from the website of the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum (USHMM) as a point of comparison.6 I ask simultaneously how knowl-
edge transmitted by this site compares to Turkish knowledge.
An extended quotation from the USHMM site’s entry on the Armenian geno-
cide indicates that the narrative bears close similarity to, but also noticeable dis-
tinctions from, the Armenian representations we encountered above, and that—by 
implication—it radically clashes with Turkish knowledge. The USHMM site states: 
“The Armenian genocide refers to the physical annihilation of ethnic Armenian 
Christian people living in the Ottoman Empire from spring 1915 through autumn 
1916. There were approximately 1.5 million Armenians living in the Empire. 
At least 664,000 and possibly as many as 1.2 million died during the genocide. 
Armenians call these events Medz Yeghern (the great crime) or Aghet (catastrophe).” 
Following this quantification of victimhood and sections with historical back-
ground information, the narrative continues thus:
Taking orders from the central government in Constantinople, regional officials 
implemented mass shootings and deportations, assisted by local civilians.7 Ottoman  
military and security organs and their collaborators murdered the majority of  
Armenian men of fighting age, as well as thousands of women and children. During  
forced marches through the desert, convoys of surviving elderly men, women, and 
children were exposed to arbitrary attacks from local officials, nomadic bands, 
criminal gangs, and civilians. This violence included robbery (e.g., stripping victims  
naked to take their clothing and conducting body cavity searches for valuables), 
rape, abduction of young women and girls, extortion, torture, and murder.  .  .  .  
Although the term genocide was not coined until 1944, most scholars agree that the 
mass murder of Armenians fits this definition.
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Having thus identified responsible actors and types of victimization, including its 
identification as genocide, the page specifies the stages of death: “Hundreds of thou-
sands of Armenians died before reaching the designated holding camps. Many were 
killed or abducted, others committed suicide, and vast numbers died of starvation, 
dehydration, exposure, or disease en route. While some civilians sought to assist the 
Armenian deportees, many more killed or tormented the people in the convoys.”8
The narrative of the USHMM closely resembles that of the Tsitsernakaberd 
Memorial Complex and, yet more closely, the exhibit at the Shoah Memorial in 
Paris. Noticeable departures are reflected in the somewhat more cautious death 
estimate, in the limitation to the 1915–16 period, and in the use of the term holding 
camps—“concentration camps” in the other exhibits. Yet we find analogical bridg-
ing from the Holocaust to the Armenian genocide by the USHMM and a confir-
mation that the term genocide applies in the judgment of most scholars.
Table 1 juxtaposes the Armenian, Turkish, and USHMM perspectives along a 
set of analytic dimensions. These dimensions overlap with the categories Jeffrey 
Alexander (2004) spells out as preconditions of cultural trauma.
table 1 Comparison of Three Repertoires of Knowledge along Analytic Dimensions 
(based on memoirs, media reports, exhibits, textbooks, speeches)
Dimension 
of Violence
Three Sets of Knowledge
Armenian Turkish USHMM
Suffering perished; massacred; 
tragic and violent 
dispersion; first 
genocide of the  
20th century;  
concentration camps;  
akin to Holocaust;  
Deir ez-Zor predecessor 
to Auschwitz
Initial: flood of disaster 
and death; theft and 
plunder; houses burned 
down; deported, 
drowned; illness 
and death during 
transportation 
Soon: millions killed
physical annihilation; genocide; 
murder; robbery; rape; 
extortion; torture; abduction 
of women and girls; forced 
marches; death from starvation, 
dehydration, exposure, disease; 
holding camps
Victims 1.5 million Armenians; 
Armenian populations; 
the Armenian people
Early: Armenians and 
Turks
Later: Turks, 600,000 
killed in five cities 
alone; 500,000 displaced
ethnic Armenians in Ottoman 
Empire, majority of Armenian 
men of fighting age; thousands of 
women and children; Armenian 
population in Anatolia; 664,000 











CUP government, ruling circle, 
leadership (specific names); 
Ottoman military and security 
organs; Special Organization; 
regional and local officials;  
civilians; nomadic bands;  
criminal groups
Time frame 1915–1923 [not specified] 1915; spring 1915 to autumn 
1916
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Under the label of “suffering,” the USHMM describes all forms we typically 
read about in scholarly literature: physical annihilation, genocide, the Armenian 
words that mean “great crime” and “catastrophe,” murder, robbery (including via 
strip searches), rape, abduction of young girls and women, forced marches, arbi-
trary attacks, killing, death by starvation, dehydration, exposure, and disease. This 
is in line with terms we find in Armenian exhibits.
Comparing both Armenian memorial depictions and the USHMM text 
to accounts of suffering in Turkish documents, memorials, media reports, and 
textbooks requires differentiation between early and later sources. The earliest 
Turkish sources use similar vocabulary to describe the suffering of Armenians: 
flood of disaster and death, theft and plunder, houses burnt down, people 
deported, drowned, illness and death during deportations. Yet, when later Turkish 
documents cite millions of innocents killed, six hundred thousand in just five 
cities, and five hundred thousand displaced, the victims are Turks. These sources 
reference “only” three hundred thousand Armenian deaths, which they attribute 
not to purposeful violence, but to war and sickness.
Armenian sources identify victims as Armenians, Armenian populations, 
or the Armenian people. The USHMM site writes similarly about the majority 
of Armenian men of fighting age as well as thousands of women and children 
murdered. Yet it also specifies ethnic Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the 
Armenian population of Anatolia. It further estimates the death toll more cau-
tiously: 664,000 to 1.2 million, contrasting with the 1.5 million estimated in some 
Armenian sources.
References to responsible actors also show a stark difference between the 
Armenian and USHMM sites on the one hand and Turkish depictions on 
the other. In Turkish sources, we find early references to Armenians and the revo-
lutionary committee Dashnak, and later references to Armenians and to militant 
Armenian groups. This depiction is in line with the identification of Turks as 
the primary victims of violence. In line with the summary thus far, the Turkish 
representation of responsible actors differs sharply from those in Armenian and 
USHMM sources. Armenian representations typically refer to Turks, the Turks, 
or the Turkish government. Here, too, the USHMM is more specific. We read 
about the CUP government, CUP ruling circle, and CUP leadership, and we find 
references to four specific leaders of the Young Turk regime. Other references are 
to the central government in Constantinople, the Special Organization, Ottoman 
military and security organs and their collaborators, regional and local officials, 
nomadic bands, criminal groups, and civilians.
Finally, periodization varies across the different sets of knowledge. Many 
Armenian sources refer to the years 1915 to 1923 as the era of the genocide, thereby 
implicating the new Turkish republic, while most other sources refer to the events 
of 1915 or 1915 to 1916, or—in the more specific demarcation by the USHMM—
spring 1915 to autumn 1916.
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In short, the structure of Turkish knowledge regarding forms of suffering, 
types and numbers of victims, and responsible actors differs radically from those 
in Armenian sources or the USHMM website. We simultaneously find finer dif-
ferences between Armenian sources and the USHMM representation. This should 
not be surprising, given that group identification and partisanship promote clear-
cut depictions of social reality. In addition, even if historians played a central role 
in the construction of Armenian knowledge, Armenian knowledge additionally 
carries features of collective memory as a ritually reinforced and affectively loaded 
expression of knowledge about the past. Collective memory differs in this respect 
from historical knowledge. While not independent of the social location of his-
torians, historical knowledge is shaped less by affective and ritual reaffirmation. 
It is thus not surprising that the USHMM depiction is closest to historical schol-
arly knowledge about the Armenian genocide. Historians, after all, agree on the 
core features of the genocide, even if different schools of historiography variably 
emphasize as conditions for genocide religion and continuity (Vahram Dadrian), 
nationalism (Richard G. Hovannisian), demographic engineering (Fuat Dündar, 
Uğur Ümit Üngör, Taner Akçam), cumulative policy radicalization (Donald 
Bloxham), or state imperialism and contingency (Ronald Grigor Suny) (for a com-
parative analysis of these positions, see Der Matossian 2015).
Chapter 4 identified conditions that contributed to the shaping of Armenian 
knowledge repertoires. In the Turkish case, the decisive mnemonic entrepreneur— 
the centralized and often authoritarian Turkish state—has been in the most 
powerful institutional position to spread a narrative of Turkish victimization. 
Importantly, the motivation of the Turkish state remained strong, as continuities 
from the Young Turk regime and the violence of the early Turkish republic put 
the glorious foundation myth of the new Turkey at risk. Finally, Turkish society 
constituted an ideal sounding board in that Turks too had experienced massive 
death, suffering, displacement, and humiliation during World War I and preced-
ing wars. Sensitivities were heightened further by Turkey’s outsider status in a 
predominantly Western alliance with Christian roots.
International comparison holds potential for further insights. Turkish denial 
resembles that of the United States, which also displays massive domestic resis-
tance to facing the evil associated with its foundation (Savelsberg and King 2011, 
2015). As in Turkey, where mass violence against ethnic minorities extended into 
the origins of the new republic, the foundation of the United States was associated 
with the near extinction of the Native American peoples, settler colonialism, and 
slavery. Mass violence associated with the creation of countries, however, does not 
sit well in national foundation myths in the modern era.
In contrast to Turkey and the United States, post–World War II (Federal Repub-
lic of) Germany cultivated the memory of evil, albeit with delay. Unlike Turkey, 
Germany was occupied entirely after the end of the war. The occupying pow-
ers held major criminal trials against leading perpetrators. Germany eventually 
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gained its independence through economic development and integration into a 
community of nations, not through armed struggle and in relative isolation as did 
Turkey. Germany, finally, did not hold the same strong bargaining chip as Turkey, 
whose military cooperation was crucial to a Western alliance confronted with the 
instabilities of the Middle East. Western countries thus hesitated for many decades 
to challenge Turkey’s insistence on innocence. A comparative analysis obviously 
suggests conditions for the motivation and ability of governments to advance revi-
sionist knowledge repertoires about episodes of mass atrocities for which their 
countries bear prime responsibility.
C ONCLUSIONS
Linking back to the conceptual and theoretical tools laid out in chapter 3, social 
knowledge about the Armenian genocide is a property of collectivities in which it 
is confirmed and reinforced—ethnic Armenians in one case, Turks in the other. 
Yet carriers of such knowledge are not a monolithic mass. Some dissent, while 
others act as entrepreneurs who spread and reinforce representations and narra-
tives with particular efficacy. Under specific post–World War I conditions, even 
criminal trials against some of the perpetrators did not display the knowledge-
generating power known from many other cases.
Organizational actors, especially states, are strong knowledge entrepreneurs. 
As their interests shift, they introduce new elements into repertoires of knowledge. 
Chapter 4 showed, for the Armenian case, how the transition from Soviet Armenia 
to the new independent Republic and the intensification of the Nagorno- 
Karabakh conflict resulted in mutations of knowledge. In the Turkish case, the state 
acted as a powerful knowledge entrepreneur, continuously interested in denial, 
but under shifting circumstances. Its integration into NATO, Armenian terrorism 
of the 1970s and 1980s, and Armenian independence in 1991 initiated some, albeit 
modest, modifications of knowledge. These observations provide cautious support 
for Maurice Halbwachs’s argument about the presentism of collective memory.
Yet, just as some basic features of Armenian memory remain constant, firmly 
sedimented and reinforced in everyday interactions, the stability of Turkish 
knowledge is pronounced. It settled in soon after the immediate post–World War I 
years. The highly centralized, at times authoritarian, state with a strong ideologi-
cal mission is the core source of denialism, and the history of Turkish suffering 
generated receptivity in the population. Cracks in the body of Turkish knowledge 
have appeared only in recent decades, especially among intellectuals. Scholar-
ship cited prominently in this chapter illustrates them clearly, and authors such as 
Taner Akçam, Seyhan Bayraktar, and Fatma Müge Göçek are but examples, all of 
Turkish descent, albeit now living outside their country of origin.9
The stage is now set for part III of this book. Part I explored how knowledge 
repertoires evolve and how they are negotiated in everyday interactions. Part II 
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showed how they solidify and become sedimented. We also saw how knowl-
edge entrepreneurs intervened in these processes and how different collectivities 
develop distinct, at times contradictory, sets of ideas about the same event. What 
Armenians and Turks know about the mass violence carried out in the Ottoman 
Empire in 1915 and subsequent years presents an astounding example of 
such contradictions.
Contradictions are likely to erupt in conflict and struggle when collectivities 
face others with very different knowledge repertoires, especially if that knowledge 
is central to their identity. How do collectivities act in such situations? Again, soci-
ological traditions provide us with helpful guidance. Some strands of scholarship 
point to strategies directed at the in-group that do not require conflictual engage-
ment with the antagonist. The Durkheimian tradition alerts us to rituals that tie 
a community together and reaffirm shared values, norms, and ways of under-
standing the world. Other scholarly traditions highlight direct confrontation with 
the antagonist in conflictual processes. Examples, short of the threat of violence, 
are legislative efforts to acknowledge, and thereby privilege, one set of knowledge 
over others. Legislation may even aim at the regulation of speech by criminalizing 
articulations that others perceive as offensive. Law courts may (or may not) apply 
such laws. In doing so, they respond to concrete disputes between antagonists in 
struggles over appropriate knowledge or permitted speech.
Both rituals and conflictual engagement with the other are thus crucial in 
struggles over conflicting knowledge. While scholars typically associate rituals 
with culture and political conflict with power, cultural strategies and power strat-
egies are certainly not mutually exclusive. Cultural practices, including rituals, 
involve actors with interests and power, while political and judicial struggles make 
use of cultural repertoires and mechanisms.
Part III therefore examines conflict and power struggles. We will see that it 
matters in which social field such struggles are being carried out. Each social field, 
such as politics or law, is governed by its own rules of the game. Actors in each 
field have acquired a specific habitus that corresponds with its rules. This habitus 
includes an immersion in the logic of the institutions that are prominent within 
each field. Yet there is also room for discretion and improvisation, for a flexible 
application of the rules of the game. Finally, institutions, nested within fields, take 
on different shapes across countries. The law works differently in the United States 
than elsewhere, and politics operate differently in France than in other countries. 
These particularities are likely to affect the shapes and outcomes of struggles, even 
in a globalized world.
First, however, I turn to rituals: Durkheimian moments that affirm identities 
and knowledge repertoires among both Armenians and Turks. Who initiates such 
rituals? What shape do they take, and what are their consequences?

PART I I I





Affirming Genocide Knowledge 
through Rituals
Parts I and II of this book examined the emergence of repertoires of knowledge 
regarding the Armenian genocide through social interaction, objectified thought 
processes, bearing witness, and the involvement of knowledge entrepreneurs. We 
saw how knowledge generated through these processes took radically different 
shapes as it became sedimented within each of two distinct carrier groups, Arme-
nians and Turks. Oppositional worldviews and associated knowledge reper toires 
are not unique to this case, of course. We find them, for example, when those who 
recognize the role of human action in global warming encounter others who see a 
Chinese conspiracy at work, aimed at harming the U.S. economy. Or again, when 
those who know that liberal or social democracy will secure a prosperous and 
secure future disagree with followers of populist authoritarian leaders and parties. 
The question arises of how each collectivity deals with the challenges posed by the 
other side.
Now, in part III, we encounter two strategies commonly deployed in struggles 
over knowledge. While chapters 7 and 8 address conflictual engagement with the 
opposing side in the realms of politics and law, and chapter 9 explores counterpro-
ductive effects of denial in an age of human rights hegemony, the present chapter 
examines the use of elaborate public rituals toward the reaffirmation of genocide 
knowledge within each of the contending collectivities.
We owe early social-scientific insights into the role of rituals in social life to 
Émile Durkheim. In his book The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim 
([1912] 2001) tells us about the ability of rituals to sanctify objects and charge sym-
bols that represent them with a special energy. Rituals also generate collective 
effervescence—a sense of shared excitement and, in consequence, of groupness 
and belonging among those who partake in them. Durkheim’s student Maurice 
Halbwachs (1992), who coined the term collective memory, applied these ideas to 
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strategies through which actors achieve knowledge about past events. Contem-
porary sociologists recognize that rituals take place in all spheres of life, while 
that which they sanctify varies. The latter may include otherworldly entities in the 
sphere of religion; claims of truth in scholarship; justice in law; health in medicine; 
or the nation and its protection in the military.
RITUALS AND THEIR C ONSEQUENCES:  A WEALTH  
OF RESEARCH AND CRITIQUES
Some current scholarship provides clear, almost operational, conceptions of ritu-
als and their consequences. Randall Collins (2005:48), for example, spells out these 
ingredients: “1. Two or more people are physically assembled in the same place, so 
that they affect each other by their bodily presence, whether it is in the foreground 
of their conscious attention or not. 2. There are boundaries to outsiders so that 
participants have a sense of who is taking part and who is excluded. 3. People 
focus their attention upon a common object or activity, and by communicating 
this focus to each other become mutually aware of each other’s focus of attention. 
4. They share a common mood or emotional experience.” The copresence of these 
elements generates the collective effervescence and its consequences about which 
Durkheim wrote. We know manifold examples of such rituals from our own expe-
rience. Consider, in the secular realm, a graduation ceremony or Fourth of July 
celebration; or, in religious life, an Easter mass, a Friday prayer during Ramadan, 
or a Yom Kippur service.
Today, in our mass-mediated societies, physical copresence is still highly effec-
tive, but it may no longer be a necessary precondition for the mobilization of emo-
tional energy. In fact, concrete embodied rituals themselves may become enduring 
symbols that carry the ritual charge through time. Filmed depictions of events are 
one mechanism (Dayan and Katz 1992), and the analysis below will reference both 
embodied rituals and their depictions in film.
Rituals work especially well when the symbols they sanctify align with some 
preexisting belief system. Alexander Riley (2008) provides a powerful illustra-
tion when he examines symbols used in the memorialization of victims of United 
Airlines flight 93. That flight—hijacked by a group of terrorists intending to 
destroy the U.S. Capitol Building or the White House—crashed in a field in rural 
Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. Those who designed the memorial sought 
to celebrate the passengers as heroes, a first line of defense in the nation’s new 
fight against international terrorism. They stacked the memorial with symbols that 
speak to larger themes in the nation’s history and (closely allied) in Christianity. 
An initial, improvised memorial featured a forty-foot steel fence, one foot for 
each passenger killed; a cross, marking the area as sacred ground; and “angels of 
freedom,” one for each passenger, who were thereby depicted as saintly figures. A 
“thunder flag” displayed four stars, each representing one site of destruction, and 
three bars: one blue, symbolizing the heavens; one white, representing the purity 
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of the heroes; and one red for the earth of America. Constructed later as a place of 
commemoration, a “Thunder on the Mountain Chapel” featured an altar resem-
bling the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., and thus representing the nation, 
and an eagle as a symbol of deliverance, pointing upward.
A wealth of scholarship has built on Durkheimian thought about rituals and 
their effects on knowledge. Mary Douglas (1966) explored how rituals separate 
humans and their dignity from polluting matters—degrading substances, utter-
ances, or actions. Edward Shils (1981) observed how civic rituals celebrate the 
sacred even in secular life; with Michael Young, he depicted the coronation of 
Queen Elizabeth II as a ritual that generated national communion within the 
United Kingdom, thereby supporting shared moral values (Shils and Young 1953). 
Robert Bellah (1970) relatedly wrote about civil religion—practices that con-
nect the American nation with God and that sanctify persons, places, and events 
such as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, John F. Kennedy, or Gettysburg. 
Through that sanctification, American civil religion provides the American people 
with a sense of meaning and direction.
Rituals are especially powerful in times of crisis, as Kai Erikson ([1966] 2004) 
showed in his famous study on punishment in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. 
Describing three “crime waves,” Erikson demonstrates how during these periods, 
not actually marked by increased criminal behavior, people experienced a per-
ceived threat to the unity of the colony. Perceptions of threat resulted from the 
arrival of new, less religiously dogmatic immigrants, a loss of political autonomy, 
and internal discord. They advanced three waves of ritual punishment, of which 
the Salem witch hunt is best known. Erikson interprets the outcome of these 
penal campaigns as the redrawing of boundaries around the community and the 
strengthening of its inner coherence and normative commitment. This benefit 
came at a price, however, that had to be paid dearly by those defined as responsible 
for social crises and insecurity.
Rituals and Conflict
Powerful as this body of Durkheimian scholarship is, it nevertheless faces criti-
cism (Smith and Riley 2009). Many studies on rituals assume that consensus 
and social integration are the only outcome. That assumption, however, may not 
always hold true, and even when rituals achieve such outcomes, the mechanisms 
remain obscure. Critics further charge that work in the Durkheimian tradition is 
idealistic, that it fails to recognize agency, intent, conflict, force, and power (e.g., 
Goody 1977; Lukes 1975; Turner 1969).
Scholars have argued, and the following will prove them right, that we can take 
these criticisms seriously and still hold on to the insights a theory of ritual has to 
offer us. In fact, the explanatory power of Durkheimian theories increases if we 
incorporate the possibility of discord and the role of power and authority. Yes, 
rituals may indeed produce consensus, but they may also generate conflict. At 
times, conflict intensifies exactly as a result of the integrative force of rituals, which 
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is easy to see where intergroup conflict is concerned. By strengthening a sense 
of belonging and shared ideas within one group, say Turks or Armenians, ritu-
als draw the boundaries to the outside group ever more starkly (see also Simmel 
[1955] 1964; Coser 1956). Consequently, intergroup conflict is likely to intensify.
Rituals may even generate conflict within a collectivity. Consider a group of 
Turkish intellectuals gathering for a set of lectures and symposia that seek to chal-
lenge the dominant Turkish discourse on the violence of 1915. Exactly this hap-
pened in the early 2000s, when a network of journalists and scholars, including 
many Turks, created a “Workshop for Armenian Turkish Scholarship.” A March 
2000 conference at the University of Chicago was followed by others in Michigan 
(2002), Minnesota (2003), Salzburg (2005), New York (2006), and Geneva (2008) 
(Bayraktar 2010:185–186). These gatherings, conceived of as scholarly rituals, 
helped sanctify a truth claim about the Armenian genocide that generated conflict 
within the Turkish context while generating collective effervescence and inten-
sified relationships among participating scholars. Through the latter, it laid the 
foundation for future scholarship in opposition to dominant Turkish repertoires 
of knowledge.
We gain further explanatory power, linking back to Randall Collins’s ingredi-
ents of rituals, when we ask who has the resources, power, and influence to bring 
together many human beings in one place. Who draws boundaries to the outside 
world, deciding who partakes in the ritual and its products and who is excluded? 
Or: Who is capable of transmitting rituals to a broader public via modern media 
of communication? Further, given the variable content of rituals, who determines 
which actors say and do what during the ritual, and what objects are offered for 
sanctification? Finally, what motivates those organizers of rituals, and what power 
potential or other tools help them achieve their goals?
Rituals, Interests, and Power
Actors, their motivations, and the tools they use to initiate and structure rituals are 
crucial for their courses and consequences. Consider struggles over the initiation 
and content of rituals that explicitly aim at the construction and preservation of 
specific collective memories. Alejandro Baer (2011) describes how Spain, during 
the Franco regime, repressed engagement with Holocaust history, not surprising 
in light of the Hitler-Franco alliance dating back to the Spanish Civil War. Spain 
began to engage with these dark chapters of history only after the transition to 
democracy of the 1970s. This engagement eventually culminated in the country 
joining the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust (2000), initiated by 
the Swedish government and seeking to secure the memory of genocides.
In Spain, democratization thus provided Jewish organizations with new oppor-
tunities. They successfully suggested an official commemoration, and an initial 
commemorative ceremony took place on May 3, 2000, in the Madrid Assembly, 
the seat of the regional government. The ceremony culminated in the lighting of 
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six candles, echoing a practice from Yad Vashem, Israel’s official Holocaust memo-
rial center, each candle representing one million of the six million Jewish vic-
tims of the Shoah. The election of a socialist government in 2004 opened further 
opportunities, resulting in the first ceremony officially sponsored by the national 
government in Madrid. Yet the proposed structure of the ritual provoked conflict. 
The organizers invited representatives of other victim groups to participate, but 
only in the candle lighting ceremony; they were not invited to deliver speeches. 
Republican associations, representing those who had fought the Franco regime in 
the Spanish Civil War, protested. When the organizers eventually included one of 
their representatives, Enric Marco, presumably a former inmate of the Mauthausen 
concentration camp, in the list of speakers, new conflict erupted. Marco refer-
enced Guantanamo Bay and “camps in Palestine,” generating intense resentment 
among Jewish attendees. In response, later ceremonies went through a series of 
modifications, each of which resulted in new struggles (Baer 2011).
The example of Holocaust commemorations in Spain illustrates how conflict, 
interest, and power accompany the introduction and structuration of commemo-
rative rituals. Each year’s event reflects a new political situation resulting in the 
incorporation of new memories, in line with Halbwachs’s (1992) argument about 
presentism of memory. Yet we cannot understand these commemorations without 
considering the previous years’ events and the sensitivities they evoked. Memory 
is thus also path dependent, in line with arguments Jeffrey Olick developed when 
analyzing series of contested German May 8 commemorations of capitulation at 
the end of World War II (Olick 1999, 2016). Each of these commemorations grav-
itated between the notions of Germany’s liberation versus its defeat, with their 
respective sensitivities. The story of Holocaust commemorations in Spain also 
confirms insights by Francesca Polletta (1998), who examined how interactions 
between power holders and challengers result in shifting modes of public com-
memoration and protest repertoires, including the creation of new holidays.1
In short, rituals play an important role in social life. They are suited to sanctify-
ing moral standards and sets of knowledge, including memories of difficult pasts. 
They are typically initiated and structured by powerful and motivated actors, rep-
resentatives of collectivities, with the intent to generate solidarity and a shared 
perception of reality. What role, then, do rituals play in solidifying knowledge 
about the mass violence of 1915 and subsequent years in Armenian life, and in 
Turkish life, when each group faces challenges from the other side?
ARMENIAN RITUALS AND THE SOLIDIFICATION  
OF ARMENIAN KNOWLED GE REPERTOIRES
The Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex, high on a hill overlooking Armenia’s 
capital city of Yerevan, consists of three main buildings: the Memorial Wall, the 
Sanctuary of Eternity (Memorial Hall and Eternal Flame), and the Memorial 
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Column, entitled “The Reborn Armenia” (see chapter 4). As a memorial made of 
stone, it represents collective memory. The description on the memorial’s website 
testifies to the meaning inscribed in the hard stone with its seemingly eternal mes-
sage. Yet that text itself was written in a particular historical situation, and current 
uses of the memorial continue to express the meaning Armenians bestow on it, 
especially on special ritual occasions such as the April 24 Armenian Genocide 
Commemoration Days. The following sections examine three events that took 
place in Yerevan on April 23 and 24, 2016, one of them at the memorial itself. Based 
on documents and participant observation, I interpret these events as rituals, and 
I consider their consequences for the reaffirmation and shape of repertoires of 
genocide knowledge.
The Commemorative Ritual at Tsitsernakaberd 
On April 24, 2016, an early-morning bus took a group of international visitors, 
including this author, to the memorial. Along the way, the bus passed a steady pro-
cession of people who walked up the hill to lay down carnations in a circle around 
the eternal flame that burns at the center of the “Sanctuary of Eternity.”2 Up on the 
hill, these visitors joined a crowd of foreign dignitaries, ambassadors, foreign 
ministers and representatives of various legislatures from around the world, who 
were gathering at the end of the Memorial Wall. It was a beautiful spring day. The 
sun was intense. Looking south, our eyes met snow-capped Mount Ararat and its 
smaller twin peak, sacred to the Armenians but just across the border in neigh-
boring Turkey. Mount Aragats towered in the north. When Armenia’s president, 
Serzh Sargsyan, arrived, he was accompanied by his cabinet, the Catholicos of the 
Armenian Church, and several guests of honor, including prominent members 
of the Armenian expatriate community, survivors of the genocides in Cambodia 
and Rwanda, and celebrities such as actor and activist George Clooney. Slowly 
the crowd moved along the Memorial Wall, toward the Memorial Hall with the 
Eternal Flame. The procession came to a halt when the dignitaries had reached 
the end of the wall closest to the hall. Prayers were said, a choir sang religious 
and patriotic songs, and military honors were performed. President Sargsyan laid 
down a wreath, and then, followed by the crowd, slowly descended the steps into 
the memorial. The carnations that the president, the guests of honor, and members 
of international delegations laid down in a circle around the flame added to an 
already meter-high wall of flowers deposited by those who had moved in proces-
sion up the hill earlier in the day (see figure 5). When returning to the hill in the 
late afternoon, a similarly dense procession of Armenians still made its way up 
the hill, commemorating the genocide and paying respect to those whose lives 
had been destroyed.
The April 24 event at the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex certainly ful-
fills the criteria of a ritual. Many people were physically assembled; the Memo-
rial Wall and other architectural elements constituted boundaries to outsiders; 
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people directed their attention to a common object or activity, and became mutu-
ally aware of each other’s focus of attention; they finally shared a common somber 
mood. Those in attendance were reminded of the history of the genocide and its 
centrality to the identity of the Armenian people. They experienced a sense of col-
lective effervescence, a sentiment of solidarity, of the sacredness of the place and 
the occasion.
The structure of the event and the identity of those who participated care-
fully displayed several messages. The presence of the country’s president and the 
Catholicos; their words, prayers, and rites; and the combination of religious and 
patriotic songs demonstrated the intimate relationship between the state and the 
Armenian Church. Participation by ambassadors and other representatives of 
many governments around the globe reflected the growing international recogni-
tion of the genocide and solidarity with the Armenian people. Finally, the presence 
of survivors of other, more recent genocides, globally defined as such, supported 
the labeling of the violence of 1915 as a genocide, while simultaneously expressing 
Armenian solidarity with other victimized peoples.
Central organs of the Armenian state and church organized the event, deter-
mining the initiation and structuration of this ritual. The power and authority 
of these entrepreneurs of knowledge and memory were crucial. Simultane-
ously, however, the mass procession up the hill by tens of thousands of ordinary 
Figure 5. A procession bearing flowers descends into the Memorial Hall, where the Eternal 
Flame is located, at Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex, Yerevan. Photo by Andreas Rentz/
Getty Images for 100 Lives.
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Armenians attested to the shared memory, the result of manifold day-to-day inter-
actions, of the telling of stories across generations. Documents indicate that the 
commemorative event of 2015, on the one hundredth anniversary of the genocide, 
was organized similarly, even if the presence of several heads of state, including the 
presidents of Russia and France, underlined the special significance of the centen-
nial (Mkrtchyan 2015).
As powerful as the ritual at Tsitsernakaberd was in its own right, we will under-
stand its meaning better if we consider it in context. Sociologist Theodore Caplow 
(2004) used the term festival cycle, exploring how the meaning of a holiday reveals 
itself most powerfully when we see it in the context of other holidays. In this 
spirit, I examine two other events that surrounded the commemorative ritual at 
Tsitsernakaberd. The first, a Global Forum Against the Crime of Genocide, was 
held on the day preceding the memorial ceremony. The final event, concluding the 
cycle, was an award ceremony on the evening of the day of commemoration, sev-
eral hours after the ritual at the memorial. It celebrated the newly created Aurora 
Prize for Awakening Humanity. Both events took place in Yerevan’s massive sports 
and convention center, sited on the same hill as the genocide memorial.
Global Forum Against the Crime of Genocide
On Saturday, April 23, 2016, a Global Forum Against the Crime of Genocide was 
held, organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Armenia. Also involved was a “State Committee for Coordi-
nation of the Events Dedicated to the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide.” 
The organizers titled the forum “Living Witnesses of Genocide.” The event took 
place in a large hall in front of an audience of some eight hundred participants, 
including diplomats and other representatives of foreign governments, mem-
bers of the Armenian legislature, a small group of survivors of genocides, and 
scholars. An image of Mount Ararat provided the backdrop behind the speakers 
(see figure 6).
The Foreign Ministry’s concept note describes the meaning of the event:
During the Global Forum 2016, entitled “Living Witnesses of Genocide”, leading 
politicians, parliamentarians, scholars, media, civil society representatives, and  
other stakeholders from around the world will address genocide-caused refugee crises,  
ramifications of protection mechanisms, and, in general, genocide consequences.
The Forum will focus on the protection of people who became refugees because 
of genocide or its threat. The purpose of genocide perpetrators is to annihilate the 
representatives and culture of the targeted ethnic group, and as long as they succeed, 
it is impossible to break the vicious circle of genocidal acts.
For that very reason, the international community should be able to save lives of 
people subjected to genocide, their property, cultural and public institutions, create  
favorable conditions for their return, and provide rapid compensation for the  
destruction through international mechanisms of accountability.
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By organizing the forum in this universalistic spirit, the government of Armenia 
not only expresses solidarity with other victims of genocide. In addition—and in 
combination with the commemorative event of the following day (“festival cycle,” 
à la Caplow)—it also pleads for the saving of lives “of people subjected to genocide, 
their property, cultural and public institutions.” It demands that the international 
community create “favorable conditions for their return, and provide rapid com-
pensation for the destruction through international mechanisms of accountability.” 
The last set of demands is still applicable, in principle, to the violence experienced 
by the Armenian people, even if the text does not make that explicit.
We gain more insights by examining specifics of the unfolding forum. The event 
was opened at 10 a.m. with a speech by President Sargsyan, followed by a “High-
level Dialogue” moderated by David Ignatius, a self-identified Armenian American 
and a columnist and associate editor for the Washington Post. This dialogue 
included statements by President Sargsyan; Andrew Woolford, president of the 
International Association of Genocide Scholars; George Clooney, UN peace envoy 
and cofounder of Not On Our Watch, a nonprofit organization;3 Joe Verhoeven, 
judge ad hoc of the International Court of Justice; and Vartan Gregorian, president 
of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Clearly, such a panel demonstrates the 
country’s ability to align behind its agenda diverse sectors of international law, 
scholarship, and civil society.
Figure 6. Discussion after a panel at the Global Forum Against the Crime of Genocide,  
Yerevan, 2016, with an image of Mount Ararat as backdrop. Photo courtesy of Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Armenia.
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ concept paper entitles the subsequent Panel 
Number 1 “Genocide and Displacement: Identifying Genocide from the Perspec-
tive of Forced Displacements and Relocation.” It describes the panel’s charge: 
“Genocide is an extreme form of identity-based violence. . . . This Panel will con-
centrate on different stages of genocide in the context of displacement by trying to 
address the following issues: The common patterns of displacement and relocation 
in the planning and perpetrating [of] genocide. Displacement as an indicator of 
the intent to destroy particular groups in part or in its [sic] entirety.”
Presenters included professors of international law, philosophy, history, and 
Jewish studies; a scholar in Russian and Eurasian studies; and human rights activ-
ists from a variety of countries, including Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Switzerland, and Turkey. Support for the notion of justice against 
perpetrators of mass atrocities was a common denominator of the presentations. 
Panel 2, entitled “Preventing Genocide and Protecting Refugees: Contemporary 
Challenges,” featured a sociologist, an anthropologist, a historian, and inter-
national lawyers from Italy, the United States, and Sweden. It concluded with a 
speech by Hayk Demoyan, director of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute.
Bringing together an international and interdisciplinary group of scholars in 
Yerevan to elaborate on issues of genocide on the day before the official Armenian 
genocide commemoration, the global forum added legitimacy to the identifica-
tion as genocide of the mass violence against Armenians during World War I. 
Indirectly, it validated moral and legal claims that today are associated with the 
notion of genocide.
Artak Zakaryan, chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, and Garen Nazarian, deputy 
minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Armenia, cochaired the closing ses-
sion. It included presentations by the Speaker of the National Assembly of the 
Republic of Armenia, and testimonies of genocide survivors. Addresses by guests 
and delegates followed, mostly ambassadors and representatives of legislatures or 
administrations of numerous countries. The final speaker was Edward Nalbandian, 
minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Armenia, who bridged events and 
speeches of the day to Armenian claims in the conflict with Azerbaijan over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region. In this most political of all the panels, the foreign min-
ister significantly attached contemporary foreign policy claims to an event that 
had addressed consequences of genocide, on the night preceding the Armenian 
genocide commemoration. Unsurprisingly, a commemoration organized by a for-
eign ministry does not unfold in neutral political space. Memory and politics in 
such settings are intertwined.
In short, we can conceive of the Global Forum Against the Crime of Genocide as 
a ritual, marked by physical copresence, boundaries to the outside, a shared focus 
of attention, mutual awareness, and a common mood. It generated an understand-
ing of genocide and its horrors, agreement on the inappropriateness of impunity 
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for those who initiate, execute, or sanction genocide, and an identification with 
knowledge, ideas, and symbols that the proceedings had sanctified. The inclusion 
of genocide scholars from various disciplines and countries added legitimacy for 
the use of the genocide label and associated claims. Finally, the inclusion of sur-
vivors of recognized genocides reaffirmed the validity of the categorization of the 
mass violence against the Armenians during World War I as genocide.
The event allowed for an expression of solidarity and explicit acknowledgment, 
for which the ritual at the memorial at Tsitsernakaberd could not provide space. 
In preceding the commemorative rite, the forum’s statements carried over into the 
gathering at the memorial on the following morning. Adding cognitive content 
to the affectively charged ritual at the memorial, it reaffirmed basic elements of 
repertoires of knowledge about the Armenian genocide.
Aurora Prize Ceremony: Dance, Stories, and the Power of Oneness  
in Ritual Performance 
A third event completed the cycle of rituals held in Yerevan in 2016. On the eve-
ning of Sunday, April 24, following the morning’s wreath laying ceremony at the 
Armenian Genocide Memorial, a profoundly moving event took place in a large 
theater that is part of the sports and convention complex on the hill overlooking 
Yerevan. The occasion was the first Aurora Prize Ceremony (figure 7). An esti-
mated two thousand people attended. The organizers’ concept note describes the 
prize and the event:
Figure 7. Aurora Prize Ceremony, Yerevan, 2016. Photo courtesy of Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs, Republic of Armenia.
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The Aurora Prize for Awakening Humanity is a new global award that will be given 
annually to people who put themselves at risk to enable others to survive. Recipients 
will be recognized for the exceptional impact their actions have made on preserving 
human life and advancing humanitarian causes, having overcome significant chal-
lenges along the way. Every year the winners will be honored with a $100,000 award 
as well as the unique ability to continue the cycle of giving by nominating an orga-
nization, which inspired their work and is consistent with the spirit of the Prize, for 
a $1,000,000 grant. The Aurora Prize is designed to further the causes that motivate 
people to risk their health, freedom, reputation or livelihood by voluntarily carrying 
out acts that enable others to survive and thrive.
The program note then lists the members of the Aurora Prize Selection Committee 
as follows:
• George Clooney, Co-founder, Not On Our Watch, humanitarian, performer 
and filmmaker;
• Elie Wiesel, President of the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity, Nobel 
Laureate;
• Hina Jilani, Former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Human Rights Defenders;
• Vartan Gregorian, Co-Founder, 100 LIVES, President of the Carnegie  
Corporation of New York;
• Gareth Evans, Former President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group, 
Former Australian Foreign Minister;
• Mary Robinson, Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; Former 
President of Ireland;
• Óscar Arias, Two-time President of Costa Rica, Nobel Laureate;
• Shirin Ebadi, Human Rights Lawyer and Iran’s first female judge, Nobel  
Laureate;
• Leymah Gbowee, Executive Director of the Women, Peace and Security  
Network (WIPSEN-Africa), Nobel Laureate.
The committee thus included four Nobel laureates and others in high positions in 
international non-governmental organizations and other international organiza-
tions. Participation by these persons displays solidarity with the Armenian people 
and its history of suffering, indirectly and directly confirming knowledge claims 
regarding the Armenian genocide.
As the event unfolded, capping the cycle of April 2016 commemorations, it dis-
played all the features of a ritual and conveyed a clear message about the Armenian 
genocide. I rely on a video recording4 and on my own observations and detailed 
note taking at and around the event in the Yerevan convention center.
The award ceremony opened with a five-minute animated film by Armenian 
filmmaker Eric Nazarian, a true masterpiece in condensation of national mem-
ory. The film shows a crane, flying over vast areas of land, imposing mountains, 
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rolling green hills, towns, and churches. The narrator tells about an “ancient civi-
lization” underneath the bird’s wing, the “Land of Noah,” about its millennia of 
building and survival, and its inhabitants’ contribution to humankind. He tells 
of the “1.5 million who perished in 1915 together with their culture” and reaf-
firms Armenian genocide knowledge: “This was a genocide, perpetrated by the 
Ottoman Empire against its own citizens.”
The voice further tells about the many refugees, including seventeen-year-old 
Aurora Mardiganian, the star of Ravaged Armenia, the first Hollywood film about 
the genocide. This silent movie was made in 1919, based on Aurora’s 1918 autobi-
ography. We learn that the film was, at the time, premiered and viewed by large 
audiences all over the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, 
and that the book sold one hundred thousand copies. Interspersed throughout the 
animated film is footage from Ravaged Armenia, including gruesome but fictional 
images of crucified young women. Historical photographs show death marches 
and survivors of the mass killings. The voice continues: “To this day, Aurora 
remains a testament to the living memory of the genocide and the gratitude of the 
Armenian people to their saviors. Aurora became a symbol of light and hope to an 
entire generation.”
Approaching the conclusion of the film, the message shifts from despair to 
hope. The voice tells us about survivors in countries around the world. Images 
show the Statue of Liberty in New York and the Eiffel Tower in Paris, symbols of 
the two countries in which most Armenian refugees found a new home. The nar-
rator speaks about refugees rebuilding their lives, with dignity, “ever grateful to 
those who rescued their families,” who “put their own lives at risk to save survi-
vors.” Concluding images shift to present-day refugees, linking the film with the 
central theme of the 2016 global forum. The voice speaks about victims of today’s 
man-made disasters. A globe appears on the screen, and the narrator summarizes 
the central message: “On behalf of the survivors of the Armenian genocide and in 
gratitude to their saviors, the Aurora Prize for Awakening Humanity honors the 
power of the human spirit that compels action in the face of adversity.” The screen 
shows faces from around the world, and, finally, again, that of Aurora Mardiganian.
The film clearly connects the Aurora Prize Ceremony to the preceding two 
events, completing the cycle of commemoration. It reinforces the labeling of the 
mass violence against Armenians as a genocide and the count of those killed as 
1.5 million. The film further pleads for solidarity with other peoples who suffered 
from mass violence and expresses gratitude and appreciation of those who aided 
survivors. Mindful of the power of oneness (Schwartz 2009), and in line with the 
title the founders had selected for the prize, the filmmaker introduces Aurora as a 
representative of the survivors of the Armenian genocide and of the survivors of 
mass atrocities generally.
A ballet, danced to music performed by the State Youth Orchestra of Armenia, 
is the second item on the evening program. Ten dancers of Foundation Ballet 2021 
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appear on the mist-covered stage, in front of four saintly figures woven into a 
large curtain behind the stage. The dancers’ movements are abrupt, signifying 
struggle, but the scene changes when the mist disappears and a single dancer enters 
the stage from the left, holding high a bronze sculpture, made up of three branches 
growing out of a common root. Each branch shows varying numbers of human 
figures, vertically on top of each other, rising upward, as though they are moving 
out of ashes into a new life. The sculpture, entitled To the Eternity, is a creation of 
the Armenian artist Manvel Matevosyan and was a prizewinner of a 2015 anniver-
sary contest, “A Message 100 Years Later.” A postcard with its image describes it as 
“12 figures symbolizing Western Armenia going up, to the eternity and the idea of 
canonization of the Great Genocide victims.” The dancer carries the statue to the 
center of the stage and the curtain in the back of the stage rises, opening the view 
to a pedestal. The dancer places the statue on top of the pedestal and then raises his 
arms, like a priest sanctifying a sacred object. The other dancers, no longer in wild 
motion, stand still symmetrically to both sides of the sanctified sculpture. Exiting 
from the stage, they leave behind the emblem that from here on represents the 
Aurora Prize for the Awakening of Humanity. In future years, copies of the statue 
will be handed to the finalists and recipient of the Aurora Prize.
Following this ritual sanctification of the new emblem, introductory comments 
by two masters of ceremonies (MCs)5 reinforce the messages of the film and of 
the dance performance. They highlight that the inauguration ceremony takes 
place on Armenian soil on the anniversary of the “genocide” that took the lives of 
“1.5 million people.” They introduce separate awards6 preceding the core of the 
event. Eventually, the awarding of the Aurora Prize unfolds in four types of deli-
cately interwoven segments: musical performances, parables told by the MCs, 
video messages from absent members of the award committee, and the introduc-
tion of the Aurora Prize finalists by members of the committee. It culminates in 
the announcement of the recipient. A few words on each element shed further 
light on the emotions evoked and the knowledge confirmed through the ritual of 
the award ceremony.
Auschwitz survivor and Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel speaks—via video, accom-
panied by pictures of 1915—to the importance of solidarity in the face of atroc-
ity. His appearance establishes a link between the Holocaust and the Armenian 
genocide, a particular form of analogical bridging. Other video messages come 
from Mary Robinson, former Irish prime minister and UN high commissioner 
for human rights, and from Óscar Arias, former president of Costa Rica, who 
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for his efforts to end the bloody civil wars 
of Central America. Again, the structure of the ceremony embeds the history of 
the Armenian genocide within the worldwide struggle for human rights, and links 
it to other episodes of mass violence.
Three parables told by the MCs all entail the same message: that giving and 
supporting those in need is the greatest gain humans can attain, possibly a 
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condition for their own survival. One example must suffice, told by David Ignatius: 
God shows the questioner two images of people sitting in front of delicious food, 
holding spoons attached to long handles. Those in one picture, depicting Hell, 
look emaciated, desperate; those in the other, showing Heaven, appear content, 
in fact happy. The questioner initially does not understand until he sees that those in 
Heaven use their spoons successfully by feeding each other. Those in Hell attempt 
to feed only themselves, but the long handle does not allow them to reach their 
mouths. The moral is in line with the spirit of the Aurora Prize, given to those who 
do extraordinary things to save others. In a Durkheimian move, the MCs juxtapose 
universal solidarity (the sacred) with individual-orientation and selfishness (the 
profane), confirming the epistemic power of narrative facility (Rydgren 2007).
The stage is thus set for the climax of the ceremony. Award cofounder Vartan 
Gregorian of the Carnegie Foundation and Liberian peace activist and Nobel lau-
reate Leymah Gbowee tell the audience about the 186 nominees from twenty-seven 
countries, the selection committee, and its procedures. They and other committee 
members introduce the finalists, each introduction accompanied by an emotional 
video depicting their projects.7 Eventually, Marguerite Barankitse, founder of 
the Maison Shalom in Burundi, is announced as the award recipient; her actions 
“saved the lives of 30,000 Rwandan children” who had lost their parents during 
the genocide in neighboring Rwanda.
Orchestral music intensifies the emotionality of the event. Pieces include the 
finale of (Soviet-) Armenian composer Aram Khachaturian’s Symphony of Bells; 
a famous Armenian lullaby, sung by Hasmik Papian, the co-MC; and a hymn to 
Armenia for orchestra and choir, performed in the presence of its composer, the 
French-Armenian chansonnier Charles Aznavour (born Shahnour Vaghinag 
Aznavourian). At the end of the ceremony, which has lasted for two hours and 
twenty minutes, the audience is released with images of Armenia and the appeal 
to shake off victimization and embrace a shared humanity.
Multiple conversations in the lobby immediately following the award ceremony 
confirmed its emotional impact. Collective effervescence was the outcome of a 
ritual that had brought many people together, attentive to the same unfolding 
events on the stage of the hall, aware of each other’s focus of attention, and sharing 
a common mood. Intense emotions supported the cognitive message.
What Theodore Caplow called the festival cycle had thus concluded. A confer-
ence, a ceremony at the genocide memorial, and an award ceremony mutually 
reinforced and supplemented each other’s messages. They instilled and reinforced 
knowledge the event had repeatedly communicated to the audiences: that the 1915 
violence against the Armenians, committed by the Ottoman Empire, indeed con-
stitutes a genocide; that 1.5 million Armenians lost their lives; that the suffering of 
Armenians links them to victims of other genocides; that all of these groups share 
a sense of solidarity; that liberators from suffering are to be celebrated as heroes; 
and that victimized peoples must overcome their victim identity, as helpers and 
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practitioners of solidarity with others who suffer today. Durkheimian ideas about 
the emotional and cognitive power of rituals find support. Viewers of the video-
recorded award ceremony will share some of the experience that moved those who 
were physically present.
Local rituals supplement grand national events. In Yerevan, they include a 
reading of “unanswered letters” from the time of the genocide in the Armenian 
Museum of Arts and Literature8 and a celebration of commemorative art.9 In the 
diaspora, communities around the globe organize commemorations. In 2015, for 
example, on the centennial of the genocide, Minnesotans held a memorial service 
in the Armenian Saint Sahag Church, welcoming, under the guidance of its pastor 
Tadeos Barseghyan, speakers such as U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar, members of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, and members of the state legislature. Academic 
events at the University of Minnesota supplemented commemorations.10
In short, in Armenia’s capital city of Yerevan and in the diaspora, April 24, the 
day of commemoration of the Armenian genocide, provides an opportunity for 
powerful rituals. These rituals evoke emotions and simultaneously acknowledge 
and reinforce Armenian knowledge repertoires. They strengthen Armenian com-
munities and identity, and they spread the message to broader audiences around 
the globe.
TURKISH RITUALS AND THE SOLIDIFICATION  
OF TURKISH KNOWLED GE REPERTOIRES
Rituals can acknowledge evil and suffering, but by selectively highlighting the 
glorious history of a collectivity, they can also contribute to denial of evil, to 
the drowning out of utterances that risk polluting both the sanctified past and a 
current-day identity built on that past (Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger 2010). This 
indeed is the situation of Turkey.
Celebratory and Purifying Rituals: Reaffirming the Ottoman Past
It is again a young Turkish scholar, sociologist Yağmur Karakaya, who—joining 
the likes of Taner Akçam, Seyhan Bayraktar, and Fatma Müge Göçek—reflects 
critically on Turkish practices. In recent work, Karakaya (2018) analyzed a ritual 
in Istanbul that commemorates the conquest of Constantinople on May 29, 1453, 
under the command of Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (also known as Fatih), and 
with it the final defeat of the Eastern Roman Empire.
Organized by the AKP, the Justice and Development Party headed by Presi-
dent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the event cultivates nostalgia for Ottoman Islamic 
civilization as a source of Turkish heritage. Note that this same civilization also 
brought the near destruction of the Armenian people and great suffering to Otto-
man Greeks, Assyrians, and other minorities. Not accidentally, such nostalgia— 
connecting a people with an imagined past, creating a sense of collective identity 
and a wholesome future—coincides with a period of authoritarian populist politics.
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In 2016, the same year in which the Armenian events in Yerevan described 
above took place, one to two millions Turks gathered in Istanbul, and tens of 
millions across the country joined the nationally televised ritual in front of TV 
screens. Karakaya describes the event as a “massive rally—one of many through-
out the year—[which] combined the latest technology, such as laser light shows 
and high volume bombastic music through loudspeakers, with Ottoman elements, 
such as the military marching band [563 strong, equaling the number of years 
since the conquest], marching to beats that had long ago inspired the Ottoman 
troops, and virtual neighing and galloping horses, to create a carnivalesque politi-
cal scene” (Karakaya 2018:126).
Karakaya observes how, in line with the myth of Fatih entering into Istanbul 
riding a white horse, Erdoğan arrived on the rally ground in a white helicopter. The 
“announcer declared his arrival like a town crier . . . Istanbul! Here comes the pro-
tector of the oppressed, hope of the poor, the strong voice of the underdogs, child 
of the nation, here comes the fearless advocate of the just cause, grandson of Fatih, 
apple of the ummah’s eye, architect of new Turkey, servant of the nation, president 
of the republic!” (Karakaya 2018:135). In his speech, Erdoğan referred to the crowd 
as “the grandchildren of Mehmed the Conqueror” (Karakaya 2018:135). He posed a 
series of rhetorical questions, each asking for a milestone of economic or develop-
ment success, and the crowd, in unison, answered “Yes!” Erdoğan appealed to the 
ummah, solidarity with—and Turkish leadership of—the Muslim world. Appear-
ing as a messianic figure, Erdoğan in fact mobilized religious sentiments.
Binaries abounded. The world is one of “winners and losers, oppressors and 
the oppressed, West vs. East, friends vs. enemies, us vs. them, strong vs. weak, 
and the dog-whistle Islam vs. Christianity” (Karakaya 2018:137), and the assem-
bled crowd repeated after its leader: “One nation, one flag, one fatherland, one 
state” (Karakaya 2018:139). The organizers of the ritual further intensified col-
lective effervescence through the event’s mise-en-scène, incorporating uplifting 
music, famous actors from a state-sponsored Ottoman-themed film series read-
ing emotion-laden poems, and jet planes roaring over the crowd. Visual effects, 
produced by a high-tech light show, repeatedly simulated the breach of the city’s 
fortifications in 1453. Clearly, physical copresence, a shared focus of attention, 
a shared mood, and mutual awareness provided the event with the quality of a 
ritual. In addition, and in line with Dayan and Katz’s (1992) arguments, the mil-
lions watching in front of their television screens, far away from Istanbul, also 
tanked up on emotional energy.
Emotions (to contradict a widely held belief) do not exclude cognition and 
knowledge. Karakaya observes correctly how participants feel a need to attribute 
meaning to their emotional state, in the form of knowledge about the greatness of 
the nation and the wickedness of its enemies. Repudiating Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
and his model for the secular Turkish Republic he founded in 1923, the new script 
favors a glorious image of Ottoman history. The collective memory associated with 
this image, the knowledge repertoire it fosters, excludes dark chapters of Ottoman 
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history, including knowledge of genocide committed in the name of the nation. 
Even if Karakaya’s interviewees from different parts of Turkey do not wholeheart-
edly support the spectacle of the Conquest ritual, all believe in the sanctity of the 
Ottoman past.
Karakaya’s analysis supports arguments about the epistemic power of memory 
entrepreneurs. They initiated and structured the elements of the Conquest ritual, 
supplied the audiovisual backdrop, and determined the content of speeches. Tur-
key’s president was the central figure, and the ritual reflected the spirit and practice 
of his rule. Crucial for our purposes, the ritual reaffirmed a knowledge repertoire 
that leaves no space for engagement with the Armenian genocide.
Opposition Rituals: Challenging the Dominant Narrative
Yet official Turkish knowledge construction is not without challengers among 
Turks, and these challengers, too, put rituals to use. Egemen Özbek (2016), for 
example, describes in vivid detail Turkish-Armenian genocide commemorations 
in Istanbul. Organized by the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği, 
or IHD) on April 24, 2010, in front of the Haydarpaşa Train Station, a commemo-
rative event attracted some fifty participants. The gathering culminated with Eren 
Keskin,11 a lawyer and human rights activist, reading a press release:
NEVER AGAIN! On April 24, 1915, 220 Armenian intellectuals, who were among 
the most productive members of the Ottoman artistic, literary and intellectual world, 
were arrested. First, they were taken to Mehterhane, which was used as central pris-
on, the next day they were taken to Sarayburnu to board on a boat that would take 
them to the Haydarpasa train station. From there they began their journey towards 
Anatolia. They were not informed about where they were taken. One group headed 
to Ayas and the other to Çankiri. 58 of 70 people who were sent to Ayas and 81 of 
150 who were sent to Çankiri were killed. Among the killed were leading intellectu-
als of the time. . . . Yes, we invite all to be conscientious in line with this convention 
[Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide] and 
to properly name the events of 1915. As human rights defenders we say once again 
that GENOCIDE IS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY and NEVER AGAIN—IHD 
Istanbul Branch. The Commission Against Racism and Discrimination. (quoted in 
Özbek 2016:414–415)
The IHD repeated similar ceremonies in 2011, 2012, and 2013. The site was either 
the train station, symbol of the deportation process, or the front of the building 
in which the Armenian intellectuals were initially kept after the roundup of April 
24, 1915.
Özbek (2016:419–427) similarly describes the ritual quality of a gathering of 
hundreds on Taksim Square in Istanbul, organized by an organization named 
DurDe, a “European Grassroots Antiracist Movement.” A banner printed in Turk-
ish, Armenian, and English read, “This is OUR pain. This is a mourning for ALL 
OF US.” The event’s emblem, a pomegranate, symbol of Armenian culture—as 
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celebrated by Sergei Parajanov’s famous film The Color of Pomegranates—but with 
a deep cut, symbolized the annihilation of the Armenians. Like the IHD, the orga-
nizers had chosen a symbol-rich location, across from the Republic Monument 
memorializing the military victory of the Turkish national struggle and the estab-
lishment of the republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s leadership. By 2012, the 
number of attendees had grown to two thousand, and the event had expanded to 
other Turkish cities (Özbek 2016:427).
In short, small and courageous groups of Turkish activists and intellectuals 
challenge the official silencing of the Armenian genocide. They use rituals and 
powerful symbols to express solidarity with Armenians and to challenge denial. 
By contrast, the official commemoration of the Conquest of Constantinople estab-
lishes a new link to a past regime under which the genocide against the Armenians 
and mass atrocities against other minorities were committed. The new model, its 
self-celebratory excess, and its boundary drawing to outgroups (defined as ene-
mies of the people and the sacred nation) do not bode well for a constructive 
engagement with the genocide.
C ONCLUSIONS
We have seen that rituals are strong mechanisms for the reaffirmation of knowl-
edge repertoires, here knowledge about the Armenian genocide on the side of 
Armenians, in their own country and in the diaspora, and the evasion of prob-
lematic aspects of Ottoman history on the Turkish side. In line with classical 
(Durkheim [1912] 2001) and modern work (Bellah 1970; Collins 2005; Douglas 
1966; Shils 1981), rituals sanctify the nation, strengthen communities, and reaffirm 
knowledge. Strategic actors, entrepreneurs with substantial resources at hand, ini-
tiate and structure these rituals (see also Baer 2011; Karakaya and Baer 2019). They 
display great epistemic power. In line with Riley’s (2008) insights, linking rituals to 
ancient symbols increases their effectiveness. References to Mount Ararat on the 
Armenian side and Mehmet the Conqueror on the Turkish side are but examples. 
The Armenian case further illustrated that we should examine rituals in the spirit 
of Caplow’s (2004) festival cycle (here, a commemoration cycle), where the mean-
ing of one ritual reveals itself fully only in combination with other rituals. Finally, 
in line with Erikson’s ([1966] 2004) insights, rituals play an especially powerful 
role in times of crisis. They do so particularly when deeply held knowledge reper-
toires of one group profoundly challenge those of another.
Yet, despite the power of rituals in reaffirming communities and validat-
ing knowledge repertoires, challenges from the outside at times provoke direct 




Epistemic Struggles in the Political 
Field—Mobilization and Legislation  
in France
Collectivities struggling for their understanding of history do not just seek to 
reaffirm knowledge through rituals such as those discussed in chapter 6. They 
also engage the other side in conflict, carried out in various social fields, politics 
and law prominent among them. In this and the following chapters, I am inter-
ested in conflicts over genocide knowledge in the two countries with the largest 
Armenian diasporas besides Russia: France and the United States. The relative 
weight of politics and law as fields of conflict resolution varies between them. In 
the United States, law has historically been the central stage on which conflict-
ing parties sought to reach binding decisions. This is not accidental, given that 
the country, far into the nineteenth century, had no strong central government to 
regulate domestic affairs. Despite changes in the course of the twentieth century, 
law continues to be the preeminent field of conflict resolution, as the exceptionally 
high rate of lawyers per population illustrates (Abel and Lewis 1989). By contrast, 
in France the political field has historically been the primary realm in which 
conflicting groups carried out societal conflicts. I examine legal struggles over 
genocide claims in the United States in chapter 8. In this chapter, after a few obser-
vations on broader trends, I address political conflict over knowledge regarding 
the Armenian genocide in France.
Today, faced with intense mnemonic struggles between Armenian communi-
ties on one side and Turkey and its ally Azerbaijan on the other, many countries 
and organizations around the globe face the choice of recognizing the Armenian 
genocide or abstaining from official acknowledgment. In this conflict between 
allegiances to human rights principles and interest in a country that holds a cru-
cial geopolitical position in the conflict-ridden Middle East, human rights prin-
ciples have increasingly prevailed in recent decades. Actors that have recognized 
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the Armenian genocide include the UN, with its Genocide Report (or “Whitaker 
Report,” 1985), the International Association of Genocide Scholars (1998), the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (2002), the Council of Europe (2011), 
the Catholic Church (2015), the European Parliament (2015), and several European 
political parties. Many Jewish organizations, their members traumatized by the 
memory of the Shoah, joined in this chorus of recognizers, including the Union 
for Reformed Judaism (1989), the Anti-Defamation League (2007), the American 
Jewish Committee (2014), the Jewish Council for Public Affairs (2015), and the 
Central Council of Jews in Germany (2015).
Nation-states, as well, took a stance in growing numbers. While they have recog-
nized the Armenian genocide in different forms and through different decision- 
making bodies, the following overview can at least provide an orientation 
(see figure 8). Countries that have traditionally had tense relationships with Turkey, 
such as Cyprus and Greece, started the trend; Cyprus recognized the genocide 
in 1975, Greece in 1996. Armenia, not surprisingly, declared its recognition on its 
way toward independence, in 1988. Russia, its allied superpower in the region, 
followed suit in 1995. By that year, two other countries had recognized the geno-
cide (Uruguay in 1965, Argentina in 1993). Twelve countries followed in the sub-
sequent decade, bringing the total to seventeen by the end of 2005 (Greece and 
Canada in 1996; Lebanon in 1997; Belgium in 1998; Italy in 2000; France in 2001; 
Switzerland in 2003; the Netherlands and Slovakia in 2004; and Lithuania, Poland, 












































































Figure 8. Recognition of the Armenian genocide by countries over time.
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and Sweden (2010) joined the group of recognizers. Only in 2015, the year of the 
genocide’s centennial, did seven additional countries fall in line (Australia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Paraguay, Syria, and Vatican City), immediately follow-
ing Bolivia (2014), with Germany (2016) and the Czech Republic (2017) in close 
pursuit. In 2019, both chambers of the U.S. Congress recognized the Armenian 
genocide, even if the presidential administration has not followed suit. Notably, 
almost all of these countries are European or Latin American.1
Recognition of the mass violence against the Ottoman Armenians as genocide 
seems to fit into a world in which ever more heads of state express apologies on 
behalf of their countries for atrocities committed in the course of history (Bilder 
2006). It also aligns with Minow’s (1998) observation about the increasing willing-
ness of countries and the international community to take steps in response to, 
or as preventive means against, mass violence. We might finally expect a growing 
inclination to recognize past atrocities, including that against the Armenians, in 
an era in which Sikkink (2011) identifies a “justice cascade.” Clearly, world pol-
ity theorists would recognize in the spread of recognition a global human rights 
script at work that diffuses to the level of nation-states (Meyer et al. 1992; Boyle 
2002; Frank et al. 2000; Tsutsui 2017). Others might speak about a human rights 
hegemony, a term to which I return below.
Yet a view of global trends hides as much as it reveals. If thirty-one countries 
recognized the Armenian genocide, why did the remaining more than 150 coun-
ties not do so, and why is recognition limited almost exclusively to European and 
Latin American countries? Further, what kinds of recognition did the thirty-one 
countries choose? Which branches of government made the decisions? Why did 
some countries publicly recognize the Armenian genocide but no other genocides, 
except for the Holocaust?
Finally, what domestic processes unfold in the mnemonic struggle over recog-
nition? Who favors recognition, and who challenges it? What types of power do 
the competing sides bring to bear and with what epistemic consequences? Even 
if we accept the notion of human rights hegemony, such hegemony is not abso-
lute. It still encounters resistance. Under its umbrella play out nation-level power 
struggles. Here I examine these questions for the case of France.
The French case lends itself to a close examination for several reasons. First, 
a remarkable political process culminated in legislation that recognized the 
Armenian genocide in 2001 and criminalized its denial in 2012. To complicate 
things, France’s Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel) ruled the lat-
ter law unconstitutional on free speech grounds. We will learn about the process 
in detail and about its embeddedness in other French “memory laws.” Second, 
France is home to the largest Armenian ethnic community (per capita) in the dias-
pora. This is not accidental in light of the long and complex history of French- 
Armenian relations (below, I present a brief overview of that history). Third, France 
is obviously part of a broader trend, but it displays both particularities and 
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commonalities with other (democratic) countries. Particularities include unusu-
ally close ties between the political field on the one hand and the fields of 
scholarship and (constitutional) law on the other. Without consideration of such 
particularities, we cannot understand the political processes that unfold when a 
country faces the question of recognition of (the Armenian) genocide.
WHAT HAPPENED? FRENCH MEMORY L AWS  
AND REC O GNITION OF THE ARMENIAN GENO CIDE
Around the turn of the century, French legislators made several crucial decisions 
regarding the recognition of the Armenian genocide.2 That story, however, can 
only be understood as part of a broader trend within the French nation, marking a 
new era of French engagement with dark chapters of history (Michel 2010). Below, 
I briefly describe both legislation pertaining to the Armenian genocide and the 
broader context of French “memory laws,” and then suggest explanations.
Laws Pertaining to the Armenian Genocide
On May 29, 1998, the lower house of the French Parliament, the Assemblée natio-
nale (National Assembly), passed a resolution in a legislative act stating in brief and 
simple words: “France publicly recognizes the Armenian genocide of 1915.” Barely 
two years later, on November 7, 2000, the Senate followed suit, adopting the bill 
that recognizes the Armenian genocide. On January 29, 2001, President Jacques 
Chirac signed that bill into law (loi 2001-70). Obviously, this is but a declaration, 
symbolic law, and cautiously worded at that. It neither spells out responsible actors 
nor suggests positive or negative sanctions.
Yet the story does not end here. Mnemonic entrepreneurs in the political field 
soon began to work toward a law that would criminalize denial of the Armenian 
genocide. On May 18, 2006, the effort seemed to be defeated, facing substantial 
opposition in the National Assembly, which indefinitely postponed voting on such 
a bill. Only half a year later, however, supporters had gathered enough votes, and 
on October 12, 2006, the Assembly approved the bill to criminalize denial of the 
Armenian genocide.
Opposition in the Senate was substantial, and proponents modified the bill’s 
wording to increase its acceptability. No longer specifying the Armenian genocide, 
representatives instead introduced a bill to criminalize denial of all genocides rec-
ognized by French law. In light of French law at the time, this would have included 
only the Shoah and the Armenian genocide. Nonetheless, on May 4, 2011, the 
Senate voted to reject the bill. Now members of the National Assembly adopted 
the more general wording and, a good one-and-a-half years later—on December 
22, 2011—the Assembly passed a bill to criminalize denial of genocides recognized 
by French law. On January 23, 2012, the Senate changed course, voting 127 to 86 
in favor of this bill. It was named the Boyer law (loi Boyer) after Valérie Boyer, a 
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young representative from Marseille who played a leading role in its promulga-
tion. It threatened a term of imprisonment of one year and a fine of 45,000 euros. 
Yet opposition was still fierce, and a group of legislators referred the law to the 
Constitutional Council (CC) to have its constitutionality examined—and the law 
defeated. They succeeded. On February 28, 2012, the CC struck down the law, an 
event to which I return below.
In the Context of Memory Laws—A New Era
We would misunderstand the legislation pertaining to the Armenian genocide 
if we failed to recognize broader contexts. We might be tempted, for example, 
to attribute it to motivations and social forces that are unique to the Armenian 
case. Instead, this legislation is part of a broader pattern of so-called memory 
laws, a term that some have used polemically (see Adjemian 2012), but by which 
I simply mean quite diverse laws that explicitly address the memory of historical 
events. The story begins in 1971, when France ratified the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This ratification 
required an adaptation of domestic law, which the legislature enacted on July 1, 
1972. Named the Pleuven Act, the law prohibits incitement to hatred, discrimi-
nation, slander, and racial insults. Not a memory law in its own right, it is an 
early predecessor.
The first of a quartet of memory laws followed almost two decades later. On July 
13, 1990, the French legislature passed the Gayssot Act, which prohibits any rac-
ist, anti-Semitic, or xenophobic activities, including Holocaust denial. Introduced 
by the Communist representative Jean-Claude Gayssot, this law criminalizes the 
questioning of the existence or gravity of the category of crimes against humanity 
as defined in the London Charter of 1945, based on which the International Mili-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg convicted Nazi leaders in 1945–46 (Article 9).3 This 
law constitutes a legislative recognition of the Shoah and it penalizes denial.
The timing was not accidental. The 1980s, after all, witnessed the rise of the 
Front National, the country’s new radical right-wing party, and the growing prom-
inence of its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, an outspoken anti-Semite. The decade also 
saw the first French trial involving charges of crimes against humanity, specifically 
the 1987 trial of Klaus Barbie, who was responsible for mass deportations of Jews 
from the city of Lyon into the German death camps. In the same year, Claude 
Lanzmann’s powerful documentary film Shoah appeared—a masterwork with a 
running time of more than ten hours, based on interviews with surviving victims, 
perpetrators, and bystanders.
All of these events and the passing of the Gayssot Act accelerated public engage-
ment with the time of German occupation, French collaboration, and the Vichy 
regime. One highlight was President Chirac’s 1995 official recognition of the 1942 
“Vel d’Hiv Roundup” (Rafle du Vélodrome d’Hiver) of Parisian Jews, their arrests 
and encampment in the Winter Velodrome and subsequent deportation into the 
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death camps. In 1997–98 followed the trial of Maurice Papon, a prominent police 
leader during the 1940s and into the 1960s, decorated with high honors by Presi-
dent Charles de Gaulle for his repression of militant Algerian activism, and later 
a long-term representative and minister of the French Republic. The court found 
Papon guilty on charges of crimes against humanity for his role in the deportation 
of more than sixteen hundred Jews from the Bordeaux region to Auschwitz, via the 
Drancy camp just north of Paris. Plaques mounted on the walls of Parisian build-
ings in the early 2000s today implicate the Vichy regime, something missing from 
plaques of earlier decades (see figure 9).4
In this heated atmosphere, engagement with past wrongs began to reach beyond 
the Shoah. The 2001 legislative recognition of the Armenian genocide was a first step. 
Just a few months later, the French legislature passed the Taubira law (loi Taubira), 
Figure 9. Commemorative plaque at a school building on the Île Saint-Louis, Paris, mounted 
in 2004. Photo by the author.
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recognizing slavery as a crime against humanity. The law, which went into effect 
on May 21, 2001, was named after Christiane Taubira, then a representative to 
the French National Assembly for French Guiana (Guyane) and a member of the 
Socialist faction (she would later be minister of justice under President François 
Hollande). This law targets the practice of slavery beginning in the fifteenth 
century as directed against African, American Indian, Malagasy, and Indian popu-
lations. It also encourages scholarly engagement with the history of slavery. Later, 
in 2006, President Chirac declared May 10, the date on which the law passed, a day 
dedicated to the memory of slavery and its abolition (Michel 2016).
While the political Left had promoted the Taubira law on the recognition of 
slavery as a crime against humanity, the Right soon followed with its own initia-
tive. On February 23, 2005, the French legislature passed a law on the memory of 
French colonialism and the status of former fighters in the Algerian War (1954–62). 
The Mekachera law (loi Mekachera)—named after Hamlaoui Mekachera, a former 
military officer and, at the time, minister for ex-combatants—sought, in the minds 
of its proponents, “recognition of the Nation and national contribution in favor of 
the French repatriates.” These repatriates were some nine hundred thousand 
French colonialists in Algeria, the so-called pieds-noirs, who returned to France 
at the end of the war in 1962, and “Harkis,” some ninety thousand Algerians who, 
having closely collaborated with the French military, fled to France at that time. 
This law was in part a response to the National Assembly’s 1999 recognition of the 
Algerian War—a war characterized by massive brutalities and resulting in the end 
of French colonial rule in Algeria. Previously, France had labeled the conflict a 
“public order operation.”
Among other specifications, the Mekachera law of 2005 obliged high school 
(lycée) teachers to instruct their students about the “positive values” of colonial-
ism (article 4, paragraph 2). The law generated intense public debate and massive 
opposition, especially from the Left. Teachers and prominent historians charged 
historical revisionism, and more than ten thousand signed a petition against 
the law. In 2006, President Chirac, through his prime minister and an appeal 
to the CC, secured a repeal of article 4, paragraph 2. The other parts of the law 
remained on the books.
At this point, the history of memory laws ended, at least for the time being. 
Four such laws remained on the books: the Gayssot Act of 1990, the recognition 
of the Armenian genocide of 2001 (loi 2001-70), the Taubira law of 2001, and the 
Mekachera law of 2005.
Clearly, this brief history shows that recognition of genocide is not a simple 
“dummy variable” that can be coded “yes” or “no.” The quality of recognition varies 
substantially. Furthermore, recognition involves intense political struggles, and, 
finally, context matters. The recognition of the Armenian genocide is part of a 
larger trend, an engagement with dark chapters of national history, embedded in 
global concerns with human rights and their violation.
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TOWARD EXPL ANATION:  THE POLITICAL FIELD, 
ARMENIAN-FRENCH REL ATIONS,  
AND MOBILIZ ATION 
Despite their embeddedness in new mnemonic practices, the laws pertaining to 
the recognition of the Armenian genocide are not quasi-automatic accompani-
ments of other memory legislation. In the absence of legislative decisions that 
recognize other genocides, with the exception of the Shoah, we have to ask what 
prompted the special treatment of the Armenian case. In answering that question, 
we must pay attention to the complex interplay between institutional particulari-
ties of the political field in France, the history of French-Armenian relations, the 
mobilization of French Armenian civil society, and the roles of academia (espe-
cially historical scholarship), foreign relations, and the CC. Below, and in chapter 9, 
I address each of these forces in turn. We will see that the unfolding legislative 
drama and the political and epistemic outcomes it yielded illustrate interactions 
between action-based power, played out in concrete legislative struggles on the 
one hand and human rights hegemony on the other.
The French Political Field in Context
In France, as elsewhere, state actors operate with substantial amounts of mate-
rial, social, symbolic, and cultural capital. They make binding decisions, in this 
case decisions to recognize historical events on behalf of the French nation. In 
Bourdieu’s terms, “the state is to produce and impose .  .  . categories of thought 
that we spontaneously apply to all things of the social world” (1994:1)—issues of 
mass violence and genocide included. In other words, the state holds significant 
epistemic power.
Yet the state does not operate in isolation. In France, it exists in close vicinity 
to the academic field, and this closeness matters for the convertibility of resources, 
including academic and political capital, across fields. This particularity results 
from the high level of centralization of French society and state and from the con-
centration of politics and intellectual life in Paris, a pattern to which scholars from 
Norbert Elias ([1939] 2000) to Pierre Bourdieu (1988) have alerted us. 
The French political field has another close neighbor that plays a crucial role 
in the unfolding story of memory legislation: the field of constitutional law, espe-
cially its central institution, the Constitutional Council, the French equivalent of 
a constitutional court. The CC, while part of the judicial branch of government, 
closely overlaps with the political sector through recruitment mechanisms and the 
character of its membership (to which I will return below).
Finally, as in all Western democracies, the political field and its neighbors are 
surrounded by civil society, made up by social movements and organizations that 
bundle and communicate interests. Ethnic groups and their organizations, cul-
tural associations, schools, and religious institutions are crucial in the case of 
memory legislation.
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Figure 10 represents the position of the political field vis-à-vis other social 
fields. At the center is what I call the “French triangle,” made up of the closely 
related political, academic, and constitutional law fields. The strongest connec-
tions are symbolized by thick connecting lines, while the dotted line indicates the 
relatively weaker link between the academic and legal fields. The circle around 
this triangle symbolizes civil society, in which all three social fields are nested. 
The depiction in figure 10 is not complete, of course, given that nation-states are 
embedded in international relations. In our case, relations between France and 
Turkey play a significant role, as do relationships to the global field of human 
rights, as a generator of human rights scripts. All of these forces come into 
play in the unfolding story of legislation pertaining to the recognition of the 
Armenian genocide.
French Armenian Civil Society: Mobilization and Epistemic Effects
Historical roots lead up to contemporary civil society mobilization of French 













Figure 10. The “French triangle”: Politics, scholarship, and constitutional law within civil society.
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Historical root 1: A sense of guilt.  In his massive volume La France face au géno-
cide des Arméniens (France facing the genocide of the Armenians), historian 
Vincent Duclert (2015) traces the history of the relationship between the French 
state and French intellectuals vis-à-vis the fate of the Armenian people. He spells 
out the guilt (culpabilité) of the victors of World War I, who—after the defeat of the 
Axis powers—did not ensure that the Ottoman rulers be held accountable and that 
the Armenians be protected and, to the degree possible, compensated. This aban-
donment carries special weight in light of the Allies’ declaration of May 24, 1915, 
that accused the responsible actors of “crimes against humanity and civilization” 
(Duclert 2015:205–208). Duclert here does for France what Samantha Power (2002) 
did for the United States in A Problem from Hell, accusing his country of repeat-
edly standing by even in the face of the gravest atrocities. In Duclert’s words, “The 
French position toward the extermination of the Ottoman Armenians illustrates, in 
the long run, the attitude of the Great Powers toward abandoning that persecuted 
minority and their renouncement of principles on which are based their repeated 
promises to protect its threatened existence” (Duclert 2015:35, translated).5
Yet Duclert also describes another France, one that spoke up on behalf of the 
Armenian people of the Ottoman Empire at the time of the Hamidian massacres 
(1894–96) under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, which took the lives of up to 
three hundred thousand Armenians. While the French government joined Russia 
to block any intervention, prominent representatives made their voices heard 
in the legislature, and renowned intellectuals backed them up. For example, on 
November 3, 1896, the historian and Catholic Denys Cochin and the philosopher 
and socialist Jean Jaurès, both members of the National Assembly, spoke force-
fully on behalf of the Armenians, an event that Marcel Proust describes in his first 
major novel, Jean Santeuil. Historian Raymond Kévorkian, author of a massive 
volume on the Armenian genocide, reconstructs this event and its consequences: 
“The Parisian newspapers, each of which knows that they receive generous subsi-
dies from agents of the Ottoman sultan, now change their tone” (Duclert 2015:46, 
translated). The new movement overlapped with the defenders of Alfred Dreyfus, 
the French officer who, in 1894, was falsely accused and convicted of spying 
for the German military, a prosecution motivated by anti-Semitism. Once born, 
this Armenophile movement grew impressively, especially after 1900, organized 
around the newly founded magazine Pro Armenia.
The new Armenophiles again urged intervention in 1915. Prominently, writer 
Anatole France spoke up powerfully on behalf of the Armenians throughout 
World War I. Yet activists did not convince their government to intervene until the 
end of the war, when the French Navy saved the lives of Armenian villagers who 
had defended themselves, on the mountain Musa Dagh (Mount Moses), against 
the onslaught of the Ottoman army. Jewish Austrian writer Franz Werfel described 
this event, famously and dramatically, in his 1933 novel on the Armenian genocide, 
The Forty Days of Musa Dagh.
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Mass immigration of survivors of the Armenian genocide to France followed 
the end of World War I, partly owing to French domination of many of the terri-
tories that housed the survivors, partly encouraged by an intense labor shortage in 
France after the war. Yet civil society engagement subsided in the 1920s and 1930s, 
and the years of Nazi Germany’s occupation and the Vichy regime obviously were 
ill suited to revive the memory of Armenian suffering.
A revival of civil society engagement would not occur until six decades later. 
In March 1979, a large group of prominent French intellectuals and academics 
issued a new plea for genocide recognition, this time to the United Nations and 
its Human Rights Commission. They included prominent jurists such as Robert 
Badinter; social scientists, including Raymond Aron and Roland Barthes; Nobel 
laureate François Jacob; philosopher Jacques Derrida; physicians such as Bernard 
Kouchner (cofounder of Médecins Sans Frontières); and famous writers, including 
Simone de Beauvoir. Just five years later, on April 13–16, 1984, in Paris, the Perma-
nent Peoples’ Tribunal—an international opinion tribunal founded in Bologna, 
Italy, in 1979—dedicated its session to the Armenian genocide. On the basis of 
historical documents and legal doctrine, the tribunal concluded that “the exter-
mination of the Armenian populations by way of deportation and massacre 
constitutes a crime of genocide, not subject to statutory limitations as defined by 
the Convention of 9 December 1948 for the prevention and punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide” (in Duclert 2015:57, translated).
This historical trajectory of genocide recognition interacted with changes in the 
nature of French Armenian civil society to which I turn now. Together, both trends 
formed the foundation without which we cannot understand the later civil society 
mobilization and legislative initiatives toward Armenian genocide recognition.
Historical root 2: The path from discrimination to recognized social force. 
Following the years of violence in the Ottoman Empire, hundreds of thousands of 
surviving Armenians sought refuge either in Armenia—the small, newly indepen-
dent country, soon to be absorbed by the Soviet Union—or in the diaspora. The 
United States and France were privileged destinations. In France, many settled 
in the cities of Marseille, Lyon, and Paris and in surrounding departments. Yet 
their legal status initially was tenuous. They gained citizenship only after World 
War II. Like other victimized peoples—and maybe more so, given their marginal 
status—those who had survived the killings did not easily remember and pass on 
their knowledge to their children and grandchildren. (Chapter 1 provides evidence 
for patterns of silencing in the biographies of French Armenians, albeit with some 
important exceptions of acknowledgment.)
Significant public events paralleled the biographical patterns described above. 
For example, after decades of silence, Armenian voices made themselves heard 
on the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide. In France as elsewhere, “demonstra-
tions are organized, brochures published, appeals issued to save the genocide from 
forgetting. In Paris, a great mass brings together thousands of Armenians in the 
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Pleyel Auditorium” (Duclert 2015:339, translated). The first French historical study 
of the Armenian genocide, entitled Un Génocide exemplaire, Arménie 1915 and 
authored by Jean-Marie Carzou, appeared in 1975, a decade after the commemora-
tion of the fiftieth anniversary (Carzou [1975] 2006). Plans for a first memorial, 
to be set up in an Armenian church in Marseille, were about to materialize in 
1973. Yet French government action, prompted by Turkish intervention, initially 
prevented the realization of this project. Terrorist actions by militant Armenian 
groups in the 1970s and 1980s, while causing a backlash against the Armenian cause 
in Turkey and elsewhere, were violent proof that the history of the genocide had 
caught up with young Armenians.
Today, the desire to spread knowledge about the genocide and the longing for 
recognition continue unabated, but they no longer translate into violence. Stopping 
over at Charles de Gaulle Airport on a journey to attend an April 24 genocide com-
memoration in Yerevan, the traveler may observe groups of children with T-shirts 
identifying them as Armenians. Similarly, in the American diaspora, Arme-
nian churches offer summer trips to Armenia for young Armenian Americans 
(see chapter 4). Large crowds attend commemorative events in Armenia and in 
the diaspora (chapter 6). In intellectual life, we observed new interest, for example, 
when historian Claire Mouradian and Anaïd Donabédian recreated and reori-
ented, in 1992, the Société des Études Arméniennes. Only one year later, a group of 
academics founded an allied association with a complementary journal, the Revue 
du Monde Arménien moderne et contemporain (Duclert 2015:356–357).
In short, delays to the recognition of the Armenian genocide, even among 
Armenians, reflect period and cohort effects known from multiple cases of 
memory formation. Today, however, genocide knowledge is firmly sedimented. 
It is hard to imagine the legislative initiatives in support of the recognition of the 
Armenian genocide without the changes unfolding in the Armenian community 
of France. Yet ethnic consciousness does not suffice. Civil society mobilization is 
another necessary component in the transmission of popular will into legislative 
action, as the following section demonstrates.
Political Debate and Contemporary Armenian Mobilization:  
Epistemic Efficacy
Six of the seven sessions in the National Assembly and in the Senate in which 
legislators deliberated on laws concerning the Armenian genocide are well docu-
mented.6 Together with my research assistants, I identified all speakers in these 
debates, their political party affiliations, the regions or departments they repre-
sented, their positions for or against the law under debate, and the types of argu-
ments they articulated.
As an illustration, consider the last debate by the French Senate, in Janu-
ary 2012, about the Boyer law pertaining to the criminalization of denial of the 
Armenian genocide. Patterns of statements by senators reveal that the facticity 
of the genocide is one of the most frequently raised themes (table 2). Other 
table 2 Arguments Presented by French Senators, January 23, 2012,  
during Debate over the Boyer Law
      Issue Discusseda
Senator Position Partyb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Patrick Ollier In favor UMP   X X     X       X X   X
Jean-Pierre Sueur Against Committee X X X       X           X
Isabelle Pasquet Against CRC           X   X   X X    
Jacques Mézard Against Radical Left   X X   X   X X          
Roger Karoutchi In favor UMP   X               X X    
Esther Benbassa Against Env.   X           X     X    
Hervé Marseille In favor UDI X X X             X X   X
Philippe Kaltenbach In favor Socialist X X X   X         X X    
Luc Carvounas In favor Socialist X X       X       X X    
Bruno Giles In favor UMP X X               X X    
Jean-Vincent Place Against Env. X X X X   X              
Nathalie Goulet Against UDI X X       X              
Bernard Piras In favor Socialist X X       X X     X     X
Ambroise Dupont Against UMP   X X   X X              
Sophie Joissains In favor UDI X X               X X   X
Nicolas Alfonsi Against RDSE X X X                    
Nicole Borvo In favor CRC X X               X X    
Jean-Jacques Pignard Against CRU   X X                    
Jean-Michel Baylet Against RDSE X X X X X           X    
Natacha Bouchart In favor UMP X       X         X X    
Anne-Marie Escoffier Against Radical Left   X X         X          
Yannick Vaugrenard In favor Socialist   X X     X       X X   X
Christian Poncelet Against UMP   X X     X             X
Robert Hue Against RDSE   X X                    
Catherine Tasca Against Socialist X X X X X X   X          
Jean-René Lecerf Against UMP   X X       X            
Jean-Noel Guerini In favor Socialist X X               X X    
Gaëtan Gorce Against Socialist X                   X    
Gérard Larcher Against UMP   X X                    
Jean-Claude Gaudin In favor UMP   X                      
aCode for issues discussed: 1 = Existence of the Armenian genocide; 2 = Role of Parliament in 
writing history; 3 = Constitutionality; 4 = Prospects for Turkey’s joining the EU; 5 = Armenian-
Turkish relations; 6 = French-Turkish relations; 7 = Recognition of other genocides; 8 = Political 
maneuvering; 9 = French atrocities in Algeria; 10 = Insufficiency of 2001 law; 11 = Comparison to 
Gayssot Act; 12 = Pleven Act; 13 = Aligning French law with European law.
bPolitical party affiliations: Committee = Law Committee of the Senate; CRC = Communist,  
Republican, and Citizen; Env. = Environmentalist; UDI = Union of Democrats and Independents;  
RDSE = European Democratic and Social Rally; CRU = Centrist Republican Union.
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prominent topics include the role of the legislature in the writing of history, the 
constitutionality of the bill, the quality of French-Turkish relations, the sufficiency 
of the 2001 law of genocide recognition (loi 2001-70), and the discrepancy between 
the 1990 Gayssot Act, which had criminalized denial of the Shoah, and the 2001 
law, which did not reinforce recognition with the threat of sanctions. While posi-
tions on most themes are divided and in line with the senators’ utterances in favor 
of or against the legislation, they are almost unanimous, and in the affirmative, in 
statements about the facticity of the genocide.
Some details illustrate the spirit of deliberations. The Senate debate of January 
23, 2012, opened with a statement by Patrick Ollier, minister for relations with Par-
liament. Ollier, speaking in support of the Boyer law, quoted philosopher George 
Santayana’s words that are engraved on many memorials: “Those who forget the 
past are condemned to repeat it.”7 He insisted that the law under consideration 
simply sought to fill a legal vacuum in providing consistency with the Gayssot Act. 
He also argued that it would be applied only to cases of outrageous denial, to be 
punished by one-year imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros. Ollier further 
insisted that the government support the law even though it was aware of potential 
repercussions for French-Turkish relations.8
Several speeches by senators echoed his comments. Some underlined their 
supportive position by establishing links to the Shoah and its recognition by 
French law. Senator Roger Karoutchi, of the center-right UMP (Union pour un 
mouvement populaire) faction, stressed the need for France to be consistent in its 
enforcement of memory laws. Given that the French Parliament had passed laws 
recognizing both the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, he argued, the denial 
of both genocides should be sanctioned in the same way. The drawing of such 
parallels, however, sparked vocal protests.9 Senator Esther Benbassa, a French-
Turkish-Israeli historian and politician and a member of the Green Party, opposed 
the legislation. She drew a clear distinction between the Shoah (followed by the 
Nuremberg trials) on the one hand and the Armenian genocide on the other. She 
reminded the Senate that the latter was not declared criminal by an international 
court. Her comments drew applause from the environmentalist group and from 
some members of the Socialist faction.10
Importantly, however, even opponents of the criminalization of denial explic-
itly and strongly recognized the Armenian genocide. Prominent among them was 
Jean-Pierre Sueur, rapporteur and president of the Constitutional Law Commis-
sion (La commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage univer-
sel, du règlement et d’administration générale). Sueur spoke in clear opposition 
to the criminalization of Armenian genocide denial. He clarified that he did not 
speak on behalf of his political party (the Socialist Party), but on behalf of the 
commission (equivalent to a committee in the U.S. Congress). He insisted that 
the legislation was at high risk of constitutional censureship, citing (fellow) Social-
ist Catherine Tasca, who had stressed in committee that allowing the law to rule 
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on historical facts violates the principle of separation of powers. Additionally, the 
commission believed, according to Sueur, that the bill violated the principle of 
freedom of opinion and expression, as well as the principle of legality of offenses 
and penalties.11 Sueur’s arguments are reflected in the commission report submit-
ted to the Senate before the debate: “Condemning all forms of denialism, which 
constitutes despicable harm to the memory of the disappeared and the dignity of 
the victims, and reiterating its infinite respect for the Armenian people and the 
terrible hardship it had to endure, [the commission] has examined the legitimacy 
of legislative intervention in the field of history—concluding that the adoption of 
resolutions and the organization of commemorations probably are better means 
to express the Nation’s solidarity with the suffering endured by the victims” 
(p. 5, translated).12
The body of the report spells out (and I paraphrase its wording) the suffering 
of the Armenians under Young Turk rule, the decision of deportation after an 
uprising by Armenians in the city of Van in April 1915, the arrest and killing of 
650 Armenian notables in Constantinople on April 24, 1915, and the loss of some 
800,000–1,250,000 Armenian lives. The report also applies the term “génocide de 
1915” (p. 9) to the violence. In short, even opponents of the bill that sought to crim-
inalize denial of the Armenian genocide documented and reinforced a knowledge 
repertoire that strongly overlaps with that of Armenians as described in chapter 4. 
Armenian mobilization was one social force that enhanced this documentation of 
genocide knowledge, and empirical support is about to follow. A broader human 
rights culture may have contributed, but it would not explain why exactly the 
Armenian genocide received this recognition while other genocides are not sub-
ject to legislative affirmation.
We were able to relate positions taken in the Assembly and Senate debates by 
departments (départements) to data on the density of Armenian cultural associa-
tions in those jurisdictions. Patterns reveal substantial variation across depart-
ments of the French Republic, with concentrations in Paris and the Ile de France 
region surrounding the capital, and in Marseille (bouche du Rhone) and Lyon 
(Rhone) and their environs.13 A selection of departments illustrates such uneven 
distribution (see table 3).
Descriptive analyses indeed show a link between the concentration of 
Armenian cultural associations and the positions legislators took in debates 
regarding the Armenian genocide between 1998 and 2012.14 Table 4 demonstrates 
that senators and representatives from departments with larger numbers of 
Armenian cultural associations were much more likely to intervene in favor 
of each of the legislative projects concerning the Armenian genocide, even if 
the difference diminishes somewhat in debates on the criminalization law. It 
comes to full display again, however, in the final vote.
Descriptive statistics always warrant caution. For example, some departments 
are Left leaning, while others gravitate to the political Right, and political position 
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source: www.acam-france.org/contacts/index_associations_culturelles.php (last viewed on April 12, 2019).
table 4 Average Numbers of Armenian Cultural Associations in Départements of Senators or  
Representatives Intervening in Favor of and against Armenian Genocide Legislation, by Date
Date In Favor Against
2000 43.8 0.6
May 2006 67.8 0.5
October 2006 38 11.5
May 2011 44.8 10
December 2011 40.4 28
2012 62 12.4
Average 47.3 10.5
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table 5 Regression Analysis: Armenian Cultural Associations per Département in Relation to  
Position Taken in Legislative Debates, by Political Party of Speakers and by Date
 
Odds Ratio Standard Error z P > z 95% Confidence 
Interval
Number of Associations 1.038 0.01 3.5 0*** 1.016 1.059
Socialist Party            
UMP 0.175 0.14 −2.22 0.026* 0.037 0.813
Radical Left 0.172 0.19 −1.61 0.107 0.020 1.459
Centrist/Independent/
Center-Right 0.908 0.86 −0.10 0.919 0.142 5.808
Moderate Left 0.079 0.10 −2.03 0.042* 0.006 0.911
2000            
May 2006 0.478 0.61 −0.58 0.561 0.039 5.751
October 2006 1.032 0.98 0.03 0.973 0.161 6.596
May 2011 0.331 0.33 −1.12 0.264 0.047 2.301
December 2011 3.615 3.79 1.23 0.221 0.462 28.255
2012 0.146 0.13 −2.15 0.031* 0.025 0.841
_Constant 5.014 4.83 1.67 0.094 0.759 33.108
note: *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
may well affect interventions in debates and votes on genocide laws. It is also pos-
sible that the distribution of participants from various regions in debates varied 
over time. We thus conducted a regression analysis that controls for potentially 
distorting factors.
Results displayed in Table 5 confirm the patterns revealed by descriptive 
statistics. Representatives and senators from departments with many Armenian 
cultural associations are more likely to speak in favor of legislation pertaining to 
the Armenian genocide than speakers from other regions, even when we control 
for time and political party. In other words, Armenian representation was deci-
sive for the patterns of arguments in the legislature and for the outcome of the 
legislative process.
How, then, does representation translate into political and legislative positions? 
The strength of the Armenian vote may have been decisive, even if leaders of the 
French Armenian community insist that there is no Armenian voting bloc, and 
even if French Armenians count only an estimated three hundred thousand to 
five hundred thousand people among the sixty-three million French (2010)—and 
not all French citizens of Armenian descent identify as Armenian. Neverthe-
less, organizational representation, in addition to (anticipated) voting patterns 
and civil society mobilization, as manifested by many well-attended demonstra-
tions around the time of legislative debates, appears to have sufficiently impressed 
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French politicians to adjust their voices, and likely their votes, to the strength of 
their Armenian constituents.
Electoral politics as a driving force were indeed on the minds of some par-
ticipants in legislative debates. For example, in the final Senate debate on the bill, 
Isabelle Pasquet—a member of the Central Revolutionary Committee (CRC), a 
Marxist-inspired political party—raised questions regarding the politics of the 
administration of President Nicolas Sarkozy and its supporters in the legisla-
ture. Claiming that the president had attempted to gain the votes of five hundred 
thousand French citizens of Armenian descent by supporting the legislation, she 
accused legislators from his party, the center-right UMP faction, of changing their 
position for political reasons. Pasquet rejected the bill, concluding that it would 
lead to more outrage from Turkish protesters.15
Indeed, presidential elections were approaching fast when the 2012 bill 
came to a vote. Importantly, also in support of the legislation was Sarkozy’s 
challenger, the Socialist François Hollande, a long-term friend of French 
Armenian leader Mourad Papazian, copresident of the Coordination Council 
of Armenian Organizations.
In short, building on a long-term process of identity formation, French 
Armenians mobilized successfully to enhance the chances of the recognition laws. 
Legislators, it seems, heard their voices well. Yet French Armenians are not the 
only constituents in these debates, and neither the quality of deliberations nor 
the final decision-making outcome can be understood without considering the 
role of three other types of actors: historians, the Turkish government, and the CC.
Epistemic Politics and Academia: Legislation and the Historians
The “French triangle” (figure 10) indicates the close relationship between the polit-
ical and academic fields in France. This closeness is due to the concentration of 
the country’s political and academic elites in Paris (Elias [1939] 2000), the often 
shared educational experience of political and academic leaders in the same elite 
institutions (Bourdieu 1988), and media practices, whereby prominent academics 
frequently articulate their positions in debates over political issues. Geographic 
proximity, network ties, and academic access to civil society via prominent media 
allow for a comparatively easy conversion of political capital (power, votes) into 
academic capital and vice versa. Historians obviously matter, especially in the con-
text of memory laws. Their utterances register with the French political field far 
more than in other countries, especially the United States.
Political mobilization of scholarship.  Given the weight of scholarly interventions 
in the political field, political actors seek to mobilize scholarly contributions to 
public debates. The numerous historians’ commissions initiated by the French state 
include one, for example, that President Emmanuel Macron established in spring 
2019 to examine the role of France in the Rwandan genocide.16 Another commission, 
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under the leadership of historian Vincent Duclert and also sponsored by the 
French government, produced a broader report on conditions of genocide.
The interest of political actors in the work of historians manifests itself, espe-
cially and not surprisingly, in the history of memory laws. Two such laws explicitly 
appeal to research and instruction. Article 2 of the Taubira law of 2001, addressing 
the legacy of slavery, states: “Educational and research programs in history and 
the human sciences accord to the treatment of people of African descent and to 
slavery the weight they deserve. Cooperation should be encouraged and favored 
that allows for synergy between archival sources in Europe and oral sources as well 
as archaeological knowledge accumulated in Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean 
and in all the other territories that knew slavery” (translated).17 Note, however, that 
this is symbolic law. The legislature attached neither positive nor negative sanc-
tions to scholarship that does or does not follow its plea. It also does not specify 
the content of scholarship it expects historians to produce, even if the qualification 
of slavery as a crime against humanity in the same law speaks to the legislature’s 
reading of history.
The law of 2005 pertaining to those repatriated from the North African colonies 
uses similar wording. Article 4 states: “Research programs in universities grant the 
deserved place to the history of the French presence overseas, especially in North 
Africa. The law encourages cooperation that allows for mutual engagement of oral 
and written sources available in France and abroad” (translated). Here, as in the 
Taubira law, the law entails neither positive nor negative sanctions. It also does not 
prescribe the content of research or instruction. It is worth remembering, how-
ever, that the current wording is a modification of the original text. The original 
text had required history teachers to cover the “positive impact” of colonialism in 
their instruction (article 4, paragraph 2). After the legislature had initially passed 
the entire act, this part of the law was later overruled.
The only memory law that threatens criminal sanctions is the 1990 Gayssot Act 
against genocide denial. Article 9 indeed modifies the criminal code and adapts 
the media law (loi de la presse) of 1881 that guarantees freedom of the press.18 Yet 
this law does not specifically address scholarship and instruction.
In sum, the French state seeks to mobilize, and thereby at times to regulate, schol-
arship and education. With the exception of the Gayssot Act, it does not threaten 
penalties for denialist utterances, but it occasionally encourages or demands—as 
in the laws regarding slavery and colonialism—consideration of specific subjects 
in research and education. The 2001 law recognizing the Armenian genocide 
(loi 2001-70) does not pose demands on research or education, nor does it threaten 
penalties. The 2012 Boyer law, by criminalizing denial of the Armenian genocide, 
sought to correct this omission. Yet the CC overruled this law.
The agency of (divided) historians vis-à-vis the political field.  Historians were not 
just targets in this unfolding legislative history. Instead, they displayed substantial 
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agency. They entered the stage early on, in response to the Gayssot Act, which 
criminalized Holocaust denial. Prominently, historian Madeline Rebérioux (1990) 
published an article in the November issue of the journal L’Histoire that criticized 
the new law. She stressed that earlier law had already allowed for a civil court 
condemnation, on grounds of public defamation, of Holocaust denier Robert 
Faurisson in 1981, without necessitating that the courts cast judgment on 
historical truth. She found herself in the good company of renowned historian 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet, an outspoken challenger of denialist claims.
While these powerful but isolated scholarly voices in response to the early 
memory law found little echo in the political field, the situation would change 
radically a good decade later. Three events prepared fertile ground for an upris-
ing among historians against laws that regulate articulations about history. First, 
in June 21, 1995, Princeton historian of the Middle East Bernard Lewis was 
convicted in a Parisian civil court. Lewis—although he had written about the 
“Holocaust against the Armenians” in publications decades before—had referred, 
in an interview with Le Monde, to the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as “la 
version arménienne de cette histoire” (the Armenian version of this story). He 
was sentenced to the payment of one (symbolic) franc to the state, 10,000 francs 
to the Forum des associations arméniennes de France, and 4,000 francs to the 
Ligue internationale contre le racism et l’antisémitisme. Lewis subsequently soft-
ened his language but continued to insist on his rejection of the term genocide, 
claiming that the Young Turk government had no deliberate plan to exterminate 
the Armenian people.19
The second event that shook the scholarly field occurred in 1998: the election 
of Ottomanist historian Gilles Veinstein to the Collège de France almost failed 
over an article he had published three years earlier in l’Histoire, for which he was 
accused of denialism, a charge other prominent historians such as Pierre Vidal-
Naquet forcefully challenged. The third event occurred in 2005, when a group 
called the Collectif des Antillais, Guyanais, Réunionnais (representing peoples 
of French overseas territories) filed a complaint, later withdrawn, against Olivier 
Pétré-Grenouilleau, a historian of slavery who—in an interview with the newspa-
per Le Journal du Dimanche on June 12, 2005—refused to apply the term genocide 
to the history of slavery. Hundreds of academics turned out to support Pétré- 
Grenouilleau.
It was against this background that scholars reacted to the memory laws initi-
ated and/or passed after 2005 with an intensity not known in the context of the 
Gayssot Act of 1990. On March 25, 2005, historian Claude Liauzu and several col-
leagues published an article in the daily Le Monde in response to the Mekachera 
law. They demanded, “Non à l’enseignement d’une histoire officielle” (No to 
the teaching of an official history). Their statement was supported by the Ligue 
des droits de l’homme (Human Rights League) and by several teachers’ unions. 
The initiative soon took organizational form, when members of this group of 
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historians, later in spring 2005, founded the Comité de vigilance face aux usages 
publics de l’histoire (Committee of vigilance against the public uses of history).20
Similarly, and soon after the March 25 article in Le Monde, the Comité national 
de l’Association des Professeurs d’Histoire et de Géographie (National Commit-
tee of the Association of Teachers of History and Geography) took action against 
article 4, paragraph 2 of the Mekachera law (May 22, 2015). They demanded that 
the legislature “must end practices that constitute an instrumentalization of his-
tory curricula in the service of memory obligations” (translated). They further 
insisted “that the content of history and geography curricula must be based on 
the state of scientific research for which the university and the National Center for 
Scientific Research (CNRS) should be sufficient means” (translated). Yet the majority 
of the legislature remained unimpressed, and thus, in early December 2005, the 
Ligue des droits de l’homme and a collective of historians issued a petition under 
the title “We Shall Not Apply Article 4 of the Law of February 23, according to 
which school curricula must acknowledge the positive role of Colonialism” (trans-
lated). Within a month, the petition gathered more than 1,120 signatures, includ-
ing 572 provided by historians and history teachers.
The historians’ opposition, specifically against the law’s demand to teach the 
benefits of colonialism, finally yielded political results. On December 9, 2005, 
President Chirac declared that “in the Republic, there is no official history. It is not 
the role of the law to write history. The writing of history is the task of historians” 
(translated). Presidential intervention no doubt augmented the weight of subse-
quent actions on the part of historians.
The next such action followed soon, when—on December 12, 2005—nineteen 
renowned academics and intellectuals signed a new declaration, entitled “Liberté 
pour l’histoire” (Liberty for history) and founded an association with the same name. 
In their declaration, they demanded an end to legislative dispositions unworthy of a 
democratic regime (“dispositions législatives indignes d’un regime démocratique”). 
They directed their attack broadly against what they called “memory laws,” with a 
derogatory intent, subsuming under this category laws as diverse as the Gayssot 
Act (aiming at the Shoah and threatening criminal sanctions), the 2001 Armenian 
genocide recognition law (simply recognizing the genocide), and the Mekachera 
and the Taubira laws (not threatening criminal sanctions while, however, demand-
ing instructional and research programs). These historians accused the four laws 
of having restrained the liberty of historians (“restraint la liberté de l’historien”) 
and of having instructed them, under the threat of sanctions (“sous peine de sanc-
tions”), what to do research on and what to find. This was different from previous 
declarations, in that these intellectuals claimed to speak for all historians.
Yet many historians challenged such claims. Prominent among them, Marcel 
Dorigny expressed his regret about the shocking amalgam (“amalgam choquant”) 
of laws that the signatories had attacked. Others charged this new group of 
historians with political bias, demonstrating that members of the group 
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themselves did not stick to their historiographic work, but instead took political 
positions in divisive public debates. Boris Adjemian quotes Pierre Nora to show 
that keeping the law out of the task of history writing was certainly not the only 
objective of the “Liberté pour l’histoire” activists: “Two thousand years of Christian 
culpability against human rights have been reinvested . . . in broad accusations and 
radical disqualification of the French nation. And public schooling was sucked 
into the rupture, with zeal, as it, favoring multiculturalism, found a new mission 
in national repentance and masochism. Historically the tug boat of humanism, 
France now became the avant-garde of the universal bad conscience” (Pierre Nora 
quoted in Adjemian 2012:18, translated).
Other signatories of the declaration expressed concerns about a fractioning 
(“fragilization”) of French society because of a “multiplication of memory laws,” 
and about minorities imposing on the entire nation their particular memories. In 
short, the “Liberté pour l’histoire” signatories and their spokespersons were not 
just concerned with the independence of scholarship, but also with an identity of 
French society, reflected in some of the memory laws, that they did not embrace.
When President Chirac expressed his opposition to article 4, paragraph 2 of 
the Mekachera law, in response to the earlier and more narrowly conceived objec-
tions by historians and teachers, its revocation was almost certainly not the result 
of the “Liberté pour l’histoire” group, even if the removal followed shortly after 
their proclamation. Six years later, however, the group’s rhetoric did color the 
political debate over the Boyer law, passed in January 2012, criminalizing denial 
of the genocide against the Armenians. Its members expressed their opposition to 
the law in the strongest possible terms, speaking about a civil memory war (“une 
guerre civile des mémoires”; Nora in Adjemian 2012:23). This language aligns with 
previous objections against repentance (“contre la repentance”) and the victim 
claims of insufficiently assimilated minorities (“victimisme” des “communau-
tés imparfaitement assimilées”). The new law, Nora argued further, prohibits “all 
historical research dedicated to one of the first great tragedies of the twentieth 
century” (translated). He in fact wrote about the risk of a sovietization of history 
(“risque de soviétisation de l’histoire”).
In short, historians made their voices heard in struggles over the appropri-
ate form of memorializing mass atrocity crimes, including the Armenian geno-
cide. The intensity and character of their positions changed over time. Individual 
interventions turned into collective action. Initially cautious articulations gave 
way to strong statements driven by political agendas of different sorts, prominent 
among them concerns with the purification of Western, Christian, and specifically 
French history.
Our analysis of legislative debates suggests that historians’ critiques and legisla-
tive voices reinforced each other. Concerns with the role of the legislature in writ-
ing history certainly featured prominently in Assembly and Senate deliberations. 
In the November 2001 Senate debate, twelve out of nineteen interventions raised 
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the issue of legislative history writing. The respective numbers for subsequent ses-
sions are, for the Assembly debate of May 2006, six out of eight; for the Assem-
bly debate of October 2006, thirteen out of twenty-one; for the Senate debate of 
May 2011, nine out of sixteen; and for the Assembly debate of December 2011, 
eleven out of twenty. Finally, and topping all others, in the January 2012 Senate 
debate, twenty-seven out of thirty interventions raised the issue of legislative his-
tory writing. Not all of these came from challengers. Yet, in this concluding debate, 
the majority of legislators who addressed the issue were in opposition to the bill 
(fifteen opposed and twelve in favor).
In general, the “role of the legislature in the writing of history” and the “con-
stitutionality” of legislative interventions are among the most frequently raised 
themes in the final Senate debate on the Boyer law, the attempted criminalization 
of denial of the Armenian genocide (table 2). Senators who raised the issue and 
opposed the Armenian memory laws clearly aligned with the skepticism articu-
lated by influential historians. This alignment shows in a speech Jean-Pierre Sueur, 
rapporteur and chair of the Constitutional Law Commission, delivered in the Sen-
ate. Senator Sueur had spoken—as we saw earlier—in opposition to the law. Here, 
he partly repeats the reasoning in the commission’s report:
The Commission inquired into the legitimacy of the legislative intervention in the 
field of history . . . considering that the adoption of resolutions and the organization  
of commemorations probably constitute more appropriate methods to express the 
Nation’s solidarity with the suffering endured by the victims. It has further reasoned 
that the creation of a criminal offense of the challenge and the outrageous minimiza-
tion of genocides recognized by the law would constitute a substantial risk of offending 
against several principles of our Constitution—especially the principle of legality of  
criminalization and penalties [nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege], the principle  
of the freedom of speech and the principle of the liberty of research. (p. 5, translated)
In an interview I conducted with Senator Sueur, he confirmed his strong identi-
fication with some of the “Liberté pour l’histoire” positions. He referred particu-
larly to the arguments of Pierre Nora, one of the main drivers of this movement. 
Clearly, a conversion of scientific into political capital was at work when close 
ties between politics and academia played out in this legislative drama concern-
ing memory laws. This affected, especially, laws concerning the recognition of the 
Armenian genocide and the criminalization of its denial. Scholarly interventions 
colored debates on the Senate floor, and they may have motivated referral of the 
Boyer law to the CC.
Epistemic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Turkish State  
and the French Legislative Process
Attempts to intervene in legislation concerning the Armenian genocide did not 
just originate within the French Republic and French society. Most noteworthy, 
Epistemic Struggles in the Political Field    155
the Turkish state intensely sought to affect the outcome of the legislative process, as 
indicated by an analysis of data on denialist acts collected by a civil society group, 
Collectif VAN (Vigilance Arménienne contre le Négationnisme), since 2006.
Figure 11 shows that the vast majority of actions measured by Collectif VAN are 
denialist actions, as opposed to either statements of recognition or anti-Armenian 
actions such as vandalism of memorials and hate crimes. This is not surprising, 
given that the movement names itself “vigilance against denialism.” Further, most 
denials result from state action, and almost half of these are statements articulated 
by the Turkish state and its representatives. Note that the more than 150 Turkish 
actions documented here tell only part of the story, because figure 11 is based on 
a random sample of one-third of the incidents recorded by Collectif VAN. The 
actual number of known denialist interventions by the Turkish state in the ten-
year period is thus likely to be closer to 450.
Numbers alone never tell the full story, and a few examples suffice to illustrate 
the prominence of Turkish actors and the character of their statements:
• The passing of the recognition law by the National Assembly in May 1998 
prompted protest letters from the Turkish president (Süleyman Demirel), 
prime minister (Mesut Yilmaz), foreign minister (İsmail Cem Ipekci), and 
parliamentary Speaker (Hikmet Çetin). In addition, Turkey suspended the 


























Figure 11. Frequency of types of actions and actors identified by Collectif VAN (sample of every 
third entry) between 2006 and 2016.
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purchase of missiles from France, and it canceled a previously scheduled high-
level meeting between officials of both countries.
• In response, some French officials expressed hope that the resolution would 
die in the Senate. That response only partially calmed the concerns of  
Turkish government representatives. They sought the actual defeat of the bill. 
They expressed concerns that the adoption of a genocide resolution in France 
could set an example for other parliaments in Europe and elsewhere. Some 
argued publicly that such a bill might encourage Armenian militants like the 
gunmen who killed thirty-four Turkish diplomats and their relatives in the 
1970s and 1980s.
• After attempts in May 2006 by the National Assembly to criminalize denial of 
the Armenian genocide, Turkish officials warned France of “irreparable dam-
age” to bilateral ties if the bill passed. Turkey temporarily recalled its ambas-
sador to France and suspended military collaboration.
• After the National Assembly actually passed a bill to criminalize denial of all 
genocides recognized by French law, interventions intensified. Turkey halted 
diplomatic consultations and military cooperation. Turkish lawmakers joined 
their government to denounce the bill and called on France to investigate 
its own atrocities in Algeria and Rwanda. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu stated that the bill violated the spirit of the French Revolution and 
of European principles like that of free speech. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan (later president) recalled Turkey’s ambassador and canceled the annu-
ally issued permission for French military planes to use Turkish airspace and 
for French naval vessels to enter Turkish harbors. The French air force now 
had to apply for permission for each flight. Turkey finally refused to cooperate 
with France in joint European Union projects and declined to participate in an 
economic summit meeting scheduled to take place in Paris in January of 2012.
We do not know if these objections and actions affected the French government 
and the outcome of the legislative process. We do know, however, that legislators 
worried that Armenian memory laws might harm French-Turkish relations. Their 
concerns permeated all legislative sessions on the laws pertaining to the memory 
of the Armenian genocide. In a corpus of 113 speeches given in six sessions, thirty-
two representatives, senators, or ministers addressed Turkish-French relations. 
Seventy-four arguments pertained to international relations more broadly, includ-
ing Armenian-Turkish relations and complications for a potential admission of 
Turkey to the European Union.
Again, examples must suffice. During the Senate session of November 7, 2000, 
Senator Jacques-Richard Delong, of the conservative Rally for the Republic, argued 
that the benefit of genocide recognition would not outweigh an almost certain 
backlash from Turkey and a complication of French-Turkish relations.21 Jean-Jack 
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Queyranne, minister for relations with Parliament, expressed similar concerns in 
the same session. He stressed that France had worked for years to bring Turkey 
closer to Europe, and he argued that the passage of the bill could reverse such 
improvements. He referred to Dominique de Villepin, at the time chief of staff 
for President Chirac and later foreign minister, who—according to Queyranne—
was concerned that the recognition bill, if passed, would damage France’s rela-
tionship with Turkey.22 Philippe Douste-Blazy, minister of foreign affairs, similarly 
intervened to speak against the bill. He, too, argued that France could easily anger 
Turkey with the legislation.23
Ministers and representatives expressed similar concerns during the National 
Assembly deliberation on the criminalization bill of October 12, 2006. Catherine 
Colona, minister for European affairs, spoke against the bill on behalf of the gov-
ernment. One of three reasons she cited was the government’s concern that its 
passing could have detrimental effects on France’s relationship with Turkey.24 
Socialist Charles Gautier expressed similar objections and received applause from 
a few members of the Socialist Party and from most of the center-right UMP.25 
Senator Bruno Giles, a proponent of the law, and thus in a minority position 
within his UMP faction, contended that most constitutional arguments were actu-
ally rooted in economic worries that Turkey could act against French business 
interests.26 Concerns about French-Turkish foreign and economic relations indeed 
permeated the legislative debates until their final stages. During the Senate session 
of January 23, 2012, Isabelle Pasquet, member of the left-wing CRC, further con-
templated that foreign policy complications could spill over into domestic unrest, 
pointing at the risk of intensified outrage from Turkish protesters.27
Yet Turkish threats did not impress all legislators. Some doubted that Turk-
ish protestations would actually translate into deteriorating international or eco-
nomic ties. For example, during the National Assembly session of December 22, 
2011, Representative François Pupponi, a member of the left-wing SRC (Socialiste, 
républicain et citoyen), used his speaking time to summarize five reasons to vote 
for the proposed bill. They included his belief that it is not productive to continue 
a relationship, in fact a strong partnership, with Turkey, based on taboos and false 
pretenses.28 During the Senate session of January 23, 2012, Socialist Luc Carvounas 
pointed out that in 2002, a year after the passing of the recognition act had evoked 
Turkish outrage, trade between the two countries actually increased by 22 percent. 
He concluded that foreign policy considerations should not preclude a vote for the 
bill. Legislators should instead focus on remembering the genocide.29
Yet others were willing to accept negative foreign policy outcomes should they 
in fact materialize. At this point, with the Sarkozy government favoring the bill, 
the minister in attendance also pleaded for a “yes” vote. Patrick Ollier, minister 
for relations with Parliament, concluded his introductory remarks to the Senate 
by stating that the government was aware of potential implications the legislation 
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could have in regard to French-Turkish relations, but the government was still 
in support.30
In short, many French legislators across party lines did indeed take Turkish 
threats and concerns about French-Turkish political, economic, and military rela-
tions seriously. Further, actors responsible for foreign policy dominated among 
those who expressed concerns. Many had not only French-Turkish relations in 
mind, but also relations between Armenia and Turkey and between Turkey and 
the European Union. The latter relationship was a special concern for the Left, 
which had worked with particular intensity for Turkish admission to the EU. 
Prominently, Daniel Cohn-Bendit of the Green Party, leader of the 1968 student 
movement and son of survivors of the Shoah, opposed the criminalizing bill, moti-
vated, he argued, by the desire to advance Turkey’s EU admission.
More broadly, we observe a tension between human rights principles on the one 
hand, including the desire to represent and remember mass atrocities as crimes, 
and the foreign policy field on the other. The tension results in part from the con-
cern of foreign policy makers with diplomatic capital, built through networks of 
international collaboration. It is intensified by a desire to achieve substantive out-
comes that often collides with the process orientation of human rights law and the 
values focus of its supporters. Previous studies have demonstrated such tension 
in debates surrounding human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia (Hagan 
2003) and in Darfur (Savelsberg 2015).
Again, foreign policy concerns may have impeded, but did not derail, the 
French legislative projects pertaining to the memory of the Armenian genocide. 
Yet the CC had not yet spoken. I now turn to that final and decisive stage of the 
French story of Armenian memory legislation.
The Constitutional Council, the Political Field,  
and Armenian Genocide Laws
The final act regarding the Boyer law, which had criminalized denial of the 
Armenian genocide, was the Constitutional Council decision that declared 
the law unconstitutional. The CC made this decision on February 28, 2012—just 
one month after a majority of the Senate had passed the law. It proceeded most 
economically, addressing only one of several grievances expressed by the legisla-
tors: the charge of an unconstitutional limitation on the freedom of expression and 
communication. In the words of the CC:
Article 1 of the law referred punishes the denial or minimization of the existence of 
one or more crimes of genocide recognized as such under French law; that in thereby 
punishing the denial of the existence and the legal classification of crimes which 
Parliament itself has recognized and classified as such, Parliament has imposed an 
unconstitutional limitation on the exercise of freedom of expression and commu-
nication; that accordingly, without any requirement to examine the other grounds 
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for challenge, Article 1 of the law referred must be ruled unconstitutional; that  
Article 2, which is inseparably linked to it, must also be ruled unconstitutional. 
(Conseil Constitutionnel—Décision n° 2012–647 DC du 28 février 2012)
We do not know if considerations of constitutionality alone informed this deci-
sion, as suggested by the formal reasoning and the above quotation. Might politi-
cal dynamics have played a role? Might CC members have been more concerned 
with power, with direct or mediated pressure from the academy and/or the 
Turkish Republic, than with norms? Might constitutional arguments only have 
disguised political intent?
Two members of the CC whom I was able to interview articulated their 
conviction that indeed, constitutional concerns were decisive. One expressed 
his dismay at Turkish news media’s interpretation of the decision as a victory 
for the Turkish cause and a confirmation of the denial of genocide. He added 
credibility to his account by his familiarity with the history of the genocide 
and the centennial exhibits—seemingly supporting his identification with 
the Armenian cause.
This constitutionality position is supported further by the description of the 
CC by its (sole and former) sociologist member, Dominique Schnapper (2010). 
Schnapper, after concluding her term, published a book in which she high-
lights the central role of a staff of highly trained jurists who prepare the CC’s 
decisions. The book’s core message seeks to instill confidence in the institu-
tion. It speaks to the continuity of the CC’s actions, the core role of the gen-
eral secretariat, and the weight of professional jurists who prepare the dossiers 
for its members. Professional and highly competent jurists, Schnapper argues, 
make sure that decisions are rationally founded on reference to jurisprudence 
and precedent.
Others insist, instead, that political rationales played a central role in the CC’s 
decision regarding the Boyer law. Leading French Armenians, especially, strongly 
believe that the articulation of constitutional concerns are mere rationalizations, 
a formal façade behind which are hidden political motives. Several members 
of Armenian civil society pointed, in interviews, to close ties between a high-
level Turkish official and a prominent member of the CC. Information circulat-
ing within French Armenian circles suggests that the decisive communication 
between these two actors occurred just days before the CC overturned the Boyer 
law. I can neither confirm nor reject this position. To understand the impact of 
power politics on the CC, we need a sociology of the CC that, to my knowledge, 
does not exist to date. Its construction, summarized on the CC’s own website, cer-
tainly suggests close ties with the political field: “The Constitutional Council was 
established by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic adopted on 4 October 1958. 
It is a court vested with various powers, including in particular the review of the 
constitutionality of legislation. . . . The Constitutional Council is comprised of nine 
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members who are appointed for nine-year terms. The members are appointed by 
the President of the Republic and the presidents of each of the Houses of Parlia-
ment (National Assembly and Senate).”31
The staffing of the CC is, not surprisingly, highly political, which is reflected 
in its membership. Almost all members at the time of the Boyer law decision had 
been appointed after successful political or administrative careers. Jean-Louis 
Debré, then president of the CC, had previously served as president of the National 
Assembly (2002–7). He had been minister of the interior from 1995 to 1997, during 
the presidency of Jacques Chirac. Jacques Barrot had previously occupied several 
ministerial positions, including those of minister of health, minister of trade, and 
minister of labor. Claire Bazy Malaurie had held high-level administrative posts 
in the ministries for transportation and health. Michel Joseph Charasse is a career 
politician, holding the position of a senator before President Sarkozy appointed 
him to the CC. Renaud Denoix de Saint Marc is a lawyer who had served as head 
of the Conseil d’État before his appointment to the CC. Jacqueline de Guillench-
midt had been a member of a national council that regulates electronic media. 
Hubert Haenel was a career politician and senator before Senate President Gerard 
Lercher appointed him to the CC. Finally, Pierre Steinmetz had pursued a high-
level government administrative career, previously serving as chief of staff of 
Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Guy Canivet is the only exception. He joined 
the CC following a career as a judge. The background of the CC’s members thus 
differs radically from that of members of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, or 
the German Verfassungsgericht, where successful judicial careers pave the way to 
membership. The CC’s constitution confirms the strong tie with the political field 
marked in the depiction of the “French triangle” (figure 10).
In short, a politically oriented CC, albeit supported by a professional and 
well-trained staff of lawyers, decided on the Boyer law in a highly politicized 
environment. On one side, civil society organizations, especially Armenian eth-
nic organizations, pleaded for the law. On the other side, the Turkish state and 
its representatives exerted substantial pressure, threatening complications to 
political, military, and trade relations between Turkey and the French Republic. 
Were these, or the critical sentiments historians had expressed, on the minds of 
CC members? They certainly were aware of them, given their high visibility in 
public debates and reflection in legislative sessions. Yet, as the CC decided to 
declare the law unconstitutional, it referred neither to Turkish interests nor 
to the concerns of historians. The explicit reasoning backing the legal decision 
follows purely formal and constitutional arguments. We will encounter formal 
reasoning again when examining court disputes in chapter 8, and there, too, 
massive substantive battles over genocide knowledge turn out to be driving 
forces. Further, in both the legislative and the judicial cases, the impact of for-
mal decisions was substantive and political, in unexpected ways, a finding to 
which I turn in chapter 9.
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C ONCLUSIONS:  BAT TLES IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL 
FIELD AND EPISTEMIC OUTC OMES
Increased recognition of the Armenian genocide may be indicative of the weight 
of global human rights scripts in the current era. This in-depth study of the French 
case has shown us, however, that recognition can mean different things, and that—
even in an era of human rights hegemony—struggles over knowledge pervade the 
political field before a decision on recognition is reached and partially defeated. 
The French case shows further that ethnic representation and civil society mobi-
lization likely affect the outcome of epistemic struggles in the political field, not 
surprising in a democratic context. The analysis teaches us further that specifics 
of epistemic struggles in the political field, their unfolding and outcome, depend 
on the relationship between the political and neighboring fields. In the French 
context, the academic field has particular weight. Similarly, the realm of constitu-
tional law aligns closely with the political field. In the end, the legislative process—
advanced by civil society mobilization but constrained by what I call the French 
triangle and by foreign policy pressure—resulted in the formal recognition of the 
Armenian genocide and legislation criminalizing denial of this genocide, as well 
as a successful challenge of the criminalizing law by a sizable group of legislators 
before the Constitutional Council. France thus partakes in the global trend toward 
recognition, but recognition here takes a specific shape in light of the particular 
institutional arrangements and conditions of the political field.
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Epistemic Struggles in the Legal Field—
Speech Rights, Memory, and Genocide 
Curricula before an American Court
by Joachim J. Savelsberg and Brooke B. Chambers
Epistemic struggles unfold not only in the political field, but also in courts of 
law. Particularly in the United States, the legal field serves as a frequent battle-
ground when questions of knowledge and denial are at stake. In line with the neo- 
Durkheimian tradition discussed in chapter 6, such battles take the form of rituals, 
suited to impress on the public a sense of shared norms and facts, right and wrong 
(Smith 2008).
Struggles between denialist intent and the desire to recognize genocide unfolded 
in several legal disputes. Prominent among them was Griswold v. Driscoll, a court 
case carried out in Massachusetts between 2005 and 2010. At stake were guidelines 
for teaching about the Armenian genocide issued by the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Education. The case pitted actors who self-defined as free speech advo-
cates, but were considered denialists by their opponents, against the Department 
of Education. While several actors on the side of the State agreed that this was 
a case about free speech, many simultaneously expressed concern with memory 
and values, considering Griswold v. Driscoll a fight for recognition of the violence 
against the Ottoman Armenians as genocide. Examining this case, we discov-
ered fascinating mechanisms. First, a subterranean engagement with substantive 
concerns took place under the cover of formal arguments. Second, a form of 
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decoupling separated “front stage” actors organized around free speech rights 
from “back stage” actors concerned with denial of the genocide.
While this chapter builds on a long tradition of work on the cultural effects 
of prosecutions and criminal trials of perpetrators of mass violence (Marrus 
2008; Pendas 2006; Hagan 2003; Savelsberg and King 2007, 2011; Savelsberg 2015; 
Savelsberg and Nyseth Brehm 2015), it goes beyond previous work in three ways. 
First, it shifts attention from trials of suspected perpetrators to court cases that 
explicitly address the generation and dissemination of knowledge about mass 
atrocity and genocide. Second, it highlights the strategic use of trials and their 
cultural potential by powerful actors who explicitly seek to affect knowledge about 
the past. Third, while taking the rules of the legal game and the institutional logic 
of formal law seriously, this chapter also investigates cultural effects of trials that 
result from informal aspects of legal proceedings, their initiation, their unfolding, 
and their use as platforms from which to talk to a broader public during and after 
the trial. Participants use the proceedings as a stage. Some of their arguments, 
even if not formally relevant, might yet affect court decisions; they certainly do 
reach various audiences inside and outside of the court.
INSIGHT S FROM PAST SO CIO-LEGAL LITER ATURE: 
RITUALS,  L AW, AND KNOWLED GE
Scholarship has shed light on cultural effects of trials, the role of strategic and 
powerful actors in legal rituals, formal and substantive concerns in legal proceed-
ings, and tensions between free speech claims and fights against denial. Insights 
from this literature can help us understand struggles over knowledge concerning 
the Armenian genocide. It is thus worth diving into this literature before exam-
ining a significant judicial fight over genocide versus free speech claims, carried 
out in a U.S. court, and pitting Turkish denialism against Armenian struggles for 
recognition: Griswold v. Driscoll.
Rituals and Law in the Hands of Powerful and Strategic Actors
Power and culture are mutually constitutive, generally and in the legal field. Trials 
produce culture—in this case knowledge about genocide—while simultaneously 
being shaped by interests and power. Consider the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT) at Nuremberg. Responding to the Nazi crimes by way of a trial was not a 
foregone conclusion. The victorious powers disagreed about appropriate responses. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt eventually agreed to holding trials, “determined 
that the question of Hitler’s guilt—and the guilt of his gangsters—must not be left 
open to future debate. The whole nauseating matter should be spread out on a 
permanent record under oath by witnesses and with all the written documents” 
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(according to his confidant Judge Samuel Rosenman, cited in Landsman 2005:6; 
see also Douglas 2001). One of Roosevelt’s goals was to undermine domestic sup-
port for American isolationism that had grown during the post–World War I era.
History-writing expectations, paired with anti-isolationist leanings, not only 
contributed to the initiation of the IMT. They also colored the structure of the trial. 
Words by Robert Jackson, American chief prosecutor at the IMT, indicate that 
much: “Unless we write the record of this movement with clarity and precision, 
we cannot blame the future if in days of peace it finds incredible the accusatory 
generalities uttered during the war. We must establish incredible events by credible 
evidence” (quoted in Landsman 2005:6–7; our emphasis). More specifically, charg-
ing a relatively small number of leading Nazis, the Allies allowed the majority 
of Germans to be ritually divorced from their past leaders. Cultural sociologist 
Bernhard Giesen (2004a) calls this a decoupling effect, through which many are 
(at least judicially) absolved while guilt is attached to a few. In addition, the orga-
nizers of the trial selected defendants carefully so that each would represent a 
major organization of the Nazi state. The expected guilty verdicts thus not only 
served as degradation ceremonies toward the defendants (Garfinkel 1956) but also 
delegitimized the organizations they represented, separating them ritually from 
the majority of the German people.
Such strategizing continued in the subsequent Nuremberg trials, held by the 
United States in the U.S.-occupied zone of Germany. Each trial was dedicated to 
a select number of individuals from different professional groups such as lawyers, 
physicians, and industrialists who had collaborated with the Nazi state. Again, a 
decoupling effect was to separate the majority of professionals from a small num-
ber of perpetrators as historian Michael Marrus (2008) critically documents for 
the Nuremberg “Doctors’ trial.”
Identifiable strategic actors in the realms of politics and law thus initiated the 
post–World War II trials and determined their structure. They sought to generate 
an image of the past in line with the law, but also in line with their geopolitical 
interests. These actors depended on power and authority, which the total defeat of 
the Nazi state and the military occupation of Germany provided.
Actor-driven intent, backed by power and authority, is certainly not unique 
to the IMT, as documented by political scientists, historians, and sociologists for 
many other court cases against perpetrators of mass atrocity. A prominent example 
is the trial of Adolf Eichmann, the organizer of the transportation of Jews to the 
extermination camps. The Israeli secret service captured and abducted Eichmann 
from Argentina, his place of refuge, and the Israeli government put him on trial 
in Jerusalem (Arendt 1963). David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s prime minister at the time, 
was determined to reawaken Israelis’ engagement with the Holocaust, especially 
among the younger generation. In Germany, Fritz Bauer, minister of justice of 
the state of Hesse, was the driving force toward the initiation of the Frankfurt 
Auschwitz trial of 1962–63 (Pendas 2006). To break the silence about the 
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Holocaust that had ruled supreme during the first postwar decades, Bauer wanted 
a single trial for many defendants, and his efforts bore fruit. All of these initiatives 
aimed at (re-)awakening memory and shaping knowledge.
Interest-driven strategic actors also drove recent international judicial 
responses to mass atrocity. In the case of Yugoslavia, they include jurists and 
prosecutors (Hagan 2003), diplomats (Scheffer 2012), and social movement lead-
ers (Neier 2012). Consider further the UN Security Council’s 2005 referral of the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Savelsberg 
2015). Without the massive engagement of American civil society groups under 
the umbrella of the Save Darfur movement, the George W. Bush administration 
would likely have vetoed a referral of the case to the court to which it stood in 
opposition. Eventually, ICC intervention substantially colored the representa-
tion of the violence of Darfur in prominent news media across the Western world 
(Savelsberg and Nyseth Brehm 2015).
In short, a study of cultural consequences of human rights trials needs to con-
sider social, political, and legal actors who initiate and structure court cases. We 
think of these legal actors as knowledge entrepreneurs with strategic interests and 
varying degrees of power. This is in line with Maurice Halbwachs’s (1992) argu-
ments regarding the presentism of collective memory, the notion that interests of 
today’s actors shape memories of past events, even if in a path-dependent fashion 
(Olick 1999).
From the Legal Field and Its Rules of the Game to Substantivized Law 
Once strategic actors decide to pursue the production of knowledge through legal 
trials, they avail themselves of a potentially powerful tool. Yet they also pay a price 
by tying themselves to the rules of the law (Thompson 1975). Pierre Bourdieu 
(1987), examining law as one specific social field within modern societies, high-
lights that, like actors in all other fields, legal actors seek to advance their own 
power and status. Yet ways to secure power and status are constrained by each 
field’s particular rules of the game. Socialized into such constraints, actors develop 
a specific habitus, a set of relatively fixed dispositions that reflect their trajectories 
and their position within the field (Bourdieu 1987; see also Emirbayer and Johnson 
2008). Rules of the legal field prescribe, for example, who can charge a crime, who 
can speak at a trial, what utterances the judge will allow, and which evidence the 
jury can consider when deciding on the guilt of defendants. In the adversarial sys-
tem, the judge acts as an umpire, ensuring that trial participants follow these rules, 
disqualifying statements and actions that offend against them.
Playing by the rules of the game includes adhering to a specific logic that is 
inherent to the institutions within the field. In criminal law, for example, a final 
and binding decision has to be reached regarding the criminal liability of indi-
vidual defendants. Social structures and larger cultural patterns that enabled a 
murderous event may interest sociologists, but they are irrelevant for the court. In 
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addition, to secure due process, only some kinds of evidence are admissible in the 
court of law, different from those a social scientist would consider. Further, a trial’s 
time horizon tends to be limited. Longer historical trajectories, of central interest 
to historians, are immaterial. Finally, the decision of a criminal court is binary, 
between guilty and not guilty, disregarding shades of gray that a social psycholo-
gist would take seriously. These elements of the institutional logic of criminal law 
become absorbed into the habitus of lawyers who operate in the context of crimi-
nal courts.
Recent scholarship has identified pronounced traces of such logic in the narra-
tives generated through criminal trials. These traces are particularly evident when 
contrasted with competing narratives, generated in other social fields with differ-
ent rules of the game (e.g., Savelsberg and King 2011, on the My Lai trial; Pendas 
2006, on the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial; Marrus 2008, on the “Doctors’ trial”).
Yet, while formal law, with its rules of the game and its institutional logic, 
demands obedience from legal actors, and while it does color legal representa-
tions, a sole focus on formal rules misses important aspects of law in action.
First, participants in court proceedings may use the court as a stage to express 
their understanding of events, even if these accounts do not enter into the court’s 
record or affect its decision. Second, what participants perform, whether it is for-
mally admissible or not, potentially affects perceptions and actions of audiences 
outside the court. Third, legal decision makers operate with varying degrees of 
discretion that leave room for extralegal considerations. Discretion varies by type 
of law and historical time. Some eras celebrate formal features of law, while others 
open the gates to, in Weberian terms, substantivation of law, an increasing orien-
tation of legal decision making toward extralegal criteria (Savelsberg 1992; Weber 
1978; relatedly, see Unger 1976; Nonet and Selznick 1978; Stryker 1989). Such cri-
teria may affect which facts of the case will be considered, and to what degree, 
in court decisions (e.g., offense versus social context), and they may concern the 
goals toward which law is oriented (e.g., retribution versus social peace).
The notion of substantivized law is consistent with Bourdieu’s view of habitus, 
which, despite its focus on rules, also leaves room for improvisation. Bourdieu 
referred to jazz musicians or basketball players for an illustration, but we may 
extend the argument to lawyers. No matter the discipline, players would be dis-
qualified if they did not follow the rules of their game, but they would be incapable 
of playing successfully were they not skilled improvisers.
Max Weber (1978) points at three driving forces that are likely to advance sub-
stantivation. First, legal clients to whom the notions of formal law are alien seek 
pragmatic solutions to their problems. Second, social activists seek interpretations 
of law that reach beyond formal rights to embrace social justice. Third, lawyers 
resist a law that reduces them, using Weber’s terms, to automatons that, after one 
inserts the facts and the fees, spew out the decision and opinion. Lawyers’ social 
status, after all, depends on the exercise of an appropriate level of discretion. In 
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court cases involving grave human rights violations, each of these three factors 
weighs strongly against the pursuit of purely formal law. Audiences are especially 
alert when incidents of mass violence are at stake. Courts, responsive to their sen-
sitivities, encourage public attention. The IMT, for example, removed the back 
wall of the courtroom to allow for a larger representation of the world’s media. 
Contemporary human rights courts such as the ICC run substantial media depart-
ments and set up sophisticated websites.
Public attention intensifies further when movement organizations and NGOs 
are involved in the mobilization of legal action. Regarding the consideration of 
extralegal outcomes of trials, stakes tend to be especially high in cases of mass 
atrocity crimes, even more so when violence is ongoing, or when political or 
military leaders might easily reignite violence or recede from peace agreements 
(Savelsberg 2015). Similarly, when historic cases of mass atrocity are at stake 
and identities of entire national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups are tied to the 
acknowledgment of past victimization, courts are under substantial pressure to 
be mindful of their sensitivities. Human rights cases thus bring a variety of issues 
into the courtroom: emotions and values as well as cultural trauma and collective 
identities (Alexander et al. 2004).1
In short, we take formal law, Bourdieu’s rules of the game, law’s institutional 
logic, and the related legal habitus seriously, but we also recognize discretion, 
room for improvisation, and the consideration of extralegal criteria in court pro-
cesses. Captured in the Weberian term substantivation of law (Savelsberg 1992), 
conceived of by others as technocratized law (Stryker 1989), responsive law (Nonet 
and Selznick 1978), or neoliberal law (Unger 1976), we expect these forces to have 
special weight in court cases that involve issues of human rights and historical 
responsibility as they clash with free speech claims.
Free Speech Claims and Historical Responsibility in Court:  
Toward the Armenian Case
Moving beyond court cases against actors charged with mass atrocity crimes, 
scholars have now begun to examine lawsuits against those charged with misrep-
resenting past episodes of mass violence. Several factors account for the increase of 
such cases that typically pit free speech claims against demands for recognition 
of past violence. First, legal responses to human rights violations are histori-
cally new, and they have increased in the post–World War II era. Second, groups 
that have experienced victimization increasingly demand recognition. African 
Americans during and after the civil rights movement (and with renewed deter-
mination in 2020) and Jews in the post-Shoah era are but examples. Acknowledg-
ment of their suffering reinforced the desire for recognition among those whose 
suffering had previously been silenced. In this climate, court battles began to erupt 
against actors who denied victimization and, in reverse, against others whose 
claims of genocide the alleged perpetrators deemed defamatory.
168    Chapter 8
The case against Princeton historian Bernard Lewis cited in chapter 7 is an early 
example, and more detail on that case will be helpful here. On May 19, 1985, an 
advertisement appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post, spon-
sored by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA). This ad cast 
doubt on the identification of the violence against Ottoman Armenians during 
World War I as genocide. Sixty-nine academics signed the ad, including Lewis, 
one of America’s foremost authorities on the history of the Ottoman Empire. The 
action sought to discourage members of the U.S. House of Representatives from 
passing Resolution 192, which would have applied the term genocide to the mass 
killings of Armenians. Eight years later, in 1993, Lewis traveled to France on the 
occasion of the publication of two of his books in French. In an interview with 
journalists of the daily Le Monde, he praised the Turkish government, argued in 
favor of Turkey’s admission to the European Union, and—when asked about the 
Armenian genocide—referred to it as “the Armenian version of the story.” This 
interview provoked not only a rejoinder by thirty intellectuals and academics, but 
also civil law suits brought by the Forum of Armenian Associations of France and 
by a Committee for the Defense of the Armenian Cause. The latter group simul-
taneously initiated criminal proceedings, based on the Gayssot Act, passed by the 
French legislature in 1990, aimed at Holocaust denial but framed more broadly. 
The trial was held on October 14, 1994. Lewis offered a partial correction of his 
position, but he insisted on the absence of explicit orders by Ottoman leaders to 
exterminate Armenian life, a precondition for the application of the term genocide 
according to the Genocide Convention. The court eventually found Lewis guilty 
and sentenced him to a symbolic monetary penalty of one franc (Ternon 1999) 
and to compensating the charging groups for their legal expenses, amounting to 
14,000 francs.
Almost two decades later, another European case attracted attention. Doğu 
Perinçek, a Turkish politician and lawyer, chair of the left-wing nationalist Patri-
otic Party, had publicly declared—during a visit to Switzerland—that the killing 
and deportation of Armenians in the context of World War I was a necessary con-
sequence of the war and did not constitute genocide. The Swiss authorities pros-
ecuted Perinçek, and the court convicted him of racial discrimination in March 
2007. The judges relied on the official Swiss recognition of the Armenian genocide 
and on article 261, paragraph 4 of the criminal code that penalizes denial and jus-
tification of genocide. After a Swiss appeals court confirmed the decision, Perinçek 
filed an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In a five-to-two 
vote, the ECHR overruled the Swiss decision. It argued that Perinçek’s statements 
did not entail a call for violence, that free speech is legitimate in the search for 
historical truth, that the qualification of anti-Armenian violence by the Ottoman 
Empire is still debated, and that it is not up to judges to decide whether the claim-
ant’s statements threaten the identity of a people (for details, see Langer 2014). 
The court also referred to Spanish and French court cases with similar outcomes. 
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Generally, the position of European courts seems to have shifted, during the 1990s 
and 2000s, toward a more robust protection of free speech rights, known from U.S. 
law, and against the legal enforcement of recognition claims by victimized groups.
In light of such developments abroad, how did U.S. courts decide in free speech 
cases that pertain to the Armenian genocide? Material to answer the question 
abounds, because claimants—typically involving Turkish lobbying groups— 
contested the use of the term genocide on several occasions. In 2010, for example, 
the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) sued the University of Minnesota and 
its Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies (CHGS). On its website, the CHGS 
included the following disclaimer alongside TCA and other Turkish sources: 
“Warnings should be given to students writing papers that they should not 
use these sites because of denial, support by an unknown organization, or con-
tents that are a strange mix of fact and opinion” (Turkish Coalition of America, 
Inc. v. Bruininks, 0:10-cv-04760-DWF-FLN [MN District] [2010], Mar. 30, Memo-
randum and Order:3). The complaint claimed that CHGS engaged in censorship. 
Though the CHGS later removed the list of unreliable sources and replaced it with a 
general disclaimer about vigilance in evaluating source credibility, the TCA lost 
the lawsuit on its censorship claims.
Another instance of litigating discussion of the Armenian genocide unfolded in 
California in Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG. In this case, the legal conflict 
was initially over insurance claims. In 2000, California passed a law that extended 
the statute of limitations for insurance claims made by survivors of the Armenian 
genocide who had lacked the resources to comply with the time limits. The insurance 
companies claimed that the California law was unconstitutional because the State 
had used the genocide label, thus interfering with the federal government’s foreign 
policy authority. Remember that the U.S. federal government had not recognized 
the Armenian genocide. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the ini-
tial district court decision that had upheld the extension, ruling that the California 
law overstepped state authority and violated the foreign affairs doctrine (Movsesian 
v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 07–56722 [U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit]).
Lawsuits initiated by Turkish or Turkish American organizations, often in alli-
ance with lawyers specializing in free speech cases, do not unfold in a vacuum. 
Turkish engagement against genocide claims had intensified in the 1970s, par-
tially in response to the first modern historical studies by Armenian American 
scholars such as Richard Hovannisian (2002) and V. N. Dadrian (2002) and the 
consideration by Congress of recognizing the Armenian genocide (Zarifian 2014, 
2018). In 1975, Turkey hired the public relations firm Manning Selvage & Lee, 
and later it hired additional firms, including Hill & Knowlton (which had ear-
lier served the tobacco industry against claims that smoking constituted a health 
risk) (Mamigonian 2015). Mustafa Şükrü Elekdağ, Turkey’s new ambassador to 
Washington, played a major role. Furthermore, 1982 witnessed the foundation 
of an Institute for Turkish Studies at Georgetown University, established with a 
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grant by the Turkish government and directed by Ottoman scholar Heath Lowry. 
Additional funding came from the defense industry, with an interest in weapons 
exports to Turkey. In 1985, Lowry crafted statements for advertisements in the 
New York Times and the Washington Post, cited above, that challenged the geno-
cide claim. Lowry also wrote critical reviews on scholarship that acknowledged 
the Armenian genocide and sent them to the Turkish ambassador in Washington, 
who almost literally used these reviews in letters to prominent scholars, encour-
aging them to adopt his (or Lowry’s) critical arguments for future publications 
(Smith, Markussen, and Lifton 1999). In 2009, the TCA funded the establishment 
of a Turkish Studies Project under the leadership of Hakan Yavuz at the Univer-
sity of Utah. The project was to become the source for numerous denialist claims 
and attacks on genocide scholars such as Hans-Lukas Kieser. Developments cul-
minated in the 2008 claim by ATAA president Ergün Kirlikovali that “The Turks 
are the new Jews. Genocide crowds are the new KKK” (quoted in Mamigonian 
2015:76). Plaintiffs in Griswold v. Driscoll (and similar cases) cited publications of 
these institutions as authoritative sources of knowledge from which they drew in 
forming legal arguments.
In short, in a politically and affectively charged atmosphere, strategic actors 
seek to mobilize law in battles over recognition of mass violence as genocide, here 
in regard to the Ottoman Armenians. In epistemic struggles, actors use formal 
arguments, drawing on free speech rights and substantive claims involving histori-
cal truth and issues of dignity and identity.
A C OURT CASE AND IT S C ONTEXT:  
GRISWOLD V.  DRISC OLL
The Griswold v. Driscoll case, regarding guidelines issued by the Massachusetts 
Department of Education for teaching about the Armenian genocide, lends itself 
to a sociological exploration of epistemic struggles over genocide recognition in 
legal contexts and their mobilizing force. Massachusetts is home to one of the larg-
est Armenian American communities in the United States. Watertown, a suburb 
of Boston, is the site of both the Armenian Museum of America and the Armenian 
Weekly, a publication focused on issues of interest to Armenian Americans. Neigh-
boring Belmont is the seat of the National Association for Armenian Studies and 
Research. It is thus not surprising that Massachusetts has a long history of sup-
porting Armenian Americans, for example through regular April 24 gubernatorial 
proclamations and legislative resolutions, beginning in 1965, that recognize the 
Armenian genocide.
Below, we introduce the main actors and basic features of the case, describe our 
data, and subsequently juxtapose a formal account of the legal proceedings with 
a substantivized, value-driven alternative understanding of the case’s initiation, 
unfolding, and audience reception.
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Basics of the Case
In August 1998, the Massachusetts General Court approved chapter 276 of the 
annual Acts and Resolves, legislating that the Massachusetts Board of Education 
create a document to provide curricular guidelines on the teaching of genocide and 
human rights in the state’s schools. The court called for the board to include discus-
sion of the slave trade, the Holocaust, and the Armenian genocide, among other 
cases it might see fit to include in the document. On January 15, 1999, the board 
released an initial draft of this curriculum guide for public feedback. “The 
Massachusetts Guide to Choosing and Using Curricular Materials on Genocide 
and Human Rights Issues” provided brief summaries of historical human rights 
abuses accompanied by lists of suggested sources for teachers to utilize in their 
classrooms. Within the initial review process, individuals or groups were invited 
to provide the Board of Education with suggested changes or additional sources.
Over the subsequent years, the content of this guide was contested in federal 
court in the Griswold v. Driscoll case, at both the district and appellate levels. The 
court case unfolded in four steps. On October 26, 2005, a group of students, par-
ents, teachers, and the ATAA filed a lawsuit against the Department of Educa-
tion and other actors before the U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts. On 
June 19, 2009, the court ruled against the claimants. On August 11, 2010, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling. Finally, on January 19, 2011, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal.
The plaintiffs, made up of local students and teachers, as well as a Turkish 
American community organization, sued the Massachusetts Board of Education 
in regard to “contra-genocide” content they had asked the board to include in the 
guide. This content challenged the application of the genocide label to the mass 
violence directed against Ottoman Armenians in the context of World War I. The 
debate over the guide’s content dealt with themes of genocide denial and memory, 
free speech and censorship, and the intersections of politics, ethics, and law. These 
contestations provided the stage for both formal legal debate and negotiations of 
memory in the courtroom and beyond.
Uncovering the Logic of a Trial through Court Documents  
and Interviews 
Our analysis of the case is based on two data sources: court documents and inter-
views. Using two legal databases, Bloomberg Law and Westlaw, we were able to 
access over a thousand pages of court documents from both the district and appel-
late cases. After accessing these remotely, a visit to the Massachusetts courthouse 
and use of onsite court records confirmed that we have access to the complete 
docket for each case. We reviewed these documents to chart general arguments 
from the plaintiffs, defense, amicus brief authors, and judges. We then coded 
interviews and key documents for themes about denial and free speech, as well as 
extrajudicial content.
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In addition to the analysis of court documents, we conducted in-depth inter-
views with several actors involved in the case. We interviewed members of the 
defense and plaintiffs, including lawyers, activists, a teacher, and a student. In 
general, plaintiffs expressed more hesitancy to participate in this study. Several 
declined to be interviewed. In addition, we spoke with reporters and with mem-
bers of the current Department of Education to better understand both the per-
ception and the lasting curricular effects of the case. The latter interviews also 
provide insights into the procedures of guideline promulgation.
Interviews complicate the neat picture painted by the court documents, as we 
will see. While the documents show finalized arguments, the interviews provide 
clearer insight into the social processes that enabled their creation, the motiva-
tion of actors, and the meaning individuals attributed to their actions. We asked 
participants about their initial motivations to join the case, including discussion 
of their previous knowledge about the Armenian genocide and early debates (both 
legal and extralegal) surrounding the case. We then inquired into their participa-
tion throughout the case, including their individual roles, their perceptions of the 
case, and their interactions and conversations with others as Griswold v. Driscoll 
unfolded. We concluded with an inquiry into lasting effects of the case on per-
sonal, legal, and communal dimensions.
Combining insights from the analysis of court documents and interviews pro-
vides us with insights into both the formal legal process and the cultural trauma, 
identity, and values mobilized throughout the unfolding case. It allows us to chart 
the arguments as they were constructed within and outside of the courtroom, 
while also accounting for the numerous legal, political, and moral incentives that 
shaped these proceedings and influenced their effects.
From Administrative Process and Pre-legal Controversies  
to the Court Case
The Massachusetts Board of Education first circulated a draft of the curriculum 
guide on January 15, 1999. As part of the review process, the board requested pub-
lic feedback. Days after the draft was released, the Turkish American Cultural 
Society of New England (TACS-NE), affiliated with the national ATAA, contacted 
the Board of Education with a request that additional materials be included. As 
it stood, the guide’s suggested resources all supported the categorization of the 
violence against the Armenians as genocide. The Turkish organizations instead 
asked that sources be included that called this labeling into question. The TACS-
NE argued that reputable scholars contested the assertion that the Turkish state 
had advocated a formal genocidal policy, and therefore that the mass killings of 
Armenians did not meet the legal definition of genocide. The board then incor-
porated these “contra-genocide” materials in the guide before circulating a 
second draft for review in March 1999. When local Armenian American organiza-
tions got word of this update, they contacted the board to request that the added 
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“denialist” materials be removed from the guide, claiming that these documents 
negated the historical fact of the Armenian genocide. They argued further that, 
beyond being inaccurate, these materials caused pain to survivors and the descen-
dants of survivors and victims. The board subsequently removed the Turkish 
sources in the final version of the curriculum guide, a move that motivated the 
initiation of the Griswold v. Driscoll case.
Griswold v. Driscoll: Initiating the Case
A series of questions arise about the initiation of the case: Who activated the law 
in this dispute? Who initiated the court case, based on which law? In line with 
the distinction between formal versus substantivized law, explored above, different 
answers come to the fore.
A formal perspective.  The formal perspective is well reflected in the name of 
the case—Griswold v. Driscoll, referring to two individual actors: Theodore (Ted) 
Griswold, a Massachusetts high school student, and David Driscoll, the Com-
missioner of Education. It seems as though Ted (rather than David) rose against 
Goliath. Yet names of court cases leave out essentials. The “Complaint and Jury 
Demand” the plaintiffs filed with the U.S. District Court, District of Massachu-
setts, on October 26, 2005, lists, on the side of the plaintiffs, Theodore Griswold 
“and his parent and next friend, Thomas Griswold,”2 as well as William Schechter 
(Griswold’s social studies teacher), Lawrence Aaronson, another social studies 
teacher at the same school, and the ATAA. Two additional students and their 
fathers later joined these plaintiffs. Ted Griswold was represented by attorney 
Harvey Silverglate, known for his pursuit of free speech cases, especially in edu-
cational settings. On the side of the defendants, we find listed “David P. Driscoll, 
Commissioner of Education, Massachusetts Department of Education, in his 
official capacity, James A. Peyser, Chairman, Massachusetts Board of Education, 
in his official capacity, The Department of Education for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Board of Education.” Other defendants 
later joined the case, including intervenor defendants from the local Armenian 
American community.
The students and teachers claimed that the removal of materials suggested 
by Turkish organizations had violated their free speech rights and that the State 
had censored students’ and teachers’ access to educational material. The ATAA 
joined the plaintiffs—they openly did so as the producer of some of the removed 
sources—but also claimed to represent Turkish parents and students who were, 
in their view, facing discrimination. The plaintiffs expressed their belief “that 
the truth of an idea cannot be tested in a marketplace artificially circumscribed 
by censorship and the imposition of government orthodoxies.” They summa-
rized their goal as “a judicial declaration that actions taken by the Massachusetts 
Department of Education and by the Massachusetts Board of Education to excise 
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academically sound materials from a state human rights curricular guide because 
of political hostility toward certain viewpoints have violated their rights to free 
expression and belief guaranteed by the United States Constitution” (Griswold v. 
Driscoll, 1:05-cv-12147-MLW [MA District Court] [2009], Nov. 25, Complaint and 
Jury Demand: 2).
The remainder of the “Complaint and Jury Demand” takes all the legally 
required steps. It clarifies the jurisdiction of the court, introduces the parties, 
and presents the facts of the case, as seen by the plaintiffs. A core passage states: 
“The [guideline] summary argued that the ‘Muslim Turkish Ottoman Empire’ was 
responsible for the deaths of large portions of the Armenian population of the 
Ottoman Empire around the time of World War I. No resources that mentioned 
the contra-genocide perspective on this period in history were included in the 
draft Guide, even though the Guide stated that one of its standards for select-
ing instructional materials on genocide and human rights issues was to provide 
‘differing points of view on controversial issues’ ” (Griswold v. Driscoll, 1:05-cv-
12147-MLW [MA District Court] [2009], Nov. 25, Complaint and Jury Demand:8). 
The document concludes with the legal norms the plaintiffs consider to have been 
violated, notably the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C., paragraph 1983, and the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
In the same document, the plaintiffs also cite precedent to back up their con-
stitutional claims. They refer to a 1982 case, Board of Education v. Pico, in which 
a local board of education in the state of New York removed several books from a 
school library, asserting that the removed books were morally unfit. Students 
in the district then sued, arguing that the board was employing noneducational 
motivations to censor student access to materials. After the district court ruled in 
favor of the board of education, the case rose to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
affirmed the district court’s decision but emphasized the centrality of the board’s 
motivation in their interpretation of the law; the board could remove materials 
only for educationally legitimate reasons (Griswold v. Driscoll, 1:05-cv-12147-MLW 
[MA District Court] [2009], Nov. 25, Complaint and Jury Demand).
In Griswold v. Driscoll, the plaintiffs argued that the Massachusetts Board of 
Education removed documents from the teaching guidelines, interpreted as a vir-
tual library, for political, rather than educational, reasons. Central to this argu-
ment, they claimed, is the educational legitimacy of the “contra-genocide” stance. 
Their arguments proclaimed the existence of a rigorous, two-sided debate about 
the appropriate labeling of the violence against Ottoman Armenians in 1915–16. 
The plaintiffs insisted that the State, in preventing such a debate by removing the 
“contra-genocide” content, had introduced into its educational guidelines politi-
cal will. The plaintiffs asserted that this intrusion of politics into the educational 
sphere could disrupt the education of students as they learn to evaluate and ana-
lyze arguments, a position that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) later 
supported in an amicus brief.
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A substantive perspective: actors behind actors, process behind process.  While 
the court files capture the inclusion and removal of the documents and the legal 
arguments regarding violation, they do not convey the steps that led the plaintiffs 
to formally initiate the case, and this initiation remains contentious. Though the 
plaintiffs were outwardly united, they remained isolated behind the scenes. 
The teachers and students rarely, if ever, interacted with the Turkish lobbying 
group. All interviews indicate that the lead attorney, Harvey Silverglate, orches-
trated the case without facilitating interactions between these groups. Consider 
the account provided by a former student who played a leading role in the case:
I became interested in the American Civil Liberties Union when I was in ninth grade 
in high school. And I think in tenth grade I approached Bill Schechter. . . . He was a 
history teacher, and he was my journalism teacher at the time. And I threw the idea 
across his desk, and he was really into it. And we started the club together. It con-
tinued through the next three years that I was there, and I think it still existed for a  
few years afterwards .  .  . ACLU Club. Like an extracurricular, after school we’d  
meet—we got involved in a few [issues], we were protesting the Patriot Act, you 
know, we’d just latch on to, like, certain causes. Gay marriage was a thing at the time 
in Massachusetts, and we got on board with that, and then Schechter, I think, was 
approached by Harvey, or he was friends with Harvey or something like that, and  
he was already a plaintiff as a teacher in the case, and explained to me the whole 
situation, that they needed a student . . . and I was into the idea, and got involved.
The interview with this student reveals other sources of support, such as peers in 
the ACLU Club, a recent publication by “a Princeton professor” who had chal-
lenged the genocide label for the Armenian case, and a front-page article in the 
Wall Street Journal. As a high school student interested in civil liberties, the student 
experienced the article as a major thrill; while presenting both sides, it cited him 
and displayed sympathy for his cause. The driving force, however, according to 
the student, was attorney Harvey Silverglate, in whose house “four meetings” took 
place, over dinner, designed to tighten bonds and to strategize. The attorney’s role 
was so central that the student never set foot in the courtroom. Our interview with 
a social studies teacher who played a central role in the case sheds additional light 
on the network ties within the group of plaintiffs. Attorney Silverglate approached 
this teacher through a colleague on the staff of the school. The teacher describes 
Silverglate as a member of Cambridge progressive circles, mentioning Silverglate’s 
wife and her old friendship with Beat poet Allen Ginsberg.
Also in our interview, the student discussed challenges, including overwhelm-
ingly negative press reactions, the upset of fellow students of Armenian descent, 
including a friend from the ACLU Club, and—especially—a call from an elderly 
Armenian woman:
I remember at one point, people were calling the school. I worked on the school 
newspaper at the time, and I was working after school. And for some reason the 
receptionist sent the call to me in that room—and it was a woman who was crying, 
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because she said her parents had been beheaded in front of her in Armenia back in 
the day. And I had to talk to her, try to explain what we were doing. And I was just 
like—I can’t do this, I can’t really explain. . . . She was just going on and on about how 
this really happened. That’s what she wanted me to hear and acknowledge. And so I 
was like, I do believe that, believe you, and that’s terrible. And I’m sorry—you know, 
I’m not trying to deny that, or detract from that at all. But I started to try to defend 
the case the way we did typically. But then I was just like, for this woman, you can’t 
really make some kind of abstract legal argument. So I was just like, I’m really sorry, 
I don’t know very much about this. I’m involved with this case because I think it’s 
important for this reason.
Despite such challenges, and his expressed empathy with a representative of the 
victim group, the student’s excitement about being involved in a big civil liberties 
case prevailed. The student also confirmed that he continues to feel pride about his 
role in a case over free speech rights, and that he continues to admire Silverglate: “I 
still think it’s cool that there are people like Harvey who really do know how those 
things work, and who see an important case—’cause they’re always thinking about 
precedent, that’s the whole point, it’s not just about this case at all. It’s really not, 
obviously. And—so he saw this as an important thing. . . . And he was doing this 
work for free.”3 Yet the student also distanced himself from the case, culminating 
in the statement that he, who never set foot in the court and eventually lost sight of 
the case as it unfolded over several years, was not upset about the outcome: “And 
so—ultimately, if we lost, I’m just like, okay . . . yeah, they won. Maybe the people 
who were upset about it, maybe it makes them feel a little better. I’m alright with 
that. . . . I don’t feel terrible—the Turks probably feel bad about it. But again, that’s 
not why I was involved.”
Obviously, the tie between the student and his admired teacher was crucial 
for their engagement in the case. Like the student, the teacher we spoke with also 
stressed that his sole interest was in free speech issues, not in a statement about 
the Armenian genocide. He expressed concern about the political determination 
of suggested instructional materials, especially in the context of high-stakes stan-
dardized testing. He also strongly articulated his belief in the pedagogical value of 
students being exposed to different sides of a debate, even if one side’s arguments 
might appear outrageous, and for students to have to struggle with disparate posi-
tions. While he expressed sympathy with the Turkish position and referred to 
arguments by historian Bernard Lewis in this context, he stressed that the court 
proceeding had, in his perception, nothing to do with a statement about history. 
“Yes, the amicus people came up afterwards and gave their spiel, and it kind of—it 
had nothing to do with anything, except their deeply felt ideas, and support for the 
Armenian American community.”
The interviews thus provide a sense of some of the plaintiffs, their network 
ties, and their substantive positions. Some actors were centered on the school 
setting, but linked with civil libertarian and free speech lawyer Silverglate and 
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progressive-libertarian circles in Cambridge of which Silverglate was a part, and 
with which some social studies teachers were marginally linked. These plaintiffs 
were ambivalent regarding the historical question of the Armenian genocide; their 
focus was on free speech issues. Acting on the trial’s “front stage,” their network 
was organized around civil libertarian issues in the school setting.
Yet these plaintiffs did not act alone. They were joined by the ATAA as a 
co-plaintiff. The network ties between these two sets of plaintiffs are murky. 
Evidence suggests that the teachers and students did not have ties with the ATAA; 
multiple interviewees reported that they never interacted with ATAA represen-
tatives. The relationship between free speech lawyers and Turkish organizations, 
however, is more difficult to ascertain. Who was the driving force in this constel-
lation, free speech lawyers or Turkish American organizations? Harvey Silverglate 
declined to be interviewed. Other participants suggested that the ATAA sought 
involvement because of the concerns of local Turkish Americans who feared that 
their children would receive prejudicial treatment in schools, based on the cur-
riculum guidelines. Court documents do reveal that the Turkish American Legal 
Defense Fund (TALDF) hired at least one attorney as a consultant who had previ-
ously been involved in the University of Minnesota case cited above. That attorney 
later also wrote an amicus curiae brief for the TALDF.
In sum, while not all social ties and motives that lead to the initiation of a case 
such as Griswold v. Driscoll can be identified, our interviews render some of them 
visible. The pattern that emerges speaks to the difference between what appears 
through the formal setup of the case and the substantive reality of what drives it. 
On the one hand, we have progressive, civil libertarian high school teachers and 
their students. They act on the front stage, as it were. On the other hand, we find a 
network of free speech lawyers and Turkish and Turkish American organizations 
who are involved in multiple cases of this nature, but who remain backstage, at 
least in Griswold v. Driscoll. We were not able to ascertain who among the latter 
dominates in this dyadic relationship. Yet it seems clear that together they are the 
driving force that seeks out suitable actors, such as civil libertarian–oriented stu-
dents and their teachers, to initiate cases and to serve as the “poster children” in 
what is meant to appear as a struggle over civil liberties.
We can depict the social structure of this group of actors in a Simmelian model of 
overlapping social circles (see figure 12). The first circle consists of civil liberties– 
engaged high school students, supported by parents and teachers. The second 
circle, partially overlapping with the first, consists of progressive-libertarian free 
speech attorneys. Among them, too, civil liberties concerns appear to dominate. The 
third circle, overlapping with that of the free speech lawyers, consists of Turkish 
or Turkish American organizations. Some plaintiffs argue that Turkish organiza-
tions joined the case at the pleading of local Turkish Americans who expressed 
concern over discrimination or animosity due to the curriculum guide. Yet, 
given the massive infringements on civil liberties in Turkey, the imprisonment of 
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journalists and academics, and the criminalization of the mere use of the term 
genocide in regard to the mass killings of Armenians—and given, finally, these 
groups’ silence vis-à-vis the repression of free speech in Turkey—it is implausible 
that free speech concerns in fact drove their actions. Instead, their intervention 
can only be understood as a new front in the struggle against recognition of the 
Armenian genocide. Through these interlinked social circles, substantive, extra-
legal concerns and their discursive expression hid behind formal free speech claims 
to motivate the initiation of the Griswold v. Driscoll case, even if that initiation was 
formally based on concerns with legal principles of the U.S. Constitution alone. 
A decoupling arrangement separated the front stage actors organized around free 
speech rights from the back stage actors concerned with denial of the genocide.
The initiation of the case by the plaintiffs and their supporters brought many 
other actors into the legal game. The defendants challenged the plaintiffs’ position, 
various groups supported them through amicus briefs, and the judges deliber-
ated and decided. The defendants and their supporters brought arguments into the 
unfolding trial that appealed to the issue of free speech or First Amendment pro-
tections. Yet they also raised issues that the plaintiffs had not formally addressed, 
but that appear to have motivated their action, at least partially. Central among 
them was the debate over the appropriateness of the genocide label for the mass 
violence against the Ottoman Armenians. Formally about free speech rights, the 
court case also involved a substantive debate about the Armenian genocide. For-
mal and substantive discourses in fact interpenetrate, as the following shows.
Deliberation in Griswold v. Driscoll
Over the course of six years, Griswold v. Driscoll unfolded in three courts. The 
majority of the legal disputes, however, took place outside of the courtroom. Plain-
tiffs, defendants, and contributors of amicus briefs submitted hundreds of pages 











Figure 12. Social organization of plaintiffs and their discourses in Griswold v. Driscoll.
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A formal perspective: trial as procedure and the free speech issue.  In September 
2006, the U.S. District Court first heard the case. After nearly three years, Judge 
Mark Wolf ruled in favor of the defense. Speaking to formal matters of the case, 
he cited the legitimacy of political participation in the process of developing the 
instructional guide. He also rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that censorship had 
occurred, denying Board of Education v. Pico as a precedent. In summarizing his 
opinion, the judge wrote the following:
The Complaint and attached exhibits demonstrate that plaintiffs and those who share 
their viewpoint concerning the treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire are 
capable of participating fully in the political process, which provides the opportu-
nity to petition the government to alter its policies. The efforts of the ATAA and the 
others who share its viewpoint evidently caused the inclusion of contra-genocide 
materials in the Curriculum Guide for a while. If plaintiffs still want those materials 
included in the Curriculum Guide, they will have to resume their efforts to prevail in 
the political arena because they are not entitled to relief in federal court. (Griswold 
v. Driscoll, 1:05-cv-12147-MLW [MA District Court] [2009], Jun. 10, Judgment: 30)
The judge did not explicate an opinion on the substantive dispute over the appro-
priate labeling of the mass violence against the Ottoman Armenians that had 
motivated major factions among both the plaintiffs and the defendants. We will 
never know what his position on this matter was or whether that position affected 
the court’s decision.
In a next step, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision, taking the case 
to the appellate court. After a hearing and deliberation, Associate Justice David 
Souter (retired U.S. Supreme Court justice) confirmed the ruling of the district 
court. He affirmed that the Massachusetts Board of Education had not violated the 
First Amendment. Like Judge Wolf, he also denied the plaintiffs’ censorship argu-
ment: “The revisions to the Guide after its submission to legislative officials, even 
if made in response to political pressure, did not implicate the First Amendment. 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed” (Griswold v. Driscoll, 09–2002 [MA 
Court of Appeals] [2010], Aug. 11, Judgment: 15). Again, the reasoning that car-
ries the decision does not engage with the substantive debate over the appropriate 
labeling of the violence, and again we will never know whether such consideration 
affected the decision in any way.
Following this defeat, the plaintiffs sought to bring Griswold v. Driscoll before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which, however, declined to hear the case. Following its 
notification of this decision on January 19, 2011, the case formally concluded.
In sum, while substantive debates over the genocide label, and associated iden-
tity issues, motivated much of the dispute, most clearly among Turkish American 
and Armenian American organizations, the courts never addressed those con-
cerns. They instead stuck strictly, and in line with a formal legal logic, to constitu-
tional arguments about free speech.
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From a formal to a substantive perspective: court as stage—history, values, and 
identities.  The previous section showed how both parties in Griswold v. Driscoll, 
while agreeing on what had occurred in the process of educational guideline 
promulgation, profoundly disagreed on the legality of the Massachusetts Board of 
Education’s actions. The plaintiffs argued that the State had overstepped its author-
ity by censoring the educational curriculum and that, by doing so, it had infringed 
on free speech rights of students and teachers. The defendants argued instead that 
the State had the authority to regulate the educational curriculum and that the 
omission of certain arguments did not constitute an infringement of free speech 
rights (this legal disagreement is represented in table 6, quadrants 1 and 2).
Yet the formal debate over free speech simultaneously allowed for two substan-
tive arguments to unfold. On one side, a subgroup of plaintiffs, specifically Turkish 
American associations, argued that debates over the appropriate labeling of the 
mass violence against the Armenians are unsettled and that both sides of the his-
torical debate are legitimate and need to be included in the curriculum (table 6, 
quadrant 4). On the other side, the defendants and writers of several amicus curiae 
briefs unanimously argued that violence against the Armenians constituted geno-
cide, and that Turkish lobbying groups sought to introduce propaganda into the 
state’s educational curriculum (table 6, quadrant 3).
The contending positions manifested themselves in divergent terminologies. 
Where plaintiffs referred to “wartime conflict materials” or “contra-genocide mate-
rials,” defendants used the term “denialist materials.” Moreover, according to some 
participants, the mere presence of such contestations within the courtroom gave 
legitimacy to the contra-genocide perspective. As one Armenian American advocate 
put it: “To make it into the other side in a debate, you can agree or you can disagree, 
but if you’re talking about it in its terms of being a debate, you’re at least recognizing 
that there are two sides. And that’s more than half the battle, in this case.”
At times, this juxtaposition, and the simultaneity of formal free speech and 
substantive genocide arguments, resulted in actors talking past each other. It also 
resulted in uneasy alliances, managed by way of the interactional distance shown 
above in the example of civil liberties advocates on the one hand and Turkish 
American actors on the other, the latter allied with a country that criminalizes 




(1) State has authority to regulate 
educational curriculum




(3) Violence against the 
Armenians constituted genocide, 
and Turkish lobbying groups 
sought to include propaganda 
in the state’s educational 
curriculum
(4) Violence against the Armenians 
is an unsettled case; both legitimate 
sides of the historical debate deserve 
to be heard
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slanderous speech about the nation, including the use of the word genocide for the 
violence against the Armenians during World War I.
A very different pattern of relationships emerges on the side of the defense. 
Armenian American groups, other contributors of amicus briefs, and the State 
articulated similar arguments, all advocating the appropriateness of the genocide 
label. State actors differed somewhat, however, in that they prioritized the argu-
ment of legitimate governmental power and free speech rights. Accordingly, we 
observe intense interactions (largely overlapping social and argumentative circles) 
between Armenian American groups and the Massachusetts Department of 
Education, much in contrast to the decoupling we identified above on the side 
of the plaintiffs.
In short, while Griswold v. Driscoll was formally about free speech issues, the 
case also provided a space for a substantive debate about the Armenian genocide. 
The latter, in fact, was the central motivating force for many participants.
Interpenetration of formal and substantive debates.  Importantly, participants in 
the legal fight did not just add substantive arguments to formal ones. Instead, the 
formal and the substantive interpenetrated in Griswold v. Driscoll. The topic of free 
speech specifically provided opportunities for both defendants and plaintiffs to 
insert substantive debates about the Armenian genocide into formal legal contes-
tations. This insertion is most explicit in arguments over “educational legitimacy,” 
or the existence of scholarly (versus political) support for documents suggested 
for the curriculum guide. Here substantive concerns were debated in formal 
rules-of-the-game terms, facilitating debates about the Armenian genocide under 
the cover of formal legal language. This mechanism enabled actors to interpret the 
Armenian genocide either as centrally important or as irrelevant for the case. It 
even allowed actors to hold both interpretations simultaneously. Some interview-
ees rejected the premise that the Armenian genocide had legal relevance to the 
case at hand (understanding this as “political” and outside of the legal realm) while 
concurrently and formally advocating the truth (or untruth) of the Armenian 
genocide claim. The following paragraphs illustrate how actors on both sides of the 
case maneuvered this interpenetration within the formal rules of the game.
In the view of the plaintiffs, the State was quieting a viable perspective in 
response to political pressure. They had to argue that experts supported their 
contra-genocide position, because the successful argument of free speech viola-
tion relied on the educational worthiness of the documents. Their lawyers ref-
erenced academic support for this perspective and expanded the importance of 
recognition to the Turkish American community. In a request for permission to 
submit an amicus brief, the TALDF, an arm of the TCA, expressed its concern 
that its “ability to educate the general public about Turkey and Turkish Americans 
will be impaired if the District Court stands.” The text of the request continues: 
“Most Turkish Americans espouse a viewpoint upon their ancestral homeland that 
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differs in an important respect from that expressed in Ch. 276 of the Massachusetts 
Sessions laws of 1998. Primarily, they believe that teaching the historical contro-
versy of the Ottoman Armenian tragedy solely within the rubric of the crime of 
genocide is incorrect and deprives Massachusetts students of crucial context of the 
devastation inflicted on all civilian populations, Muslims and Christians alike, on 
the eastern and Caucasus fronts in World War I” (Griswold v. Driscoll, 09–2002 
[MA Court of Appeals] [2009], Oct. 15, TALDF Amicus Brief:2).
In its actual amicus brief, the organization refers to the guidelines as “propa-
gandistic” and charges anti-Turkish discrimination. Other amicus briefs for the 
plaintiffs similarly tie together formal free speech arguments with substantive 
statements about the genocide. The ACLU, for example, writes in its amicus brief: 
“As submitted to the legislature, the resources included the website of Georgetown 
University’s Institute for Turkish Studies and other organizations with a view-
point different from those of other scholars and Armenian groups on whether the 
treatment of the Armenians constituted genocide” (Griswold v. Driscoll, 1:05-cv-
12147-MLW [MA District Court] [2009], Nov. 4, ACLU Amicus Brief: 19). Here 
again, the substantive validity of the Turkish stance becomes a key component of 
the legal debate.
We see similar interpenetrations between formal and substantive arguments in 
amicus briefs on the side of the defense. One brief, dated March 8, 2006, submitted 
by attorney Arnold Rosenfeld on behalf of a community of educators, students, 
and the Armenian Assembly of America, calls the plaintiffs’ assertions “histori-
cally and educationally unsupported.” The brief includes a lengthy argument as to 
why the events in the Ottoman Empire constituted genocide, supported by legal 
and scholarly sources. Having made these arguments, aware of substantive moti-
vations held by some plaintiffs, the majority of the brief addresses the plaintiffs’ 
free speech claims, demonstrating attorney Rosenfeld’s mindfulness of the for-
mal issues at stake (Griswold v. Driscoll, 1:05-cv-12147-MLW [MA District Court] 
[2006], Mar. 8, AAA Amicus Brief).
Similarly, a brief submitted some days later by the Armenian Bar Association 
and others provides formal arguments on government speech that are interspersed 
with commemorative considerations. Here the authors argue that governments 
have the right to commemorate tragedy and to take a non-neutral stance in the case 
of such violations. Arguments are enriched with analogical bridging to other events 
addressed by the educational guidelines, including the Holocaust and Ireland’s 
Great Famine. The authors compare attempts to legitimize pro-Turkish materials 
to legitimizing the Holocaust and other recognized instances of genocide (Griswold 
v. Driscoll, 09–2002 [MA Court of Appeals] [2009], Oct. 5, Motion to Dismiss, 
Griswold v. Driscoll, 1:05-cv-12147-MLW [MA District Court] [2006], Mar. 8, 
Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss).
An amicus brief from the International Association of Genocide Scholars, 
filed on April 28, 2006, equally supports the government’s formal right to select 
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educational material, linking this right with the government’s responsibility 
to train citizens to participate in democracy and to take on national and global 
responsibilities, resisting indifference. It too, however, simultaneously engages in 
substantive debate on the appropriateness of the genocide label. It challenges the 
plaintiffs’ position that there are two valid sides to this debate, provides a historical 
overview of the Armenian genocide, and cites scholarship and widespread inter-
national recognition. The authors use the language of genocide denial as the last 
step in the unfolding of genocide. They engage in extensive analogical bridging 
to other genocides, referring to the Armenian genocide as the first genocide of 
the twentieth century, from which Hitler and the Nazis borrowed techniques in 
orchestrating the Holocaust (Griswold v. Driscoll, 1:05-cv-12147-MLW [MA District 
Court] [2006], Apr. 28, IAGS Amicus Brief).
In short, Griswold v. Driscoll shows how free speech debates allow substantive 
arguments to interpenetrate with formal discourse. Two mechanisms are at work. 
First, formal debate over speech rights invites arguments over the legitimacy of spe-
cific speech acts. It partly necessitates such arguments, given that only some speech 
is free, especially in an educational context. Formal claims are thus contingent on 
substantive ones. We refer to this phenomenon as the substantive contingency of 
formal claims mechanism in processes of formal-substantive interpenetration.
Second, legal cases over formal claims open a subterranean realm where coded 
language allows for substantive debate, hidden behind formal language. Actors 
may, as in Griswold v. Driscoll, claim to fight for free speech and reject the notion 
that they pursue a denialist agenda, while simultaneously relying on denialist inter-
pretations of material when articulating their legal argument. Those who stress 
their sole focus on the formal provide space, simultaneously, for the subterranean 
insertion of the substantive. Such subtle insertion of substantive concerns into 
formal debate allows participants to engage in double-speak, with one message 
openly articulated and the other implied. These actors can reject the charge that 
a case is about genocide denial, while simultaneously acknowledging as legally 
relevant “propaganda” or “contra-genocide” sources, categorizations informed by 
their stance on the Armenian genocide. Subtle changes in language allow these 
actors to shift back and forth, in what they classify as legally valid lines of argu-
ment. Perhaps this is why debates over denial often arise in the context of trials 
over speech. We call this the subterranean argument device in processes of formal-
substantive interpenetration.
C ONCLUSIONS ON GENO CIDE KNOWLED GE  
AND TRIALS:  LESSONS FROM GRISWOLD V.  DRISC OLL
Court cases, even if fought under the guise of formal claims and through for-
malized procedures, involve substantive claims. Importantly here, they have epis-
temic consequences. They affect the shape of knowledge and collective memories 
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about events under deliberation, including episodes of mass violence. Neo- 
Durkheimians have made this point convincingly, for criminal law generally 
(Smith 2008) and for human rights trials specifically (Alexander 2004). The pres-
ent chapter has provided further evidence.
This chapter shows, moreover, that the ritual power of legal proceedings can be 
a tool in the hands of strategic actors who seek to shape the public understand-
ing of history. Durkheimian and conflict perspectives are not mutually exclusive 
(Garland 1990). This is in line with insights from past work on the cultural effect 
of court trials of perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes and their initiation by stra-
tegic actors (Hagan 2003; Savelsberg 2015). The Griswold v. Driscoll case illustrates 
that strategic actors are also active when the subjects of trials are not atrocities 
themselves, but claims of denial and demands for recognition. While such court 
cases may be less dramatic than trials of perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes, they 
may nevertheless shape narratives and affect the epistemic power of competing 
collectivities.
Past work has also documented how narratives produced and disseminated to 
the public by legal proceedings reflect not only the cultural power of trials as rituals 
and the efficacy of strategic actors, but also the institutional logic of law (Pendas 
2006; Marrus 2008; Savelsberg and King 2011). The narratives they produce are 
constrained by the rules of the legal game. This chapter has shown that these con-
straints also apply to trials in which cultural production is not a byproduct but is 
the issue at stake. Yet extralegal considerations also play out, often in subterranean 
ways, in this case debates over the appropriateness of the genocide label for the 
mass violence committed against the Ottoman Armenians during World War I.
While formally dealing with free speech claims, judges at the district and appel-
late court levels were intensely exposed to such substantive pronouncements, but 
they did not use them when deciding, or at least when justifying their decisions. 
Instead, they stuck to arguments about free speech. Their line of argument thus 
suggests that they adhered to the rules of the legal game, to use Pierre Bourdieu’s 
language, or to the principles of formal-rational law in Max Weber’s terms.
We cannot know whether the judges’ decisions were in any way affected by the 
substantive debate over the appropriateness of the genocide label and the respec-
tive sensitivities and interests of the conflicting groups, and whether they thus 
constituted substantivized law. We do know, however, that parties concerned with 
free speech issues on the one hand and genocide arguments on the other engaged 
in strategic coalitions, presenting a discourse in which formal free speech argu-
ments and substantive genocide debates interpenetrated.
The trial also provided a stage on which the parties could carry out their dispute 
and present their positions to a broad public. It seems as though the victim side 
won this contest, not just in formal legal but also in substantive terms. The trial, 
after all, resulted in the mobilization of Armenian Americans, public resonance, 
and sympathy for their cause, and in an encouragement of other victim groups to 
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pursue the public acknowledgment of their history in the education system and in 
the public sphere (see chapter 9).
Finally, our analysis speaks to the fate of recent legal decision making on issues 
of free speech in the context of genocide debates. It may challenge common expec-
tations that in cases processed in U.S. courts—in a country that, more than other 
democracies, privileges individual rights—those sides lose their cases that claim 
free speech rights, while in several European cases—most famously the Perinçek 
case before the European Court of Human Rights—free speech arguments have 
prevailed (Langer 2014). Note, however, that Perinçek was initially found crimi-
nally guilty and sentenced in a Swiss court. Note also that a French court had 
earlier found Princeton historian Bernard Lewis guilty for statements he made 
in interviews regarding the Armenian genocide (Ternon 1999). Note, finally, an 
important difference in the character of these European cases compared to the U.S. 
cases mentioned above, including Griswold v. Driscoll. While the European trials 
were held against individuals who had made use of free speech rights, even to the 
detriment of victimized groups (specifically Armenians), American cases such as 
Griswold v. Driscoll and those involving the University of Minnesota dealt with 
the right of institutions to practice free speech rights. The decisions in Griswold v. 
Driscoll additionally stated that the Massachusetts Department of Education had 
not infringed upon the rights of teachers and students to articulate ideas that were 
not included in curricular guidelines. The varying nature of plaintiffs and defen-
dants adds complexities that future work should address.
In conclusion, a new type of trial pits those who make free speech claims, some 
of them seeking to advance denial of genocide, against others who represent, or 
identify with, victimized groups. While initiators of such trials act with strategic 
intent, the consequences of resulting court cases are cultural, potentially coloring 
collective memories and knowledge about the past. Throughout the proceedings 
in Griswold v. Driscoll, formal legal arguments interpenetrated with substantive 
concerns with history, memory, and identity, even if only the former became visible 
in judicial decisions. Substantive concerns intruded through several hidden mech-
anisms: the decoupling of back stage actors with denialist intent from front stage 
actors who pursue civil liberties; the substantive contingency of formal claims; and 
subterranean insertions of substantive claims in formal legal arguments.
This would be the end of the story if we limited ourselves to a classic decision-
making approach. Yet the decision-making process, be it in the field of politics or 
that of law, unfolds in a larger cultural environment. Chapter 9 therefore addresses 
unintended, in fact counterproductive, consequences of denialism in the context 
of an era characterized by a human rights hegemony.
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Denialism in an Age of Human  
Rights Hegemony
Denialism can be effective, especially when powerful and influential actors repress 
dark chapters of history that the populace already seeks to avoid. Yet denial of 
mass atrocity and genocide in the context of human rights hegemony is likely 
to fail. In fact, denialists have to expect counterproductive consequences. Their 
“successes” turn out to be Pyrrhic victories.
To argue this point, I briefly return to central insights from the two preceding 
chapters. There I examined epistemic conflicts in the context of legal and politi-
cal decision-making processes. Both chapters taught us important lessons about 
the social forces at work, the entrepreneurs of knowledge and carrier groups, the 
effect that rules of the game have on fights carried out in specific social fields, 
the limits of those rules when players improvise, and the weight of national 
contexts in which fields are nested.
Yet focusing on concrete processes of decision making alone leaves out some-
thing important. It does not speak to situations in which problems never become 
issues in the first place, in which they do not enter public consciousness and are 
absent from the realm of deliberation and decision making. Scholarly debates of 
the 1960s and 1970s about community power structures can teach us important 
lessons about such blank spots. These debates initially involved two camps. One 
camp used a conflict theoretical model inspired by C. Wright Mills and took a repu-
tational approach to measuring power, asking experts or members of local elites 
about the amount of power held by different actors in the community. The resulting 
image was that of a steep hierarchy, resembling a pyramid. The other camp used a 
pluralist model, following political scientist Robert Dahl. Its proponents inquired 
about specific decision-making issues that came before city councils. They identi-
fied involvement of diverse groups and shifting coalitions with variable outcomes, 
depending on the issues at stake. Findings of this school were in line with a school-
book model of American democracy and a pluralist notion of American politics.
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Both schools, however, overlooked that some problems, often the most funda-
mental ones, were never articulated. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1970), 
in a groundbreaking study of the city of Baltimore, found that no city leader and 
no constituent group articulated the issue of poverty, an overwhelming condition 
for many of its (minority) residents. Nor did any leader or interest group have to 
intervene to keep the problem of poverty out of public view. Similarly, air pollution 
never became an issue in some municipalities (but it did in others), and patterns 
of issue making were independent of the actual concentration of pollutants in the 
respective cities (Crenson 1972). In other words, hegemonic thought can keep a 
problem off the radar of public engagement and policy making.
Just as hegemony can keep a problem away from the realm of concrete deci-
sion making, it may frustrate efforts of those who seek to hide an issue that hege-
monic thought embraces. When actors attempt to initiate and color the outcome 
of concrete decision-making processes with the intent to deny grave violations 
of human rights, then they are likely—in the current era of a human rights 
hegemony—to encounter counterproductive consequences. Both the Griswold v. 
Driscoll court case in Massachusetts and the memory legislation in France serve 
as examples.
In this concluding chapter, I explore such counterproductive consequences of 
denialist actions in the context of a human rights hegemony. I do so both for cases 
analyzed in the preceding chapters and for denialism of the Armenian genocide 
more broadly, using media reporting and documentary films for data. A brief 
terminological clarification of human rights hegemony, however, is warranted at 
the outset.
HUMAN RIGHT S HEGEMONY
By human rights hegemony, I mean the domination of a mode of thought that 
submits events and phenomena to a specific interpretation, as consistent with, or 
in violation of, human rights. The term hegemony derives from the work of Italian 
neo-Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci. While I borrow the term from Gramsci, I 
do not limit hegemony to class-based hegemony. Instead, I see additional forces at 
work, invoking their power, including “soft power.” I do, however, follow Gramsci’s 
focus on universal acceptance, taken-for-grantedness, and the special attention 
he pays to the potential role of the state and its ability to “regulate beliefs within 
civil society” (Smith and Riley 2009:36). In addition to the state as a contribu-
tor to hegemony, Gramsci alerts us to “organic intellectuals,” including journalists 
and priests who translate complex themes into everyday language to instill them 
in the minds of readers and believers. Today, journalism is still a powerful force, 
but other interpreters—such as filmmakers, social movement actors, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)—often take on the role previously fulfilled 
by clerics (Levy and Sznaider 2010; Keck and Sikkink 1998).
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Structural and cultural changes, reinforced by historical contingencies, 
advanced the notion of human rights. Transformations such as global interdepen-
dencies and the advancement of human rights NGOs were undergirded by con-
tingencies such as the catastrophes of World War II and the Holocaust to promote 
a new focus on the dignity of individuals. Human rights hegemony now accepts 
the rights granted each human being, even if these rights are often underenforced. 
It is expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the protec-
tions promised to members of social categories such as ethnic, racial, religious, 
and national groups by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide and by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Human rights hegemony challenges actors who seek to deny the recognition of 
victims of grave violations against human rights norms. Those who bear respon-
sibility for massive human suffering may have been seen as heroes for much of 
human history, but contemporary institutions increasingly classify them as crimi-
nal perpetrators.
Human rights hegemony experiences blowback in times of right-wing popu-
list movements and authoritarian leaders, even in Western democracies such as 
the United States. Its principles certainly clash with concentration camps, euphe-
mized as reeducation facilities in China; mass killings of “infidels” by militant 
“Islamists”; murderous campaigns in the name of drug control in the Philippines; 
arbitrary imprisonment of scholars, journalists, and others in Turkey; and large 
refugee populations worldwide. Yet none of the above go unnoticed, and perpe-
trators see reason to hide their deeds or to use coded language. For example, they 
call torture “enhanced interrogation” and use new torture methods that do not 
leave traces on the body (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014). They 
know that their deeds evoke outrage if they reach the eyes of a world public. 
Their attempts at cover-up only show that today we live with a taken-for-granted 
notion that humans are carriers of certain unalienable rights. We live in an era 
of—at least partial—human rights hegemony.
C OUNTERPRODUCTIVE C ONSEQUENCES  
OF DENIALISM IN A TIME OF HUMAN  
RIGHT S HEGEMONY
In a time of human rights hegemony, state actors are tempted more than ever to 
deny or to neutralize grave violations of human rights. Yet they face challengers, 
and their denialism generates counterproductive consequences. Both the 
Massachusetts case and the French legislative story support this thesis.
The Griswold v. Driscoll Court Case
The legal conflict over teaching guidelines pertaining to the Armenian genocide 
in the state of Massachusetts showed that formal legal processes, constrained by 
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the logic of law, nevertheless have substantive consequences.1 While Griswold v. 
Driscoll shaped the law by clarifying the extent of government speech protections 
in the realm of public education,2 the court proceedings also provided a stage for 
the presentation of claims about the Armenian genocide, most noteworthy in vari-
ous amicus briefs.
Most importantly, the case mobilized Boston’s Armenian American commu-
nity and supporting groups, with detrimental consequences for those who initi-
ated the court case with denialist intent. A lawyer and high-ranking official with 
the Armenian Association of America reports how, in the midst of Griswold v. 
Driscoll, an Armenian Heritage Foundation was formed with the goal of building a 
memorial space on the Boston Greenway. Ground was broken a year after the court 
case concluded (Armenian Weekly 2012). Called the Armenian Heritage Park, 
the area features green space, a fountain, and seating (see figure 13). It provides 
Figure 13. Armenian Heritage Park in Boston. Photo courtesy of the Armenian National 
Institute.
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information about the Armenian genocide, as well as personalized panels 
that individuals dedicated to prominent Armenian Americans and Armenians, 
including those killed in the genocide. The outcome is all the more remarkable 
in that the Boston Greenway, a mile-long park near the Boston Harbor, was 
originally mandated to not include culturally specific memorial spaces.3 Numer-
ous respondents to our study commented on the link between the Griswold v. 
Driscoll case and the creation of the memorial. They tell how efforts toward real-
ization of this project had been stagnant until the case provoked support by local 
Armenian Americans and the public. They believe that the eventual construction 
of the Armenian Heritage Park succeeded, at least in part, because of successful 
fundraising mobilized by the court case.
The court case also mobilized other local groups that live with the cultural 
trauma of past mass violence. The local branch of the Anti-Defamation League 
(ADL), a Jewish international NGO, for example, originally took no stance on 
Griswold v. Driscoll. Yet, after neighboring communities threatened to draw out of 
their Holocaust remembrance campaigns and after pushback from national head-
quarters, the local ADL began to support Armenian American groups in their 
legal mission.
Finally, the Armenian success advanced the struggle for recognition of the 
plight of other groups, for example in 2018, when the Massachusetts Board of 
Education released a new history and social studies framework. The development 
of this guide again provided an avenue for public feedback. This time, a group of 
Ukrainian Americans contacted the Department of Education, requesting that 
the Holodomor, the Stalinist-induced mass famine in Ukraine, be included in the 
new document. The updated curriculum guide now lists this famine, depicting it 
as a Ukrainian genocide. An interviewee from the Board of Education explained 
the emotionality of this inclusion for her contacts within the Ukrainian American 
community. Their letters and statements had contributed to the curricular innova-
tion, and the addition “elated” them.
In short, attempts to prevent the inclusion of the Armenian genocide in the 
Massachusetts curriculum guidelines, or to neutralize them through the inclu-
sion of denialist materials, were defeated in court. Importantly, in the context of 
human rights hegemony, these attempts contributed to community mobilization 
that eventually resulted in the strengthening of public acknowledgment of the 
Armenian genocide and of other occurrences of mass violence. Denialist efforts, 
in this cultural context, yielded counterproductive consequences for those who 
engaged in them.
The French Legislative Case
In France, too, despite the Constitutional Council overruling the 2012 criminal-
ization of denial of the Armenian genocide, the consequences of the struggle 
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process—and upset over massive interventions by the Turkish state beginning in 
the late 1990s—had mobilized ethnic Armenians and their supporters. After the 
CC struck down the law, mobilization intensified and induced other means to 
meet substantive demands for recognition.
Already in 2008, the French government had decided that the Armenian geno-
cide should be included in history curricula (see table 7). Guidelines promulgated 
by the French Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research 
specify subjects to be covered in the French equivalent of ninth grade: “II. WORLD 
WARS AND TOTALITARIAN REGIMES (1914–1945) (about 25% of time dedi-
cated to history). Theme 1 ‘THE FIRST WORLD WAR: TOWARD TOTAL WAR 
(1914–1918). KNOWLEDGE. The First World War shook states and societies: It is 
characterized by mass violence. . . . PROCEDURE: After the succinct presentation 
of the three phases of the war, two examples of mass violence are to be studied: 
trench warfare (Verdun) and the genocide against the Armenians. . . . To describe 
and to explain the trench warfare and the genocide against the Armenians as mani-
festations of the mass violence” (Bulletin officiel spécial n° 6 du 28 août 2008, p. 41; 
translation and emphasis by author).4
Further specifications followed the defeat of the 2012 law aimed at the crimi-
nalization of genocide denial. These culminated in the April 2015 promulgation 
of a teaching aid by the Ministry of National Education. Authored by histo-
rian Vincent Duclert, the teaching aid is entitled Le Genocide des Arméniens 
Ottomans: Mise au point scientifique et pédagogique pour les enseignements (The 
genocide against the Ottoman Armenians: scientific and pedagogical focus 
for instruction). The ministry’s introduction states: “The transmission of such 
knowledge is central to the mission of schools because the Armenian genocide 
figured prominently in historical programs, especially in mandatory schooling, 
but also because the necessity to know and the study of a world confronted by 
such trauma are part of the ambitions of moral and civic education. . . . We also 
requested that Vincent Duclert, Inspector General of National Education, simul-
taneously historian and scholar of the Armenian Genocide, propose resources 
on this subject. He proposes here an easily accessible synthesis that summa-
rizes that history and addresses the challenges of its transmission” (Duclert 
2015, translated).
This excerpt states that the highest national authority in the realm of educa-
tion asked an actor at the intersection of scholarship and political administration 
to summarize, and provide resources that communicate to teachers, knowledge 
about the Armenian genocide and sources for instructional purposes. The guide-
lines’ central tenets confirm Armenian knowledge. A brief chapter on the geno-
cide, as the first event of this kind in contemporary history (modified in the text by 
a recognition of the German genocide in today’s Namibia), is followed by a central 
chapter entitled “1915–1923. The Destruction of the Armenians of the Ottoman 
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Empire.” A history of oppression preceding World War I follows, informing readers 
about the Armenians as an ancient, faithful, and vulnerable population in 
the Ottoman Empire. It addresses the “genocidal” massacres under Sultan 
Abdülhamid II in the years 1894–96; the Young Turk revolution with its hopes for 
democratization, defeated by nationalist radicalization; total war and the release 
of exterminationist forces; phases of the genocide; and weak punitive responses 
in the aftermath of World War I. A final chapter addresses the state of histori-
cal research under the title “Scientific progress and struggle against denialism.” 
A brief paragraph shows that the basic contours of knowledge communicated 
here are in line with sedimented knowledge within Armenian communities and 
with dominant scholarship, and are detrimentally opposed to Turkish knowl-
edge: “At the heart of the First World War, between 1915 and 1917, the Ottoman 
Armenians, who formed the most important among the non-Muslim communi-
ties of the Empire, endured a programmed destruction, efficiently and effectively 
executed. Sixty percent of the population, some 1.3 million men, women and chil-
dren disappeared, were massacred through numerous techniques with a cruelty 
that surpasses the limits of comprehension and marks a fall into the darkness of 
inhumanity” (Duclert 2015:4, translated).
Other initiatives in the realm of higher and public education, some state- 
initiated, others originating in civil society, parallel these educational efforts. The 
year 2013, for example, witnessed the foundation of a Conseil scientifique interna-
tional pour l’étude du génocide des Arméniens (an international scientific council 
for the study of the Armenian genocide), which organized a major international 
colloquium on the subject in the Grand Amphitéâtre of the Sorbonne University. 
Furthermore, in 2015, the centennial year of the Armenian genocide, two promi-
nent exhibits on the genocide took place in Paris, one in the Hôtel de Ville (city 
hall), the other at the Mémorial de la Shoah, the official French Holocaust memo-
rial (see chapter 4). Numerous magazines chose to display the event on their cover 
pages, prominently visible on kiosks throughout Paris.
A few years later, in February 2019, President Emmanuel Macron lived up 
to a promise he had made during his election campaign. He issued a decree 
declaring April 24, the day on which Armenians remember the genocide, an 
official national memorial day of the French Republic (see box 1). President 
Macron explained his decision in these words: “France is above all a country, 
which knows how to look history in the face .  .  . among the first to denounce 
the murderous manhunt of the Armenian people in the Ottoman Empire . . . , 
which—already in 1915—called the genocide for what it was: a crime against 
humanity, against civilization. Which, in 2001, after a long struggle, recognized it 
by law, and which—as I promised to do—will make April 24 in the coming weeks 
a national day of commemoration of the Armenian Genocide” (in Le Monde, 
February 2019, translated).
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Observations at the first official commemoration show how a presidential 
decision translates into practice. On April 24, 2019, a large crowd gathered at the 
Armenian genocide memorial of Paris, the Komitas statue. This statue is a six-
meter-high representation of Father Komitas, a priest and scholar of Armenian 
music, a survivor of the genocide, and a refugee to France. It stands prominently at 
the entrance to Yerevan Park (Jardin d’Erevan), at the northern end of the Pont des 
Invalides and close to the Grand Palais. It serves as a commemorative monument 
to the Armenian victims of the genocide and to those Armenians who fought and 
lost their lives in French military service and in the Résistance against Nazi Ger-
man occupation. The City Council of Paris voted for its establishment on January 
29, 2001, the day on which the legislature passed the recognition law, and the inau-
guration followed in 2003.
On the memorial day of 2019, close to the statue and with its back to the river 
Seine, stood a temporary stage with the inscription “Commemoration Nationale 
du Génocide Arménien.” Around the stage, a first security perimeter was reserved 
for dignitaries, ministers, prefects, mayors, legislators, ambassadors, and lead-
ers of the Armenian community. An outer perimeter began to fill with a mostly 
French Armenian crowd at 5 p.m. Bags and purses were checked at the entry 
points. By 6 p.m. an estimated two thousand people had gathered, and the offi-
cial ceremony began half an hour later. Many in the crowd held up posters with 
the words “Génocide Arménien. 24 Avril. Journée Nationale de Commémoration. 
1915–2019. Mémoire et Justice.” Others waved French or Armenian flags. The sym-
bolic display, and the ritual itself, demonstrated unity between the Armenian and 
box 1. Decree by President Emmanuel Macron Declaring April 24 an Official French 
Memorial Day. Source: Legifrance (www.legifrance.gouv.fr).
Décret n° 2019-291 du 10 avril 2019 
relatif à la commémoration annuelle du génocide arménien de 1915 
NOR : PRMX1820266D 
Le Président de la République,  
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre, 
Vu l’article 37 de la Constitution ;  
Vu la loi n° 2001-70 du 29 janvier 2001 relative à la reconnaissance du génocide arménien de 1915, 
Décrète :  
Art. 1er. – La date de la commémoration annuelle du génocide arménien de 1915 est fixée au 24 avril.  
Art. 2. – Chaque année, à cette date, une cérémonie est organisée à Paris. 
Une cérémonie analogue peut être organisée dans chaque département à l’initiative du préfet.  
Art. 3. – Le Premier ministre est chargé de l’exécution du présent décret, qui sera publié au Journal official de  
la République française.  
EMMANUEL MACRON 
Fait le 10 avril 2019. 
Par le Président de la République :  
Le Premier ministre,  
EDOUARD PHILIPPE 
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French nations and their joint memory of the genocide against the Armenians of 
the Ottoman Empire (see figure 14).
The ceremony included the playing of the Armenian and French national 
anthems, the laying of wreaths at the memorial, and four speeches. Mourad 
Franck Papazian and Ara Toranian, copresidents of the Coordination Council of 
Armenian Organizations of France, delivered the first speeches.5 The event culmi-
nated in speeches by Anne Hidalgo, mayor of Paris, and Édouard Philippe, prime 
minister of France.
All speeches specified the close alliance between Armenians and the French 
nation. They referred to Armenian immigrants who became heroes in the 
fight of the Résistance against Nazi Germany’s occupation, famous among them 
Missak Manouchian, and to those who became national treasures in the world of 
arts such as chansonnier Charles Aznavour. Importantly, all speakers confirmed 
the Armenian repertoire of knowledge concerning the mass violence against the 
Armenians in 1915 and subsequent years, as illustrated by a quotation from Prime 
Minister Philippe:
Between April 1915 and July 1916, one million Armenians disappeared, their blood 
shed, burned alive. The massive deportations transformed the Anatolian highways 
into routes of death. Women and children of all ages were martyred. An industrious 
people with a millennial history that had contributed much to the prosperity of the 
Ottoman Empire experienced a methodical and organized attempt at annihilation.
The Armenians were put to death, as a people, because they were “guilty of being 
children of Armenia.” Because they embodied an ethnic and Christian minority, thus a 
difference. The specificity of genocide is that one is guilty of being oneself.6 (translated)
Figure 14. A crowd gathered in Paris for the first national day of commemoration of the 
Armenian genocide, April 24, 2019. Photo by the author.
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Conceding that the 2001 recognition law alone does not do sufficient justice to his-
tory, the prime minister stressed the need for this day of commemoration to secure 
the memory of the Armenian genocide. He challenged denialism, but—different 
from the two copresidents—he did not explicitly refer to Turkey and its current 
government as denialists and aggressors. Instead, he offered an olive branch and 
encouraged cooperation, stating, “For a long time already, ladies and gentlemen, 
courageous voices engage in the labor of memory and dialogue between Turks and 
Armenians. This day of commemoration of the Armenian genocide, of that we are 
convinced, is a day of peace. This day is not being celebrated to the detriment of 
any people” (translated). 
In short, like the Massachusetts court case, the French story shows that massive 
opposition to genocide recognition, in an age of human rights hegemony, back-
fires. Acknowledgment of the genocide intensifies and is diffused. The knowledge 
repertoire of the victimized group enters into the edifice of hegemonic thought.7 
It solidifies and becomes further sedimented. In line with Gramsci’s arguments, 
the state and “organic intellectuals” play key roles in this process. Gramsci’s iden-
tification of media as another transmitter of hegemonic thought suggested an 
examination of media reports and documentary films.
Effects of Denialism: Contention in Western Media Reporting
Media reflect and transmit articulations by knowledge entrepreneurs—and the pub-
lic events they initiate, including rituals and legislative and judicial proceedings—
thereby enhancing hegemonic thought and communicating it far into civil society. 
Simultaneously, media filter articulations and events through their own institutional 
logic. Pierre Bourdieu characterized journalism as “a microcosm with its own laws, 
defined both by its position in the world at large and by the attractions and repul-
sions to which it is subject from other such microcosms” (1998:39). He appropriately 
depicted these microcosms as relatively independent or autonomous fields, follow-
ing their own “rules of the game.” Journalistic depictions of the world thus cannot 
be read, for example, as simple reflections of economic interests—even if pursuit of 
such interests is vital to the operation and survival of a newspaper or TV station.
While highlighting internal rules of the game, Bourdieu’s argument is not nec-
essarily contradictory to Gramsci’s point about journalism’s role in hegemonic 
thought. The field’s rules, after all, are informed by its “position in the world at large” 
and by “attractions and repulsions from other fields.” Bourdieu thus refines Gram-
sci’s argument: news media’s rules of the game are themselves affected by the envi-
ronment in which they operate. Media are only relatively autonomous. While they 
must bolster legitimacy by projecting a sense of procedural fairness, they also depend 
on markets, thereby securing survival (and profits), and on sources of information.
All of this matters here because media pay attention to the judicial, legislative, 
and ritual events surrounding struggles over Armenian genocide recognition and 
denial. Even a simple count of all reports on Armenian issues in U.S. newspapers 
of record (New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal) and in renowned 
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papers from those regions that are home to the majority of diaspora Armenians 
(Los Angeles Times, Boston Globe) reveals remarkable patterns.
Figure 15 displays, by years, peaks and valleys in the frequency of reporting 
on Armenian issues. Three peaks stand out: 2007 and surrounding years, 2012 
(albeit less pronounced), and 2015. Each peak speaks to an event analyzed in the 
preceding chapters. The years around 2007 witnessed the unfolding of Griswold 
v. Driscoll. Since that case was about Massachusetts teaching guidelines, it is not 
surprising that this peak of reporting is especially high for the Boston Globe. In 
2012, the year of the second peak, the French legislature passed the law crimi-
nalizing denial of the Armenian genocide, and France’s Constitutional Council 
overruled that legislative decision. This peak shows that important political events 
pertaining to the memory of the Armenian genocide register in U.S. reporting, even 
when they unfold abroad. Finally, 2015 is the centennial of the Armenian genocide, 
an event commemorated by Armenian communities and their supporters in 
Armenia and in the diaspora (see chapter 6). Media reported these rituals widely 
and thereby transformed public events into cultural events, multiplying their 
effects on collective perceptions (Dayan and Katz 1992).
What, then, do journalists write when they address the Armenian genocide 
and struggles over its recognition? An analysis of a random sample of 301 articles 
from English-language newspapers in various countries around the globe and 
of 265 French media reports provides answers. For the latter, we selected articles 
published in Le Monde, the leading center-left daily newspaper, and in Le Figaro, 
the most prominent center-right paper of record in France. The period included 
in the analysis is from 1998, just preceding the French legislation recognizing 
the Armenian genocide, to the beginning of 2016, the year after the centennial 
commemoration.
 
Figure 15. Frequency of reporting on Armenian affairs in selected U.S. newspapers.
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Out of the articles we selected, seventy-four English-language pieces and 179 
French articles addressed the French legislative process. Twenty-nine articles 
in English (and no French articles) engaged with the Griswold v. Driscoll court 
case. Given my interest in effects of legislative and legal struggles on knowledge, 
I refer to these as treatment cases. I refer to other articles that speak directly to the 
Armenian genocide as control cases.
Figure 16 shows that the distribution of this sample of articles over time is quite 
similar to that for the population of articles in U.S. newspapers shown above, con-
firming that the events we are interested in resonate transnationally. In addition, 
debates over the 2001 French recognition law are reflected in the sample, adding 
an additional peak in reporting. Figure 16 also shows a noteworthy specification: 
peaks surrounding major legislative decisions are due to articles that focus on 
debates over recognition as opposed to articles about the genocide per se. The peak 
of the 2015 centennial instead results primarily from reporting on the genocide 
itself. Figure 16 further indicates that political struggles (2000, 2011–12) are less 
likely than a court case (2006–7) to evoke reports about the genocide as such. At 
the expense of reporting history of the genocide itself, politics keeps journalistic 
attention focused on controversies carried out by highly visible political actors, 
compared to judicial proceedings or memorial events. The following, then, is a 
significant takeaway from this analysis: Commemorative events, and even court 
trials, are more likely than political struggles over recognition to direct public 
attention toward the events of the genocide per se.
Content analysis of the sample of 566 articles reveals the structure of represen-
tations of the genocide and of disputes over its recognition, the time and place of 


















































Figure 16. Frequency of reports in news media sample, by treatment vs. control group, over 
time.
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Media’s striving for procedural fairness is commonly reflected in a tendency 
to cite players from opposing sides and a reliance on actors in positions of high 
authority in reporting about conflicts. Our data show that journalists apply both 
these strategies when reporting debates about the Armenian genocide. While 
media strongly support genocide claims, articles also present arguments used by 
those who challenge acknowledgment and criminalization of denial. They refer-
ence political motives of actors (20.2%) and concerns about free speech issues 
(22.2%), the latter especially in the context of criminalization debates, concerns 
about Turkey’s position in international relations (49.2%), and the health of 
French-Turkish relations (39.2%). Some articles speak to Armenian militancy 
(8.8%), potentially weakening the legitimacy of Armenian claims, and many argue 
that both sides of the divide present at least some legitimate arguments (49%).
Our analysis also confirms media reliance on holders of high political office 
from both sides of the divide. The most frequently mentioned actor in the sample 
of articles, in fact, is the Turkish president (previously prime minister) Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan (12.4%); two other leading Turkish politicians are also cited 
relatively frequently (Ahmet Davutoğlu and Abdullah Gül, each just above 4%). 
On the French side, presidents dominate, all of them proponents of acknowledg-
ment of the Armenian genocide and criminalization of its denial. They include 
Nicolas Sarkozy (8.6%), Jacques Chirac (5.1%), and François Hollande (5.1%). 
Other individual actors are cited far less frequently.
Arguments intended to weaken the legitimacy of the Armenian side emerge 
primarily in the context of political conflicts over acknowledgment and denial, 
as shown in Figure 17. We see that the percentage of references that highlight the 
militancy of Armenian insurgency is higher during periods of political or legal 
disputes (bars, left y-axis). The same applies to the frequency of those references 
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Figure 17. Percentage and frequency of references to “rebellious Armenians” in news media 
over time.
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reports about political or legal disputes (dark bar graph and line) compared 
to articles on the genocide as such (gray bar graph and dotted line).
Other rules of the journalistic game reflect the nature of the medium itself. 
Because of time and space constraints, journalistic reports about mass violence 
often simplify, focusing on the most dramatic (and quantifiable) events and 
portraying conflicting parties in overly streamlined ways. Previous studies have 
found—in reporting on African conflicts—that opposing parties are frequently 
presented as primordial ethnic or racial groups (e.g., Allen and Seaton 1999; Crilly 
2010; McNulty 1999; Thompson 2007). Might this pattern apply to journalistic 
depictions of Turks and Armenians as well?
Our analysis reveals remarkable patterns. Consider specific forms of victim-
ization. Most articles (45.7%) explicitly speak to killings and many (16.2%) to 
displacements. Journalists only rarely mention rapes (1.1%), kidnappings (1.2%), 
the appropriation of Armenian property (1.2%), lack of food and water (4.1%), 
or disease (1.8%). The rarity of reporting of other forms of victimization starkly 
contrasts with most historical studies, which engage with the entire range of 
victimization to which the Ottoman Armenians were exposed. Space constraints 
are one likely contributor to such omissions.
In line with previous research on other violent conflicts, journalistic references 
to differentiations within each of the conflicting groups during the unfolding of 
the genocide are rare. Yet some journalists report dissent within contemporary 
Turkish society. A March 17, 2015, article in Le Monde (“Editorial” section, p. 15), by 
staff writer Marie Jégo, addresses Turkish civil society as a motor toward reconcili-
ation with Armenia, listing the many “brave” Turkish intellectuals who engage in 
difficult “memory work.” Furthermore, on April 25, 2007, Sophie Shihab published 
an article in Le Monde (“International” section, p. 4) about Kurds in the southwest 
of Turkey who commemorate the genocide and accept (co-)responsibility. Such 
depictions of conflicting parties within Turkey seek to open up avenues for under-
standing and reconciliation. In doing so, they simultaneously encourage future 
acknowledgment of the genocide.
One important constraint on media is the markets in which they operate. Sur-
vival depends on sales and ratings. Sales and ratings, in turn, depend on consum-
ers’ level of interest and the degree to which reports make sense to them. Espe-
cially in the commercialized segments of the media field, journalists thus seek 
to stir excitement and to dramatize representations. South African dramaturgist 
Jane Taylor put it well when she wrote about opportunities for dramatization in 
the realm of grave human rights violations, specifically regarding the role of per-
petrators (quoted in Payne 2008:16): “What makes the stories of perpetrators so 
compelling is, in part, that they are agents: they act upon others. All of the psycho-
logical structures of desire, power, greed, fear, identification are invoked in these 
accounts. Milton’s classic dilemma in Paradise Lost was that Satan became the hero 
of the narrative, because of the inherent interest in his character.”
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Unsurprisingly, journalists tend to play to preconceptions among consum-
ers of news. In an era of human rights hegemony, we expect them to write about 
the genocide against the Armenians within the human rights frame; to interpret 
the violence as criminal, in line with the Genocide Convention; to identify perpe-
trators; and to link this genocide to others about which the public has reached a 
broad consensus. In our sample, the relative majority of articles (29.5%) indeed 
interpreted the aggression against the Armenians as a form of criminal violence 
and those who executed it as violent criminals. This percentage is especially impor-
tant, given that half of all articles that do not deal with the violence per se, but rather 
with disputes over acknowledgment or denial, do not frame the acts of aggression 
themselves. To support the crime frame, many articles address the mens rea, the 
violators’ mental state, as a necessary ingredient of crime, especially the crime of 
genocide. In fact, 25.8 percent of articles explicitly confirm intent. Within those, 
journalists most often identify the (Ottoman) state (46.4%) and the Young Turks 
(5.3%) as perpetrators. An article by Le Monde correspondent Jerôme Gautheret 
of April 23, 2015, provides an excellent example, elaborately reconstructing events 
and statements by the successors of the Young Turk government. Gautheret here 
quotes a December 13, 1918, pronouncement from the Turkish Ministry of the Inte-
rior: “During the war, our leaders applied . . . the law of deportations in a way that 
exceeds the infamy of the most bloodthirsty bandits. They decided to exterminate 
the Armenians, and exterminate them they did. The decision was made by the Cen-
tral Committee of the CUP [Committee of Union and Progress] and was imple-
mented by the government” (Le Monde, April 23, 2015, supplement, p. 5; translated).
Referencing other, generally recognized, mass atrocities is another means of 
attributing meaning to a debated event. This includes analogical bridging—the 
referencing of past atrocities that have taken cultural shape to shed light on new or 
debated episodes of violence. In our sample of articles about the Armenian geno-
cide, a quarter (25.8%) indeed refer to other mass atrocities as points of compari-
son. Of these, about two-thirds (16.7% of total) cite the Shoah. To be sure, at times 
journalists reference the Holocaust to draw a distinction with the Armenian geno-
cide, most commonly in reports about the criminalization debate. Yet, because 
most readers of journalistic reporting understand the Holocaust as the ultimate 
evil of the twentieth century and because the genocide convention grew out of this 
dark chapter of human history, frequent bridging indicates that the media seek to 
appeal to the known in order to dramatize the Armenian genocide.
Media reports resort to analogical bridging especially in the context of dis-
putes over denialism, which supports my central argument about the counterpro-
ductive effects of denial in an age of a human rights hegemony. A 2011 article in 
Le Monde, for example, reports on a state visit by President Sarkozy to Armenia. 
The article quotes the president, who was “profoundly moved” by the genocide 
memorial. It “evoked memories of Yad Vashem—in Israel—and of the 
genocide museum of Kigali—in Rwanda.” Sarkozy continued that Armenia is “in 
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the heart of all French people [because] from the tragedy of the genocide was born 
our alliance” (Le Monde, October 2011, “Europe” section, p. 4; translated).
In sum, news media, when reporting on the Armenian genocide and struggles 
over its recognition, reinforce a human rights hegemony. It is true that they strive 
for balance in their reports, quoting prominent representatives from both sides 
of the divide. Yet they nonetheless tend to frame the violence as an instance of 
crimes committed in violation of human rights principles. They point to specific 
perpetrators and their exterminationist intent. At times, they even use, or report, 
analogical bridging to the Shoah, thereby comparing the Armenian genocide to 
that which the public perceives as the ultimate evil in modern history.
Documentary Films, Acknowledgment of Genocide,  
and Effects of Denialism
Documentary films reinforce the dominant message in U.S. and French 
news media. An analysis of ten films reveals factual and interpretive denial by 
Turkish authorities and suggests that filmmaking became one strategy to 
challenge denialist claims.
Consider the film Aghet—Ein Völkermord (Aghet—a genocide), produced in 
2010 by ARD, Germany’s public media giant. This documentary offers a chrono-
logical depiction of the Armenian genocide, supported by archival sources from 
multiple countries. Footage of Turkish denialism leads into a chronological recon-
struction of events before, during, and after the genocide. The film intersperses 
actors reading excerpts from archival reports, as though they are the author 
relaying the information, with narration expanding on the reports, accompanied 
by footage of the atrocities. Focusing on conditions leading to the genocide, its 
execution, and responsible actors, the film seeks to prove that the Young Turks—
under the leadership of Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Jamal Pasha—carried out a 
planned, systematic annihilation of the Armenian people. Deportations and death 
marches are thoroughly covered.
This and other films dramatize their depiction of the Armenian genocide by 
building analogical bridges to the Shoah. Aghet reports, for example, how “in 1934 
the body of Talaat Pasha was sent by the Nazis with a pompous state ceremony 
from Berlin to Turkey” (1:18:50). It establishes a further link by quoting the infa-
mous words attributed to Hitler, “Who still talks today about the annihilation of 
the Armenians?” (1:19:12). Footage from Nazi Germany explicitly draws parallels 
to the Armenian genocide (1:18–1:20). The message is further underlined when the 
film quotes Raphael Lemkin’s conclusion that the Young Turks’ actions “seemed 
.  .  . like a blueprint for the Hitlerian Holocaust and further genocide” (1:20:29) 
or words by Patrick Devedjian, a French minister and close advisor to President 
Sarkozy, who challenged Turkish denial with these words: “It is as if the Nazi 
government members were generally honored in today’s Germany” (1:22:26).
We find similar themes and links to the Shoah in other films. Destination 
Nowhere: The Witness (2003) tells the story of Armin Wegner, a German medic 
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during World War I who took many of the iconic photographs of the genocide. 
Inspired by his traumatic observations on the way to the Syrian Desert, Wegner 
later raised his voice against Hitler’s rise to power. This film thus adds at least an 
indirect historical link between the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust. My 
Son Shall Be Armenian, a 2004 documentary, follows six people traveling through 
Armenia to gather stories and connect to their Armenian heritage. Directed by 
Hagop Goudsouzian, the film frames the violence as genocide. A quotation from 
a New York Times article about “Another Armenian Holocaust” (20:23) is followed 
by video footage from the Syrian Desert (21:04) and photographs of deportation 
routes to Deir ez-Zor (21:10). Screamers, a 2006 film about an Armenian American 
metal band with a mission to inform its listeners about genocide, focuses on the 
Armenian genocide but presents footage from the Holocaust, Rwanda, Yugoslavia 
(Srebrenica/Sarajevo), and Darfur as well. It also mentions Pol Pot’s Cambodia 
and Stalin’s Russia, at times building direct links to the Armenian genocide. 
Finally, Secret Histories: The Hidden Holocaust builds analogical bridging into its 
title and follows up with explicit references. The narrator reports, over imagery of 
caves, “Into these caves were tipped literally thousands of women and children,” 
calling them a “Subterranean Auschwitz” (25:45). The film refers to a “Scene of 
the century’s first Holocaust” (29:27) and concludes that Turkish denial is “in some 
ways identical” to denial by Neo-Nazis when they say that the “Nazi Holocaust 
against Jews never happened.” Other documentaries, such as Voices from the Lake 
(2003), graphically depict the mass violence and use a genocide frame, but without 
bridging it to the Shoah.
In short, documentary films seem to parallel curricular guidelines, memorials, 
official recognitions, and a majority of media reports. Filmmakers suggest that 
denial motivated their drive to acknowledge. Most seek to shed light on the 
Armenian genocide by building analogical bridges to the Holocaust.
C ONCLUSIONS
Case studies from the political and legal fields in France and the United States—
begun in chapters 7 and 8, respectively, and continued here—demonstrate the 
power of human rights hegemony. Power struggles at the level of concrete deci-
sion making may yield partial victories to denialist actors. Yet those turn out 
to be Pyrrhic victories under conditions of human rights hegemony. Just as 
hegemony prevents grave problems from becoming issues in public conscious-
ness and in politics, so it precludes the denial of problems that are broadly rec-
ognized. State actors and NGOs are driving forces in securing human rights 
hegemony and acknowledgment of mass atrocity. Journalists and documentary 
filmmakers strengthen their case. In the context of human rights hegemony, 
efforts at denial yield counterproductive consequences, reinforcing the under-
standing of the mass violence against the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire as 




Closing the Epistemic Circle  
and Future Struggles
The circle of knowledge about the Armenian genocide began to unfold when 
knowledge repertoires were built up through manifold personal interactions 
and reflections, through micropolitics of silencing, denial, and acknowledgment. 
Knowledge entrepreneurs stepped into the picture. Using their privileged access 
to channels of communication, they shaped rituals and took sides in epistemic 
struggles in a variety of social fields. In the end, knowledge became objectified 
and sedimented to establish the “Armenian genocide.” It became part of a taken- 
for-granted historical reality, especially among young generations of Armenians, 
part of their identity, collective memory, and cultural trauma.
The epistemic process followed a similar logic among Armenians and Turks, 
but the content of knowledge took radically different shape for these victim and 
perpetrator peoples. Faced with fierce opposition from the other side, each of 
these ethno-national groups used public rituals to solidify knowledge repertoires 
in the in-group. Each also engaged in conflictual strategies to confront the other, 
in the spheres of law and politics.
The outcomes of these epistemic struggles were mixed. In Griswold v. Driscoll, 
the legal struggle over teaching guidelines in Massachusetts, the court’s decision 
did not confirm the knowledge of either side but it allowed the Massachusetts 
Department of Education’s guidelines to stand. The Armenian genocide thus con-
tinues to be a recommended subject of instruction in public schools. In France, 
legislation acknowledged the history of the Armenian genocide, but the Consti-
tutional Council, on free speech grounds, struck down a later law that sought to 
criminalize denial of that genocide.
As important as concrete decision-making processes and their outcomes 
are, we cannot fully grasp their consequences without recognizing that today, 
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judicial and political conflicts unfold in the context of human rights hegemony, 
a broad recognition of human dignity and condemnation of mass atrocities and 
violations of basic human rights. Human rights hegemony emerged in the post–
World War II era, simultaneously with the Armenian struggle for recognition. 
It contributed to the generation and sedimentation of knowledge about mass 
atrocities, including the Armenian genocide. It also produced counterproduc-
tive consequences for those who pursued denialist agendas. In the context of a 
human rights hegemony, denial created and continues to create painful disso-
nances. It motivates resistance by civil society and governmental actors, and—
consequently—further solidifies genocide knowledge. We have observed this 
pattern in the aftermath of both the Griswold v. Driscoll case and the French 
Constitutional Council decision. My analysis of media reporting and filmmak-
ing provided further support.
Finally, once sedimented over the course of 105 years, knowledge repertoires 
about the Armenian genocide constitute a matter-of-course understanding of 
history. Resistance appears vain, even absurd. Survivors can no longer pro-
tect new generations from knowledge of a cruel past, and elders of the third 
generation typically no longer seek to do so. Young Armenians encounter the 
history of the genocide in stories told at home, in church, and in cultural asso-
ciations. Some participate in organized group travel to Yerevan on April 24, the 
official Armenian day of genocide commemoration. Many students, not just 
Armenians, encounter knowledge about the genocide through school curricula. 
Others visit memorials, listen to news about commemorative events, and watch 
documentary films. Learning about the Armenian genocide is now part of the 
socializing process through which the objectified reality of the Armenian geno-
cide becomes instilled in the minds of new generations. At this point, the circle 
of knowledge closes.
C ONTINUING STRUGGLES AND NEW DIVISIONS
Importantly, though, the closing of the epistemic circle is not the end of history. 
Those who grow up today with knowledge about the Armenian genocide do so in 
a world different from that of their elders, and the same will be true for their chil-
dren and their children’s children. In this changed world, the reaffirmation of, and 
struggles over, genocide knowledge take different shape, in everyday interactions, 
in ritual life, and in political and legal processes. Consequently, knowledge—no 
matter how sedimented—continues to mutate.
Several historical changes will affect current and future epistemic struggles and 
mutations of knowledge. Human rights hegemony is well established, but new 
cohorts (will) also experience challenges to that hegemony. Nationalist forces, 
new forms of ethnocentrism advanced by populist political leaders, and grow-
ing mistrust in democracy are contributing factors. In the homeland, young 
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Armenians recently experienced new struggles over democracy. In international 
relations, Turkey continues to play a powerful role, and President Erdoğan is 
among the growing number of rulers who exhibit nationalist-populist leanings 
and practices. These include military assertiveness, even support for Turkey’s 
ally Azerbaijan in a new war in Nagorno Karabakh in fall of 2020 that has killed 
hundreds and threatens to destabilize the region at the time of this writing. 
Correspondingly, Erdoğan’s government has been enforcing denial with a new ven-
geance, a continuing provocation to young Armenians and to those who solidarize 
with them. How will they react to a denialist’s deadly campaign against their people 
that, one century earlier, had fallen victim to his genocidal predecessors? What will 
the consequences be for knowledge formation? What will they be for practice, war 
and peace? These are among the questions I have to leave unanswered.
We also saw, however, that Turkish knowledge is no longer unified. A multi-
tude of scholars who contributed critical evidence on the Armenian genocide and 
about Turkish denialism, many cited in this book, are Turks or of Turkish descent. 
Many have been forced into exile. Their communication now unfolds around the 
globe, and some of it reaches back into Turkey. Their chances at making inroads 
within Turkish society will be contingent on multiple factors, including domestic 
developments within Turkey and geopolitical shifts. At any rate, new chapters 
will be added to the history of conflicts over genocide knowledge between 
Armenians and Turks and their respective allies. In this struggle, coalitions of 
young Turks and Armenians will play an important role. While this book cannot 
predict the future shape of genocide knowledge, all evidence indicates that 
struggles will continue but that acknowledgment will solidify.
This book also calls out for future research. For example, we can read the strug-
gle over recognition of the Armenian genocide as one among a growing number 
of instances in which populist and authoritarian leaders disregard overwhelming 
evidence. While the story of struggles over recognition of the Armenian genocide 
provides insights into these leaders’ strategies as well as ways in which they can be 
defeated, future research on this question is desirable. It seems that opportunities 
will be plentiful. The struggle over recognition of the Armenian genocide sheds 
light on elite-populace interaction, and several chapters in this book elaborated 
on sources of denialism, often strategically deployed by leaders. Yet the book has 
also shown that conditions of receptivity among the populace matter. In the case 
of the Armenian genocide, these conditions of receptivity include the suffering of 
Turks and the defeats experienced by the Turkish state in the period preceding and 
during World War I, and the conditions of the founding of modern Turkey. Addi-
tional factors are authoritarianism, centralized control of the educational system, 
and the recent and massive cleansing rituals that glorify the Ottoman Empire. In 
addition, Turkey’s geopolitical position in a volatile Middle East, a bargaining chip 
against pressures from the international community, further enables denialism. 
Yet denial risks counterproductive consequences, as indicated by the final chapter 
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of this book. It does so especially in the context of human rights hegemony and 
sedimented genocide knowledge.
SEDIMENTATION:  APPLYING A METAPHOR  
IN THE SO CIAL SCIENCES
“Sedimentation” indeed features centrally in this book. It marks the end of a 
process that begins with rather fluid elements, thoughts expressed in interper-
sonal interactions, verbal utterances, and diary or memoir writings. The term, 
borrowed from the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, is one exam-
ple of the use of metaphors in social science. In geology, sedimentation refers 
to a “process of deposition of a solid material from a state of suspension or 
solution in a fluid (usually air or water).” The quality of these materials, once 
deposited, depends on a complex set of factors, “related not only to the density 
and viscosity of the fluid medium but also to the translational velocity of the 
depositing fluid, the turbulence resulting from this motion, and the roughness 
of the beds over which it moves. These processes are also related to various 
mechanical properties of the solid materials propelled, to the duration of sedi-
ment transport, and to other little-understood factors” (www.britannica.com 
/science/sedimentation-geology).
Translating this definition into the sphere of cultural life, we may think of the 
density and viscosity of the medium as the shape of network structures in which 
thoughts and articulations circulate (varying, for example, between diaspora and 
homelands). Turbulences are the rapidity of social change within which cultural 
expressions take place (e.g., the breakup of the Soviet Union or the emergence 
of human rights hegemony). We may liken the features of the material propelled 
to the variable forms of expression (e.g., spoken word, written text, or ritual per-
formance). The duration of sediment transport is comparable to historical time 
(105 years), and contributing gravitation is analogous to the power and force 
expressed in conflictual processes (in the legal and political fields). Importantly, 
that which is sedimented may be solid, but it is still subject to future muta-
tions: in geology from peat to coal, and—with enough pressure and time—to 
diamonds. I leave it to the reader to think of the cultural equivalents of these 
physical materials for the formation of knowledge repertoires regarding the 
Armenian genocide.
I thus end with two messages. The first is an epistemological lesson that 
the social and cultural sciences may learn from the natural sciences. Apply-
ing the geological concept of sedimentation in sociology reminds us that com-
plex processes require complex and multidimensional theoretical approaches. 
I attempted to capture those various dimensions in the model of an epistemic 
circle. Second, and closely related, is a substantive lesson: that knowledge about 
genocide—including knowledge about the Armenian genocide—is the outcome 
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of processes that lead from thinking and social interaction, through interventions 
by knowledge entrepreneurs, through ritual affirmation and conflict carried out 
in various social fields and national and global settings, toward sedimentation. 
Subsequent generations acquire such knowledge, and this acquisition occurs in 
new historical contexts. Sedimented knowledge is thus subject to future change. 
Especially when attacked by authoritarian forces, those who carry the knowledge 






1. I keep citations to a minimum in this introduction. The authors and works men-
tioned here will be cited and referenced in the following parts of the book.
2. While the sociology of scientific knowledge shows that historians and their work also 
reflect their place in history and society, here I do not engage in a sociology of historical 
knowledge. This book is instead concerned with knowledge in the everyday world of private 
lives, civil society, politics, and law. Accounts by historians serve as orienting information.
CHAPTER 1 .  SO CIAL INTER ACTION,  SELF-REFLECTION,  
AND STRUGGLES OVER GENO CIDE KNOWLED GE
1. Gülek is a strategically important mountain pass. Many refugees had to pass through 
it and thus became easy targets (see Kévorkian 2011:597–599). The reader will encounter 
a few references to Gülek (or Külek) Station in chapter 2. On events around Yozgat, see 
Kévorkian (2011:502ff).
2. Little of our knowledge is certified knowledge. We often do not even remember its 
source, but we think of it as knowledge nonetheless. If knowledge is certified, most of us do 
not know who certified it. Knowledge about what constitutes valid methods of certification, 
like all knowledge, varies across social groups, and few have exposed their methodological 
assumptions to rigorous epistemological inquiry.
3. Quoted from www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx 
(last visited June 21, 2020).
4. These video recordings are available online from the Shoah Visual Archives at the 
University of Southern California (USC) Shoah Foundation, https://sfi.usc.edu/what-we-do 
/collections (last visited June 21, 2020).
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5. Fatma Müge Göçek reports similar observations from interviews with Armenians 
in Turkey. In those exceptional cases where silence was broken, women were the ones who 
spoke about the past (personal communication).
6. The credibility of scholarly or other kinds of evidence is itself variable. Attacks by 
interested actors, doubts in public opinion, and even challenges internal to the world of 
scholarship have lately experienced new heights, and research on the Armenian genocide 
is no exception.
7. The notion of interpretive denial poses a challenge to constructionist thought. Con-
structionists never consider crime an ontological given, because behaviors considered 
criminal in one place or one era may not be criminal in another. Those responsible for 
mass violence, historically celebrated as heroes and great state builders, today fear criminal 
indictments (Giesen 2004b). I contend that we can solve the puzzle if we apply the analytic 
potential of the sociology of knowledge while we take a philosophically realist position.
8. According to Dariuš Zifonun (2004), self-stigmatization of those who remember, 
as descendants of the perpetrators, leads to a symbolic transformation of guilt into grace.
9. This section is based on a content analysis of video recordings of Armenian genocide 
survivors from the Visual History Archives of the USC Shoah Foundation, conducted by 
Kate Dwyer, an undergraduate student at the University of Minnesota, in the context of a 
Dean’s First Year Student Scholarship. Dwyer also contributed to the writing of this section.
CHAPTER 2 .  DIARIES AND BEARING WITNESS  
IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD
1. Prashasti Bhatnagar and Erez Garnai contributed to this chapter through their dili-
gent work in the Minnesota History Archives. Dr. Lou Ann Matossian made us aware of the 
materials analyzed in this chapter and guided us into the archives.
2. Quoted from www2.mnhs.org/library/findaids/P1282.xml?return=brand%3Dfindaids 
%26q%3Dcharmelite%2520christie (last visited June 21, 2020).
3. We sought to work with volumes 3 through 13, containing Christie’s diaries writ-
ten between January 23, 1915, and December 23, 1919. Because the first of these volumes 
(no. 3) appears to be missing, the analysis is limited to the period of October 1, 1915, through 
December 23, 1919 (MHS Box 28).
4. Today, scholars interpret the lack of international response as a signal to the Young 
Turk government that they could proceed with impunity in their mistreatment of the 
empire’s minority populations.
5. On the significance of Gülek Station, see chapter 1, note 1.
6. Christie’s actions and accounts occasionally focus on particular individuals. On 
August 31, 1917, she observes: “Each day I could write pages [underlined in original] of the 
suffering I see. The very old and the little children suffer the most acutely. I took a boy with 
me last night to carry a soft bed to old Jizmejian, an exile from Harpoot to whom we have 
given a little help each week for upwards of two years. Last week he started to come here, 
fell unconscious in the street, was picked up and taken to his wretched mud room in a filthy 
yard with crowds of other exiles all about him in adjoining rooms, all as poor as himself. 
His bedding was wretchedly scant and dirty, and bed sores were forming on his hips. I took 
my thermos bottle full of tea along, thinking to divide it between him and a blind girl living 
NOTES    213
near and ill. He told me he had had nothing to eat all day. He drank every drop of four large 
cups of tea and ate the other food I had brought as if starving. . . . I sent more food today as 
he has no one about him he can trust to buy for him. In the next yard I found a feeble old 
woman wretchedly destitute and nearly blind. With her was a 2-year-old baby girl with a 
face like white wax, and so hungry! The mother is dead and no one knows what has become 
of the father. The child goes out into the street and eats melon rinds etc. from rubbish heaps. 
I left money to help in her care: saw other cases about as bad, with ague in nearly every 
house” (MHS Box 28:159–160).
7. Appropriation of collective property is also an issue, according to an October 6 entry: 
“Fine congregation today. The people seem to enjoy getting back to their old place of wor-
ship. How we had hoped, long ere this to have the new church! The foundations stand, but 
the outside wall, about half has been carried away with practically all the stones ready for 
the building and the lime. The trees have been cut down, and the premises left in a state of 
ruin and desolation. Most of the money that had been put into materials was given from 
America, but the property was held in the name of the Armenian Protestants of Tarsus. So 
the chance of receiving damages is extremely small. The stones were carried off and sold by 
Govt order, confiscated as Armenian property” (MHS Box 28: 255).
8. Remaining diary entries of 1919 center around thankfulness for peace and the re-
union with her husband. They contain little more bearing witness or reports about humani-
tarian aid. In 1920, Carmelite Christie and her husband returned to the United States.
9. On “righteous” Turks who helped Armenians, see Shirinian (2015).
10. I owe this information to Serge Avédikian and his film Nous avons bu la même eau.
11. For supplemental materials, see the author’s website, www.joachimsavelsberg.com.
12. See the spoken text of many of these testimonies in the film Aghet—Ein Völkermord, 
a documentary produced in 2010 by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen 
Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD), one of the two major German 
public broadcasting corporations. I discuss the film in chapter 9. It can be viewed at www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=5UdieWTeUcc&t=514s.
13. See Akçam (2006), Bloxham (2005), Kévorkian (2011), and Suny et al. (2011). For a 
review of a wealth of scholarship, reflecting overwhelming consent despite controversies on 
specifics, see Der Matossian (2015).
14. For contemporary literature building on these classics, see chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3 .  CARRIERS,  ENTREPRENEURS,  AND EPISTEMIC POWER— 
A C ONCEPTUAL TO OLB OX TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING  
OF GENO CIDE KNOWLED GE
1. On the relationship between the social and the individual in memory, see Olick 
(1999).
2. Current scholarship builds on Mannheim’s suggestion (e.g., Corning and Schuman 
2015; Schuman and Scott 1989). Yet a revival of Karl Mannheim’s broader contribution is in 
order. See The Anthem Companion to Karl Mannheim, edited by David Kettler and Volker 
Meja (London: Anthem Press, 2018).
3. David Kertzer (1983) shows that Mannheim really means birth cohorts when he 
writes about “generations.”
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4. On their categorization as genocide, see Naimark (2010).
5. Studies on the diffusion of law and policies show similar mixes of path dependency 
and orientation to current circumstances. In the case of genocide law, countries adopting 
such laws often build on, but at times expand or contract, the definition presented in the 
Genocide Convention of 1948 (McElrath 2020).
6. Different from criminal trials, truth commissions allow for, and under specific cir-
cumstances explicitly invite, implicatory acknowledgment. The TRC of South Africa is a 
prime example (Payne 2008).
CHAPTER 4 .  SEDIMENTATION AND MUTATIONS OF ARMENIAN  
KNOWLED GE AB OUT THE GENO CIDE
1. See www.genocide-museum.am/eng/Description_and_history.php (last visited 
before typesetting of this book on June 21, 2020, recently altered).
2. On religious dimensions of this war, see Tonoyan (2012).
3. Armenian community experiences and learning about the genocide are not limited to 
Armenia and the two large recipient countries. Events organized by Armenian cultural asso-
ciations in the United States, for example the Armenian Cultural Organization of Minnesota, 
show the spread of genocide knowledge in the diaspora of the Middle East and the former 
Soviet Union. In 2017, one speaker, now in his fifties, who grew up Armenian in the Ukraine 
and whose grandparents had survived the genocide, reports about his childhood and youth. 
While “soaked” in Armenian culture, his grandfather, whom he never saw laugh, did not read-
ily speak about the genocide. He does remember, however, the politicization of the Armenian 
community in Ukraine around the pogroms of the late 1980s in Azerbaijan. Another speaker, 
now in her fifties, tells about growing up in Iran. She attended an Armenian school in Teheran, 
where she was a member of the Armenian girl scouts and of the Ararat Society. She recalls 
many ethnic events as a girl and young woman, including annual April 24 commemorations. 
She also remembers vividly a picture of her grandparents handed down across generations. A 
young woman in her late twenties, an immigrant to the United States from her native Syria, 
reflects on her growing up in the lively Armenian community of Aleppo. There the genocide 
had been a subject of instruction throughout her education, beginning in kindergarten. In the 
United States, she is an active member of a traditional Armenian dance group.
4. See, for example, https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/programming/educator-workshops/past 
-educator-workshops (last visited June 26, 2020).
5. On links between ethnicity and religion, see Wimmer (2013) and Brubaker (2015).
6. A Wikipedia entry on Watertown reports that “Watertown is also the venue for the 
publication of long-running Armenian newspapers in English and  Armenian, including 
Baikar Association Inc.’s Armenian Mirror-Spectator and Baikar, and Hairenik Association 
Inc.’s Armenian Weekly, Հայրենիք (Hairenik Weekly), and Armenian Review. Hairenik 
Association also runs a web radio and a web TV station.”
7. While the Dashnaks were originally grassroots oriented, the AAA relied on a small 
professional staff.
8. The majority of these are not Armenian Americans.
9. Other examples include Richard Hovannisian, who grew up in the Armenian world 
of California to become one of the early American historians studying Armenia and the 
Armenian genocide (Hovannisian 2010).
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10. Dörtyol, a place name meaning “four roads,” refers to a location of strategic impor-
tance, where the Ottoman military expected a British attack. Deportations were to remove 
populations that might have welcomed enemy forces. These events preceded the persecu-
tion of Armenian intellectuals on April 24 by a good one month. The April 24 arrests and 
killings prevented potential oppositional action by Armenian leaders against these earlier 
deportations (for further detail, see Kévorkian 2011:585ff).
11. This situation differs from one in which carriers of opposing memories and mean-
ings converge by necessity or desire. There, we may encounter institutionalized polysemy, 
as Elizabeth Barna (2020) shows for the Hermitage, Andrew Jackson’s plantation outside of 
Nashville, Tennessee.
12. For a contrasting case, see Gao and Alexander (2017) on the memory of the Nanking 
Massacre, which disappeared from public consciousness in China. The authors attribute 
this outcome to the lack of the event’s narration as a collective trauma and to missed 
opportunities to extend psychological identification and moral universalism.
CHAPTER 5 .  SEDIMENTATION OF TURKISH KNOWLED GE  
AB OUT THE GENO CIDE—AND C OMPARISONS
1. Also ingrained in Turkish public memory is the 1896 raid on the Ottoman Bank by 
twenty-eight members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnak), even if the 
fact is repressed that the raiders primarily sought to attract international attention to 
the killing of as many as two hundred thousand Armenians under Sultan Abdülhamid II. 
Western powers intervened diplomatically and the sultan pardoned the surviving attackers, 
who were allowed to travel into French exile—an outcome that many Turks resented.
2. Here and in the following paragraphs, quotations from Turkish newspapers were 
translated from Turkish into German by Bayraktar, and from German into English by this 
author (J.J.S.).
3. Note that the term Holocaust is uncommon in the Turkish language. Instead, the 
Turkish term Soykırım applies to both the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, thus 
suggesting an equalization of both events, not just their subsummation under the common 
category of genocide (Bayraktar 2010:209).
4. Here, and in the following quotations, page numbers are missing because I quote 
from an online publication.
5. These numbers are likely inflated. In addition, the cited death toll includes not just 
Turks but also Kurds killed. Current Turkish narratives silence the latter aspect of the death 
toll.
6. Seemingly because of Turkish opposition, this entry appeared only belatedly.
7. Further down, the site specifies: “The CUP government systematically used an emer-
gency military situation to effect a long-term population policy aimed at strengthening 
Muslim Turkish elements in Anatolia at the expense of the Christian population (primar-
ily Armenians, but also Christian Assyrians). Ottoman, Armenian, US, British, French, 
German, and Austrian documents from the time reveal that the CUP leadership intention-
ally targeted the Armenian population of Anatolia. The CUP issued instructions from Con-
stantinople and ensured enforcement through agents in its Special Organization and local 
administrations. The central government also required close monitoring and data collection 
on the number of Armenians deported, the amount and type of housing they left behind, 
216    NOTES
and the number of deportees reaching holding camps. Initiative and coordination came 
from the highest levels of the CUP ruling circle. At the center of the operation were: Talât 
Pasa (minister of interior), Ismail Enver Pasa (minister of war), Baheddin Sakir (field direc-
tor for the Special Organization), and Mehmed Nâzim (leader of demographic planning).” 
8. Quoted from https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-armenian 
-genocide-1915–16-in-depth (last visited June 21, 2020).
9. On new trends within Turkish academia, see Göçek (2015:466–476).
CHAPTER 6 .  AFFIRMING GENO CIDE KNOWLED GE THROUGH RITUALS
1. On contested memorials with ambivalent messages, see Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 
(1991) on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C.
2. On encounters with genocide memorials as more than engagement with history it-
self, but as visitors’ civic engagement with themselves and others, in the case of the Berlin 
Holocaust memorial, see Dekel (2013).
3. Not On Our Watch is a nongovernmental, international relief and humanitarian aid 
organization. Based in the United States, it was established in the context of the Darfur 
conflict to bring global attention to situations of mass atrocity.
4. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQuWvY1FlKk (last visited June 21, 2020).
5. They were Hasmik Papian, Armenian opera singer of world renown, and David Igna-
tius, a Washington Post journalist.
6. An Integrity in Journalism Award went to New York Times journalist Rukmini 
Callimachi for her reporting on grave human rights violations. Callimachi’s brief address 
and a video show her work reporting on ISIS and the rape of Yezidi women and girls. The 
MCs establish the link to the Armenian genocide by reminding the audience of Henry 
Morgenthau, the late U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, who bore witness and whose 
communications informed many articles about the Armenian genocide published in the 
New York Times during World War I. A second prize went to The Promise, a film about 
the Armenian genocide, produced by Survivor Pictures and lead producer Eric Esrailian.
7. Gregorian and Gbowee also introduced the first finalist, Syeda Ghulam Fatima, 
a Pakistani activist who freed more than eighty thousand bounded workers from a state 
of quasi-slavery in her native Pakistan. Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister, 
renowned for his human rights work, together with Shirin Ebadi, the first female judge 
in her native Iran, founder of the Defenders of Human Rights Center in Iran and a Nobel 
laureate, introduced Tom Catena, a physician operating in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan 
as the only surgeon for almost two hundred thousand people. Dr. Catena spoke about an 
“ongoing genocide” in the Nuba Mountains and the government’s refusal to allow humani-
tarian access. Hina Jilani, a former special representative of the UN Secretary General and 
a human rights defender, and her copresenter introduced Bernard Kinvi, a priest from the 
Central African Republic, who—during a time of massive violence between Christian and 
Muslim groups—opened his mission to the threatened populations, irrespective of religion. 
Finally, George Clooney, known to most as a movie star, but introduced as a cofounder of 
Not On Our Watch, and Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian social entrepreneur, philanthropist, 
and cofounder of the Aurora Humanitarian Initiative, introduced Marguerite Barankitse, 
founder of the Maison Shalom in Burundi.
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8. The museum, tucked behind the massive National Museum, hosted a recitation of 
“unanswered letters” from the years of the genocide on the day preceding the official cer-
emonies. People spilled out into the hallway, and TV cameras filmed the proceedings. I 
thank Zara Karakhanyan, who interpreted for me. Following the reading and a candle 
lighting ceremony, a film showed a group of Armenian artists—participants in a compe-
tition on the one hundredth anniversary of the Armenian genocide—on a journey into 
“Western Armenia.” They walked through ruins of the ancient city of Ani and visited iconic 
buildings in Van, Kars, and other sites. Interviews with deeply moved participants tell 
viewers that the artists felt as though this was home (one even referred to local Kurds as 
their guests).
9. Narek Knyazyan received a “Special Prize” for a sculpture entitled The Last. It dis-
plays a man sitting at the head of long table, alone, shoulders bent forward, head bowed, his 
right lower arm and his left elbow leaning on the table. Cast in bronze, the work reflects a 
profound sense of loss, sadness, and mourning. The text on the back of a postcard depict-
ing the sculpture, however, offers a more optimistic interpretation: “The gradually narrow-
ing empty table, as the main axis of the creation, symbolizes the intention to exterminate 
completely the Armenians by the Ottoman Empire. But if we look at the sculpture on 
the opposite side, the last from the big family is sitting looking at the widening part of 
the table in the prospect as one to restore the family and to continue the Armenian gene.” 
Diverse interpretations confirm the polysemic nature of material memorial culture.
10. Events at the University of Minnesota included the Annual Ohanessian Lecture, 
held in 2015 by Professor Bedross Der Matossian and an international conference, which 
brought together students from many countries, including Armenia. At a teachers’ work-
shop, Professor Der Matossian and Minnesota historian Dr. Lou Ann Matossian (not 
related) provided Minnesotan high school teachers with strategies and materials suited to 
bridge the geographic and temporal divide between the events of 1915 and the students’ lives 
in contemporary Minnesota in an effort to teach effectively about the Armenian genocide.
11. In 2019, a Turkish court sentenced Eren Keskin to three years and nine months 
in prison on the charge—commonly used nowadays against dissenters—of supporting a 
terrorist organization. Violent repression is obviously one strategy for keeping opposing 
knowledge at bay.
CHAPTER 7 .  EPISTEMIC STRUGGLES IN THE POLITICAL FIELD— 
MOBILIZ ATION AND LEGISL ATION IN FR ANCE
1. On the complex case of the United States, see Zarifian (2014, 2018). On years of rec-
ognition, see Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian_Genocide_recognition 
(last viewed June 21, 2020). The data in this Wikipedia entry are based on government 
records. The meaning of recognition varies somewhat as different branches of government 
recognized the genocide with various wordings across countries. I selected the earliest 
marked year in cases for which several dates were provided.
2. The following analysis has greatly benefited from exchanges with many French 
colleagues, whom I acknowledge in the preface.
3. See http://melaproject.org/sites/default/files/2017–12/Law%20no.%2090–615%20of% 
2013%20July%201990.pdf (last viewed June 21, 2020).
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4. See Johan Michel (2011) on the institutionalization of the “crime against humanity” 
and the advancement of a victim-memorial regime in France.
5. All quotations from Duclert (2015) were translated from French to English by me 
(J.J.S.).
6. Data were not available for the 1998 National Assembly session.
7. Unofficial English translation. Original French: “Ceux qui oublient le passé sont 
condamnés à le revivre” (23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings, p. 332).
8. 23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings 1, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 3–8. 
Official French transcript pp. 332–335.
9. 23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings 3, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 1–3. 
Official French transcript pp. 341–342.
10. 23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings 3, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 3–4. 
Official French transcript pp. 342–343.
11. 23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings 1, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 8–11. 
Official French transcript pp. 335–337.
12. “Condamnant toute forme de négationnisme, qui constitue une atteinte odieuse à 
la mémoire des disparus et à la dignité des victimes, et réitérant son infini respect pour le 
peuple arménien et les terribles épreuves qu’il a endurées, il s’est interrogé sur la légitimité 
de l’intervention du législateur dans le champ de l’Histoire—considérant que l’adoption des 
résolutions et l’organisation de commémorations constituaient probablement des moyens 
plus adaptés pour exprimer la solidarité de la Nation avec les souffrances endurées par les 
victimes” (Commission report submitted to the Senate before the debate of 18 January, 2012, 
p. 5; official French transcript, http://www.senat.fr/rap/l11-269/l11-2690.html [last viewed 
October 7, 2020]).
13. See www.acam-france.org/contacts/index_associations_culturelles.php (last viewed 
April 12, 2019).
14. While similar analyses would be desirable for voting patterns, the distribution of 
votes is unknown. There is no reason, though, to expect different patterns.
15. 23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings 2, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 1–4. 
Official French transcript pp. 337–339.
16. See www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2019/04/05/vincent-duclert-la-commission-sur-le 
-rwanda-aura-un-pouvoir-d-investigation-dans-toutes-les-archives-francaises 
_5446212_3232.html (last viewed April 18, 2019).
17. This and the following quotations are translated by the author (J.J.S.).
18. Art. 9.—Il est inséré, après l’article 24 de la loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de 
la presse, un article 24 bis ainsi rédigé: « Art. 24 bis.—Seront punis des peines prévues 
. . . ceux qui auront contesté . . . l’existence d’un ou plusieurs crimes contre l’humanité 
tels qu’ils sont définis par l’article 6 du statut du tribunal militaire international annexé 
à l’accord de Londres du 8 août 1945 et qui ont été commis soit par les membres d’une 
organisation déclarée criminelle en application de l’article 9 du dit statut, soit par une 
personne reconnue coupable de tels crimes par une juridiction française ou interna-
tionale. »
19. Lewis refused an offer by the Turkish state to cover the court expenses. Soon there-
after, the Turkish Republic awarded him a prominent prize; he accepted the award, while 
declining the substantial monetary award associated with it.
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20. The committee’s manifesto declares that “le CVUH s’élève contre toute forme 
d’instrumentalisation de passé et souligne la nécessité d’une action collective de la part de 
‘tous ceux qui refusent que l’histoire soit livrée en pâture aux entrepreneurs de mémoire’ 
dans un contexte où ‘l’information-spectacle et l’obsession de l’audimat poussent constam-
ment à le surenchère, valorisant les provocateurs et les amuseurs public, au détriment des 
historiens qui ont réalisé des recherches approfondies, prenant en compte la complexité du 
réel’ ” (in Adjemian 2012:13).
21. 7 November 2000 Senate Proceedings, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 160–163. 
Official French transcript pp. 155–158.
22. 7 November 2000 Senate Proceedings, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 163–165. 
Official French transcript pp. 158–160.
23. 18 May 2006 National Assembly Proceedings, (unofficial) English translation, 
pp. 30–35. Official French transcript pp. 3647–3650.
24. 12 October 2006 National Assembly Proceedings, (unofficial) English translation, 
pp. 17–19. Official French transcript pp. 6106–6107.
25. 4 May 2011 Senate Proceedings, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 22–23. Official 
French transcript pp. 3329–3330.
26. 4 May 2011 Senate Proceedings, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 23–24. Official 
French transcript pp. 3330–3331.
27. 23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings 2, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 1–4. 
Official French transcript pp. 337–339.
28. 22 December 2011 National Assembly Proceedings, (unofficial) English translation, 
p. 13. Official French transcript pp. 27–29.
29. 23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings 4, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 3–5. 
Official French transcript pp. 346–348.
30. 23 January 2012 Senate Proceedings 1, (unofficial) English translation, pp. 3–8. 
Official French transcript pp. 332–335.
31. Taken from the council’s website in English: www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en (last 
viewed June 21, 2020).
CHAPTER 8 .  EPISTEMIC STRUGGLES IN THE LEGAL FIELD—SPEECH 
RIGHT S,  MEMORY,  AND GENO CIDE CURRICUL A BEFORE AN AMERICAN 
C OURT (WITH BRO OKE B.  CHAMBERS)
1. Social anthropologist Sally Engle Merry and her collaborators (2010) examine the 
mobilization for women’s rights in New York City. Conceding that much of the human 
rights language in that mobilization stemmed from legal doctrines on both international 
and domestic levels, codified within the frame of legal logic, they nevertheless demonstrate 
that the mobilization of values by women’s movements—law from below—substantially 
affected the outcome of the processes at stake.
2. A next friend is an “individual who acts on behalf of another individual who 
does not have the legal capacity to act on his or her own behalf ” (https://legal-dictionary 
.thefreedictionary.com/next+friend).
3. The last point was debated by other respondents. We can neither confirm nor reject 
this assumption.
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CHAPTER 9 .  DENIALISM IN AN AGE OF HUMAN RIGHT S HEGEMONY
1. This section uses interviews and archival research that Brooke B. Chambers conduct-
ed in the Boston area and in Washington, D.C., in 2018.
2. The state, contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, can prioritize the views of one political 
group over those of another, particularly when the legitimacy of the speech is questionable. 
Additionally, the plaintiffs’ loss of Griswold v. Driscoll may have affected the strategizing of 
the Turkish state and Turkish-American groups in promoting a “contra-genocide” stance 
within courtrooms. One interviewee argued that this loss “didn’t just discourage them, it 
stopped—they haven’t done anything since then, in this regard. Have they tried to influence 
state departments of education and local school boards? Yes, but to a lesser extent— instead 
their focus has moved to other areas.”
3. In addition to the Armenian Heritage Park, a Holocaust memorial was built on the 
Greenway in 1995. See www.nehm.org/the-memorial/history/ (last viewed June 21, 2020).
4. All translations here and in the following are by the author (J.J.S.).
5. The CCAF is the representative body of the French Armenian Community, an 
umbrella for its major political, cultural, educational, religious, and social organizations.
6. Quoted from www.gouvernement.fr/partage/11011-discours-lors-de-la-ceremonie 
-de-commemoration-du-genocide-armenien-de-1915.
7. On memory-activism in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Gutman (2017).
8. A subset of articles was read by two coders to examine inter-coder reliability, which 
was in the acceptable range throughout.
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